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C O N T E N T S

**Articles and Statements**


Provoking a War: Polish Fake Documents in Warsaw's 17 <sup>th</sup> century Eastern Policy V. Pylypenko .....	3
At the Origins of Don Military Propaganda: the Creative Activity of I.S. Ul'yanov at the Time of the Crimean War A.Yu. Peretyatko .....	8
“How Our Fleet is Different from the Bourgeois One” or Distinctive Characteristics of Propaganda in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Fleet in the mid-1920s D.V. Liventsev .....	19
The Political-Information Component in the 1994–1996 Chechen Military-Political Conflict V.P. Trut .....	25
Hybrid Tools for Proxy Warfare A.E. Lebid .....	33

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## Articles and Statements

### Provoking a War: Polish Fake Documents in Warsaw's 17<sup>th</sup> century Eastern Policy

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#### Abstract

This paper addresses the use of fake documents in Rzeczpospolita's 17<sup>th</sup>-century political discourse. The author discusses a variety of fake documents used at the time, including the following: the Sultan's letters to the King of Rzeczpospolita, fake correspondence between the monarchs, the Sultan's letters to the Polish gentry, and a set of false agreements related to the creation of a European Christian anti-Turkish coalition. Whomever they may have been addressed to, these documents must have had an impact on political life in the Polish-Lithuanian state and must have served to push Warsaw into war with the Ottoman Empire.

**Keywords:** fake document, correspondence, political publicistic writing, political discourse.

#### 1. Introduction

A key characteristic of the state system in Rzeczpospolita was the active participation of the Polish and Lithuanian gentry in the state's political life. For centuries, the gentry fought for its estates rights, and it achieved great success in this. Essentially, in the Polish-Lithuanian state it was the gentry that had a major say in both foreign and domestic policy making, wielding decision-making power over matters like establishing the size of taxes, affirming important decisions by the King, ratifying international agreements, etc.

The gentry enjoying this exclusive status in the state system made political propaganda and publicistic writing a necessary element in political life and a key factor in state decision-making. With that said, Rzeczpospolita was no paragon of democracy (unlike what the gentry believed it to be) – there were oligarchic groups (especially, in Ukrainian provinces), there was clientelism, and there were dynastic conflicts. So extensive use was made of literature's propaganda potential. Every crucial political decision was grounded in sustained work on popularizing a certain viewpoint and discussions with the opponents. "Political parties" worked with all types of writers. Sometimes they acted on their own initiative, aiming for a cash award from magnates whose stance they represented. But more often they were hired by others. Their "literary arsenal" included just about anything – from decent analytical essays to occasional verses of a propagandist nature, many of dubious artistic quality. One was not squeamish, either, to employ fakes, which were produced for the purpose of galvanizing public thought in the run-up to another Sejm meeting and helping, on the back of an emotional surge, "push" a certain proposal through the Sejm.

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The tradition to use fakes in political discourse is a fairly long one. Some of the classical examples of the use of fakes in Europe include the letters of Prester John or the Donation of Constantine, which was proven a forgery by renowned Italian humanist Lorenzo Valla.

## 2. Materials and methods

This paper's primary focus is on the use of historical fakes in the political struggle in Rzeczpospolita. One thing to note straightaway, however, is that it is hardly possible to describe and analyze all fakes which were produced in the history of the Polish-Lithuanian state. On the one hand, there is no publication cataloguing these fakes, and, on the other hand, this is way beyond the scope of this work.

In the context of the subject under investigation, the study's source base has a number of distinct characteristics of its own. I have no interest in forged financial documents or land acts, or documents related to conferring nobility (which abound), but do only in those which have to do with Rzeczpospolita's Eastern (Turkish) policy specifically. Thus, the study's source base is grounded in a set of forgeries produced in Rzeczpospolita in the 17<sup>th</sup> century.

## 3. Discussion and results

In terms of its Turkish policy, Warsaw tried to balance between pragmatic interests, a categorical unwillingness to start a costly and very dangerous war with the Porte, and a willingness to retain in international relations its image as an *Antemurale Christianitatis*, i.e. the Bulwark of Christianity in Europe, a defender of the entire Christian world from the Moslem threat. Zygmunt III and his son and successor Władysław IV continually sought to enlist the support of the gentry to advance their plans regarding the anti-Turkish war – but to no avail. One of these attempts has to do with the first fake we are going to examine below.

Following a failed attempt to drag Warsaw into another Holy League, sought to be organized by the Austrian Habsburgs in the late 16<sup>th</sup> century, Zygmunt III had to make a pause before undertaking a new move. In the early 1600s, he resumed his attempts to enlist the support of the Sejm. It is these attempts that might have had to do with the emergence of a forged letter from Persian Shah Abbas to the Polish King. A copy of the letter is stored at the Raczyński Library within a *silva rerum*, a collection of handwritten documents maintained by the Polish gentry for their own needs. The front-page contains the date November 22, 1605, with Zygmunt III listed as the recipient. The very date listed on the document is testimony to the author planning to distribute the text on the eve of the 1606 general sejm. This required hurrying up to get it done before the convening of a pre-sejm meeting of the regional councils in 1605. Based on the letter's text, Persian Shah Abbas proposes that the Polish King, along with the other Christian rulers, start a war on several fronts against the Ottoman Empire. This kind of proposal was not new in Polish political publicistic writing. Back in the late 16<sup>th</sup> century, there had started to emerge in literature calls to taking a closer look at Persia as a potential ally in a possible war with Turkey. The two states had had diplomatic contacts. In 1605, Rzeczpospolita was visited by envoys from Shah Abbas who approached the King with a partnership proposal. At the same time, prior to the 1605 sejm the King himself claimed that the Persians were distracting the Sultan and confusing him, precluding him thereby from attacking Poland (Strzelecki, 1921: 45). Curiously, the year 1608 saw the publication of a verse by Wawrzyniec Chlebowski entitled 'Trąba Pobudki Ziemie Perskiej do Wszystkich Narodów Chrześcijańskich, Przeciwko Machometanow' (Chlebowski, 1608), which called on all the European monarchs to join hands and start a war against Istanbul.

Why do I think the letter is a forgery? There are several arguments in favor of doing so. Firstly, the letter's structure is out of alignment with the diplomatic protocol. It, of course, may be assumed that the person who created the record in the *silva rerum* must have left out of the letter all the redundant parts. At the same time, the letter contains several phrases which neither the Persian Shah or any of his courtiers, nor any of his envoys to the Polish King could have possibly produced. For instance, in proposing peace and amity to Zygmunt III, Abbas expresses a hope that **"as two Christian rulers, we will enjoy a relationship of love and friendship similar to the one between the Italian states and all the Christian rulers"**. The letter further says that to fight Istanbul **"we have already sent our Christian troops (in the name of Jesus) to seize their land and subdue them"** (Copia lista krola, 1605: k.125-125v.).

Thus, Abbas's letter to Zygmunt III may be regarded as a fake which was written specifically on the eve of a Sejm session for the purpose of promoting amongst the gentry the idea of offensive war against the Ottoman Empire. The plan failed, and the following year Rzeczpospolita witnessed the Zebrzydowski Rebellion, while Warsaw got involved in the False Dmitry ventures. But the fact that the letter got in a *silva rerum* is testimony to the eventual dissemination of its contents amongst the gentry. Unfortunately, it is not possible to find out at this time where, who, and when placed the letter's text in the *silva rerum*.

Another fake that might have pushed the gentry into war with the Turks has been identified by Polish researcher Dariusz Kołodziejczyk. A letter dated July 26, 1618, written in the name of the Sultan, contains accusations against Zygmunt III of attempts to sever the friendly ties with the Porte and provoke a war. In response to these attempts by the King, the Sultan promises death to Zygmunt III himself, the destruction of Christianity, and repressions against the clergy: "Are you not scared of death with such a small number of men at your side? If war is what is on your mind, so be it – you will soon see how powerful our state is. Wait with your plans until the next summer, and you will soon know our real power. I will seize your capital, Kraków, and show no mercy. I will leave you my bloody sword so that you remember me forever. I will walk all over your land, trample down your crucified God, and root out your faith for good... So I conclude here, and I want you to think about it and be ready". I totally agree with the assessment of the text provided by Professor Kołodziejczyk. I just want to add that it is not impossible that the text was employed by the author, who is certain to have had the Royal Court behind him, not to push the gentry into war (as this was extremely hard to achieve) but, rather, wangle additional funds for defense purposes, for in the letter they were giving Zygmunt III some time to prepare – until the following summer.

Known for its long history of use, the above type of fake was re-launched nearly 30 years later, during preparations for the Turkish War – now by Władysław IV. But this time contemporaries clearly understood who and why did it (Kołodziejczyk, 2012: 91).

Another fake letter from the Sultan to Warsaw emerged in 1672. Although long known about among researchers, the "letter", however, continues, as noted by D. Kołodziejczyk, to be regarded by some historians as original (Kołodziejczyk, 2009: 13). However, unlike many of the other fakes, its purpose is not to provoke a war but mobilize the resources for defense purposes. This is attested by the circumstances under which the text might have emerged. In 1672, Rzeczpospolita lost Western Podolia along with one of the state's more powerful fortresses – Kamieniec Podolski. The fortress was viewed as a gate to Rzeczpospolita, the state's bulwark. Therefore, the letter contained no threats of war, as the war had already begun. The fake's author was using a different tactic. He was poking right at the sore spot, something which the gentry valued the most and which they fought for with so much zeal – it was about a threat of loss of freedom.

The gentry's attitude toward freedom has been discussed widely<sup>1</sup>. Freedom was the biggest value for the gentry. It was something that set it apart from other social categories and peoples. The threat of loss of freedom sounded especially humiliating coming from the lips of the Sultan. The Polish gentry viewed the Sultan as a symbol of tyranny and absolute power and viewed the actual Ottoman Empire as a state where there was no freedom (Pylypenko, 2014).

Fakes were launched into public circulation not only in the form of manuscripts but in printed form as well. This, certainly, would help get more readers, and, plus, add to the veracity thereof. I am going to illustrate this via the following two examples. In 1620, they published in Kraków a short verse by Marcin Paszkowski entitled 'Posiłek Bellony Słowińskiej na Odpor Nieprzyjaciółom Krzyża Ś. Na Seym Warśawski Terazniejszy w Roku 1620 Wydany'. As evidenced by the title, the text contains a call on all Christian states to join hands to fight the Turks. The author himself was not a very famous poet, and wrote occasional poetry. Among the key themes in Paszkowski's oeuvre was the Turkish and Tatar threat, with continual calls made to fighting the Ottomans (Kuran, 2012: 663). While this particular verse is no different from any of Paszkowski's previous verses in substance, it does end somewhat differently. It contains the text of an alleged agreement entitled 'Umowa Niemiecka z Różnymi Nacjami Chrześcijańskimi na Turka i

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<sup>1</sup> For more literature see the following: Grześkowiak-Krwawicz Anna. *Regina libertas: Wolność w polskiej myśli politycznej XVIII wieku.* – Gdańsk. – 2006 and the collection of articles *Wartości polityczne Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów: Struktury aksjologiczne i granice cywilizacyjne / redakcja naukowa Anna Grześkowiak-Krwawicz.* Warszawa, 2017. 318 p.

Tatary', claimed to have been signed by the European monarchs. The coalition comprised the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, the Pope, the German states (both Protestant and Catholic), the Spanish King, Czechia, Moravia, Silesia, 72 free cities, Hungary, and Poland (Paszkowski, 1620: A4-A4V). Each of the allies was providing troops of their own for the war effort. The united army was to be headed by the Emperor himself. This way of talking about yet another alliance of Christian rulers hardly stands up to much scrutiny. Suffice it to say that Paszkowski brings together in a single army the Catholics and the Protestants. And that is when Europe was being torn by the Thirty Years' War. However, from a perspective of political propaganda and the gentry's influence on public opinion, of importance was information regarding the engaging of other states in the struggle against the Turks. It is also worth noting that the verse was addressed to participants in the general sejm held in Warsaw November 3 through December 11, 1620. The emergence of the verse was aligned with the "spirit of the time", as Rzeczpospolita's army had been destroyed by the Turks in the Battle of Cecora, Hetman Żółkiewski had died in the battle, and Rzeczpospolita had been left without an army. The Sejm had several vitally important issues to address: come up, as soon as possible, with the funds for a new army, find allies, and appoint a new hetman.

In my view, the greatest propaganda effect came from information indicating that the other states were providing funding for the war effort. Nearly every project related to the reform of the Polish army shattered against the need to come up with the funds for the purpose. The gentry were categorically unwilling to introduce new taxes to pay for the army for fears that it would strengthen the King's power.

It is hard to tell whether or not Paszkowski's verse had an effect on Sejm decision-making, as no coalition was formed. It is likely there was no direct effect, albeit the very fact of the use in political discourse of various ways of influencing public thought is testimony to the vast extent of discussion on the Turkish subject.

