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
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Articles and Statements

The Glorification of Underage Volunteers in Russian Military Service during World War I

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Abstract

The article covers the problem of glorification of underage volunteers in the Russian army during the years of World War I. The article is focused on the beginnings of the voluntary movement, the first appearances of volunteers at the front and the glorification of the children, who heroically performed at the fronts in the periodical press.

The sources for the work are the articles in Russian circular periodicals (newspapers and magazines) and the postcards, issued before the Revolution, illustrating the problem of glorification of young volunteers in the Russian army during World War I. The author achieved the research goals, applying general scientific methods (analysis and synthesis, particularization, generalization) and the conventional methods of historical analysis. It enables the author to study the causes, motivating the Russian youth to flee to the front as volunteers.

In conclusion the authors resume that the unexpectedly appeared movement of underage volunteers became a fait accompli despite the counteractions of civic and military authorities. Having failed to prevent and stop it with the help of prohibitive practices, the Russian government presented young volunteers activities as the samples of patriotic service in mass media.

Keywords: glorification, propaganda, minors, the Russian Empire, World War I, front.

1. Introduction

Historically, when we mention propaganda during World War I, first of all we remember the Propaganda of Horrors (Zoltzman, 1957). But there were other topics of propaganda coverage. In this work we would like to study the problem of glorification of young volunteers at the fronts of World War I in the Russian Empire propaganda.

2. Materials and methods

2.1. The sources for the publication are the articles in Russian circular periodicals (newspapers and magazines) and the postcards, issued before the Revolution, illustrating the problem of glorification of young volunteers in the Russian army during World War I.

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2.2. The author achieved the research goals, applying general scientific methods (analysis and synthesis, particularization, generalization) and the conventional methods of historical analysis. It enables the author to study the causes, motivating the Russian youth to flee to the front as volunteers.

3. Discussion and results

3.1. Fleeing to the front

At the eve of World War I the process of establishing children paramilitary organizations was in progress. The “poteshny” regiments (regiments of boy -soldiers), scouts and others appeared. The “poteshny” regiments establishment started in 1910 initially in the capitals then in the outskirts of the Russian Empire (Molchanova et al., 2013: 89) The Emperor Nicholas II himself took part in the “poteshny” regiments’ shows (Oldenburg, 1992: 440) as he considered patriotic education of the youth an important integral part of the state’s policy.

It is important to stress that the establishment of the paramilitary organizations, such as the “poteshny” regiment, was only for the purpose of youth education. It was not meant that children would become volunteers in the army at wartime. Nevertheless, with the outbreak of World War I, a great number of minors appeared at the fronts. Their age was from 10 years old (Ogonyok, 1915, 20).

Already on the first day of the Russian Empire's entry into the war, August 1, 1914, “Novorossiyskaya gazeta” reported: “The 16-year-old Vladimir Galdin was preparing to enter the Cadet Corps and on receiving news of the war, left classes and continuously asked to be allowed to volunteer for the war. Parents believe that Goldin had secretly left for active duty (Chernomorskaya gazeta. Novorossiysk, 1914. 1 Aug.)

According to the news from Pskov only in September 1914 railway gendarmes got off the trains more than 100 children, who were heading to the front. On October 20, 1914, more than 30 children volunteers were caught by the police at the Vilno railway station. All in all more than 100 children fled to the front from the city of Vilno during the first years of war (Nedelya voyny, 1915, 11).

One of the first cases of girl fleeing to war was reported in Petrograd. As “Chernomorskaya Gazeta” wrote: “A boy of 14 drew the non-commissioned officer’s attention at the Warshavsky railway station. The boy answered the suggested questions and claimed that he was heading to the war as a volunteer. But after the further questioning the volunteer had to make a recognition: it turned out that the authorities dealt with a student of Revel’s gymnasium, a daughter of a photographer Teterin. The girl explained that the parents didn’t let her go to the war and she decided to flee. The men’s clothes and the gun she got from the other student of the gymnasium, who had left for the war earlier. Teterina was sent back home to her parents (Chernomorskaya gazeta Novorossiysk, November 12, 1914).

The front flee wave didn’t decrease half a year after the war outbreak. On January 13, 1915 “Chernomorskaya Gazeta” reported, that more than 10 young student volunteers, who escaped from their parents for admission to active duty were arrested. By the way, there were two local gymnasium students among them (Chernomorskaya gazeta (Novorossiysk). 1915, October, 23).

According to the reports from Kiev, only during January-February 1915 railway police arrested 214 young volunteers, 11 girls turned out to be among them (Nedelya voyny. 1915, 11).

Summer, 1915 was marked by the process of the retreat of the Russian army at the Eastern front, in military-historical literature this process was named “The Great retreat”. Disappointing reports from the frontlines, a desire to help parents and adults aroused a strong will in some part of the Russian youth to provide all possible assistance for the front. So for example, Ivan Kalchenko, 14, a student of the second higher primary school, Ivan Gessen, 13, and Victor Golovchenko, 16, fled to the front (Nikolaevskaya Gazeta, October 23, 1915).

The process of kids fleeing to the front came as a surprise for the Russian administration, but the phenomenon became so large scaled that the practices of propaganda character should have been taken. For example, “Niva”, the weekly magazine, published an interview with one military officer, “Their wounds are useless, so is their death. There is no place for children at war. They should study... Isn’t it ridiculous that Russia, that can have at fronts 16 million soldiers, has children in the army! If such little fellows are captured by the Germans, they wouldn’t miss a chance to reveal to the troops: “Look! How depleted Russia is. Kids are sent to the war!” (Niva, 1915, 52).

This article was reprinted in many periodicals of the Russian empire, but it didn't make any change. Police actions of searching kids at the railway station squares, stations, as well as at the frontline zone were not very efficient.

Despite these and other attempts to stop the flight of children to the front, it was impossible to do it. Meanwhile, the front news reported that in many units, minors, who managed to reach the frontline and were enrolled in military commands began to perform heroic deeds and became the Knights of St. George.

The underage voluntary soldiers served in all armed forces: artillery, cavalry, in intelligence, machine-gun teams, infantry, they were even in the Russian expedition corps in France. Arriving at the front, children quickly adapted to war, standing all the hardships of the camp life, food shortages, substandard living conditions, cold and combat losses.

Let's consider an example from 'Niva' magazine: "In September 1914 Konstantin Zapolli, 14, fled to the front. On September, 29 he was already at the frontline by the Pilitsa river in Poland. The positions of the adversaries were at the distance of just 200 steps. The location of the Zapolli's coy was constantly 'swept' by the well camouflaged German machine gun on the parapet. The company commander ordered to terminate the pillbox. The young warrior offered to be the 'hunter'. At night Konstantin crept to the enemy trenches and found a machine gun, masked with branches. It was impossible for him to carry the gun, so he tied it with the brought rope. The volunteer returned to his soldiers, pulling the rope as long as he could. A team of military intelligence pulled the rope in the neutral zone: the machine gun was knocked down from the parapet and in a moment "jumped" in the field in the direction of the Russian trenches. Awakened Germans rushed to catch it, but were forced back to their trenches by the Russian fire. For the successful 'search' Zapolli was awarded St. George's cross 4th class (Fig. 1) and later he became a Knight of one more St. George's cross (Niva, 1916, 4).



Fig. 1. St George's crosses 1–4 class.

St George's crosses were awarded only for the military merits to the servicemen (to the soldiers and junior officers), ascending from the lowest to highest. One could get only one cross for each successful operation. But some cases were recorded at the front, when minors were awarded with up to three St George's crosses of 4th, 3rd and 2nd classes relatively.

3.2. Volunteers at the front

Seeing the impossibility to stop the children fleeing to the front, in addition to the quite encouraging information from there, periodical press starts massive publishing of soldier children progress at the battlefields to promote this social phenomenon. Even the youngest volunteers' success wasn't left unattended. A 10-year-old ammunition volunteer of 131 Tiraspol infantry regiment team, Stepan Kravchenko, was wounded twice and was awarded with St George's cross 4th class (Ogonyok, 1915, 20) for the rescue of the machine gun.

It happened so that the children made an army career. For example, a 12-year-old scout, Vasily Naumov, was awarded with two St. George crosses and medals, became a non-commissioned officer, and was wounded twice in the battles.

Another volunteer, a Zhitomyr gymnasium № 2 4-th grader, Nikolay Orlov, went to the South-Western Front at the beginning of the military operations. He managed to take part in 11 fights, but his main show-off event occurred in Galicia at Zlochev's. Orlov's unit was cut off by the Austrians. And then this young warrior volunteered to make his way through the enemy fire to get reinforcements. For this feat Nikolai was awarded St George's cross 4th class. On September 20th, 1914, he arrived back in Zhytomyr, where he was enthusiastically greeted within the walls of his native Gymnasium ([Nicholaevskaya gazeta, 27 September, 1914](#)).

