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
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Actual problem

The History of Military Propaganda: The Horizons of Related Research in the 21st century

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Abstract

This paper provides an analysis of 25 research studies on military propaganda indexed in the Web of Science database and published in the period 2004–2019, i.e. in the 21st century. The materials were systematized by year, publication venue, and research subject matter.

The author draws the conclusion that in the early modern period military propaganda was employed mainly in times of revolutions and wars of independence. This may be explained by the fact that the period's armies did not have the institution of military propagandists in place yet. It was only as late as the Crimean War that mass media were first used to shape public opinion among the populations of the countries at war.

In the modern period, the role of military propaganda grew significantly, with military propagandists getting set apart into a special military unit. In a time of war, mass media were subordinate to the local administration, which made it possible to create the conditions for keeping public opinion steady and preventing the “war weariness” phenomenon.

The development of digital technology and the Internet has facilitated communication among terrorist communities significantly. This has given researchers reason to explore the nature and manifestations of terrorist activity and seek out ways to counteract it. In the contemporary period, military propaganda is finding manifestation in terrorist activity, hybrid wars, and states' activity on countering domestic and international threats.

Keywords: military propaganda, early modern period, modern period, contemporary period, research, terrorism, cyber wars, hybrid wars.

1. Introduction

In today's fast-changing world, the history of military propaganda is increasingly becoming a subject of interest among the scholarly community. Researchers are not only delving into the historical past, with a focus on analyzing the propaganda of the early modern period, but are trying to gain insight into new trends in the area of military propaganda in the modern and contemporary periods as well.

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2. Materials and methods

2.1. The paper drew upon 25 publications on the history of military propaganda published in the period 2004–2019. To determine the vectors of research conducted by the scholarly community on the history of military propaganda, the author consulted the Web of Science database, searching for ‘military propaganda’, and drew up a sample spanning the period from 2004 to 2019. The sample included 25 research studies on the subject. Out of these, there were two papers presented at a conference and one book. By year, the publications were distributed as follows (Table 1):

Table 1. Publications’ Distribution across Years

Years	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006	2005	2004
Number of research studies	1	2	4	4	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	3	2

As evidenced from Table 1, the extent of interest among researchers in the subject of military propaganda has varied over the last 15 years. Nonetheless, in recent years there has been an increasing interest in it.

In analyzing Table 1, it is worth understanding that the decline in number of publications in 2019 was associated with not all publications having been counted in. This can be explained by the fact that by the time this paper was completed (October of 2019), not all publications from the first half of the year (and, all the more so, those out in the fall) had been uploaded to the Web of Science. Overall, Table 1 clearly illustrates that in recent years there has been a significant increase in number of publications on the history of military propaganda, which may be due to both the events in areas of local conflict and the use of new propaganda weapons.

Thematically, the research studies were distributed as follows (Table 2):

Table 2. Research Studies’ Distribution across Thematic Areas

Research subject matter	Number of research studies
Research into the early modern period	4
Research into the modern period	11
Research into the contemporary period	10
Total	25

By publication venue, the research studies were distributed as follows (Table 3):

Table 3. Research Studies’ Distribution across Publication Venues

Publication venue	Number of research studies
Peer-reviewed journal	22
Conference	2
Book	1
Total	25

In terms of the analysis of the publications’ content, it is worth noting that this work’s thematic distribution of related research studies is the author’s personal choice. Without question, the problem field could include other thematic areas as well.

The author is not providing a deep analysis of all the 25 scholarly publications selected for the purpose, as this would be too voluminous for the scope of this paper. The idea, rather, is to gain an insight into what research niches related research is being conducted in in the 21st century.

The first major group of publications is made up of research studies on the modern period. The largest group of publications, it includes 11 bibliographical units. The fact that there are so many publications in this group (nearly 40%) can be explained quite simply – in the contemporary world, there are a number of local conflicts that have taken on a smoldering form and are characterized by the emergence of new forms of propaganda work. This group is followed by research studies on the contemporary period – 10 bibliographical units that are focused on contemporary issues in military propaganda. This group is almost as large as the first one in size, but it covers a much smaller historical period – just the beginning of the 21st century. This provides hope that the stock of research on this period will only grow going forward.

The publication topics will be examined in chronological order. This will make it possible to get a more comprehensive picture of how military propaganda has been employed in the world history and identify some of the key typical characteristics. The work is divided into the following three major chronological periods:

- 1) the early modern period – from 1640 to 1900;
- 2) the modern period – from 1900 to 2000;
- 3) the contemporary period – from 2000 to the present time.