Perhaps, the most famous forgery in Ukrainian history, a fake with a long and vibrant history, is the apocryphal letter of Zaporozhian Cossacks to the Turkish Sultan. The text has undergone numerous translations and rewritings. The most famous are its translations into French and German, which helped make it accessible to the European reader. The letter's text was written by Koshovyi Otaman of the Zaporozhian Host Ivan Sirko in response to a letter to the Cossacks from the Sultan. Due to the known popularity of the Cossacks' letter to the Sultan, I will not go into its actual contents in this paper. However, it may be worth noting the popularity in political publicistic writing in various countries of apocryphal correspondence between sultans and various rulers in Europe. To exemplify this, I will mention a set of printed letters allegedly written by the Sultan to Zygmunt III and the replies to them. They were published by Grzegorz Czaradzki in 1621 in a little brochure entitled 'Pobudka na Wojnę Turecką Rycerskim Ludziom Polskim ku Pocięże, z Listy Tureckimi y Constitucyami Tegorocznymi o Rządzie Woennym Przydaninymi'. The letter, addressed to the Polish King in the name of the Sultan, contains an allegation that the King is deliberately breaking peace between Rzeczpospolita and the Ottoman Empire without any cogent reasons for doing so. The Sultan threatens: "And let me assure you that I desire to vanquish you and stampede you day and night, and I will finally establish my authority over the entire globe... And you will know my ruthlessness... I have resolved to raze a few castles and towns of yours to the ground right in front of your eyes. Do not expect any more of our amity and stop trusting your defensive walls. I want to ruin Kraków so as to make certain your kingdom remembers my bloody sword forevermore" (Czaradzki, 1621: A4). One cannot but notice a similarity between this text and those mentioned above. The author goes on to present the reader with Zygmunt III's reply to the Sultan. The King allegedly speaks of how strong the Christian faith is and that Jesus is there to protect all faithful Christians, and tries to assure the Sultan that castles and fortresses in Rzeczpospolita are safe and that artillery will suffice to defend it from any adversary (Czaradzki, 1621: B1V-B2V).

Historians have identified instances of apocryphal correspondence between monarchs and sultans in other states as well. For example, 17<sup>th</sup>-century lists contain the legendary correspondence of Ivan the Terrible and the Turkish Sultan. Some researchers are of the view that it originated in the Ambassadorial Prikaz and was based on merging Turkish and Tatar diplomatic correspondence with Moscow book tradition (Kagan, 1957: 272). The priority in our study is not what exactly is in the correspondence (so I am ignoring the actual text herein) but the very fact of its existence altogether.

#### 4. Conclusion

Political discourse in Rzeczpospolita was often infiltrated by fake documents and letters. It is impossible to tell the exact percentage of fake documents in circulation at the time, but the informed guess is that there were quite many. Documents of this kind were produced by representatives of various political groups, including those of both the pro-Royal and gentry opposition. Depending on the political force, fake documents were to perform various functions in propaganda, like smearing the name of an opponent, “pushing” a certain proposal through the Sejm, or mobilizing public thought.

In the context of Warsaw’s Turkish policy, quite frequent were forged letters from the Sultan to the King containing threats of war, destruction of the Catholic Church, and enslavement of the gentry. In my opinion, letters of this kind might have been used as part of the political struggle for a variety of objectives, including both as an argument for introducing additional taxes to pay for defense and for criticizing the Royal Court’s international policy.

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
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## At the Origins of Don Military Propaganda: the Creative Activity of I.S. Ul'yanov at the Time of the Crimean War

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### Abstract

During the Crimean War, a series of patriotic texts by prominent Don writer I.S. Ul'yanov were published in The Don Military Gazette. This article represents an attempt to analyze these texts and compare them with the latest official Don Cossack propaganda. The author comes to the conclusion that I.S. Ul'yanov's oeuvre clearly features a plotline that would later become typical for that kind of propaganda. This plotline is a panegyric for a Don hero who, rather than representing a real historical person, epitomizes an ideal Cossack, someone to whom the author ascribes some of the ideas and statements that matter to himself. Of particular mention in this respect is Ul'yanov's work 'Military Ingenuity', which could qualify as a historically credible narrative but would eventually be positioned by his younger contemporaries as a literary story. Certain elements thereof were even included in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century in 'The Pictures of the Past Quiet Don', a book released at the behest of the military authorities which was intended to be read by those in military units and schools.

**Keywords:** Don Cossack Host, Crimean War, military propaganda, The Don Military Gazette, I.S. Ul'yanov.

### 1. Introduction

The previous issue of the Propaganda in the World and Local Conflicts journal carried a small article devoted to military-patriotic propaganda amongst the Don Host during the Crimean War (Peretyatko, 2018: 39-48). The article discussed why it is this particular war that led to the spread of the actual literary text format in Don print: if prior to 1854 the only local paper, The Don Military Gazette, had published only one story and not a single poem, in the period 1854–1856 it, by contrast, would now each year publish five to 10 patriotic stories and poems in one way or another devoted to real military events (Peretyatko, 2018: 45-46). With that said, most of the literary works published were by totally unknown individuals who had published nothing – either before or after the Crimean War (Peretyatko, 2018: 46). The overall failure of literary propaganda in the Don region in that period (with the number of The Don Military Gazette subscribers remaining microscopic – just a few dozen copies) may be linked with the incompetence of its authors, the artistic level of their works remaining quite low (Peretyatko, 2018: 46). Having said that, at the initial stages (in 1854) quite an active part in the propaganda activity of The Don Military Gazette was taken by one of the few recognized Don writers of the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century – Ivan Samoilovich Ul'yanov. This paper will examine both the only story written by Ul'yanov during the

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Crimean War *and* a set of rough sketches of literary and publicistic texts that have survived to this day. Was the author, who was well-respected amongst the Cossacks, able to offer the reader works that would be perfectly aligned with the psychology of the Don Cossack? To what degree were the patriotic ideas propounded by him aligned with those which afterwards would be actively employed by the Russian imperial media for Cossack-oriented propaganda? And, lastly, what was the significance of Ul'yanov's texts to the development of Don military literature?

## 2. Materials and methods

A key source of information for this study is manuscripts by I.S. Ul'yanov which have survived to this day (GARO. F. 243. Op. 1. D. 28, 29, 31). The authors undertook to compare the characteristics and techniques typical for those works *with* the latest texts intended for the cultivation of military and patriotic spirit amongst the Don Cossacks (Kirillov, Popov, 1909; Krasnov, 1909; Leonov, 1909). Accordingly, the study's key methods are the historical-descriptive method (considering that texts by I.S. Ul'yanov have yet to be introduced into scientific discourse) and the historical-comparative one.

## 3. Discussion

Before proceeding to examine I.S. Ul'yanov's texts, it may be worth saying a few words about the writer himself. In recent years, alongside us, articles wholly or partly devoted to this Don figure have been published by a few other scholars, including A.A. Volvenko (Volvenko, 2015; Peretyatko, 2019) and O.S. Morozova (Morozova, 2007; Morozova, 2008). This kind of attention on the part of historians to someone who is a secondary figure in Don history must be associated with the fact that the State Archive of Rostov Oblast (GARO) has maintained a file of records on his family, which is quite vast both in manuscript volume and diversity (GARO. F. 243). As evidenced from O.M. Morozova's survey of pre-revolutionary private-origin files of records maintained within the GARO, this is one of two files of records of this kind in the archive which provide materials from the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> and mid-19<sup>th</sup> century (Morozova, 2011: 42-43). Therefore, if, in working with the time's other historical Don figures, researchers are normally faced with a lack of information, in the case of I.S. Ul'yanov it is the other way round – the surviving published works, rough texts, and correspondence by the Don writer, historian, public figure, and general make it possible to explore his personality from totally different methodological and conceptual angles. However, this diversity of interpretations leaves us with quite a fragmentary image of I.S. Ul'yanov, with certain elements of his biography (particularly, his writing activity) remaining insufficiently researched, while, by contrast, some other aspects (e.g., his participation in the public life of the Don region in the 1860s) have been studied in quite a detailed manner. Therefore, the characterization of writer I.S. Ul'yanov provided below is of a preliminary nature and may lack accuracy in certain respects.

By the start of the Crimean War, I.S. Ul'yanov, born in 1803, was precisely 50 years old (Dontsy, 2003: 480). He became part of the Don elite not by birth, as his father was not a gentleman by birth; he even received his officership only after the birth of his son (Dontsy, 2003: 480). His manor, known as 'Mirage', was personally established by him on a tract of land he had received for his service (Dontsy, 2003: 481). O.M. Morozova characterizes him mainly as an official with just a few years of full military service, who on the civil front, however, rose in the period 1848–1854 to the rank of Senior Member of the Host's Board, i.e. "Deputy Appointed Hetman on Civil Matters", a Nicholas-era functionary (Morozova, 2007: 308-327). Indeed, after 1854 I.S. Ul'yanov's career would not just go into decline, but he would actually begin to be regarded by the authorities as a firebrand and dissenter who stood up against the State's liberal reforms in the spirit of the reign of Alexander II. In 1873, Don ataman M.I. Chertkov characterized him as follows: "General Ul'yanov is old-school, with old-fashioned views, doubtless highly intelligent, known for his proclivity for opposition, which he used to exercise against the atamans in the past" (Karpenko, 2006: 278). Thus, this article's protagonist made his career by virtue of his personal qualities, among which his contemporaries particularly highlighted intelligence and allegiance to the conservative ideals of the Nicholas era.

Possibly, a decisive role in shaping I.S. Ul'yanov's political views was played by his captivity by Polish rebels in 1830. Threats and insults on the part of the Poles would make the Don Cossack feel most keenly his Russian national identity and take pride in it. In his personal notes made at the

time which were not intended for publication and would come out only many years after his death, I.S. Ul'yanov called Nicholas I "a great monarch who looks after Russia as a guardian angel, a monarch who possesses Peter's strong will and efficiency and Catherine's wisdom and perception of the people's spirit" (Ul'yanov, 1901: 83-84). No less enraptured is the manner in which the Cossack writes about the Russian people – "a truly remarkable nation, which concurrently is highly enterprising and kind" (Ul'yanov, 1901: 84-85). With that said, I.S. Ul'yanov drew a clear line between the bulk of the Russian population *and* Don Cossacks. He would be greatly vexed at "Russians' bad-mouthing of the Cossacks", something he kept hearing from his fellow captives (Ul'yanov, 1901: 81). The Don officer would even pose the rhetorical question as to whether he would be able to live to see a day when one "no longer calls them [the Don Cossacks] outcasts and finally equates Russians with Russians" (Ul'yanov, 1901: 82).

Thus, not only Russian, but specifically Don, patriotism, would form a significant part, if not the basis, of I.S. Ul'yanov's social stance, while his attitude toward Nicholas I was most rapt. What is more, he regarded patriotism as a crucial quality of literature even prior to his Polish captivity. In one of his early manuscripts written in 1820, the Don writer calls on Russian writers to leave writing about Napoleon to the latter's "compatriots and followers" and instead switch to writing about "the heroes of national history" (GARO. F. 243. Op. 1. D. 28. L. 13-13ob). Therefore, it is not only no wonder, but is actually perfectly natural, that in 1854 I.S. Ul'yanov, despite being a busy man with a high service rank, would take part in the literary propaganda of The Don Military Gazette, something another Don writer of the time, I.I. Karsnov, would refrain from doing.

It is also worth noting that manuscripts by I.S. Ul'yanov demonstrate an evolution from the early, "romantic", stage in his oeuvre (1820–1830) (e.g., a translation of a work by A. Mickiewicz (GARO. F. 243. Op. 1. D. 29. L. 118-129ob) and one of a set of philosophical dialogues by an unknown author (GARO. F. 243. Op. 1. D. 29. L. 41-43ob)) to the "utilitarian" period (1840–1850) (e.g., the articles 'On a Regular Ox-Drawn Cart' (GARO. F. 243. Op. 1. D. 28. L. 85-86) and 'Workers on the Don' (GARO. F. 243. Op. 1. D. 28. L. 87-88ob)). Judging from surviving sources, early works by I.S. Ul'yanov did not receive special recognition outside of the Land of the Don Cossack Host, although the file of records on it contains a letter dated 1832 which voices a request to have a sort of "my creation" published in Northern Bee. However, no testimony that the work *was* actually published has been provided to this day (GARO. F. 243. Op. 1. D. 31. L. 1-2). The situation changed in 1843, when The Agrarian Gazette published an economics article by I.S. Ul'yanov, which it had first abridged greatly – much to his chagrin. What is more, a year later the same source would publish a critical review of the article, which would attract to the Don writer a certain amount of reader attention, but which at the same time would cause him great displeasure (GARO. F. 243. Op. 1. D. 31. L. 3). Subsequently, I.S. Ul'yanov would attempt more than once to gain a foothold as an author that can write not just for the provincial press but for the capital's print media as well, but he would often be hampered in that by his keen self-esteem. Nonetheless, he would gain a certain amount of recognition on the part of the capital's public, and in 1853 he would be mentioned in a highly authoritative source, The Works of the Imperial Free Economic Society. The publication would report that I.S. Ul'yanov had taken part in a contest related to "seeking out and describing a facile, convenient, and inexpensive method for drying and storing bread", and that his work, although it did not garner him any special award, was recommended for publication in that major journal (*Torzhestvennoe zasedanie, 1853: 44*). That, however, was absolutely not fine with the Don author – he would respond to a request to have his work published with quite an irate letter, in which he would communicate to the Secretary of the Free Economic Society that he did not wish to have the article published, as it had "failed to gain the amount of approval which would permit considering it particularly useful" (GARO. F. 243. Op. 1. D. 31. L. 28).

As a result, by the 1850s, I.S. Ul'yanov's reputation as a writer amongst the Don Cossacks would be of a dual nature: his contemporaries would characterize him as both an author of "superb verses" (GARO. F. 243. Op. 1. D. 31. L. 34-34ob), which, however, were absolutely not known beyond the Don region, *and* an author of economic articles published in some of the capital's major journals (Dontsy, 2003: 481). Despite him not being a professional writer (there were hardly any in the Don region at the time, anyways), essentially, only I.I. Krasnov, with his book about Don Cossacks published in Saint Petersburg (Krasnov, 1852), and A.A. Leonov, whose verses had once received a positive review from no other than V.I. Belinskii (Belinskii, 1953), could compete with

I.S. Ul'yanov in terms of literary recognition. So it is no wonder that in early 1854 he not only would take part in patriotic propaganda by The Don Military Gazette but would actually assume charge thereof, backing up with his authority as an official and a literary figure the start of regular publication on the journal's pages of literary patriotic texts.