It should be noted that minors' presence at the front was not constant. For one reason or another, the commanders tried to send such volunteers back - to the home front. The "Smolensky Vestnik" on April 30, 1915, reported that "an Echelon" of 7 volunteers, aged 11-7, all being from different provinces of Moscow, Tver, Kaluga and Smolensk, returned from the war theatre across the village of Nadva, arrested by the police.

They were housed in apartments of the Palcev village, all being previously bathed. The volunteers look very cheerful, talk about their combat life on positions, regretting they could not battle any longer" ([Smolensky Vestnik, 1915, April 30](#)).

A 13-year old volunteer, Nikolay Smirnov, Knight of St George (awarded with St George's cross 4th class and 2 medals), escaped from German captivity in 1915, and captured a German officer by himself in subsequent battles ([Ogonyok, 1915, 20](#)).

Pavel Smolyanoy, at the age of 13, being awarded with a St George cross 4th class, came back from the Southwestern front to his hometown Nikolaev for the treatment in summer of 1915. He was a Modlinsky infantry regiment scout, escaped captivity, repeatedly executed his superiors' dangerous orders ([Nicholaevskaya gazeta, 11 July, 1915](#)).

Foreign young volunteers were also actively described in the periodical press. So, «Niva» magazine published a picture of a 12-year-old Chechen boy Abubakar Dzhurgaev ([Fig. 2](#)), a Caucasian native mounted Division (commonly known as the "Wild Division"*) volunteer.



Fig. 2. A 12-year-old volunteer Abubakar Dzhurgaev.

* The Cavalry Division, one of the compounds of the Russian Imperial Army, was formed on August, 13, 1914. By 90% it consisted of Muslim volunteers - the natives of North Caucasus and Transcaucasia, which, like all the native inhabitants of the Caucasus, according to the laws of the Russian Empire were not a subject to conscription. Many representatives of the Russian nobility served as Division officers.

Abubakar Dzhurgaev went to the front at the age of 12 with his father Yusup, leaving his studies in Grozny specialized school. He was an active participant in all the famous "Wild Division" battles during the World War I. Being on service in the Division, this boy frequently displayed bravery and valor.

When the "Wild Division" commander, the Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovitch Romanov (a brother of the Emperor Nicholas II) found out about him, he presented the boy a dagger. Abubakar was only 12 year old at that time. Being 14, Abubakar received an honorary award – St. George's Ribbon, tied by the His Highesty the Commander himself, the Grand Duke M.A. Romanov.

By the way, not only boys battled on the front, but girls, too. A 6-th grader of the Highest **Mariinsky Vilen School, Kira Bashkirova, was awarded St. George's cross 4th class** for her combat feats. Disguised as a volunteer Nicholas Popov, she joined one of the regiments, and after a single week, she exceeded in a night scout mission ([Parlamentskaya gazeta, 2014, 31 July](#)).



Fig. 3. A Portrait of Alexey Dyachkov, a 98 infantry Yuriev regiment volunteer. Artist V.A. Zverev. Petrograd-Tsarskoye Selo. The Knight of St. George is pictured wearing a Grenadier Regiment overcoat and a cap without badges.

A 13-year-old volunteer Ivan Stepanovich Sobolev, native of Antonovka, Tomsk province, joined the 208-th machine gun Lori command of the 5th infantry regiment when the war broke out. He distinguished himself in May 1915, during the defensive battles on the San River, while the regiment was retreating, being showered by the German heavy shells. Regimental machine gun carts were destroyed during one of the firings. Only one of them was left, but the rider was killed. Ivan, not wasting time, despite the shells rushing around him, rode that cart to the gathering point. He got a severe head concussion during this ride. But, upon reaching the gathering point, he refused to go to the infirmary and asked for medical help only when the regiment was out of the battle. For the salvation of the machine gun and courage Sobolev was awarded the Valor **St. George's Medal 4-th class** ([Niva, 1917, 9](#)).

Another young volunteer performed the salvation of a machine gun. A 10-year-old ammunition team of 131 infantry Tiraspol regiment volunteer, Stepan Kravchenko, was wounded **twice, and was awarded the St. George's cross 4th class** for the salvation of the machine gun ([Ogonyok, 1915, 20](#)).

Periodical press often represented children-volunteers performing activities specific for their age. Thus, 1915 "Niva" magazine published a photo of the Petrograd volunteer Hugo Daniel ([Fig. 4](#)), a 14-year-old Estonian.



Fig. 4. Hugo Daniel is exhausted.

Hugo joined one of the Cossack regiments. He endured all the hardships of the battle life on a par with the adults. He was in battles and went scouting dozens of times, where he showed outstanding bravery. (Niva, 1915, 26)

It is necessary to note, that the young volunteers were enlisted in the Russian infantry brigades in France (Fig. 5).



Fig. 5. An expeditionary corps of the Russian army in France.

What psychological motives moved the youth in their desire to go to war? We believe that many things intertwine: the magnitude and significance of the World War I, the explosion of patriotism, the relative proximity of the front, the intensification of the social life on the home front, a great deal of refugees and wounded – all this contributed to the fact that hundreds of volunteers became "sons of regiments" of the Russian Imperial Army. A. Bogdanov, a Russian

teacher, wrote in 1914: "When the whole country is agitated, then the children, unwittingly following the adults, cannot remain indifferent spectators of events ... Who, among the children, did not imagine himself as ... Robinson, the rogue Churkin, Mike Pinkerton, Sherlock Holmes, before the war? The love for heroic adventure is inseparable from a child's soul. Their inflamed imagination, being under the influence of what they have heard and what they have read, pushed children to war" (Niva, 1915, 12).

In addition to newspaper and magazine publications, children-heroes popularizing was also performed on postcards. They often portrayed a collective image of a young volunteer, without reference to any specific historical character on the postcards (Fig. 6, 7).



Fig. 6. A little body often harbors a great soul.



Fig. 7. Young volunteer Peter Littlefellow fled to war not wearing an overcoat.

Postcards were printed in thousands of copies and also contributed to the glorification of children soldiers and formed the patriotic image of the Russian youth.

4. Conclusion

Thus, during the World War I, a sudden volunteerism movement appearance among the underage youth, despite of all the opposition of civil and military leaders, was a fait accompli. Failed to prevent it and eradicate it with interdictions, Russian administration made the youth volunteer movement an example of patriotic fatherland, through the mass media services.

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
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Caricature as a type of propaganda during World War I (as illustrated by materials published in the Ogoniok magazine)

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Abstract

The paper analyzes caricature as a propaganda instrument utilized during World War I. The source used includes caricatures published in *Ogoniok*, a Russian magazine, in 1914–1916.

The systematization principle, applied in the study into the caricatures, helped to identify main topics that were a subject for debate in the periodical press. Importantly, the researcher also remains as neutral in their interpretation and assessment of the actual material in the study as possible.

At the end, the author concludes that the *Ogoniok* magazine focused its caricatures on the topic of Germany during World War I, while allies of Germany – Austria-Hungary and Turkey – were paid much less attention. The propaganda usually portrayed German allies in as dependent countries which were subordinate to Germany. In addition to the Entente's enemies, the caricature genre highlighted the military topic and the subject of the issued society faced in the rear.

Keywords: caricature, propaganda, Russian periodical press, World War I, *Ogoniok* magazine.

1. Introduction

Caricature is one of the most common genres made use of by the war propaganda both on the pages of leaflets and in the press. Caricatures are easy to perceive and most of them feature clear interpretations. This makes the caricature character one of the most powerful methods of shaping the required image in the general public.

In this article, we would like to review key topics of the caricature character in the period of World War I, published in a Russian magazine – *Ogoniok*.

Historical background of the *Ogoniok* magazine. Its first issue appeared December 9, 1899 as a weekly illustrated literary and art supplement to the *Birzhevie vedomosti* (Stock Exchange News) newspaper by publisher Stanislav Propper. The magazine was published in St. Petersburg (Petrograd). It had the A4 format. Its volume was 20 pages.

2. Materials and methods

2.1. The materials used included issues of the Russian magazine *Ogoniok* for 1914–1916, containing caricatures devoted to various events during World War I.

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2.2. The methods of the study were the principles of objectivity, historicism and systematization. The systematization principle, applied in the study into the caricatures, helped to identify main topics which became a subject for debate on pages of the periodical press. Importantly, the researcher also adopted as a neutral approach to the interpretation and assessment of the actual material in the study as possible.

3. Discussion

The caricature genre as a propaganda instrument during World War I came into focus in the late 20th – early 21st centuries. The world saw a significant number of works published in this period, which used caricature to reflect a wide range of topics related to the global confrontation.