2.2. The work's methodology is grounded in the principles of historicism and objectivity. Major consideration is given to methods of work with historiography. The author's internal textual criticism has helped determine the general and the particular in contemporary military propaganda.

3. Results

3.1. Early modern period

The first mention of the use of propaganda in a local conflict goes back to the Reapers' War, which took place in Catalonia in 1640. The war had its roots in the discomfort generated in Catalan society by the conscription of local residents into the Italian army of the Spanish King and the presence in Catalonia of a royal army made up of foreigners. Taking advantage of Spain's engagement in military action against France, the Catalans appealed to the French for help. As a result, this would help keep Catalonia out of Spanish rule up until 1652. An article by M. Rohrschneider, entitled 'The Word as a Weapon. Political Propaganda in the Insurrection of the Catalans, 1640–1652', examines the characteristics of political propaganda employed by the Catalans during this revolt ([Rohrschneider, 2005](#)).

Music and singing are known to have served as a vent for public feeling in times of revolutionary upheavals. This was the case during the French Revolution. Researcher F. Derne notes in his 'Singing as a Revolutionary "Weapon", and Echoing the Society in Auvergne' that the French people have never sung so much as they did during the revolution. Songs written in that period reflected the actual feelings of Auvergne residents at the time. Away from the harsh realities of warfare and free from all sorts of political unrest and the horrors of civil war, the local authorities sought to foster in the people a commitment to republican ideals. Accordingly, the arts, particularly music, must have been used as a propaganda tool in alignment with the public impulse and the state's interests ([Derne, 2005](#)).

In the early 19th century, several regions in South America witnessed wars of independence from colonial rule. To stabilize the situation, the colonial governments undertook a variety of measures to sway public opinion among the locals. M. Capelán provides in 'Music and Theater as War Weapons: Propaganda Pro-Fernando in Venezuela during the War of Spanish Independence' an insight into the implementation of a large-scale propaganda campaign in support of Fernando VII, in which a key role was also played by both music and theater. The researcher examines a pool of patriotic songs and religious works written at the time to gain insight into how the patriotic song evolved from a conspiratorial genre into a form of art sponsored by the government ([Capelan, 2016](#)).

Military propaganda was first employed during the Crimean War (1853–1856), the purpose being Great Britain's desire to discredit the Russian Empire. English newspapers were used to spread military propaganda with a view to positioning Russia as an enemy in the minds of the foreign general public. At the same time, certain Russian newspapers published patriotically oriented works too. In this context, issues of patriotic propaganda in the land of the Great Don Cossack Host have been explored by researcher A.Yu. Peretyatko ([Peretyatko, 2019](#)).

To sum up, in the early modern period, military propaganda was employed mainly in times of revolutions and wars of independence. This may be explained by the fact that the period's armies did not have the institution of military propagandists in place yet. It was only as late as the Crimean War that mass media were first used to shape public opinion among the populations of the countries at war.

3.2. Modern period

The modern period witnessed a significant number of military conflicts in which active use was made of military propaganda. A major military conflict in the early 20th century was World War I. During this military period, much of the responsibility for shaping public opinion was placed on mass media. A group of researchers led by E.Yu. Leontyeva have examined in a work entitled 'The Russian Provincial Press at the Beginning of the First World War as the Most Important Means of Forming and Maintaining Patriotic Feelings' the role of the periodical press through the example of a particular Russian city. Based on an analysis of daily print media in the city of Tsaritsyn, the researchers have found that the newspapers provided timely coverage of military events, religious ceremonies, local charity events, pro-mobilization sentiment, and manifestations of patriotism (Leontyeva et al., 2017). Through the example of the same city, a study conducted in 2016 by O.A. Karagodina examines the charitable activity of the town's population during World War I. It has found that a determining factor in its volume was coverage of charitable activity in the press (Karagodina, 2016).

A 2018 study by C.R. Lima, entitled 'Photomontage as a Revolutionary Agent', addresses the effect of photomontage on socio-political processes (e.g., the rise to power of the Fascist regime in Germany and propaganda efforts in Soviet Russia undertaken subsequent to the establishment of Bolshevik power) (Lima, 2018).

A paper by S. Wei, entitled 'News as a Weapon: Hollington Tong and the Formation of the Guomindang Centralized Foreign Propaganda System, 1937-1938', examines the process of centralization of foreign propaganda activity by the Chinese Nationalist Party between 1937 and 1938. The researcher establishes that foreign propaganda was an important war strategy for the Chinese Nationalist Party after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (Wei, 2014).