The first text of this kind, published during the Crimean War in 1854, Issue 2 of The Don Military Gazette (the second ever short story published in the paper), was by no other than I.S. Ul'yanov (Strukov, 1878: 53). It should be taken into account that the unofficial part of the Don region's only newspaper came into being only in 1852 – prior to that, it had published only government news and ordinances (Strukov, 1878: 1). It may be reasonable to assume that, if the first patriotic literary text published by the paper had been a work by a chance author, an amateur whose works would subsequently be actively published on its pages, it could have raised questions and drawn criticism on the part of conservatively predisposed readers. So, a patriotic story by a high-ranking official, someone who was part of the circle of a host ataman, an author whose works were published in Saint Petersburg, and a person well-respected amongst the Don region's educated public would have been received a lot better. As mentioned earlier, eventually that would be the case, and I.S. Ul'yanov's 'Military Ingenuity' was followed in The Don Military Gazette by a few dozen stories and verses by less known or totally unknown authors, which were received by Don society quite indifferently, without astonishment or resentment. Since the story in question is not big and has not been reprinted ever since it came out, it is worth providing all of it herein in its original form.

"The description of the Kalalakh battle, provided in last year's Issue 48 of the Don paper, in which our glorious ataman, M.I. Platov, first carved his immortal name into the annals of military history, brings back the memories of an occurrence first heard from no other than Matvei Ivanovich and later related to me by a relative of Platov's, Lieutenant-Colonel P.N. Ilovaiskii.

On the eve of the battle, after the detachment and transport of Colonel Larionov and Sergeant Major Platov has set up camp for the night, a Cossack guard comes up to Platov, takes him for a stroll, and asks him to put his ear to the ground.

- So can you hear it, Matvei Ivanovich?

- I can hear some kind of noise. Sounds like bird squalling.

- Come on. Birds don't squall in a murky night, do they? They are quiet.

- So what is it then?

- All right. Close by, there is the enemy camping for the night, with fires laid around the place. So the lights have made the birds fly up and squall. Judging by the loudness of it, there must be many fires out there, meaning there are numerous infidels out there too right now. Live longer and know more. We'll now need to keep our eyes skinned and be prepared to face the enemy at dawn.

It was the first piece of news about the impending danger. The necessary measures would be taken instantly – for the attacking enemy to be met with an improvised sacks-and-wagons fortification, which had brought glory to the heroically defending Cossacks.

Platov would later reminisce, with gratitude, of the Cossack's ingenuity and experience. Quite possibly, if the Cossacks had spotted the enemy too late, they would have been short of time to rearrange the train; given that the detachment was not very big numbers-wise, this could have made their defense quite fragile.

Throughout his military career, Platov was the most accessible officer a common Cossack would ever meet – he knew the names, sobriquets, and addresses of nearly all Cossacks distinguished by acumen and prowess (let alone the officials). He liked chatting with them and would never leave unheeded a single piece of advice or comment founded on the Cossack's experience and typical ingenuity and resolve. You should be able to hear the following story from one of Platov's comrades-in-arms. One day a "cloaklet" (a term used by Matvei Ivanovich to refer to retinue officers), who was accompanying Platov's convoy at night on a rainy day, strayed off the course. Following a series of wearisome wanderings, he ordered for camp to be set up. Soon after the sky started to clear, Platov was visited by a group of Cossacks, who started to explain to him that the camp was, actually, positioned with its rear to the enemy, trying to back that up by pointing to the dew over the hills, the stars, and the direction of the "Batu Road" (the Milky Way). Matvei Ivanovich, after having assured himself of the fairness of their comments and realized the graveness of the error, issued a furious alarm, with the retinue officer having to face the brunt of its

consequences. The camp's position would be changed immediately, with the ensuing horse patrol activities and the advent of the dawn only substantiating the "cloaklet"'s error" (GARO. F. 243. Op. 1. D. 28. L. 154-155ob).

A reader who is conversant of pre-revolutionary Don historiography may find the dialogue between M.I. Platov and the old Cossack provided at the story's beginning quite familiar. The thing is that it is reproduced word for word in a book published in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century at the behest of the military authorities which was intended to be read by those in schools and military units, 'The Pictures of the Past Quiet Don' by P.N. Krasnov (the later author would only change the arrangement of the sentences in the last line and make the Cossack's words to M.I. Platov a bit more respectful) (Krasnov, 1909: 205-206). And that is for a reason: the small story by I.S. Ul'yanov and the large book by P.N. Krasnov are linked by powerful conceptual similarities, although it is hard to tell whether it is direct influence or just the possibility that the two authors, divided by a century in time, might have had the same understanding of Cossack psychology and tried to influence the same characteristics of Cossack consciousness. It is this similarity that enabled P.N. Krasnov to insert a dialogue from a work by his predecessor, which contemporaries would position as a story, into his historical book so naturally that the transition to I.S. Ul'yanov's text in 'The Pictures of the Past Quiet Don' is hardly noticeable.

What, above all, is common to literary propaganda by I.S. Ul'yanov and P.N. Krasnov is the uncertainty of the genre, which is on the border between literature and historical research. In 'Military Ingenuity', the author claims that he is describing real events – and is doing so without adding anything of his own but by reference to input from some witnesses. However, already in the case of his description of the events preceding the Kalalakh battle the information provided appears to be highly inaccurate. To substantiate it, I.S. Ul'yanov invokes a relative of M.I. Platov's P.N. Ilovaiskii; but he will not specify how it had become known to P.N. Ilovaiskii – from the Don ataman personally or from rumors about him. What is more, he provides the dialogue between M.I. Platov and the old Cossack in a detailed fashion – it is not paraphrased but appears to be provided word for word. Having said that, it is clear from the context that there had been no witnesses to the dialogue, it had not been written down either, and I.S. Ul'yanov was reproducing it 80 years later based on the memories of people who had once heard of it. But it is the use of literary dialogue that helped the Don author to have the Cossack utter the dictum 'Live longer and know more', a phrase that is crucial to his text which reflects the "military ingenuity" of Don Cossacks. If I.S. Ul'yanov had provided the phrase as his own, the text might have produced a smaller propaganda effect, as military ingenuity would be talked about not by an 18<sup>th</sup> century veteran who had helped M.I. Platov garner the first victory but a military official whose military experience was limited to just a lengthy captivity with the enemy.

In this regard, it would be of interest to trace the way P.N. Krasnov later "deploys" his source, the story by I.S. Ul'yanov – he does not add to it anything new in the parts preceding and those following the word-for-word dialogue but actually "literarizes" them, making them more attractive for the reader and transforming the heroes' image.

I.S. Ul'yanov's version: "On the eve of the battle, after the detachment and transport of Colonel Larionov and Sergeant Major Platov has set up camp for the night, a Cossack guard comes up to Platov, takes him for a stroll, and asks him to put his ear to the ground".

P.N. Krasnov's version: "Platov, a young, 23-year-old, colonel was about to go to bed when he was visited in his tent by an old Cossack who more than once had been outside of the Kuban steppe.

- Matvei Ivanovich, - he said, - Can I see you for a second?

Platov quickly got dressed and followed the Cossack out into the open steppe.

- Can you put your ear to the ground? – the Cossack said to Platov.

Platov got down" (Krasnov, 1909: 205-206).

I.S. Ul'yanov's version: "It was the first piece of news about the impending danger. The necessary measures would be taken instantly – for the attacking enemy to be met with an improvised sacks-and-wagons fortification, which had brought glory to the heroically defending Cossacks. ... Platov would later reminisce, with gratitude, of the Cossack's ingenuity and experience".

P.N. Krasnov's version: "Platov heard the ingenuous Cossack out (the epithet "ingenuous" may serve as an additional testimony to P.N. Krasnov invoking the story 'Military Ingenuity'), then

quietly walked into the camp, had the regiment up, had them get everything ready, had them pull the wagons into the bivouac area, and ordered everyone to just sit tight and wait for the enemy to attack” (Krasnov, 1909: 206).

It is not hard to notice that, if I.S. Ul’yanov’s main character is M.I. Platov’s collocutor, a “Cossack guard”, who alerts his commander to the impending danger, P.N. Krasnov assigns a central role to a future Don ataman, noting that he agrees to follow the experienced Cossack out into the field despite having gone to bed already, and that he “had the regiment up” and had them “wait for the enemy to attack”, whilst in the earlier text the measures were somehow taken on their own – owing to the Cossacks’ “military ingenuity”. As a result, the plotline stays the same, but conceptually the text changes tangibly, with a panegyric for Don Cossacks turning into one for M.I. Platov personally. It is more than likely that I.S. Ul’yanov, too, approached the initial story by P.N. Ilovaiskii in a creative fashion – somewhere he added something of his own to it and somewhere he just added more detail to a story founded on hearsay from 80 years back. It is also worth remembering that a literary text would have been more interesting to a less-prepared reader than a dry historical research study.

Altogether unverifiable is I.S. Ul’yanov’s description of the events with the “coatlet”, a retinue officer who strayed off the course. Here the Don author provides no source from which he got that information, nor does he furnish any details that would permit linking it to a specific date or place. With that said, we are presented now with quite a vivid testimony to Don Cossacks’ “military ingenuity”: we learn that, owing to their experience and acumen, the Cossacks knew their way around in the situation better than a well-trained retinue officer! It, perhaps, is due to the story’s doubtful credibility and obvious propaganda focus that the author’s younger contemporaries would classify ‘Military Ingenuity’ as a literary story, in contrast with other historical materials published in *The Don Military Gazette* which were positioned as scholarly works (Strukov, 1878: 53).

We have already touched upon the next characteristic that is common to the propaganda works by I.S. Ul’yanov and P.N. Krasnov. Their quite loose treatment of the sources enabled these authors to have the ideas that were important to them be voiced by major historical figures. We are talking here about not just anonymous 18<sup>th</sup> century Cossacks but no other than M.I. Platov. I.S. Ul’yanov was here a lot more careful: in his story, the legendary whirlwind ataman utters no major phrases, with the author not claiming to reproduce long speeches by Don Cossacks’ sacrosanct ataman word for word. Nevertheless, a major conceptual focus in ‘Military Ingenuity’ is on the statement “Throughout his military career, Platov was the most accessible officer a common Cossack would ever meet – he knew the names, sobriquets, and addresses of nearly all Cossacks distinguished by acumen and prowess (let alone the officials). He liked chatting with them and would never leave unheeded a single piece of advice or comment founded on the Cossack’s experience and typical ingenuity and resolve”, which, in actual fact, has yet to be substantiated. P.N. Krasnov would proceed a lot farther – he would make M.I. Platov deliver patriotic and religious speeches, something the poorly educated Don Cossack was hardly capable of doing at the time. For instance, right in the heat of the Kalalakh battle, during a brief lull, M.I. Platov allegedly had this to say in response to a surrender offer: “No way! I’d rather die in honor and glory than let the enemy possess me and slap me in the face, to the shame of my people. What shall be, shall be. I place my faith in God. He won’t leave us without help!” (Krasnov, 1909: 207). In theory, this kind of approach would have eliminated the very possibility of discussion: in the case of ‘Military Ingenuity’, a man questioning the Cossack’s “typical ingenuity and resolve” would have to debate this not with I.S. Ul’yanov but with M.I. Platov personally, who, doubtless, had a much higher standing in the community.

The next characteristic that is common to the propaganda texts by I.S. Ul’yanov and P.N. Krasnov follows from the previous one. Key historical figures (above all, M.I. Platov, of course) represent in these texts not so much an attempt to describe real figures but some kind of an ideal figure that epitomizes what a Cossack ataman/general/officer must be. The legend about a commander who knows all his soldiers by name (e.g., Napoleon and Alexander the Great) is quite a well-known myth. That said, no serious literature on M.I. Platov mentions this about him (not even P.N. Krasnov). The latter, however, asserts that the Don ataman, for instance, called Warsaw ‘Arshava’ – not because he was illiterate, but because he just felt like “flaunting the simplicity of speech for fun” (why he would do something like that and where that information had come from was, of course, not something P.N. Krasnov would disclose) (Krasnov, 1909: 348). It is clear that

ascribing to that kind of idealized hero the author's personal stance and statements in, essentially, a literary text was an a lot easier thing to do and made it possible to avoid a dissonance – say, between the real image of not-too-literate M.I. Platov (who spelled his last name wrong all his life (Zakharevich, 2005: 68)) and the literary monologues which P.N. Krasnov ascribed to him (while there can be no doubt about the Don ataman's mental abilities and the aphoristic nature of his speech, it simply could not be correct and literary a-priori; curiously, if in the monologues in 'The Pictures of the Past Quiet Don' M.I. Platov promises to "stun, shame, and expel" the French, in the cited letters he "belabors" them and "kicks them out" (Krasnov, 1909: 350-351)).

We can but state that I.S. Ul'yanov was indeed first to employ, which he did in his 'Military Ingenuity', a set of techniques and methods which would later be further developed by Don military propaganda. Noteworthy is not just the way he delivers the material but the very material itself, for, instead of talking about the ongoing war, the Don author opts to focus on the Don region's most significant hero, linking his victories with the ability to appreciate the Cossacks' perennial "ingenuity and resolve". In point of fact, he would write, in the form of a historical essay or a story, a panegyric for the Donians' traditional military prowess, intended to make them feel proud of their Motherland and infuse them with confidence in their own ability in the face of a new war. This way to draw upon prominent figures would be typical for Don patriotic authors going forward too. But we will talk about this in conjunction with the next text by I.S. Ul'yanov.

Soon after 'Military Ingenuity' was published, 1854's Issue 4 of The Don Military Gazette carried the first material about relevant military events, which had a somewhat intricate title – 'On the Military Exploits of Don Cossacks in the Caucasus under the Command of Baklanov (Military News from the Caucasus)' (Strukov, 1878: 24). I.S. Ul'yanov stood in the most direct relation to him as well. Here again it may be worth providing a little text found in his archive, which served as a foreword to the publication.

"The Don Military Gazette's editorial team has taken on the pleasant duty to share with the reader news about the Donians' military affairs, based on information from official and other possible sources.