The subject of World War I in satirical characters was reviewed by well-known experts, such as H. Jahn (Jahn, 1995; Jahn, 1998) and S. Norris (Norris, 2006). As to Russian authors, it is necessary to mention the works by A.G. Golikov and I.S. Rybachenok (Golikov, Rybachenok, 2010) and T.P. Nazarova (Nazarova, 2015). There were also works published on specific theaters of war. For example, the work by C. Finkel discussed the Ottoman Empire in the satirical form (Finkel, 2007). The topic was also considered by T.A. Filippova who used materials of the Russian satirical journalism (Filippova, 2015). Traditions of historical descriptions related to the Ottomans in many respects set up stereotypes which could be easily caricatured. The problem of Turkey's entering the war was highlighted by D.D. Vasiliev (Vasiliev, 2014).

4. Results

4.1. The image of Germany, Austria and Turkey in the Russian periodical press

4.1.1. Germany in World War I.

August 1914 witnessed the start of World War I. In the conflict that arose, the Entente (Russia, Britain and France) was confronted by Germany and Austria-Hungary. October 1914 saw Turkey entering the war on the side of Germany. As a result, the Russian press began to ridicule the image of the German Emperor and his allies already in November 1914 (Fig. 1).



Fig. 1. "Formidable" triumvirate. Wilhelm: - Give way or I'll pull you to pieces, there are already three of us!
 Drawn by P. Zapolsky-Dovnar (Ogoniok. 1914. No. 44)

A major topic in the propaganda among the Russian population concerned the German aggression against Russia. We know that the war began with Germany's declaration of war. Following the act, Russian society received a moral right to defend itself from external aggression.

This circumstance distinguished radically World War I from the Russian-Japanese War and resulted into a powerful patriotic movement which emerged independently in the country. The topic of the German aggression was repeatedly raised in the Russian press (Fig. 2).




Fig. 2. European equilibrium before the war.
Caricature by P. Zilver (Ogoniok. 1914. No. 46)

After the German blitzkrieg failed to defeat France, the Russian periodical press viewed the destroyed military plans and intentions of the enemy as a clear victory. The magazine published a very original presentation of this topic in November 1914 (Fig. 3).



Fig. 3. Legend has it that ancient castles and palaces witness portraits coming alive in the dead of night. Wilhelm is very surprised by Napoleon's symbolic gesture.
Drawn by P. Kushnir (Ogoniok. 1914. No. 44)

Notably, the topic of the failed seizure of Paris was also covered in the Italian satirical press. So, one of the Ogoniok November issues republish two caricatures in its "Italian humor" section (Fig. 4, 5)



Fig. 4. Solemn march-in of German troops into Paris. Caricature by artist Jolia (Ogoniok. 1914. No. 46)



Fig. 5. Wilhelm in Paris
"Where will we put the Kaiser."
"Where? Um... well... I got it ... in the Pasteur Institute."
Caricature by artist Prozdoccimi (Ogoniok. 1914. No. 46)

As it is known, an important role in World War I that broke out in August 1914 was assigned to the German blitzkrieg as it would subsequently help quickly remove France from the war and prevent a possible British deployment on the continent. After that, it was planned to start active operations against the Russian Empire. Attempts to seize Paris and a plan to occupy Warsaw were not successful for Germany and, as a result, beginning from December 1914, the Russian satire abounded with speculations on the topic of Germany's predicament (Fig. 6, 7).

"The Great Kaiser" on the path to eternal glory




Fig. 6. He was going to have dinner in Paris, he was going to have supper in Warsaw, and in the meantime he found himself in a critical situation
Caricature by Pier – O (Ogoniok. 1914. No. 50).




Fig. 7. Knights Errant of the Rueful Countenance in a critical situation.
Franz Joseph: "Oh, Willie, Willie. You promised a dinner in Paris and supper in Warsaw, and we did not even have a smell of it."
Wilhelm: "Wait, old boy, maybe with this monkey someone will give alms to us."
Well, Mahmud, do a somersault
Drawn by Pier-O. (Ogoniok. 1914. No. 44)

In August 1915, despite the retreat of the Russian army and delayed prospects of the quick victory in World War I, the Russian press demonstrated that, notwithstanding the difficulties encountered, the enemy would certainly be broken. Sometimes this was expressed through the image of the toilet (Fig. 8).



Fig. 8. Where, despite all efforts, Germany would eventually find itself. Caricature for Ogoniok by A. Albo (Ogoniok. 1915. No. 31)

With the outbreak of World War I, all participating countries nationalized financial assets of business representing opposing states. In Russia, for example, the process took the form of the struggle against the "German predominance" (Tveritinov, 2014; Alishina, 2016). As for Germany, its authorities arrested business representatives of the Entente countries under the pretext of espionage. The French press published the following caricature in relation to this topic (Fig. 9).



Fig. 9. As easy as pie
 "And the one who was executed last, was a spy as well?"
 "Worse than that, my friend – one of my major creditors!"
 (Le Rire, Paris) (Ogoniok. 1915. No. 31)

Caricatures very often depicted Germany as the instigator of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. By this they showed that Austria-Hungary had a dependent position in the global conflict. We will give the following example (Fig. 10).



Doctor Willie: "Come, come, my dear Ferdinand, he is barely breathing, there is no pulse...."



.....



Fig. 10. Ferdinand (Almost crying): "No pulse, no pulse..! I thought that there was a dead body in the bed and he is more alive than ever before...
Caricature for Ogoniok by artist Borodata ([Ogoniok. 1916. No. 43](#))

In October 1916, after the Brusilov Offensive and a number of victorious operations carried out by the Russian army in Turkey, it became evident that Germany and its allies were losing the war (Nazarova, 2015). Building up a picture of the economic situation in Germany, the Russian press turned its attention to irreversible processes that would lead to the defeat of Germany. It spoke about famine, anarchy and a looming revolution (Fig. 11)

Based on Macbeth



Fig. 11. Witches are preparing the fate of Germany
The Montreal Star (Montreal) (Ogoniok. 1916. No. 43)

Summarizing the results, we can say that the Russian periodical press turned to three main topics to construct the image of Germany:

1. Germany is the aggressor responsible for the attack on Russia;
2. Germany instigates Austria-Hungary and Turkey to the conflict;
3. Germany will inevitably be defeated in World War I.

4.1.2. Austria in World War I.

The image of toilet was one of the favorite instruments often used by Russian caricaturists. For example, the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Empire tried to wait until Russia first declared war on it, created the indecisive image of Austria-Hungary (Fig. 12).



Fig. 12. "And Franz Joseph is still checking the plumbing..."
Drawn by P. Zapolsky-Dovnar ([Ogoniok. 1914. No. 44](#))

In August 1914, Russian troops entered Galicia in an attempt to prevent the Germans from occupying Paris. These events were immediately reflected in the Russian caricature (Fig. 13).



Fig. 13. An Austrian. "Why are you leaving my, my dear, I haven't granted you a divorce."
Galicia. "I think my elder sister Russia will get you to agree to it."
Caricature by S. Smirnov ([Ogoniok. 1914. No. 46](#))

Meanwhile, to portray Austro-Hungarian Emperor Franz Joseph as a weak personality, Italian caricaturists employed the image of the double bass which anyone can play (Fig. 14).



Fig. 14. From ... to the mandolin to the double bass.
L'Asino (Rome) (Ogoniok. 1916. No. 43)

Austria-Hungary was given a secondary role in the genre of caricature. It was viewed as a country which was drawn into the war almost against her will. Hence, the Russian society formed the image of Germany as a country which caused trouble to everyone – to opponents and allies alike.

4.1.3. Turkey in World War I.

Turkey was an extremely poor fighter in World War I. After they went to the war in October 1914, Turkish troops were defeated already early in 1915 in cross-border operations mounted by the Russian army and began to retreat deep into their territory. Already in the summer of 1915, Russian periodicals started to promote the image of Turkey as a country which was bound to lose the war (Fig. 15, 16).



Fig. 15. Turkey's future... "It's real mess!"
Caricature for Ogoniok by V. Denisov ([Ogoniok. 1915. No. 31](#))



Fig. 16. "Fooled."
(From newspapers: Germans have become sole owners of the Turkish capital).
Caricature for Ogoniok by V. Denisov ([Ogoniok. 1915. No. 28](#))

At the same time, there were publications in which Turkey appeared as a country betrayed by Germany. This is most clearly illustrated by the following caricature (Fig. 17).



Fig. 17. Reassurance.

"Don't worry, my friend, go down, it's safe. Only three more arsheens and there is solid ground under you – the Crimea and the Caucasus. As soon as you go down, all will be yours."

Caricature for Ogoniok by Danilov (Ogoniok. 1915. No. 28)

Therefore, already in mid-1915, region-specific features of fighting against the Ottoman Empire contributed to the image of Turkey as a country that had lost the war. On the other hand, Turkey was represented as a country controlled by Germany rather than an independent player. This image was partly influenced by the Black Sea operations of the German Navy (cruisers Goeben and Breslau), as well as German military advisers and experts working in Istanbul.

4.2. The military theme in Russian caricature

The genre of caricature featured prominently various military subjects. It is a well-known fact that World War I provided a real-life testing environment for the massive use of the latest technology and weapons. A diverse array of warships used by opponents led to more complex surveillance techniques. For example, Ogoniok published a caricature of the modern sea warfare tactics in the summer of 1915 ([Fig. 18](#)).




Fig. 18. A modern technique of the naval warfare
A triple observation post: for airplanes, for battleships and submarines
Caricature for Ogoniok by A.I. Tavitsa ([Ogoniok. 1915. No. 31](#))

Caricatures on the military theme also reflected everyday life in the rear. For example, the motif of bursting "suitcases" was played with in the following caricature. The "suitcase" was an informal name for heavy shells of the German artillery during the war (Fig. 19).



Fig. 19. A little bit of politics

Customer: "Damn you... What suitcase have you sold to me! I bought it only yesterday, and it has already broken..."

Salesman: "It is obvious that you are a Russian; a German is pleased if his "suitcases" are broken."
Caricature for Ogoniok by A.I. T-tsa (Ogoniok. 1915. No. 31)

The theme of fighting in the Dardanelles Strait was referred to by Russian cartoonists in the summer of 1915. This formed the idea that not only Russia fought the enemy, but its allies as well (Fig. 20).




Fig. 20. French style Kebab.

"It is almost ready..."

Caricature for Ogoniok by Yatak (Ogoniok. 1915. No. 28)

An essential part of measures was aimed at improving harsh conditions of life at the front. One of the methods was intensive correspondence that was sent from military positions to good-hearted women deep in the rear. These letters often failed to reach the addressee that soldiers drew in their imagination (Fig. 21).

Correspondence between military positions and the rear



She: "Fine, brave warrior! What is your life like on the front? What gift could I send to you?"

He: "A clay pipe, for God's sake! Damn Germans have smashed mine to pieces."



".....?" "A rose from your breast."



".....?" "A complete collection of Virgil and Bossuet. It is impossible to get it here."



Fig. 21. This served as a basis for many humorous anecdotes that provided a theme for caricatures by artist Valdes (The Sketca), shown below (Ogoniok. 1915. No. 28)

4.3. Caricatures as a means of explaining the issues faced by society in the rear

In 1915, when the rear started having problems with the food supply and high prices, Ogoniok also began to publish caricatures on this urgent topic. For example, the problem of high prices was addressed in the caricature A Coachman in Wartime (Fig. 22).



Fig. 22. A coachman in wartime

"Why, Vanya, you've fleeced me out of half of the ruble, and are barely crawling now..?"

"Do you know that we're now paying 20 rubles per sack of oats?.."

"And why is your horse passing such stinking gas?.."

"And this is from barley because oats are too expensive and we feed it with barley"

Caricature for Ogoniok by Pier-O. (Ogoniok. 1915. No. 28)

The topic of the English humorous perception of the First World War events was also reflected in caricatures (Fig. 23, 24).




Fig. 23. Information for volunteer workers from the London aristocracy

Avoid going directly to your living room, when you come back from the factory, without first asking your maid. You may compromise yourself in the eyes of your guests.

(Sketch, London) (Ogoniok. 1915. No. 31)




Fig. 24. Mother: "Naughty boy! You've beaten your little brother again!"
 Bobby: "He is babbling something in German all the time, I can't understand him at all!"
 (Sketch, London) (Ogoniok. 1915. No. 31)

5. Conclusion

Summing up our review, we should conclude that the Ogoniok magazine focused its caricatures on the topic of Germany during World War I, while allies of Germany – Austria-Hungary and Turkey – were paid much less attention. The propaganda usually portrayed German allies in as puppet countries which were subordinate to Germany. In addition to the subject of the Entente's opponents, the periodical press also used the genre of caricature to address such themes as new military technologies and problems that society in the rear had to deal with.

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
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German Propaganda in the Military Zone of Ukraine in 1941–1943

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Abstract

The article considers the propaganda in the press, radio, cinema and scenic art during the German occupation of 1941–1943 based on the examples of five regions that were a part of the Ukraine military zone (Chernigov, Sumy, Kharkov, Voroshilovgrad and Donetsk regions), controlled by the military authorities.

The works of the contemporary Ukrainian historians, as well as the archival documents of the supreme authorities and administration of Ukraine central state archive (KMF-8 foundation, which holds the documents photocopies of the "South" Army), state archives of the Sumy and Kharkov regions and the periodical press materials of the occupation time were used in the research.

It is noted that the ideological principles of the Nazi and their confidence in the success of the "blitzkrieg" did not allow the invaders to follow the pragmatic political course, offered by A. Rosenberg. Certain propaganda efforts were successful largely due to the involvement of the representatives of the local intelligentsia.

Keywords: German occupation, propaganda, Ukraine military zone.

1. Introduction

Since the ancient times propaganda has been an integral part of the warfare, because without the human resources mobilization and motivation of people, involved in military actions, achieving victory is unlikely. Earlier, however, it came usually in a rather primitive form of the direct commander-soldiers communication, which explained the goals of the war, its necessity and "justice" and promised material benefits.

In the twentieth century, the development of technology and the media: newspapers, radio, cinema, television, Internet, etc. made it possible to raise the propaganda to a new level. This is the past and present demand of the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. The Nazi Germany and its propaganda, inherently connected to its creator Dr. J. Goebbels, is the textbook example (Bartov, 2011). He became a household name.

2. Materials and methods

2.1. The works of contemporary Ukrainian historians, as well as the archival documents of the supreme authorities and administration of Ukraine central state archive (KMF-8 foundation, which holds the documents photocopies of the "South" Army), state archives of the Sumy and

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Kharkov regions and the periodical press materials of the occupation time were used in the research.

Propaganda issues were covered in the works of V.I. Dashichev, M. Mikhailyuk, R. Cecil, Karel C. Berkhoff, V. Kosik, V.O. Shaikan, M.V. Koval, A.V. Skorobogatov, D.M. Titorenko in different ways.

2.2. The methodological workground is based on the principles of objectivity and historicism, assuming an unbiased approach to the analysis of the studied problems, a critical attitude to the sources, which enabled a thorough study of the investigated problems and provided the best usage of archival sources and historiographic developments.

3. Results and discussion

The racist ideology tenets of the National Socialists are widely known, assigning to the Slavic peoples an unenviable role of the "subhumans" (Ger. untermensch). The Nazi elites, in preparing the attack on the Soviet Union, despite the confidence in the power of the Wehrmacht, were aware **of the enemy's human potential. Therefore the Nazis did not intend to show their attitude to the numerous peoples inhabiting the Soviet Union.**

The ideological inspirer and developer of the foundations of the German occupation policy in the Soviet Union was Alfred Rosenberg (Fig. 1) (he was of a Baltic German descent and got his education in the Russian Empire), the ideologist of the National Socialist Party. He was considered to be an "Eastern areas expert". In his suggestions in April-May, 1941, he used the classical principle of "divide and conquer". In political terms, the Soviet Union was a multinational country and, in his opinion, was held in only by the power of the punitive authorities. A discontent was felt in the national suburbs, especially in the Baltic states and Western Ukraine. He suggested dividing the territory of the Soviet Union into the national geographical units in order to weaken the Great Russia. Regarding Ukraine, he suggested supporting their national independence aspirations, up to the foundation of the separate Ukrainian statehood, or the Black Sea Union, which would include the Don region and the Caucasus, in addition to Ukraine.



Fig. 1. Alfred Rosenberg.

Later, on June, 20, 1941, speaking in the narrow circle of the German leaders, he said that **Russia's influence was felt everywhere in Ukraine, so Germany's aim was to ensure the freedom of the Ukrainian people.** Thus, it suggested the national identity development by supporting **Ukrainians' memories of their Hetman cults: Khmelnytsky, Sagaidachny, Mazepa, the formation of the Ukrainian language, publishing Ukrainian classic works, establishing University of Kiev and creating a political movement, based on the example of the Free Ukrainian Cossacks:** «There is a difference – the speaker insisted – in a few years we will get forty million of people who will voluntarily cooperate with us, or we will have to put a soldier behind every peasant» (CSASUA, F. KMF-8, Op. 1, D. 171, L. 114).

Other German leaders, H. Himmler and H. Goering, did not support Rosenberg's approaches. But Hitler's opinion, which he announced at the meeting on July 16, 1941, was the decisive one. He rejected the suggestions of the party ideologist and supported G. Goering, who said that firstly it was necessary to supply the Wehrmacht and Germany with food, and all the "rest" issues must be put off. The only thing allowed by Hitler was to establish newspapers on the occupied territories to influence the population. However, A. Rosenberg was appointed the Minister of the occupied eastern provinces and could affect the situation.