Based on his military exploits, Major General Baklanov is part of heroes' history. His name rolls across the Caucasus Mountains like a thunderstorm and is pronounced by his Don compatriots with pride.

The Gazette has published a report on the Caucasus Corps regarding yet another brilliant defeat of the mountaineers by General Baklanov with his Cossack detachment. It will be an even greater joy for the Donians when the leadership makes public a report on this by Major General Baron Vranghel. The report mentions some of the hero's more distinguished comrades-in-arms: who knows, maybe one day one of them will bring back fond memories of their commander's glory days.

Even if one had not already learnt from hearsay of General Vranghel's new talents and his lofty magnanimity, just this single report of his could serve as a perfect testimony to that. A commander giving, with that degree of chivalrous unselfishness, credit to his subordinates and colleagues produces an involuntary sense of surprise; yet, at the same time, this may trigger noble competition amongst comrades-in-arms in the name of serving the Motherland" (GARO. F. 243. Op. 1. D. 28. L. 156-157ob).

As one can see, this is yet another example of I.S. Ul'yanov acting as a mastermind of Don military propaganda. As already mentioned, initially The Don Military Gazette published exclusively government news and ordinances. As evidenced by the above text, information on current military events *was* actually published in it back then, but it was limited to official military reports. However, starting in 1854 The Don Military Gazette decided to change their policy and "take on the pleasant duty" to familiarize its readers with "news about the Donians' military affairs" not only from official sources. This kind of change of editor policy must have been a decision so daring and unusual that here too they would have I.S. Ul'yanov, regarded as a go-to person both in literature and in officialism, publish the first new material, which would include a little explanatory foreword of his to it.

Despite being not very informative, I.S. Ul'yanov's foreword merits attention for the way it substantiates the choice of Ya.P. Baklanov's figure for reporting for the first time about topical military events in the unofficial part of The Don Military Gazette. This choice may seem somewhat strange from the perspective that for military propaganda during the Crimean War they would choose a Caucasus War commander. However, as evidenced from the foreword, a deciding factor

for the choice was the actual figure of Ya.P. Baklanov. It is beyond the shadow of a doubt that to I.S. Ul'yanov he was part of "heroes' history", which puts him up there with a character from a past publication of his – M.I. Platov. Judging from other sources, Ya.P. Baklanov was held in that high a regard not only in his eyes. Around the same time, in the early 1850s, the second reputable Don author who took part in the literary propaganda of The Don Military Gazette, A.A. Leonov, would write and start to distribute in flyers a poem about Ya.P. Baklanov. Below are a few quatrains from it:

"The pride and honor of every ataman,

A hero-knight, a valiant warrior,

We salute you, our daring hero,

Our stouthearted Mr Baklanov!

<...>.

With your heroic deeds,

You've revived the glory of our fathers and grandfathers

Amongst us.

You're a true Cossack!

<...>.

There's a ray of past Yermakian glory

Shining over you;

Like a falcon appearing from behind the clouds,

You unleash your Platovian knack" (Leonov, 1909: 144).

Thus, by the year 1850 Ya.P. Baklanov was at least to a portion of the Don educated public a sacrosanct figure, a living continuator of the line of indisputable Cossack heroes. Accordingly, bringing up his specific deeds on the pages of The Don Military Gazette could be viewed as yet another attempt to highlight the link between the past and the present and between the exploits described, say, in 'Military Ingenuity' and the activity of contemporary Cossacks in the Danubian principalities and in the Caucasus. The choice proved correct: subsequently, the significance of the figure of Ya.P. Baklanov in Don military-patriotic propaganda would remain sustainable, with his exploits in the Caucasus positioned as a sort of bridge from the brilliant part of Don Cossacks in the Patriotic War of 1812 to the modernity of the late 19<sup>th</sup> – early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. With that said, however, just like in the case of M.I. Platov, a real person was increasingly substituted by an ideal image. In 1909, in Novocherkassk there even came out a special book by Don regional studies experts Kh.I. Popov and A.A. Kirillov entitled 'The Baklanov Collection'. The book's foreword quoted A.A. Leonov as crediting Ya.P. Baklanov with reviving "the past glory of our fathers and grandfathers" (Kirillov, Popov, 1909: I). The Don general, who had already passed away by that time, was positioned by them as a "genuinely pious" person, an "Orthodox son of the Church of Christ", someone who is "whole-hearted in his devotion to his Tsar Father" and "sincerely attached to his Motherland", and even as someone "has a profound love for not just his associates and other Cossacks but any faithful Russian citizen" (Kirillov, Popov, 1909: I). 'The Pictures of the Past Quiet Don' would even confer on Ya.P. Baklanov a key role: at its end, the book cites as a piece of timeless Cossack wisdom a few statements which allegedly had been made by him and M.I. Platov (Krasnov, 1909: 521-522). Thus, his foreword to the publication on Ya.P. Baklanov is yet another testimony to I.S. Ul'yanov having stood at the origins of a certain tradition in Don military propaganda.

However, this foreword is the last patriotic fair-copy manuscript from the time of the Crimean War found in I.S. Ul'yanov's archive. No mention of any other publications of his in The Don Military Gazette from the period under examination is provided by the newspaper reference books either. It looks like this paper's protagonist abandoned patriotic propaganda as early as the beginning of 1854, switching back to economic articles. It has yet to be established why that happened, although it is possible that information on this will be found in the course of time in I.S. Ul'yanov's correspondence. Both his keen self-esteem, on account of which the Don writer would refrain from publishing in the capital's press if it treated him without due deference, and his being busy with service may have been among the key reasons for his refusal from further literary and peri-literary patriotic endeavors. However, I.S. Ul'yanov's rough-books contain one more poem, which is undated but may be related to events of the Crimean War. The poem, entitled 'The Triple Alliance', features a donkey who wishes to challenge the lion's authority. Green with envy about Lion's famed power, while everybody seems to forget about his own hooves, Donkey rants and raves, vilifying and maligning Lion. He resolves to speak to Wolf and Hyena and offer

them an alliance. Wolf and Hyena agree to meet with Donkey. During the meeting, they complain to Donkey that, despite owning vast land, they are struggling to make ends meet. Eventually, the three of them resolve to form an alliance against Lion and seek that the latter's reputation be severely damaged. They plot to have Donkey challenge Lion to a battle, which Wolf and Hyena are going to join once it is in progress. So Donkey goes on to challenge Lion to a battle. Lion accepts the challenge with equanimity but tries to talk some sense into Donkey, exhorting him not to listen to his allies and reminding him of how he once saved him from Panther. But that, however, is to no avail, with Donkey adamant he should avenge his honor through war. Once the battle begins, one can hear the sinister howling of Donkey's approaching allies. Lion supplicates God not to judge him if he slays Donkey, who, as he points out, is refusing to listen to the voice of reason (GARO. F. 243. Op. 1. D. 29. L. 314-314ob).

Note that the poem snaps midway through the last quatrain. It was written on a separate piece of paper. There might have been the rest of it, but that has not survived to this day. Although it contains no direct references to the Crimean War, the situation described by the author matches some of the events that took place between 1853 and 1854. To be specific, the noble, powerful lion must be allegorically representing Russia, with the envious, aggressive donkey standing for Turkey, and the wolf and hyena, which urged the donkey on to attack the lion, denoting Great Britain and France. The lion's salvation of the donkey from the panther may be a reference to the assistance that the Russian Empire provided to Turkey during the Turkey-Egypt conflict. Our previous article cited entirely another poem, a fable by F. Bykov found amongst I.S. Ul'yanov's papers which, plot-wise, is built using the same technique. It portrays in detail the envy harbored by two dogs against the princely eagle. It becomes known in the end that the two dogs stand for the English and French who are foaming at the mouth with hatred for Russia (Peretyatko, 2018: 43-44). The verses by I.S. Ul'yanov and F. Bykov appear to be composed based on the same plot scheme: in them, the sequence of historical events is transformed into a system of relationships between the fable's animals, with Russia being a princely animal, which traditionally holds a positive emotional connotation (the eagle or lion), and its adversaries, on the contrary, being pathetic or obtuse (e.g., the donkey, wolf, dog, or hyena). Ultimately, while the authors do not expose the flaws and shortcomings of human character, as is characteristic of the traditional fable, they, in actual fact, seek to vilify Russia's adversaries by ascribing to them the negative qualities of the respective fabular animals.

Yet, neither F. Bykov's fable 'The Eagle and Two Dogs', nor I.S. Ul'yanov's verse 'The Triple Alliance' were ever published in The Don Military Gazette. No analogues thereof have been found in the latest military-patriotic propaganda in the Province of the Don Cossack Host either. We are of the view that by the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century the actual genre of allegorical denigration of the enemy, which the above works represent, might have become somewhat outdated. Allegorical fables and verses would inevitably have to be detached as much as possible from specific Don realities, with F. Bykov even confessing in a letter to I.S. Ul'yanov that he had first written the main part of his fable, without placing any political import into it, and only afterwards understood that the fable had "a presentiment of England's and France's attitude" toward Russia, subsequent to which he would add the direct accusations against those nations (GARO. F. 243. Op. 1. D. 31. L. 34-34ob). One even cannot be absolutely confident that 'The Triple Alliance' is indeed devoted to events of the Crimean War and that its plotline overlapping the time's realities is not an accident. By contrast, both the above-mentioned texts by I.S. Ul'yanov and the conceptually succeeding works 'The Baklanov Collection' and 'The Pictures of the Past Quiet Don' represented specifically Cossack propaganda centered on glorifying Don Cossacks and their military history. It is this type propaganda that the future would lie with.

#### 4. Conclusion

"The names of Yermak and a few other popular atamans are still quite fresh in the memory of the people; there is no well-to-do Cossack who does not have in his house a likeness of the conqueror of Siberia or other famous military figures. All these memories, along with the army's achievements in the Patriotic War and particular exploits of its units and servicemen in other campaigns, make every Cossack proud of their military significance", wrote approximately a decade after the Crimean War Chief of the Don Host Staff A.M. Dondukov-Korsakov (Karasev, 1896: 574). Don Cossack military propaganda would continually bring up Cossacks' military past and their

heroes throughout the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Things would not be limited to publishing books like ‘The Pictures of the Past Quiet Don’ and ‘The Baklanov Collection’ alone. The propaganda element would even be present in the creation of the first ever museum in the Province of the Don Cossack Host, The Don Museum in Novocherkassk, designed to “gather Don antiquities, silent witnesses to Cossack glory” (Krasnov, 1909: 480).

One of the first authors to attempt cultivating military propaganda amongst Don Cossacks based on their history was I.S. Ul’yanov. Both of his patriotic texts, published in The Don Military Gazette during the Crimean War, could be regarded as historical. The texts already display a set of characteristics that will be typical for Don military propaganda subsequently as well. Listed below are some of the more significant of these characteristics.

1) Genre uncertainty. I.S. Ul’yanov’s ‘Military Ingenuity’ is classified by the latest reference books as a story, but that is not quite accurate. In actual fact, the work is on the border somewhere between literary prose and reminiscences. According to the author himself, he is retelling stories from M.I. Platov’s life which he heard from others, although he does not always share the names of those individuals and makes no mention whatsoever of whom, in turn, they themselves obtained information about the legendary ataman from. Additionally, one of I.S. Ul’yanov’s dialogues is allegedly provided by him word for word, although, in actual fact, he could know about it only by word of mouth. This leaves us with a text that could be viewed as historically credible, while at the same time it was largely, if not entirely, put together by the author himself.

2) Substitution of their idealized images for real historical figures. In the same story ‘Military Ingenuity’, I.S. Ul’yanov imparts to M.I. Platov a set of abilities that no serious literature about him has ever mentioned. In his foreword to the publication on Ya.P. Baklanov, he places the above Don commander, who has far yet to go to complete his career, among those who are already part of “heroes’ history”. In this respect, quite representative is also a verse by I.S. Ul’yanov’s contemporary A.A. Leonov in which the same Ya.P. Baklanov is rhetorically compared to Yermak and M.I. Platov, although the similarity between them remains undetailed (as is Ya.P. Baklanov’s image as a whole). With that said, it is this kind of nominal “heroes of the Don region” that played a central role in military propaganda and acted as significant heroes in patriotic texts, both literary and publicistic, which could even be considered scholarship.

3) Ascribing to “Don heroes” the various statements that are important to the author. It is worth noting that I.S. Ul’yanov was the one who only actually paved the way for this trend – by having the Cossack guard who edified no other than M.I. Platov use the dictum ‘Live longer and know more’ and noting that going forward the “whirlwind ataman” “would never leave unheeded a single piece of advice or comment founded on the Cossack’s experience and typical ingenuity and resolve”. In his case, it is rather about the artistic processing of real facts. Indeed, I.S. Ul’yanov might have heard from P.N. Ilovaiskii a story about the effect of communication with the Cossack guard on M.I. Platov and could have just desired to supplement it with an expressive dialogue (or the dialogue might have emerged earlier while the story was going around as hearsay). However, subsequently Don authors would display a lot more imagination in relation to historical figures. P.N. Krasnov even provides a set of long patriotic monologues by Yermak, many of which are suspiciously similar to monologues by M.I. Platov and Ya.P. Baklanov (Krasnov, 1909: 35).

Thus, a crucial plotline in Don patriotic literature, starting, at a minimum, with texts by A.A. Leonov and I.S. Ul’yanov written during the Crimean War, is the panegyric for a historical or a living hero, with a claim to historical credibility, which in actual fact, however, will hardly lend itself to any verification and is founded on hearsay and all kinds of stories, and sometimes even just the author’s imagination. The spread of this plotline and the frequent drawing of various authors upon it indicate that it must have been quite effective in its impact on the Cossacks. With that said, I.S. Ul’yanov would only produce just the initial sketches of this type of panegyric, which would be developed further by his followers, P.N. Krasnov being one of the group’s more crucial representatives. I.S. Ul’yanov’s literary oeuvre is still waiting to be researched, while it may be asserted already now that it has had a significant effect on the history of Don literature, with this paper’s protagonist serving as one of the founders of the military-propaganda and patriotic strands of Don literature.

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
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## “How Our Fleet is Different from the Bourgeois One” or Distinctive Characteristics of Propaganda in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Fleet in the mid-1920s

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### Abstract

The paper discusses distinctive characteristics pertaining to military propaganda in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Fleet (RKKF) in the 1920s. It reviews the state of propaganda in the Red Fleet divisions and analyzes the objective difficulties related to attempts to explain the tasks and goals of the Soviet government.

The paper uses documents from the Russian State Navy Archives (St. Petersburg, Russian Federation) as research materials. In addition, materials from the brochure “How our fleet is different from the bourgeois one” by A. Krymov were utilized. Collective monographs used include “Twice Red Banner Baltic fleet”, “Red Banner Pacific Fleet”, “Red Banner Black Sea Fleet” and “Northern Fleet of Russia”.

In conclusion, the author sums up the factors that drove military propaganda efficiency among officers and sailors of the Baltic Fleet in the historical period under review. The author also provides little-known facts about the organization of propaganda activity among Soviet sailors.

**Keywords:** Baltic Fleet, propaganda, political department, USSR, bourgeois fleet, sailors, officers.

### 1. Introduction

In 1926, the political department of the Baltic Fleet issued a propaganda brochure by A. Krymov “How our fleet is different from the bourgeois one” which in plain language explained all benefits offered to Red Navy sailors by the service in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Fleet as compared to the fleets of foreign states. This edition by the Baltic Fleet political department was a perfect example of military propaganda in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Fleet.

### 2. Materials and methods

The paper uses documents from the Russian State Navy Archives (St. Petersburg, Russian Federation) as research materials. In addition, materials from the brochure “How our fleet is different from the bourgeois one” by A. Krymov were utilized. Collective monographs used include “Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet”, “Red Banner Pacific Fleet”, “Red Banner Black Sea Fleet” and “Northern Fleet of Russia”. Along with the sources, the scholarly paper reflected materials of research dissertations by D.V. Liventsev, S.L. Gurinov and A.V. Mursalov.

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The work employed traditional scientific methods to study military propaganda in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Fleet. The author separately made use of general scientific methods. A particular role was played by the historical and situational method in analyzing propaganda techniques used by the Soviet system. The paper also explored agitation efforts among navy servicemen and sailors, designed to explain the immediate objectives of the country's domestic and foreign policies.

### 3. Discussion and results

The author of the brochure “How our fleet is different from the bourgeois one”, prepared by the political department of the Baltic Fleet, brought before Red Fleet sailors the following problem: “First, we should ask: who serves in the navy – in our Red Fleet or in bourgeois fleets? And where do ordinary sailors come from?

... It turns out that here again – the similarity! In any fleet, be it ours or bourgeois fleets, ordinary sailors are workers and peasants.

... That's right! But it is here where the difference starts.

Let's deal with it by handling individual issues” (Krymov, 1926) (Figure 1).



Fig. 1. Soviet patriotic naval poster

It is noteworthy that the year of 1926 can be called a challenging period for the Workers' and Peasants' Red Fleet (Liventsev, 2007). The Baltic Fleet (Twice red, 1990) and Black Sea Fleet (Red Banner Black, 1987) were weakened and struggled with the aftermath of Civil War and Intervention. In 1926, the government made a decision to liquidate the Naval Force in the Far East due to its small size (Red Banner Pacific, 1981). These adverse circumstances hindered the revival of the Far Eastern naval formation until 1932 (Gorinov, 2010). In the north, the country was yet to begin creating a regular fleet. Only Amur and Caspian river flotillas were in a somewhat better position (Mursalov, 2010).

So, what advantage did the Workers' and Peasants' Red Fleet had. First of all, the authors said: “Capitalists, landowners, generals and admirals in all countries are forcing workers and peasants to serve in their bourgeois fleets so that the workers and peasants shed their blood only for the predatory interests of rich pockets – masters. Bourgeois fleets exist to attack, not just to defend, to rob other people and not just to protect their own property

... The working people of the Soviet Union are sending their best young people, their sons to the army and the navy to protect the heritage and rights of their fathers, mothers, brothers and sisters, the rights of all workers and their own rights” (Krymov, 1926).

Further the brochure drew attention to the officer corps of the bourgeois fleets: “All chiefs and officers there are totally from nobles, landowners and sons of capitalists. Even if a person with a different rank presented himself well during a war, he is still pushed into the background and is not allowed to advance.


... The situation is not dissimilar in France, in America, in Japan, in Germany and in Sweden, yes – anywhere you look at in any bourgeois country. In any place, ordinary workers and peasants are under exclusive command of officers from the bourgeois classes. Our people promoted to commanders come workers and peasants” (Krymov, 1926).

A. Krymov provides statistics that out of a hundred students at Soviet naval colleges 45 will be workers and 37 peasants, and the remaining 18 are children of teachers and Soviet employees (RGA VMF. F. 34. Op. 2. D. 1054. L. 102). The author of the propagandist edition concluded based on the given statistics: “So, the vast majority – 82 people out of every hundred of future Red Fleet commanders – are children of workers and peasants. No sons of the people, who ever oppressed workers and peasants, who grew rich at the expense of the working people, are in any time admitted into naval educational institutions” (Krymov, 1926). (Figure 2)



Fig. 2. Soviet patriotic poster (1924)

According to propagandists at the political department, the horrors of the service in a bourgeois fleet also included corporal punishment. A. Krymov’s brochure contains an image of a lash belonging to an officer of the German fleet, used to punish the lower ranks. Interestingly, similar lashes were mentioned by periodicals in 1914 as part of military propaganda, found on the “Magdeburg” sunk cruiser. By the way, the issue of a liberal system of official penalties in the Russian fleet was debated already in the time of World War I (Twice Red, 1990) (Figure 3).



**Fig. 3.** Whip to punish the lower ranks of the German Navy

Then the Baltic Fleet political department's "How our fleet is different from the bourgeois one" focuses on the means to enforce discipline in the bourgeois fleet and contrasting it with similar relations in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Fleet: "The entire discipline in the bourgeois fleet (and in the army) is based on coercion. All is the will of capitalists and officers appointed by them. Sailors from peasants and workers are forced to fulfill what capitalists wish" (Krymov, 1926).

Of course, the political department also referred to intolerable conditions of service in the Russian Imperial Navy before the October Revolution, leveraging the idea as a standard propaganda method: "Anyone who served in the old Russian fleet has a lot to tell about it. An old sailor can tell you how Kronstadt sailors rendered salutes to the house where the fierce Admiral Viren lived. The admiral used to look out the window, and a sailor could not see him and would pass by without rendering a salute. A harsh reprisal would be at once taken against him. So, just to be safe, frightened sailors also saluted to empty windows! In Revel, a sailor once got careless in a street and did not render a salute to an officer. The latter called him. The sailor, in fear of punishment, decided not to come up and say his surname. He set off running, hoping to escape. Shots thundered behind his back, and the sailor, hit by bullets, fell, bleeding heavily" (Krymov, 1926) (Figure 4).



**Fig. 4.** The journals "Red Fleet"

According to A. Krymov, a reasonable and conscious discipline was maintained in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Fleet, as both workers and peasants, serving as Red Fleet sailors, believed that their cause was the building of the common good, while a sailor in the bourgeois fleet built a state building for the prosperity of capitalists and members of other exploitative classes.

He separately mentioned the rich cultural and political life of Red Fleet sailors. Unlike a sailor in a bourgeois fleet, a Red Fleet sailor was a full citizen in his spare time and was actively engaged in public organizations. Moreover, the Soviet government sought to re-educate and teach the Red Navy sailor new ways during his service.

To illustrate the efficiency of the efforts made by the Baltic Fleet political department in the field of training and cultural enlightenment of Red Navy sailors, it cited the story of Timofey Kuzmin, born in the Oryol governorate, Mtsensk district. When a peasant lad came to serve in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Fleet, he could not even write his own family name. As part of the fleet crew, he graduated from the school for the illiterate where he studied writing and arithmetic (RGA VMF. F. 111. Op. 2. D. 585. L. 154). Afterwards, Timofey Kuzmin became an active reader at a local library. Later he was engaged in the ship's bulletin-board newspaper as a regular correspondent. In the fleet crew, the serviceman signed up for a foreign language study group and became a confident a German and English user. At last, the Red Fleet sailor joined a drama group and started to take a course in political literacy. In addition, Timofey Kuzmin took up physical training and personal hygiene.

We should say that despite a certain propaganda packaging of this example, the Baltic Fleet political department did not deviate considerable from the truth. Even in the pre-revolutionary Russia, the service in the Imperial Fleet for a peasant guy was not only a life, but also an intellectual university. Without question, when in the 20s of the twentieth century, when the Soviet authorities looked closely at the training and education of the Red Navy sailors, the results can be described as outstanding.

Of course, A. Krymov's brochure "How our fleet is different from the bourgeois one" also emphasized the role of the Communist Party and the Komsomol as the patron of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Fleet (Figure 5).



Fig. 5. Postage stamp "Komsomolets"

However, the pervading idea was that sailors' consciousness in the bourgeois fleet was "suppressed", while Red Navy sailors were enlightened by the Soviet authorities. The key accent

was put on the prediction that sailors of bourgeois fleets would inevitably open their eyes to subsequently accomplish the world revolution (Figure 6).



**Fig. 6.** The poster of the propaganda film "Red Fleet"

#### 4. Conclusion

It necessary to note that the brochure “How our fleet is different from the bourgeois one” by A. Krymov successfully fulfilled its military propaganda functions among the sailors of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Fleet. It leveraged an efficient technique of comparing the conditions of daily service in the RKKF with those in bourgeois fleets and the pre-revolutionary Russian Imperial Fleet. In this comparison, the Red Fleet had a significantly better representation as it massively contributed to educational and cultural activities of sailors. The information was given in the context of great care exercised by Komsomol.

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
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## The Political-Information Component in the 1994–1996 Chechen Military-Political Conflict

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### Abstract

This paper draws upon an analysis of various published documents, a pool of relevant Russian historiography, and materials from various mass media outlets (above all, various periodicals from the period under review) to examine the various aspects of the political-information component in the 1994–1996 Chechen military-political conflict. The author suggests that, in covering the Chechen conflict, the Russian media (above all, the nation's print media) took different stances on the issue: some justified the activity of illegal political and military formations in Chechnya, others espoused the official position assumed by the Russian government, and still others, a rather small group, sought to cover the conflict as objectively as possible, opting to keep an open mind on the issue and eschew political bias and financial concerns. The paper examines a set of specific issues experienced by mass media at the time in covering the 1994–1996 Chechen military-political conflict. The author suggests that, judging from the process of covering the Chechen conflict, back then Russia still lacked free and independent mass media outlets committed to reflecting and protecting the interests of civil society in Russia, a direct consequence of the nation being dominated by an oligarchical system of power and a lot of its mass media outlets being run by various political forces. The paper shares the findings from an analysis of the key characteristics of media coverage of the Chechen ethno-political conflict, especially during its active hostilities phase.

**Keywords:** military-political conflict in Chechnya, political-information component, mass media.

### 1. Introduction

The events of 1994–1996 in Chechnya remain a matter of dispute amongst the Russian and international communities to this day. The Russian government has yet to resolve all of the problems that arose during the military conflict, with yet another socio-political and culturological issue having emerged in Russian history along the way. The relevance of the topic brought up in this paper is substantiated not only by the actual historical and academic factors but keen interest in it on the part of intelligent readers and deep thinkers amongst the Russian public. The military-political conflict in Chechnya was, and still is, one of the major issues for Russian society. The relevant issue that remains is why Russia's armed forces ended up losing in the first Chechen campaign. The causes are, doubtless, quite diverse: some say it is the peculiar historical development of the North Caucasus, while others set it down to the mountainous region's peculiar

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geographical location and a lack of military units specially trained to work in such conditions. There is also the effect-of-information factor.

In the context of present-day conflicts, mass media are an immense mobilizing and staggering force. They can be placed alongside such military resources as tanks and artillery, for TV and the press can be used to achieve such crucial objectives as preparing the soldiers for it morally and psychologically and boosting their morale, as well as securing public, including international, support for the conflicting sides. In today's world, in this era of rapid development of information technology mass media have become a powerful tool for managing armed conflicts. This has been attested to by many analytics experts. "In today's society, without mass media it is virtually impossible to organize a conflict – they have always been part of, and one of the frontlines in, conflicts. Every journalist, no matter how much they claim to be objective, acts within a certain field of power and bias (political, ethnical, or editorial-bureaucratic)" (Gakaev, 2001: 115). The media have an immense potential to significantly increase or decrease the scale and severity of a conflict.

The 1994–1996 military-political conflict in Chechnya revealed a set of issues in media coverage of an ethno-political conflict, especially during its active hostilities phase. Back then, Russian journalism, like all of Russian society, educated under conditions of totalitarian rule based on Communist ideology, proved unprepared for the role cast for mass media in a democratic society. The true degree of freedom of the press is tested during times of crisis. In this regard, the war in Chechnya raised a set of serious questions to be answered regarding the ability of the authorities to observe the principles of information openness and that of the media to act objectively in extreme conditions. The question is not whether information to be disseminated is positive or negative – it is rather all about a primary criterion for assessing the performance of mass media in a democratic society being the veracity and completeness of information to be provided (Informatsionnaya voina..., 1997: 89).