At the stage of planning the attack on the USSR, it was decided to abandon the occupied territories' unified administration system. It was considered that the military could not implement the political line efficiently (Dashichev, 1973: 22). Therefore, the Wehrmacht rear was limited to the two hundred mile zone and during the invasion was to be passed under the control of the civil administration. On August, 20, 1941, the "Ukraine" Reich Commissariat was created. But the blitzkrieg failed, the march of the Wehrmacht was stopped and the Reich Commissariat did not reach its planned size. Thus, during the whole period of the occupation, five regions of Ukraine were under the military control – the Chernigov, Sumy, Kharkov, Stalin (now Donetsk) and Voroshilovgrad (Lugansk) regions, commonly called **"the war zone of Ukraine" in the Ukrainian historiography.** The Wehrmacht was considered to be the supreme authority. The field and the local commandants operated locally, under the political guidance of A. Rosenberg's Ministry. Some of the military supported his ideas of the "moderate" policy in Ukraine (Nesterenko, 2005: 175-178).

In 1938, Adolf Hitler issued a directive on war propaganda, which defined the interaction of the Ministry of propaganda and the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht). Since the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union, the Ministry of A. Rosenberg was involved in this work. The "Oriental" department with the Subdivision "Vineta" was established as a part of the Ministry of propaganda. It cooperated actively with the Office of Press and Propaganda of the Ministry of Eastern Occupied Territories and the OKW propaganda department. Propaganda companies were set up in the combat operations zone. In Ukraine, their activities were supervised by the **"U" Propaganda Department (Ukraine),** established at the headquarters of the rear operational area commander of the "South" army group. It controlled the local press, radio broadcasting, theater, etc. on the military administrated territories.

The most important means of propaganda, which could cover a significant number of urban and rural residents, was the press. A. Rosenberg, aware of this, signed a corresponding directive at the beginning of the war, which allowed establishing local newspapers, but only in a compliance of several conditions: the presence of politically reliable editors and a sufficient number of the German censorship authorities. The goals of the press and propaganda in general, were to implant **the idea of the Reich's financial might, along with the thought of the invincibility of Wehrmacht and the need for an active cooperation with the new authorities in people's minds. At the same time** it was necessary to cover the crimes of the "Yid-Bolsheviks" in Ukraine, for example, the famine and repressions of the 1930s, to talk about the "liberating" mission of the Wehrmacht and the **Führer Adolf Hitler himself and to use the name "Ukraine" only in the territorial meaning, to avoid questioning on the further political structure** (Mihailiuk, 2011: 644-646).

The Ukrainian military zone newspapers could be divided into the district and municipal ones. But some were distributed on a larger area. For example, the Kharkov newspaper "Novaya Ukraina" covered almost all the areas of the former Kharkov region (the Germans, in administrative terms, refused the regional authority). The table below represents the quantitative composition of the press (Table 1).

Table 1. A List of Ukrainian and Russian newspapers published by the propaganda battalion in Ukraine. On 01.10.1942 (CSASUA, F. KMF-8, Op. 2, D. 478, L. 64)

Location of publishing	Name	Language
1. Stalino	«Donetskie izvestiya»	rus.
2. Debal'tsevo	«Debal'tsevskaya gazeta»	ukr.
3. Gorlovka	«Ukrainsky Donbass»	ukr.
4. Konstantinovka	«Konstantinovskaya gazeta»	ukr.
5. Snezhnoe	«Snezhnenskie izvestiya »	rus.
6. Chistyakovo	«Novaya zhizn»	rus.
7. Voroshilovgrad	«Novaya zhizn»	Not specified
8. Makeyevka	«Ukrainskaya zemlya»	Not specified
9. Marioopol	«Marioopolskaya gazeta»	ukr.
10. Kharkov	«Novaya Ukraina»	ukr.
11. Kransograd	«Konstantinogradskie izvestiya»	ukr.
12. Slavyansk	«Donetskaya gazeta»	ukr.
13. Artyomovsk	«Bakhmutsky vestnik»	ukr.
14. Konotop	«Osvobozhdenie»	ukr.
15. Nezhin	«Nezhinskie izvestiya»	ukr.
16. Oster	«Osterskie izvestiya»	ukr.
17. Priluky	«Pilootskiye izvestiya»	ukr.
18. Romny	«Vozrozhdenie»	ukr.
19. Snovsk (Shors)	«Novaya snovskaya gazeta»	ukr.
20. Chernigov	«Ukrainskoe polesye»	ukr.
21. Kursk	«Noviy put'»	rus.
22. Putivl	Not specified	ukr.
23. Rylsk	«Noviy put'»	rus.
24. Shostka	«Novoe vryemya»	ukr.
25. Belgorod	«Podyom»	rus.
26. Akhtyrka	«Golos Akhtyrki»	ukr.
27. Sumy	«Sumskoy vestnik»	ukr.
28. Millerovo	«Vozrozhdenie»	rus.
29. Rossosh	«Rossoshskiy vestnik»	rus.
30. Morozovskaya	«Morozovsky vestnik»	rus.

The Table 1 shows that some of the Russian territories were in the group "South" army action zone and was a part of the propaganda battalion area performing. But it is difficult to say whether it was in the plans of A. Rosenberg to include some parts of the Russian territories in the future "Great Ukraine" or not. Some newspaper titles are incorrect or not specified at all in the document: «Vesti Priluchchiny» (Priluky), «Donetsky Vestnik» (Yuzovka-Stalino), «Konstantinovskie vesti» (Konstantinovka), «Debal'tsevsky vestnik» (Debal'tsevo), «Snezhnyansky vestnik» (Snezhnoye). **The translation may not be exact. In Putivle, the Sumy region the "Putivlyanin" newspaper was published. A number of the newspapers weren't mentioned at all, although they were published, according to the archive materials. For example, «Lebedinsky vestnik» (Lebedin), «Kramatorskaya gazeta» (Kramatorsk), «Chistyakovsky listok» (Chistyakovo), «Khartsizsky vestnik» (Khartsizsk), «Khleborob» (Volnovakha), «Ranok» (Popasna), «Golos Severshchiny» (Novgorod-Seversky), «Chernigovskiy kurier» and «Ukrainsky kurier» (Chernigov), «Ukrainsky kurier» (Priluky). In some cases, the name changes were possible. In Oster, the Chernigov region the "Shkolyar" children newspaper was published in Ukrainian. In Bogodukhov, the Kharkov region, "Ridny kraj" magazine was published. In January, 1943, in Sumy, the "Sumskoy vestnik" editorial office opened a subscription to "Ukrainsky zasiv" monthly magazine and distributed the first issue.**

Most newspapers were published on the permission of commandant officials, by local authorities (city and district councils) using the technical resources of the Soviet editorial offices. The local government covered the funding and also received profits, as it was very important for

the local budgets. But in 1943, despite the objections of the military administration, propaganda departments took under control the economic aspect as well (CSASUA, F. KMF-8, Op. 2, D. 332, L. 66). Local intelligentsia representatives were commonly employed as the editors and authors of the materials.



Fig. 2. Newspaper «Noviy put».

A significant circulation of other printed material – various leaflets were published to achieve the propaganda aims. Posters were published in a smaller number, perhaps this was due to a limited technical capacity of the local publishers.

In order to give the idea of the amount of the printed materials, that were produced by the occupation authorities, we present data from the June, 1942 monthly report of the corps commander of security forces and the commander of the operational rear area of the “B” Army Group (Up to September, 1, 1942, the entire territory of Ukraine east to the Dnieper River was under the military administration control). On the anniversary of “the beginning of the war on the East” 37,000 posters and 275,000 leaflets were distributed among the local population. The total circulation of newspapers was 265,000 copies. The Ukrainian newspapers provided materials for two bulletins "Presse-und Bilderdienst" and "Politische Sneldienst" (CSASUA, F. KMF-8, Op. 2, D. 195, L. 41-42).

In order to cover the rural population with the printed propaganda, the newspapers were instructed to send a part of the copies to the villages. Village prefects were obliged to install special display boards for newspapers and advertisements in public places.

Radio, both wireless and wired, had a great propaganda potential. The signal of the Berlin radio station that was rebroadcasted by the Warsaw, Belgrade, Bucharest and Helsinki radio stations, could be received on the territory of Ukraine. The signal could be received by the broadcasting centers of large cities and military radio stations. Radio programs in the Russian and Ukrainian languages were sometimes aired in 1943. The daily reports of the German command on the progress of military operations at the front, news, orders of the occupation authorities, music, etc. were aired (Mihailyuk, 2011: 651-652). But the effect was insignificant, due to the lack of relevant radio receivers among the Ukrainian population. During the pre-war period the residents couldn't afford the necessary equipment and only a small part, mainly state and party officials, “white collars” and intelligentsia, had such an opportunity. But at the beginning of the war, radio receivers were confiscated, not to be under the influence of the German propaganda. At the beginning of the German occupation, the confiscation was performed again. Those who dared to violate this order were sentenced to death. Thus, 8 people from Dymer, Ivanovo district of the Chernigov region, were executed for the use of radio and for listening to foreign stations (Visti Ostershini).

A slightly different situation was with the wired radio. In the USSR, there was a well-developed network of this type of radio, and local authorities, economic and other institutions, along with the population had radio receivers and plate-resembling radio transmitters. Since the beginning of the occupation period these networks were repaired and used in many cities. For a greater effect, as in Soviet times, the speakers were often installed in public places outside. For example, in the Sumy city, the central radio receiving station was fixed, and about 1,000 speakers were connected to it: approx. 300 – for the Wehrmacht and the rest – for the local population, on the chief of communications of the 6th Army permission in November 1941 (the city was occupied on 10 October) (CSASUA, F. KMF-8, Op. 2, D. 156, L. 6).

The cars with loudspeakers operation were even less efficient.

The cinema, perhaps, was the most spectacular and potentially efficient means in the terms of propaganda. Local people had an opportunity to visit cinemas that were open for the Wehrmacht soldiers. German films mostly of an entertaining character were shown, specifically dubbed or subtitled in the Ukrainian or Russian languages. Newsreel was shown at the beginning of each session («Deutsche Wochenschau»).

A report of the Akhtyrka 198 (U) field commandant office on May 15, 1942 marked a positive **propaganda effect from enabling the local population to visit soldiers' cinemas** (CSASUA, F. KMF-8, Op. 2, D. 157, T. 1, L. 3). Konotop field Commandant's Office 200 (U) reported on the demonstration of films for the German troops and the civilian population in the cities of Konotop, Shostka, Glukhov and Belopolye in June, 1942 (CSASUA, F. KMF-8, Op. 2, D. 157, T. 1, L. 206).

Scenic art also provided for propaganda purposes. It was an important activity of local intelligentsia for the purpose of national and cultural renaissance. In this aspect, its goals coincided with the needs of the German occupation authorities, who pursued the task to provide cultural recreation to the Wehrmacht soldiers. Therefore, in the military zone of Ukraine, theaters as well as numerous new theatrical groups, choir capellas, ensembles, orchestras, musical studios, etc. were reopened; a circus was open in Voroshilovgrad.

The repertoire mostly consisted of the works of the Ukrainian dramatists: I. Tobylevitch, G. Kvitka-Osnovyanenko, M. Staritsky, M. Kropivnitsky, T. Shevchenko and others. In the cities, with a larger number of professional theatre companies and with relatively better technical facilities, plays by the foreign authors, as well as operas, ballets, operettas and symphonic concerts were performed.

The military authorities, following the command of A. Rosenberg, almost did not interfere in this sphere of cultural life. This was supposed to testify the tolerance of the "new government" towards this matter (Nesterenko, 2005a: 54-61).

Exhibitions were held in order to demonstrate the greatness of Germany and also to attract volunteers to work for the Reich. For example, in November 1942, in the Chistyakovo city, the Donetsk region, a four day photo exhibition, named "German nation - German labor" was held, and it was attended by 4,300 people (Novaya zhizn). **In October 1942, in Kharkov, the exhibition "Get' bilshovizm" (Get out, Bolshevism) was organized by the German propaganda department and the "Prosvita" ("Education") local partnership. It was organized "to celebrate the anniversary of the day of the European nations liberating war against Bolshevism"** Its purpose was the following: "... In general, this exhibition demonstrating the essence of the Bolshevism destructive ideas, hostile to the Ukrainian people, should be an effective tool for anti-communist cultural resources propaganda and the fight against **the "remnants" of Judeo Bolshevist ideology, and become the herald of the transition of Ukraine to the peoples of the New Europe**" (translated from Ukrainian by the author) (KRSA, F. R-2982, Op. 1, D. 53, L. 1).

The propaganda penetrated into the sphere of education as well, for raising the youngsters in **the spirit of the "New Order"**.

The local intelligentsia, on the orders of the Ministry of A. Rosenberg ("Eastern Ukraine" working group), performed the libraries' **"purification" of the literature, banned by the occupation authorities**. Thus, in Kharkov, on December, 15, 1941, Krivenko, the Kharkov city council propaganda department head, held a librarian meeting, on which he set the following rules of the "harmful" literature removal: 1. Literature, published from 1917 to October 20, 1941, with a few exceptions, should have been removed completely; 2. Fiction, art history, technical, scientific, etc. literature for this period – to be carefully reviewed, the "harmful" ones to be removed; some places to be cut out, the veracity of the texts of works of the Ukrainian and other writers to be checked;

3. This work was to be performed by the librarians themselves; 4. The same actions should have been performed in the bookstores (KRSA, F. R-2982, Op. 3, D. 76, L. 1). The «undesirable» Ukrainian author list included M. Bazhan, I. Goncharenko, I. Kulik, A. Malyshko, P. Panch, V. Vinnichenko, N. Zabala and others, in total 36; 13 – «Ukrainian-Yid» (Natan Rybak among them); 23 – «Yid»; 136 – Soviet; 38 – German and «Yid», which works were translated to the Ukrainian language (H. Heine, H. Mann, T. Mann, E.-M. Remarque among them) (KRSA, F. R-2982, Op. 4, D. 216, L. 18-19).

For example, 1263 books were seized from the school library of the city of Putivl, Sumy region on February 1, 1942 (SRSA, F. R-1955, Op. 1, D. 16, L. 1). These books lost their value and were brought to a special foundation, and were transferred to various enterprises to be used as writing paper. The following figures indicate the scale of these activities: only in May, 1942, in the above mentioned city of Putivl, 22519 books were seized. And this process continued (SRSA, F. R-1955, Op. 1, D. 16, L. 8-139).

At the same time teachers at schools were engaged in the textbooks "editing" in accordance with the instructions. The word «pioneer» was changed to «student» or «pupil», «kolkhozniki» – to «peasants», «impact class» – to «one of the best», «excellent pupil» – to «the best pupil», «sovkhoz» – to «state farm». The words «soviet», «Internationale», «socialist construction», «Ukrainian SSR», «USSR» and etc. were crossed out. Programs were being renewed. For example, **a reading program for the 4th grade of the primary school included the students' acquaintance with** such works of the Ukrainian classics: I. Franko «Zakhar Berkut», T. Shevchenko «Blind», «Ivan Podkova», «Gamaliya», «Chernets», «Gaydamaki», M. Staritsky, «Epiphany night», P. Kulish, «Black Rada», L. Ukrainka «Boyarynya» and others (KRSA, F. R-2982, Op. 1, D. 44, L. 1-6).

To assist the teachers, local newspapers sometimes published materials for children. In Oster, the Chernigov region, as already mentioned, the two-weekly “Shkoliar” (“Shkolnik”) newspaper was published. For instance, in its March issues of 1942 an article about Shevchenko, as well as his poem "Mati", Ukrainian fairy tales, stories, riddles, and the "Nibelungen" poem, translated into the Ukrainian language were published.

What were the spirits of the Ukrainian population and how did the Germans evaluate the effectiveness of their propaganda? The Zhitomyr Chief of Counterintelligence filed a confidential analytical note, dated 22 October 1943, which stated that in 1941, 90% of the population harbored a hope for the collapse of the USSR and the combat failures of the Red Army weakened even the **Bolshevik supporters' faith. Several quotations: «All people unanimously moved to the service of the German authorities ...», «German soldiers felt calm in Ukraine ...», «mutual understanding between the army and the people was as its best ...», «the Ukrainians, first of all the peoples of the Soviet Union became an ally of Germany and all the other nations followed their example ...»**

But at the same time he points out the mistakes, made, in his opinion, in the field of propaganda: 1. In their propaganda, the Germans operated the Great Germany scale and stated that the Ukrainians have no culture; 2. At first it was considered, that Ukrainians and Bolsheviks were identical and they were not distinguished; 3. Instead of engaging supportive Ukrainians to the cooperation, they involved people that had nothing to do with the Ukrainian matter; 4. The necessity of propaganda against the Russian imperialism, which was passionately hated by **the Ukrainians, didn't receive any attention; 5. The criticism of Stalin in the German propaganda** was considered as "breaking through the open door," because **the Ukrainians knew the "very prosperity" of the Stalin regime; 6. The "New Europe" outlook and the place of the Ukrainians** there was not explained; 7. Teachers, clergy, prefects, volunteers were not involved in the propaganda activities; 8. Radio and the press were able to cover only a small part of the population; 9. Incorrect grammar, historic misconceptions and even lies and nonsense in the economic issues reduced the value of the numerous propaganda appeals; 10. The propaganda in the fields of music, singing and theater fulfilled its task only partly; 11. Theatrical performances in the Russian language and with the participation of the Russian actors were alien to the Ukrainians, as well as the idea of "one and indivisible Russian Empire" (the territory of the Reich Commissariat "Ukraine"); 12. Articles on the historical facts of the heroic fights of the Ukrainians against the Bolsheviks were not covered in the press (CSASUA, F. KMF-8, Op. 1, D. 74, L. 1-12).