## **2. Materials and methods**

The paper employs a set of various publications dealing with the activity of federal authorities – more specifically, materials from a special State Duma committee concerned with investigating the events in Chechnya, the Russian Armed Forces Command, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Counterintelligence Service, as well as various nongovernmental and human rights organizations. It draws upon the reminiscences of some of the actual participants in said events, which reflect the various aspects of the Chechen military-political conflict, shedding some light on media coverage of the events. The paper makes use of periodicals of varying social-political focus from the period under review which covered the conflict. It draws upon various historiographical research studies on the subject. The work employs a multi-factor approach, a historical-systemic method (to explore the study subject by way of singling out its particular structural elements, studying their direct and mediated functions, and investigating their relationships between each other and with the whole), and scholarly-critical analysis.

## **3. Discussion**

The 1994–1996 Chechen military-political conflict has received limited coverage in the literature. This gap has mainly been filled by general-audience works, most of which are, of course, full of various subjective estimations by the authors. Yet, they offer a few definite benefits – the authors strive to share as much event-related and factual material as possible. To substantiate their viewpoint, they draw upon all kinds of sources (e.g., statutes, event participant correspondence, and materials from the periodical press), and supplement their writing with full-text sources specifically at that. Accordingly, these works are distinguished by being large in volume. It stands to reason that this genre features a wide variety of works, with each author focused on substantiating a certain view of the events that took place. The most successful works in this respect include those by N.N. Grodnenskii (Grodnenskii, 2008) and A.A. Lyakhovskii (Lyakhovskii, 2006). Other publications that merit a mention are those by A.S. Kulikov and V.S. Runov (Vse kavkazskie voiny Rossii, 2013) and A.G. Mikhailov (Mikhailov, 2002), which combine the features of a memoir source and a research work. One of the key drawbacks of these works is their subjectivity, which is reflected in variance in estimations regarding key issues such as the legality of the declaration of independence by Chechnya, the causes of the Chechen crisis, and the reasons

behind the entry of Russian troops into the republic. For instance, N.N. Grodnenskii is of the view that Russian policymakers had taken more steps toward reconciliation (it is them who would initiate the peace talks), but the Chechen leadership would most of the time ignore these peace-building endeavors, letting the situation get out of control and call for more resolute measures (Grodnenskii, 2008: 142). On the other hand, in the view of A.A. Lyakhovskii, it is, actually, the Russian side that ruined the talks, bringing to nought the possibility of getting away without forceful intervention (Lyakhovskii, 2006: 158). We are inclined to believe that the truth is somewhere in the middle. A.A. Lyakhovskii points out that, during the early-1990s' climate of the USSR breaking up and the Union Treaty getting signed, Chechnya could have had a real chance to become a sovereign republic if its leaders had been guided by legal loopholes rather than loud slogans (Lyakhovskii, 2006: 121).

As regards research works, while there, of course, is a pool thereof, most are of a theoretical and summarizing nature. The most noteworthy in this respect is the research on ethnology and ethnography by V.A. Tishkov (Tishkov, 2001). The scholar has devoted some attention to the religious aspect of the Chechen problem as well. A study by N.F. Bugai and A.M. Gonov (Bugai, Gonov; 2004) examines the key principles of Russia's national policy in the North Caucasus in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. V.V. Chernous (Chernous, 2001) dwells in his study upon the socio-political facets of the Chechen conflict. Of particular interest is a monograph by A.V. Malashenko and D.V. Trenin (Malashenko, Trenin, 2002) which investigates some of the key issues in Russia's policy in the South (broadly, the Caucasus and Central Asia) and analyzes the religious factor and the evolution of Islamic currents in the region. The scholars have come to the conclusion that the Southern dimension became in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century a determinant for Russia's policy.

Worthy of a mention is a collection of articles by a number of prominent experts in Caucasus Studies, entitled 'Chechnya: From Conflict to Stability' (Chechnya: ot konflikta k stabil'nosti: (problemy rekonstruktsii), 2001), which explores a wide variety of issues associated with the Chechen Republic in terms of ethnography and ethnology, conflictology, economics, and the post-war situation.

Scholar V.V. Degoev (Degoev, 2003) explores Russia's relationship with the Caucasus as a whole and Chechnya in particular. As regards the actual situation in the Caucasus in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, the scholar questions the willingness of certain authors to look for the roots of the Chechen crisis within the period between the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. V.V. Degoev points out that, while there, of course, are certain coincidences, the real causes of the war in Chechnya had increasingly been coming into being spontaneously – so it would be more rational to locate them in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. Scholar D.D. Gakaev (Gakaev, 1999) explores in great detail the political processes that had been unfolding in Chechnya starting in the late 1980s and provides a detailed analysis of the causes of the situation that resulted. Another major work that illustrates the situation in Chechnya on the eve and during the conduct of the military operation is a book that is founded on conclusions drawn by the Parliamentary Commission on Investigating the Causes and Circumstances of the Emergence of the Crisis in the Chechen Republic, better known as the Govorukhin Commission (Komissiya Govorukhina..., 1995).

Thus, the findings from a study of historiography on the issue attest to a certain amount of work having been conducted in terms of investigating the 1994–1996 Chechen military-political conflict, including media coverage thereof at the time. However, there are very few summarizing scholarly works that provide an in-depth analysis of most of the key aspects of said issue that is based on comprehensive study of various source materials.

Another area that is worth looking at is memoir literature. Some of the well-known works in this respect include the books 'My War. The Chechen Diary of a Trench General' (Troshev, 2001) and 'The Chechen Relapse. The Notes of a Commander' (Troshev, 2003) by General G.N. Troshev, 'Heavy Stars: Reminiscences' (Kulikov, 2002) by General A.S. Kulikov, 'General Staff with no Secrets' (Baranets, 1999) by Colonel V.N. Baranets, and other memoir sources. So what is common to these books? It, above all, is the fact that each of the above authors took an actual part in said events, and each of them endeavors to get across to us, in their own, raw, words, the period's actual state of affairs and give their own estimation regarding the events and people who took part in them.

A special place in exploring said issue is occupied by analysis of the period's periodical press. To note, many of the sources appear to contradict each other. The same events are viewed from

different angles in, say, *Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kur'er* and *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* or in *Soldat Udachi* and *Logos*. And that figures, as each paper has an ideological and political focus of its own and tries to pursue interests and views of its own. This particular source most often serves the purpose of immersing one in the atmosphere of a particular era and giving one an idea of what kind of news people were exposed to and in what light information was presented to them at the time. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* has been invaluable to the search for published documents. *Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kur'er* is known to have more than once published soldiers' reminiscences. For instance, its 2005's Issue 13 carried an article by Sergei Smirnov entitled 'A Battle, not a Slaughter (The Truth and Lies about the Special Operation in Samashki)' («[Voenno-promyshlennyi kur'er](#)». 2005. №13) – it is this article that served as a departure point for my own investigation and analysis of the events of April 7-8, 1995. The existence of this source has been substantiated in documents of a relevant State Duma committee and in the memoirs of well-known general G.N. Troshev. The article provides an initial groundwork for further research into the issue.

#### 4. Results

In covering the Chechen conflict, the Russian media (above all, the nation's print media) took different stances on the issue: some justified the Chechen resistance movement (associating it with fighting for freedom, independence, etc.); others espoused the official position assumed by the Russian government ("Chechnya is an integral part of Russia, so any armed groups are illegal and are subject to elimination"); still others (the smallest group) sought to cover the conflict from a centrist standpoint, opting not to take sides and not to rush into extremes. These differences in covering the conflict may be explained by the different stances assumed by specific mass media, as they reflect the interests of distinct social groups and population strata. Thus, as a consequence of social differentiation and the emergence of special interest groups, there occurred corresponding changes in the political focus of various mass media outlets as well, depending on the views of the portion of the audience toward which the outlet was oriented, as well as depending on whose interests the outlet was catering to. This is why the events in Chechnya, which had provided the groundwork for infighting amongst Russia's social, financial, and political forces, received that kind of coverage in the press, which reflected, like in a mirror, the battle that was going on the Russian political Olympus ([Mikhailov, 2002: 243](#)). As quite rightly put by prominent Chechen historian D.D. Gakaev, "a key characteristic of media coverage of the situation in Chechnya was a transformation of mass media outlets' stances at certain stages in the development of the conflict: if during the first Chechen campaign (1994–1996) most mass media outlets treated the Chechen resistance movement with a certain degree of empathy and often covered the events from the Chechen side, during the counterterrorist operation begun in 1999 virtually all mass media outlets now justified the operation, viewing it as a way to protect Russia from threats coming from Chechnya, which they deemed to have become a base of international terrorism" ([Gakaev, 2001: 51](#)). Collective violence requires an image of the enemy represented by a group or an institution that must be punished or destroyed. The image of the enemy is created and then cultivated by the initiator of violence for the purpose of supplying its executors with a means of mobilization and a direct objective. When violence reaches a stage of war, i.e. results in a conflict with a front-line and all necessary organization, the image of the enemy is simplified to what is referred to by the military term 'opponent'. V.A. Tishkov writes in this regard: "Yet, here too what the conflicting sides implied by the term 'opponent', or 'enemy', was pretty vague. With the Chechens, it was an umbrella term for what they normally referred to as 'federals', 'Russians', 'invaders', 'aggressors', and 'infidels'. On the contrary, to Russian federal soldiers deployed in Chechnya the term was synonymous with 'thugs', 'dukhi' (spooks), 'nokhchi' (Chechens), 'chichi' (monkeys), 'militants', and 'terrorists'. From the very beginning and on through the entire conflict the Chechens were invariably 'them' to most of the Russian military personnel, despite the fact that these were their fellow citizens, many of whom could even have served in the same army with them" ([Tishkov, 2001: 156](#)).

Over the years of the Chechen conflict, the portrayal of the enemy in Russian propaganda had undergone significant changes. At the beginning of the conflict, the enemy's force was deliberately understated – someone was "speculating for a fall". An example of this kind of tactics is the following statement by Russia's then-Federal Security Minister S.V. Stepashin: "It is not the Chechen people who are fighting. The fiercest resistance is being put up by Afghan mujahideen and mercenaries from the Baltic states, including female snipers". A year or so later, the enemy was

now portrayed as a “large army – virtually, the entire male population”. When it became necessary to explain why the military operation had failed, they resorted to hyperbole: “an army that is good enough to measure up to that of any other European nation”. At the start of the conflict, one predominantly employed terms like ‘dudaevtsy’ (Dudaev’s guys) and ‘brigand groups’, with the ethnic attribute avoided. The same mindset was being cultivated amongst propagandists in the army: “One was not pursuing the objective of fostering hatred toward the Chechen people. Quite on the contrary, soldiers and sergeants were being persuaded of the common people having nothing to do with the Dudaev regime”. However, it did not take long before the media stopped being so “soft” on things. Here are a few publication titles to illustrate this: ‘The Troops Pounding the Chechens. The Chechens Trying to Answer Back’, ‘The Nokhchi Seething with Fury’, ‘The Nokhchi Scattering into the Woods, Trying to Break through the Russian Blocks’, etc. Now it was no longer just the “dudaevtsy” but all Chechens as such who were being urged to “quickly go cap-in-hand to the Russian people, who have done so much for them and have never gotten anything in return, except bloodshed and violence. Do this voluntarily. It will be good for everybody: for the Chechens and for the Russians. If the Chechens keep being cocky – there will be trouble” (Tishkov, 2001: 267).

The image of the Chechen kept getting transformed by journalists. During the first Chechen campaign, individuals engaged in military activity as part of illegal armed groups were referred to as militants. During the period between 1996 and the start of the counterterrorist operation in 1999, the image of the enemy changed to the one as an armed bearded Wahhabi with a fanatical facial expression. However, Chechen militants, who considered themselves a winner and who had instituted an army of their own and put in place a system of military ranks, did not wish to be viewed as “militants”. And that led to certain oddities. Some media outlets had to apologize for calling a Chechen a ‘militant’. Page 3 of 1999’s Issue 27 of *Obshchaya Gazeta* contained a regrettable error in the caption of a photo taken by Reuters at the Chechen border. As a result of an inaccurate translation from English, the individuals shown in the photo were referred to as ‘Chechen militants’. In actual fact, they were soldiers in the regular army of Ichkeria who were guarding the republic’s border. The editorial board later had to apologize to the Chechen border patrol and the photo’s author. However, as early as the start of the second Chechen campaign, and especially after the US had declared the global war on terrorism, Chechen armed groups would increasingly be referred to as ‘international terrorists’ («*Obshchaya gazeta*». 1999. №27).

As early as the start of the anti-terrorist campaign in the summer of 1999, Russia’s public opinion gave virtually total support to the policy pursued by its government and military. Basaev’s raid on Dagestan and the nighttime explosions in the Russian cities proved to have helped achieve the principal objective – to prepare Russian public opinion for the hard-power way of resolving the Chechen problem and the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya. Both the government and society backed the new military campaign unanimously.

The second Chechen campaign was preceded by an unprecedentedly intense anti-Chechen campaign in the Russian media in conjunction with terrorist attacks in Moscow, Volgograd, and Makhachkala, which claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians. And yet again the only ones to blame were all the Chechen people. Russian Federation citizens of Chechen nationality would be prosecuted on a mass scale. For two years, Russian viewers and readers would be shown and told what kind of society the Chechens were building – a society in which it is legal to practice slavery and taking prisoners for ransom is considered to be a “lucrative business”. Footage of prisoners being tortured and abused, executions of people by firing squad in Grozny squares, and threats of terrorist attacks from rebel leaders – all this produced an effect. But the Chechen rebels could now no longer hope for compassion on the part of the Russian media, unlike in the period 1994–1996. Here is what *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* had to say on the matter: “It is worth noting that the time is much more propitious today than it was in December of 1994. Today, public opinion in Russia, and around the world, is ready for this kind of campaign, as it has been prepared for it by mass media. If in the period 1994–1996 journalist reports on atrocities committed by Russian troops abounded in the media, now in the event of a new war the Chechens may face an information blockade: most reporters will think twice before making up their mind to work in an area that is being controlled by people who used to take their fellow workers hostage and who had, basically, legalized slave trade” (Rotar', 1999: 28). The authorities and the military would eventually impose tough censorship on information from the conflict zone.