4. Conclusion

The ideological tenets of Nazism, in which the Slavic and other peoples of the USSR were considered "subhumans", and the confidence in the success of "blitzkrieg" did not enable the German authorities to perform propaganda activities pragmatically, as it was suggested by A. Rosenberg. The German propaganda did not answer the main question that interested the population of the occupied territories, and the Ukrainians in particular: what would happen tomorrow to them, their families and their country. Despite some progress in certain activities in the field of media, theater, cinema, etc., due to a large involvement of the representatives of the **local intelligentsia, the whole occupants' propaganda activities were not efficient enough, and that** was admitted by the Germans themselves.

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
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Technical Means of Propagandists

Medium Powered Sound Broadcasting Station ZS-82 (“The Decorator”) as a Weapon of Propagandists

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Abstract

This article considers tactical and technical characteristics of a Russian army’s propaganda weapon – the medium powered sound broadcasting station ZS-82 (“The Decorator”) on a base of open sources.

The sources used for the compilation of this article were various open source data, such as official news websites, forums, educational and scientific literature.

Despite some thematic diversity, this topic is presented quite limitedly in the open access. We used general scientific methods, analysis and synthesis methods, concretization and generalization in solving research problems. The use of these techniques allowed us to create a complete picture of combat use of this technology in local conflicts at the end of XX – beginning of XXI centuries.

In conclusion, it is indicated that the Russian army arsenal possesses an effective means of advocacy – the medium powered ZS-82 “The Decorator”. Despite its limited combat use, practice showed that this equipment can be used for conducting negotiations (agitation), as well for performing disinformation activities.

Keywords: weapon of propaganda, ZS-82 (“The Decorator”), sound broadcasting station, the Russian army.

1. Introduction

Sound broadcasting on the enemy territory is an essential part of psychological warfare. Sound broadcasting was used not only in the active phase of military confrontation, for example during World War II period (Mamadalyev, 2015: 59), but also during the Cold War, for example, between DPRK and ROK (Shiukashvili, 2015: 112-114). Oral (sound) broadcasting is an information-psychological effect, carried out by transmitting different messages and programs, which are directly perceived by the enemy soldiers, by civilian population and captives, through the sound broadcasting stations (Krys’ko, 1999: 81). The arsenal of the Armed Forces of the Russian

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army holds a range of sound broadcasting equipment, which task is the implementation of a psychological impact on the enemy in combat. Sound broadcasting stations are divided into several types: strong, medium and light. In this article we will cover medium powered sound broadcasting equipment, one of the models of which is a sound broadcasting station of medium power ZS-82 (“The Decorator”).

2. Sources and methods

2.1. The sources used for the compilation of this article were various open source data, such as official news websites, forums, educational and scientific literature. Despite some thematic diversity, this topic is presented quite limitedly in the open access.

2.2. We used general scientific methods, analysis and synthesis methods, concretization and generalization in solving research problems. The use of these techniques allowed us to create a complete picture of combat use of this technology in local conflicts at the end of XX – beginning of XXI centuries.

3. Results

3.1. The performance characteristics

The operating range of **3C-82 (“the Decorator”)** is **6 km**, **capacity** – 1000 Wt, and the operator, reading out the text, has the opportunity to be at a distance of up 500 meters from the armored vehicle with the device. This is the main propaganda weapon of modern Russian army, previously barely used. By using sound-amplifying equipment Russian officers in case of a military conflict can persuade the enemy to surrender ([Russia settled...](#)).



Fig. 1. ZS-82 (“The Decorator”) left side view.



Fig. 2. ZS-82 front view.



Fig. 3. ZS-82 (“The Decorator”) right side view.

ZS-82 (“The Decorator”) standard equipment set:

1. Chassis GAZ-41-14, in the complete set, tools and spare parts according to the inventory of the manufacturer;
2. Operator panel P02-01;
3. Amplifier P01-02, 2 pcs;
4. Device P04-02;
5. Loudspeaker P05-01, 2 pcs.;
6. Loudspeaker P05-02;
7. Microphone P06-01;
8. Line shield P06-03;

9. KS Connecting box;
10. Junction box;
11. Antenna switch P06-02;
12. Tripod;
13. Grounding pin;
14. Audio library case;
15. Case ID4.166.040 Sp;
16. Case Hg4.166.008;
17. Case Hg4.166.005;
18. Case, 4 pcs.;
19. Electric motor fan DV-3;
20. Radio receiver «Integral»;
21. Troop tape recorder VM-75K, set of 2;
22. Field telephone device TA-57;
23. Intercom R-124;
24. Battery 5NKLB-70, 4 pcs;
25. Summer tank headset TSH-001I, 2 pcs.;
26. Winter tank headset TSH-001B, 2 pcs.;
27. Type-TP-7 thermometer;
28. Telephone headsets TA-56M;
29. Cable coil No. 5;
30. Connection cable No. 39;
31. Connection cable No. 40;
32. Set of a single reserve asset;
33. ZIP in set: ZI-O-198, ZI-8, ZI-O-335, ZI-O-339, ZI-O-340, ZI-O-342, ZI-O-341, ZI-O-349.
34. MK-60 audiocassette, 20 pcs.;
35. Maintenance documentation set ([ZS-82 sound broadcasting station](#)).



Fig. 4. Interior equipment, tape recorder.



Fig. 5. Operating panel of ZS-82 (“The Decorator”).

3.2. Combat use

According to available data, an earlier version of the sound broadcasting station – ZS-72b in 1980 was in service of agitation troops (later – psychological action troops), 10 in number (1 for the border area and a group of troops) ([Schüşpanzers are in attack](#)). It was used in combat operations in Afghanistan by the agitation units of the 40th army.



Fig. 6. ZS-72b in a convoy in Afghanistan.

ZS-82 (“The Decorator”) was developed later. Military officers, interviewed by “RosBusinessConsulting” did not remember this particular equipment being used during military practices. During combat operations these machines are used to influence the blocked enemy forces, in aim to compel them to lay down their weapons and surrender. According to the military servicemen, sound broadcasting stations were not used in South Ossetia. They were used only in a few occasions during the counter-terrorist operations in Chechnya for negotiations with the rebels ([To the border with Ukraine...](#)).



Fig. 7. ZS-82 (“The Decorator”) in an open position.

Open press mentions the use of ten Russian ZS-82 sound broadcasting stations near the Ukrainian borders ([Russia settled...](#)).

As mentioned above the main purpose of ZS-82 (“The Decorator”) is agitation of the blocked enemy forces to surrender, however, the sound broadcasting station may perform other psychological impacts, including spreading disinformation or creating a misconception about the events. Thus, according to the head of the National Television Company of Ukraine, Zurab Alasania, the Russian sound broadcast station ZS-82 in August 2014 broadcasted a roar of heavy machinery on the march and a roar of the aircraft engines at the very border with Ukraine ([Russian army...](#)). This reference may indicate that the use of sound broadcasting stations may be multifunctional.

4. Conclusion

Summing up, we can state that the Russian army arsenal possesses an effective means of propaganda – the medium powered ZS-82 “The Decorator”. **Despite its limited combat use**, practice showed that this equipment can be used for conducting negotiations (agitation), as well for performing disinformation activities.

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
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Letters to the editorial office

Documents reveal: German war propaganda and the Vlasov Campaign during World War II

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Abstract

The paper considers first propaganda efforts by the German intelligence services to carry out activities as part of the General Vlasov Campaign in the occupied territories and at the front. It cites a German document from the archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs – "Development and Status of War Propaganda in the East since Autumn 1942 (Vlasov Campaign)". The English version of the document is published for the first time. The paper specifically looks at the international consequences that followed from this campaign.

Keywords: German documents, war propaganda, Third Reich, Vlasov Campaign, General Vlasov, collaboration.