Nonetheless, it is crystal clear now that the information war was lost. So what were the causes of the defeat? In the war of ideologies the Russian secret services had kept neutral, refraining from taking up ideological arms against militant Islamic extremism, despite the fact that the latter was quite vulnerable in its conceptual foundations. But the war with it had to be waged exclusively from Islamic perspectives and in the language of the “laws of the mountains”.

In the Caucasus, dying with a weapon in hand is regarded by many as luck, a reward for the person’s brave deeds, and a ticket to paradise (Plutser-Sarno, 2005: 198). Accordingly, it is possible to punish a Moslem mountaineer only after proving to them that they have committed a deadly sin by betraying Allah and violating the laws of the mountains. Propaganda would have to be strictly Islamized and based on all kinds of facts of the violation of the laws of Islam. But on the part of the Russians there was nothing put forward except some bellicose statements which, unfortunately, could have an effect only on the “Russian mind” and were not quite comprehensible to the Chechen one. One can only wonder now how it would all have panned out if the information war had been conducted in a competent and neat manner...

The media can, and, essentially, must, work to eliminate any negative images from mass consciousness. This work must be conducted in a gradual and stage-by-stage manner. Above all, a conflict must be covered in an accurate, fair, balanced, and comprehensive manner. Of course, sometimes it is impossible to obtain a clear picture of what we refer to as ‘the truth’, ‘facts’, or ‘the objective’. A journalist must aspire to this ideal, but, when the situation is ambiguous, it may be worth furnishing, or at least making references to, the different viewpoints that exist on the conflict so as to enable the audience to judge the situation for themselves. Next, it would make sense to cover things within a certain context – not just cover it. Conflicts often arise against a backdrop of complex historical claims, which may be laid by various societal groups and may be of a territorial nature. In covering a conflict, it is especially important to be able to place all the events within a context, or else their purport may be unclear to the audience. Despite numerous obstacles and restrictions that may hamper a journalist’s coverage of the context, there is compelling reason to present the events’ background as completely as possible – so as to provide insight into the issue’s complexity. It is important that one provide insight into the conflict’s complexity, or else too simple an explanation may be facilitative of too simple a decision, e.g. get a large stick, an axe, etc. It is worth taking into account that the media tend to focus on covering the actual events – rather than the talks process or the daily life and views of the civilian population in the conflict zone. This pressure is often from the editors, who tend to demand reports on a “major event”. One ought to devote more time to the talks process and the daily life of the civilian population, rather than concluding that instances of violence are an accurate reflection of the actual state of the relationship between the groups. Lastly, in order to be able to accurately cover all of the conflict’s aspects, the journalist must ask the opinions of people who are familiar with both sides of the conflict – historians and specialists who speak both languages or are engaged in the study of the various cultures and ethnic groups involved in the conflict.

## 5. Conclusion

The Chechen crisis revealed many key issues in media coverage of an ethno-political conflict, especially during its active hostilities phase. Back then, Russian journalism, like all of Russian society, educated under conditions of totalitarian rule based on Communist ideology, proved unprepared for the role cast for mass media in a democratic society. The true degree of freedom of the press is tested during times of crisis. In this regard, the war in Chechnya raised a set of serious questions to be answered regarding the ability of the authorities to observe the principles of information openness and that of the media to act objectively in extreme conditions. The question is not whether information to be disseminated is positive or negative – it is rather all about a primary criterion for assessing the performance of mass media in a democratic society being the veracity and completeness of information to be provided (*Informatsionnaya voina v Chechne, 1997: 89*).

Judging from the process of covering the Chechen conflict, back then Russia still lacked free and independent mass media outlets committed to reflecting and protecting the interests of civil society in Russia, a direct consequence of the nation being dominated by an oligarchical system of power and a lot of its mass media outlets being run by various political forces.

Conflicts and wars have set the global community on edge throughout history. With us living in the 21<sup>st</sup> century now, the spread of the ideas of humanism, tolerance, and compassion should have been facilitative of military conflicts being resolved with less violence, but, judging by what the media report to us each day, things are exactly the opposite. In newspapers and magazines, on radio and TV we keep hearing about cruel acts of violence, both in war and in peace, with mass media being a crucial tool for managing a conflict.

Meeting the interests of Russia and those of all the Caucasus peoples and fostering safe and sustainable development in the unique region will require that all participants in shaping Caucasus policy act in a responsible and well-considered manner. The path the Caucasus is currently on and the current Caucasus policy may require a major overhaul. Without major change in this respect, the Caucasus will find it hard to actualize its potential in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as it will still be hampered by conflicts. This is neither in the interests of the Caucasus peoples nor of Russia.

It is particularly worth noting that the 1994–1996 Chechen military-political conflict has taught many lessons to both policymakers and the military. On top of that, it, above all, has revealed that you cannot demand success from the army when it is lacking moral support and is even being disparaged by contemporaries and denigrated by the actual national media. It is a no-win situation for the entire nation if someone is trying to undermine the spiritual foundations of its Armed Forces. As rightly noted by a researcher, “in these conditions, of particular significance is trust among the government, society, and the army. If the government is to send its soldiers to war, it ought to protect them from unfair bashing and try to counteract attempts to foster a negative attitude toward them” (Putintsev, 2003: 93).

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
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## Hybrid Tools for Proxy Warfare

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*The supreme art of war is to subdue  
 the enemy without fighting  
 (Sun Tzu)*

### Abstract

Of relevance to modern military doctrine is the concept of hybrid (or proxy) warfare, i.e. a combination of conventional, irregular, and asymmetric ways of conducting war, including manipulation of political and/or ideological conflicts and engagement of special operation forces, conventional armed forces, intelligence agents, political agent provocateurs, and mass media outlets. Among the tools employed quite actively in modern proxy warfare are economic blackmail, cyber-attacks, proxy servers and surrogates, paramilitaries, and terrorist and criminal elements.

**Keywords:** hybrid tools for special operations, proxy warfare, information-based special operations, asymmetric conflict, irregular warfare.

### 1. Introduction

Conventional warfare is becoming a thing of the past. Modern warfare is like radiation – one cannot feel it, but its deadly effect is there. Modern warfare is, for the most part, proxy warfare with hybrid tools employed in special operations. Of particular importance in the process of the development of proxy warfare is the fact of emergence and spread of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Quite low is the likelihood of conflicts between two or more high-tech armies. In the view of J.S. Levy, the cause of the recent upsurge in irregular proxy warfare is the possibility of incurring significant physical losses and damage while deriving potentially minor gains from waging a regular war (Levy, 1983).

Since the end of World War II, the world has witnessed the following fact: two thirds of all armed conflicts were between small and medium-sized states, with the superpowers acting, for the most part, as their initiators, but by no means their participants, with a focus on providing remote support in the form of asymmetric influence. The three regions that have become the world's major conflict zones are Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. From this perspective, the overwhelming majority of armed conflicts today are intrastate conflicts with elements of proxy warfare (Smith, 2004).

Essentially, proxy warfare is warfare conducted via third parties with “passive” participation from the key actors<sup>1</sup>, which is accompanied by information, political, economic, and cyber

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<sup>1</sup> Proxy warfare can be employed not only by states but by coalitions thereof, as well as multinational corporations.

operations and involves the provision of military, organizational, resource, and other types of support on their part under the pretense of helping resolve an “internal conflict” in the third country. In other words, a proxy war is nothing other than a war fought by the hands of others, a “war by proxy”, or a civil war with hybrid tactical attacks, of strategic significance in which is the destabilization of the socio-political situation for the purpose of replacing the government, cultivation of manageable chaos, and use of other destructive factors, which involves the use of information tools designed to alter human behavior and relationships.

A proxy war is an international conflict between two actors which are pursuing their geopolitical interests through military actions in the territory of a third state and using the latter’s resources. A formal smokescreen to justify such actions is assistance in resolving the third state’s internal conflict, which, once again, is being fuelled by the proxy war’s key actors.

A characteristic of proxy warfare is the fact that it, first of all, is conducted not via the armed forces of the key actors but those of a third side, which can be represented not only by state military units but private military companies, security contractors, terrorist organizations, rebel groups, or tribal or religious irregular armed groups; second of all, military actions as part thereof tend to, again, take place in the territory of a third state supported by the actors. Of interest is the following characteristic of the evolution of proxy warfare: a state “participating” in the conflict gets substituted by all kinds of foundations, civil society institutions, political forces, etc. In this context, we are talking about “double proxy wars”, which are waged through the use of information-based special operations and disinformation.

## 2. Materials and methods

This study has drawn upon data from a set of research projects on gathering information in the area of international and domestic conflicts, namely: UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program), COW (Correlates of War), and KOSIMO (Conflict Simulation Model).

These projects are focused on the pursuit of a set of objectives related to the search for consistent patterns in data arrays and monitoring and prevention of conflicts.

## 3. Discussion

Scholar A.A. Stepanov has proposed several conceptual dimensions for the terms ‘war’ and ‘peace’, which are as follows: formal-logical, existential, ontological, axiological, praxeological, and gnoseological (Stepanov: 30).

In the formal-logical dimension, the term ‘peace’ is conceptualized in negative form, as the opposite of war, whilst the term ‘war’ has positive, direct definitions and is often used in a broader sense, as a synonym for ‘struggle’, ‘conflict’, and ‘confrontation’.

In the existential dimension, war is, supposedly, associated with death, whilst peace, accordingly, is linked with life. However, paradoxically, the concept of ‘war’ is connotatively linked with life, or existence on the border between being and non-being (Heraclitus), whilst peace is associated with death as absolute rest.

In the ontological dimension, we observe the following paradox: ‘war’ is immanent and phenomenal, whilst ‘peace’ is transcendental and noumenal. The former is associated with movement, change, and making, whilst the latter is linked with invariability, quiescence, and perpetuity.

In the axiological dimension, ‘war’ is viewed as absolute evil, and ‘peace’ is seen as absolute good.

In the praxeological dimension, ‘war’ is viewed as a means, and ‘peace’ is seen as an end.

In the gnoseological dimension, the term ‘war’ is the subject of research in empirical sciences, whilst the term ‘peace’ is explored without invoking empirical reality, exclusively through the lens of the speculative.

Based on the above, war may be regarded as a multi-vector and multi-factor phenomenon, which is not limited to the conduct of actual military actions exclusively. In this context, what is also obvious is the diversity of theoretical substantiations of war as a complementary phenomenon. The first attempts to create a universal theory of war can be traced to Ancient China, and are associated with Sun Tzu (Sun Tzu, 2007).

Among the military theoreticians of the Middle Ages, worthy of special mention is N. Machiavelli, credited with setting out the key tenets of organizing, training, and arming an army,

as well as some of the key requirements to commanders (Machiavelli, 2003). Machiavelli is known to have borrowed many of his ideas from Vegetius, a source he consulted in adapting the military experience of Ancient Rome to whole new historical realities. The aim of warfare was defined to be the following: to develop the capacity to withstand any opponent and then come out victorious in a decisive battle.

In 17<sup>th</sup> century Europe, the phenomenon of warfare was conceptualized based on the interests of monarchs and was limited objectives-wise, central to analysis of warfare being military maneuver strategies. A significant landmark in warfare research is associated with input from Prussian military theoretician C. von Clausewitz, who regarded war as a tool for national policy (Clausewitz, 1993). Another Prussian military theoretician, A.H.D. von Bülow, the author of “cordon strategy”, believed that a war can be won through focusing on defensive actions around crucial communications hubs and refraining from engaging in a major battle (Bülow, 1926).

By contrast, military theoretician and historian General A.-H. Jomini was a proponent of the theory of strategic victory over the opponent via all-out offensives. French military figure and theoretician Marshal F. Foch viewed fighting a battle as an indispensable condition for the conduct of warfare, its objective being the destruction of the enemy’s organized forces.

The concept of total warfare propounded by German military theoreticians in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century viewed warfare as war between nations, not armies. The suggested formula for winning that kind of war was the mobilization of all resources, with comprehensive pressure exerted on the enemy for the purpose of disheartening it.

During the 1920s, English military theoretician and historian L. Hart proposed a strategy of indirect actions, whereby the idea is to try to avoid an all-out collision with the enemy, try to disarm it, and try to undermine its morale and fighting spirit, which is to culminate in a decisive blow (Hart, 1967).

Modern polemological research takes account of factors such as the technological evolution of arms, the possibility of mass destruction, and the protracted nature of war. These are the factors that have predetermined our reflections on the future of mankind, the unprecedentedness of nuclear weapons being owned by several states, and the effectiveness of drawn-out local conflicts. Each war theory, doubtless, has a rational kernel of its own, but the latest geopolitical realities are giving relevance to a somewhat different conceptualization of war, including its goals, objectives, strategies, tactics, means of achieving the objectives, tools, mechanisms, etc. In particular, the conceptualization of military trends and global trends of modernity has been explored in works by M. van Creveld (Creveld, 2005), A. Toffler (Toffler, 1993), M. Kaldor (Kaldor, 2012), M. DeLanda (DeLanda, 2014), and others.

The WMD factor<sup>1</sup> is what has determined the nature of future warfare: in modern warfare, moral-psychological pressure on the opponent is prioritized over just plain, physical, destruction thereof. In today’s new realities, warfare is seen as a complex information-technological, cognitive-psychological, and virtual phenomenon. Modern wars are conducted at the level of consciousness and ideas, and that is where they are won too. The result of modern warfare is a certain preset state of individual (collective) consciousness. Thus, the efficiency of modern warfare depends on that of information operations at all levels of warfare and across the entire spectrum of armed military actions.