Since the late 1980s, the role of Soviet citizens in the World War II on the side of the Third Reich has been extensively covered both in the Russian and foreign historiography. People who assisted Germany were made use of in diverse ways – at the front, in the occupied territories and in the Soviet rear. It is important to understand that, despite the opinion of the German intelligence (the Abwehr) that it was appropriate to use the "Eastern Card" in the war (Beevor, 1999: 199), leaders of the Third Reich adopted a very cautious approach to the use of Soviet citizens at the front. As a result, it turned out to be one of the fatal mistakes made by the Third Reich, and the "Eastern Card" was never fully played out. Leaders of the Third Reich took a position of progressing "in small steps". First, it published a directive on payment to volunteer assistants – "Hiwis"; its second success was a permit to staff divisions in the East with up to 15% of Russians and Ukrainians... The position led the outcome that the an independent Russian government – Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia and its armed forces – was created only in November 1944, when the right time was completely missed, and the fate of the war foredoomed (Strik-Strikfeldt, 1993: 117-118, 354). The cautious approach by the leaders of the Third Reich is clearly visible in the document cited below. In May 1943, the General Staff of Germany prepared an official memorandum entitled "Development and Status of War Propaganda in the East since Autumn 1942 (Vlasov Campaign)." This document was published in Russian in the journal *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya* 20 years ago in 1996 (1996. No. 4). The papers analyzes the practice of using activities developed as part of the Vlasov Campaign for propaganda purposes, i.e. the activities

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which became the first experience of using former Soviet citizens supporting the Third Reich in the war. The document was stored in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 1941–1945 period. Aus dem Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts. Serie E: 1941–1945, Bd VI, Dok. 85. p. 145–149. (Vishlev, 1996: 130-146). The document gives a good overview of the results that the activities produced as part of this campaign, and, in our opinion, needs no comment.

Document

I. Development and status of war propaganda in the east since autumn 1942 (Vlasov Campaign)

1. The purpose of the German war propaganda directed against the enemy is to demoralize enemy forces, undermine their capacity to resist enemy soldiers, motivate them to go over to our side on a massive scale, and thereby save the German blood. The same goals are also pursued with respect to bandits in the occupied territories, i.e. to deprive the enemy banditry of fertile soil, stimulate bandits to go over to our side and through this also save the German blood and prevent the diversion of German troops.

II. Development of war propaganda since autumn 1942

1) Background

In summer 1942, a Russian army commander, General-Lieutenant Vlasov (Fig. 2), was taken prisoner in the "Volkhov pocket" fighting. Once captured, he offered himself for the cause of combating Bolshevism.

Vlasov's first leaflet was published in September 1942 and was so successful that the headquarters of the OKW's operational command, as approved by the Chief of the OKW, decided to include a larger campaign, "Russians against Russians," in the plan of propaganda activities for the winter 1942/43.

2) Progress and results of the Vlasov Campaign to date.

A) Progress of the Campaign.

The campaign was based on the appeal written by Vlasov, in which the "Russian Committee" called for a struggle against Bolshevism on the side of Germany.

Units consisting of natives of Russia were combined for propaganda purposes. This was supposed to encourage patriotic, but at the same anti-Bolshevist forces to switch sides and start cooperation with Germany. At the same time it aimed to undermine the morale of Russians by instilling an idea into them that the place of Russian patriots on the side of Germany.

It was not until mid-January 1943, after a moment, suitable for the campaign, was in fact lost, that it was approved by the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories and was further developed. Nevertheless, it achieved a major success.

To avoid any doubts in the reliability of the German propaganda from the first steps, it had to be bolstered with practical measures. This gave birth to the idea of creating a committee which was to be given certain advisory functions in the economic and social spheres. Along with strengthening trust to the German propaganda, such committee was intended to weaken the Russian propaganda in areas abound with bandits, and thus address the issue of bandits in a way beneficial for us.

B) Results of the Campaign.

A detailed picture of the impact produced by the German war propaganda is provided by the attached reports from the troops and statements of prisoners of war.

Their summary suggests the following description of the impact:

A) Impact on the Russian army.

A large number of reports, received from all sections of the front, indicate that Vlasov's appeal makes a deep impression on Russian soldiers. A conclusion can be that Vlasov's appeal actively contributed to the disorganization of Russian resistance, undermined the enemy's strength and amplified the desire to go over to the side of Germany.

Countermeasures taken by the opposition confirm this impression.

Recently, however, more and more voices have been heard, which are questioning the honesty of the German propaganda by referring to the failure of the German side to comply with its earlier promises. We unanimously believe that the German side should officially declare its position at the moment – the declaration may come in the form of the Fuehrer Directive – and thus

dispel the existing doubts and ensure the campaign's success which can be decisive for the course of the war.

B) Impact on the occupied eastern areas.

Vlasov's appeal has also spread among civilian population of the occupied eastern territories in the shortest term, although its announcement in these areas has not yet been officially authorized. It has soothed concerns everywhere, which, in turn, has positively affected the situation with banditry and again has given the population hope for honest cooperation with Germany.

The ban on distributing the appeal in the occupied territories, of which the enemy is aware of, has negative consequences and is generally viewed by Russians as evidence that the whole campaign is just a propaganda trick.

c) Impact on units formed from natives of Russia.

Units, formed from natives of Russia, have been particularly impressed by Vlasov's appeal. Russians combating on our side see it as the first attempt of the German side to tell them not only against whom they should fight but for what they should fight as well.

Any doubts regarding the reliability of the German propaganda or any deviation from the promises will affect them even more severely.

d) Impact on prisoners of war.

In prisoner of war camps, Vlasov's appeal has led to a split of the single anti-German front which existed there. We are receiving an increasing number of applications for admission into units of natives. There have been repeated reports on the growing labor enthusiasm among prisoners of war serving in working teams (Considering the success, at the request of the air forces and the Todt Organization, the propaganda campaign is now also extended to air force support units formed from natives of Russia, and prisoners of war used by the Todt Organization).

e) Impact on foreign countries.

The Vlasov Campaign caused a great sensation among our allies, neutral or hostile states in April and May [1943]. It was massively suggested that the campaign could lead to a decisive turn in the war in Germany's favor if the German side ensured its right and skillful continuation.

Opportunities, which will be created for the enemy propaganda if the Vlasov Campaign fails, are boundless. Similarly, we should not underestimate the loss of confidence in German leaders, which neutral countries and our allies may sustain in this case.

III. Current status of the Campaign

The Campaign, which ran very intensively from the very beginning, has further intensified since mid-May (1943) following the connection of the propaganda operation Silberstreif (Silver Lining).

However, the enemy's increasing doubts in the German propaganda are hindering further progress of the Campaign with each passing day. We have no slogans or mottos which we could make use of to gain time until Fuehrer makes decision and are unable at the same time still to make the enemy feel the impact of the German campaign and hide the ambiguity of German goals.

We should not expect that we will manage to further successfully gain time.

IV. Summarized description of urgent measures and consequences of their possible rejection

1) The Vlasov Campaign, which was initially devised as a propaganda trick, has given start to a movement that, from the enemy's point of view, is dangerous and poses a threat of civil war.

The current situation requires strict control and support for the movement not to discredit the German war propaganda.

General Vlasov is particularly suitable for the role of the movement representative, as his position regarding national policies and his attitude to emigration coincide with Germany's vision.




Fig. 1. Address by the Russian Committee to soldiers and commanders of the Red Army

Vlasov is convinced that only honest collaboration with Germany guarantees ultimate success. Close surveillance, that he is still under, gives grounds for concluding that he is trustworthy and knows that there is no returning to Stalin option for him any longer...



Fig. 2. General Andrey Vlasov

Peak impact of the [German] propaganda based on officially approved messages has passed. Each subsequent day that brings no Fuehrer's decision will adversely affect our propaganda efforts. We can not ignore the fact that further delays (in addressing the issue) or phasing out the Vlasov Campaign will jeopardize our military interests, given that about 800 thousand Russians are already enrolled in our Eastern troops; that the Silberstreif propaganda operation is essentially

based on Vlasov's appeal; and that the situation with bandits (in the occupied territories) largely depends on how Germany will fulfill its promises.

2) For these reasons, it is critical to urgently implement the following measures that will enable progressive run of the German war propaganda efforts:

a) Rapid actions because further procrastinations are unacceptable from the military point of view;

b) Formulating Germany's official position on the Vlasov Campaign and, if possible, publishing the Fuehrer Directive. If there is no Directive, the German position then should be outlined in a document and put into practice in the form of a committee created of Russians (the committee will initially have advisory functions in specific areas, such as, taking care of the units formed from Russians, mounting propaganda exercises among the population, etc. In the future, if appropriate, its scope of activities will be extended to include economic propaganda);

c) Vlasov should become chairman of the Russian committee. He should be provided with all possible support both through propaganda and material resources, as he is the only figure which guarantees an integral combination of German demands and Russian wishes, as well as with his authority, he is able to ensure overwhelming success of the entire Campaign...

(Aus dem Archiv des Auswartigen Amts. Serie E: 1941-1945, Bd VI, Dok. 85. S 145-149)

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