Another key concept related to future warfare is network-centric warfare, which is about boosting the combined combat power of one’s military units by joining them up into a single network, which is characterized by speed of command<sup>2</sup> and self-synchronization<sup>3</sup>. The network makes it possible to bring geographically dispersed forces representing the various military arms and branches together in an integrated operation and, based on an information advantage,

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<sup>1</sup> WMD is the acronym for weapons of mass destruction.

<sup>2</sup> Speed of command is achieved based on an information advantage through the implementation of new systems of administration, surveillance, intelligence, control, and computer modeling. As a result, the opponent is deprived of the ability to conduct effective operations, as all of its actions are preempted by those of the opposite side.

<sup>3</sup> Self-synchronization implies the ability of the organizational structure of military units and of the forms and methods of their execution of military missions to transform at their own discretion but in alignment with the needs of the Higher Command. As a result, the military actions may take on the form of continuous high-speed actions.

use them with greater effectiveness through ensuring a unity of opinion amongst the military leadership in terms of the content, role, and place of interaction in an operation, as well as through getting the actions self-synchronized in the interests of achieving the common objectives for the operation.

**Table 1.** Four Generations of Warfare

	<b>1GW</b>	<b>2GW</b>	<b>3GW</b>	<b>4GW</b>
Ways of conducting warfare	Preindustrial era warfare  Participants – states  Main tactics: firing lines and assault columns  Relatively small armies and a relatively small combat area  Short-lived (except for sieges)	The conflict engaging numerous troops over a large area  Long, intense battles  Defense prevailing over offense  Development of techniques related to camouflage, field fortifications, and intelligence equipment	Maneuver-based warfare with increased dynamics and great firepower  Warfare grounded in new ideas, not technology  Time prioritized over place. Initiative prioritized over discipline  Self-discipline prioritized over coercion	Modern warfare of an asymmetric nature  A decentralized, cross-border, and quasi-state conflict base  The civilian population acting as the target of tactical actions, with the media involved  No front and no rear. No decisive battles

Present-day realities are attesting to not only a change of the world’s geopolitical picture but changes in means and tools used to transform it. Worthy of a particular mention in this respect is the Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW) phenomenon, which implies the conduct of proxy warfare using hybrid tools in the physical, information, virtual, and cognitive dimensions of a conflict. These tools include the following:

- 1) investments and funding for the political forces in third countries;
- 2) putting together a lobby in the political environment of third countries (including using corruption mechanisms);
- 3) infiltrating the government in third countries in order to conduct intelligence activity;
- 4) making use of unresolved ethnic conflicts;
- 5) fostering propaganda in the information space in third countries; engaging targeted media support;
- 6) orchestrating coordinated cyber-attacks, etc.

In recent years, one has witnessed an expansion and enhancement of hybrid warfare tools with a focus on the use of “soft power”, with deception, disinformation, and manipulation regarded to be much more efficient than the use of regular troops. Consequently, belligerent rhetoric, cyber-attacks, trolling, and mass production of fake news along with disinformation have become an innovative instrumental basis for propaganda and political technology by the key actors inclined to employ proxy warfare as a tool for global hegemony, which encapsulates the know-how required for furthering their information-psychological aggression.

It is information aggression that proxy warfare begins with, and that is what it ends with as well, with information pressure and information-psychological impacts being its major attributes. It is warfare not for the victim state’s land but for the consciousness of its people, with a focus on generating manageable chaos in it. And, since just about any war today is information-based, it is the information component that acts as the key aspect of influence through denial, the use of false information, subjective judgments of the events, etc. Information operations in the context of

proxy warfare can perform several functions: (1) attack “hostile” and support “friendly” sources of information; (2) drag the opponent into an information arms race; (3) create a sustainable system of semantic impacts for the purpose of generating new identities.

The above may result in a state of deprivation, when people are unable to satisfy their mental needs, provoking thereby negative pressure on their thinking, which may subsequently result in neurosis. This kind of state may urge one to search for and consume some other type of information, something habitual and simple. With that said, the rational component of choice is minimized when there is no information alternative. In this context, it is worth noting the effective conduct of information-based special operations at the global, regional, and local levels concurrently.

S. Blank cites, among other nations keenly employing hybrid warfare tools, North Korea and Iran (Blank, 2014), although this list may and must be expanded to include other global and regional players. In particular, there is China, which is a powerful geopolitical player interested in a swift shift to modern methods of command and ways to conduct hybrid warfare and which has long stopped regarding the “doctrine of popular war” as relevant and aligned with the modern realities of the geopolitical balance of power.

In China, the “doctrine of popular war” has been replaced by the “doctrine of active defense”, which implies delivering preventive local strikes in the event there is any threat to the interests and security of the Celestial Empire. Along with this, the new doctrine implies the use of diplomatic, legal, information, and other means of neutralizing a threat (China's Military Strategy, 2015). China's military doctrine has been predetermined by the possibility of future military conflicts, with a focus on the coordination of the nation's aerospace forces and intelligence and operation control systems.

This way to articulate the issue obviates the very concept of front and rear areas, which are perfectly acceptable when it comes to classic warfare scenarios. Moreover, the actual reality becomes amorphous, distorted, and diffuse. With this in mind, China's new military doctrine implies boosting its presence on the Internet and amplifying its focus on virtual warfare. Worthy of separate consideration in the context of China's new doctrine, the “doctrine of active defense”, is the growing role of information warfare and special operations, with a parallel focus on the creation of special military units concerned with propaganda activity. Thus, the Chinese model treats hybrid warfare as unrestricted multi-vector warfare with limited objectives and unlimited resources (Kilcullen, 2006).

As mentioned earlier, one of the more effective hybrid tools for conducting proxy warfare is cyber-attacks. We are living in an era of networking, of the dominance of networks, of interconnections, and of rhizome (Ferguson, 2018). Surprising as it may sound, the evolution of networking in a global context is indeed posing a threat to national security. Cyber-defense is way behind cyber-offense in development, for which reason replacing the “iron curtain” with the “virtual” one may well help resolve the issue of the intellectual arms race, a key objective behind which is to create an efficient doctrine and system of information, cyber-security, and information resource security.

Criminal groups, terrorist organizations, hackers, and biohackers are becoming increasingly instrumental in tapping into areas such as robotics, synthetic biology<sup>1</sup>, and artificial intelligence, acting as an agent of future influence, threats, and crimes, an effective instrument in proxy warfare. The criminal world, which incorporates terrorism, is migrating from the physical into the virtual space, with the presence of the above tools in it only increasing (Goodman, 2016).

Proxy warfare is profitable to the actors for a number of reasons, which are as follows:

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<sup>1</sup> Synthetic biology is a new area in genetic engineering which is focused on creating whole new, more enhanced living systems. An example of this is the production of programmable organisms whose behavior, characteristics, and functions can be pre-set at the moment of their creation. Among the possible areas where synthetic biology could be employed is pharmacology, where it will be possible to create the “right” bacteria for the production of the “right” pharmaceuticals. Synthetic biology could provide a basis for new forms of bioterrorism, with the wrongdoer capable of creating their own microorganisms which could “hack” the human brain to control the mind (similar to the way it is done with hacker attacks).

- it is cheaper<sup>1</sup>;
- it is more convenient<sup>2</sup>;
- it is more effective<sup>3</sup>;
- it is more stable<sup>4</sup>.

At the same time, proxy warfare has a number of drawbacks as well, which are as follows:

- Dependence 1<sup>5</sup>;
- Dependence 2<sup>6</sup>;
- the conflict lasting for too long;
- the latent subjectedness of the third states.

Throughout history we can find many examples of proxy warfare. The concept entered particularly wide use in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when proxy warfare became an effective means of orchestrating international conflicts. For instance, on the African continent proxy warfare started to gain topicality subsequent to the gaining of independence by African nations after the 1950–60s. The reasons were several and included the following: (1) a weak government in the newly-formed states; (2) political instability; frequent coups; (3) ethnic, religious, and racial tensions. These factors have turned Africa into a permanent conflict zone and an arena of strife between the key actors focused on maintaining or amplifying their influence in the region, with hybrid warfare tools employed at that. It is support from the key players in a conflict that has served to change the balance of power in and prolong such conflicts.

#### 4. Results

An example of this kind of warfare is the Chadian-Libyan conflict, which involved a series of sporadic clashes in Chad between 1978 and 1987. The conflict was preceded by the Chadian Civil War (1965–1979), which initially was fought to overthrow the dictatorship of President F.Tombalbaye, and afterwards as a struggle for power amongst the opposition. During the conflict, the various sides involved were supported, on the one hand, by Libya under the wing of the USSR, which supplied the Libyans with military machinery, arms, advisors, and specialists, and, on the other hand, by France and the US, which provided air defense systems and financial support. What is more, to Libya's direct intervention the French responded with the entry of their troops into Chad. Thus, it is clear that the Chadian-Libyan conflict had the nature of a proxy war, as it displayed all the attributes inherent in this type of warfare. A noteworthy characteristic of proxy warfare illustrated by the above conflict is that a nation weakened by domestic issues and conflicts is still perfectly capable of beating the aggressor in proxy warfare – obviously, provided there is support on the part of a more powerful player.

<sup>1</sup> It is worth noting that the low cost of a proxy war is determined not only, and not so much, by expenditure on the direct employment of regular troops but by the political consequences of employing them. Take, for instance, the Propaganda-200 (“coffin-based propaganda”) phenomenon, employed for fostering negative public opinion with regard to war, like it was done during the US-USSR standoff in Vietnam. In present-day conditions, the extensive use of regular troops may be viewed as economically unsubstantiated (of course, we are not talking here about the use thereof in defensive warfare), when a more advisable option is relying upon local human resources or enlisting the services of a private military company.

<sup>2</sup> This can be influenced, for instance, by the political situation in the region, territorial-geographic characteristics, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Proxy armies are better familiar with the regional characteristics of the operational theater. Also, one must not rule out the factor of minimization of the risk of a surge in nationalist sentiment as a reaction to the intervention.

<sup>4</sup> By not acknowledging officially their participation in a conflict, its actors manage to evade accusations of military aggression against a third state, while maintaining the illusion of peaceful relations.

<sup>5</sup> A proxy war is alive as long as it is still of benefit to and is, thus, being funded by the actors. Otherwise, there is a grave danger of a real civil war, an armed collision between the conflict participants, involved in the conflict against their will as a consequence of geopolitical games.

<sup>6</sup> Formally, an independent state that is the victim of a proxy war can remain viable only as long as it continues to receive financial, resource, and military, or other types of, support from one of the war's orchestrators. Otherwise, there is a high possibility of loss of statehood by the state, including due to weak internal structural-systemic linkages within it.

A classic example of proxy warfare is the war in Vietnam. Subsequent to the end of the Indochina War (1946–1954) and the signing of the Geneva Accords, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam started to build the “foundations of socialism” after the Soviet template and with comprehensive support from the USSR. In 1955, a referendum held in the south of the country sealed the fate of pro-French emperor Bảo Đại, who was ousted. Power in South Vietnam was assumed by pro-American generals. A new state was established – the Republic of Vietnam, its government focused on pursuing a clearly anti-national tack and protecting the monopolistic capital of the US, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Germany which was present in the region.

In response to that, there sprang a movement of resistance to the ruling regime – the National Liberation Front (established in 1960), which sought to put an end to the pro-American regime, unite the nation, and create a democratic state. The National Liberation Front interacted with the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and received assistance from it on a regular basis, which posed a direct threat to the Saigon regime and the “vital interests” of the US in the Southeast Asia region.

Starting in 1961, the US was engaged in “special warfare” in Vietnam in alignment with the Stanley-Taylor Plan and the McNamara Plan. And as early as 1965, the US started an open war in South Vietnam and an air war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. With support from the USSR, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam put in place an effective air-defense system. By the start of 1969, the Vietnam war had engaged nearly half a million American soldiers, the Seventh Fleet of the United States, which numbered a couple of hundred military ships and 80,000 marines, as well as the military forces of the military-bloc allies – Australia, Thailand, South Korea, the Philippines, and New Zealand.

The obvious dragging out of the conflict, sizable losses on both the military and political-diplomatic fronts, the unpopularity of “dirty warfare”, and spikes in protest sentiment would eventually render the further conduct of military actions impossible. It was decided to now focus on “Vietnamizing” the war, which would subsequently involve the withdrawal of the American troops, a process which started in late 1968 and ended in 1973 with the signing of the war-ending Paris Peace Accords.

Other noteworthy examples of a proxy war in world history include:

- the India and Pakistan confrontation;
- the war in Korea;
- the war in Angola;
- the war in Afghanistan;
- the war in Lebanon;
- the war in Libya;
- the war in Iraq;
- the war between Sudan and Uganda

Between 1989 and 2005, a total of 121 conflicts were recorded around the world, of which 90 were domestic, including 46 which had all the attributes of a proxy war and 16 which were of a proxy nature in the intrastate stage already. Just seven were classic conflicts, regular interstate wars, four of which had the attributes of a proxy war.

## 5. Conclusion

Thus, most armed conflicts in today’s world are not conventional and occur in an uncustomary form of confrontation between various states. There is every indication of the asymmetric nature of such conflicts, which is construed not in terms of resource, or some other type of, superiority but in terms of the means of achieving the objectives employed, when hard power gets effectively replaced by soft power. Conventional warfare is being supplanted today by armed conflicts with multiple asymmetries.

Today, many armed conflicts can no longer be viewed as classic interstate conflicts. New-generation conflicts can be characterized by a whole array of terms, including ‘low-intensity conflict’, ‘limited armed conflict’, ‘small war’, ‘local war’, etc. Wars of this kind tend to occur in third-world countries mostly.

In new-generation wars, a direct military confrontation between the key actors is supplanted by new, indirect, forms of collision, like information-based special operations, spreading

disinformation to demoralize the enemy, cyber-attacks, intelligence activities, funding the political opposition, etc.

Consequently, in today's warfare, more specifically proxy warfare, of great significance is non-military factors governed by the underlying rules of the existing world order.

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