In 1939, the USSR invaded Finland. This conflict was covered by the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS). By the end of the 1930s, TASS began to play an important role within the Soviet Union, with its activity being quite diverse. A paper by M.L.G. Spencer, entitled 'Signals from Stalin: The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union in the Midst of the Soviet-Finnish War, 1939-40', examines the activity of TASS during the Soviet-Finnish War. The researcher notes that, eventually emerging as a tool of foreign policy and versatile propaganda weapon for the Soviet Union, TASS was employed by the Soviet government to limit the damage caused by global condemnation of the Soviet invasion (Spencer, 2013).

In 1945, Indonesia witnessed the outbreak of a war of independence. Fought against the allied Dutch and British forces, the conflict ended in 1949 with the Netherlands' recognition of Indonesia's independence. A work by H.A. Poeze, entitled 'The Fourth Weapon: Information, Propaganda and Public Resistance, 1944-1953', examines the use of information during the period 1944-1953 as a fourth weapon (Poeze, 2014).

In 2017, the journal *Israel Affairs* published a work by G. Goodman entitled "'Spokesmanship is a Weapon': Israeli Army News Management during the October 1973 War", which explores propaganda during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (also known as the Yom Kippur War). The researcher examines news management by the Israeli army and the Israel Defense Forces' press activity during the war and describes some of the key ways in which the government and military sought to control and manage news reporting in the domestic and foreign media (Goodman, 2017).

Note that wide use of propaganda was also made as part of Operation Desert Storm. This subject has been explored by A.T. Thrall (Thrall, 2007), G. Carlyle (Carlyle, 2004), and A. Romarheim (Romarheim, 2004). It has also been investigated by J. Western in 'The War over Iraq: Selling War to the American Public' (Western, 2005). The researcher examines the influence of four critical factors that enabled the administration to frame the case for war in Iraq: (1) executive-branch information and propaganda advantages; (2) executive cohesion; (3) oppositional fragmentation; (4) the nature and history of the Iraqi regime.

In the modern period, the role of military propaganda grew significantly, with military propagandists getting set apart into a special military unit. In a time of war, mass media were subordinate to the local administration, which made it possible to create the conditions for keeping public opinion steady and preventing the “war weariness” phenomenon.

3.3. Contemporary period

Operation Desert Storm revealed that the coalition’s technical superiority is so overwhelming that the resistance of just about any army can be overpowered in quite a short period. This has forced certain political regimes change their tactics of how they resist the coalition. And that has resulted in terrorism becoming a major threat in the contemporary world, the point of departure being the events of September 11, 2001.

The development of digital technology and the Internet has facilitated communication among terrorist communities significantly. This has given researchers reason to explore the nature and manifestations of terrorist activity and seek out ways to counteract it.

For instance, the issue of inciting terrorism through the Internet has been explored by A. Douai. In his “Technology and Terrorism: Media Symbiosis and the “Dark Side” of the Web”, the researcher notes that to propagate mass panic and thus influence policies, terrorists exploit the media’s ability and willingness to publicize indiscriminate violence, creating “media spectacles of terror”. On top of that, the Internet has allowed terrorists to evade detection, communicate, recruit, and organize (Douai, 2015).

In 2010, Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Old Threats, New Channels – The Internet as a Tool for Terrorists contained a report by E. Hacoheh, entitled ‘Digital Hate: Terror, Anti-Semitism and Racism on the Internet’. The report drew attention to digital hate on the Internet as a phenomenon that propagandizes terrorist, anti-Semite, and racist activity (Hacoheh, 2008).

Issues related to recruitment of terrorists and countering this activity in the cyber world have been explored by scholars A.R. Alzoubaidi, D. Prodan-Palade, and S. Ekici. In their work, entitled ‘Terrorist Recruitment and Counter Measures in the Cyber World’, the researchers note that in the contemporary world terrorist organizations are increasingly employing the Internet to spread their propaganda and promote extremism. The paper identifies a set of key tools for recruiting terrorists in cyberspace and examines a set of legal tools and methods for countering this type of activity on the Internet. It discusses how cyber systems can be secured and thus become safe for the cyber world environment (Alzoubaidi et al., 2016).

A paper by Y. Saramifar, published in March of 2018 in The Journal of Material Culture, views the AK-47 as an indispensable weapon used by Hezbollah militants. The researcher notes that, despite its lethal potential, the AK-47 has largely been an object of humor and fun among the militants (Saramifar, 2018).

Another contemporary conflict that the media was used as a weapon in is the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah War. This subject has been explored by M. Kalb and C. Saivetz in their report ‘The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict’, presented at the 2007 US–Islamic World Forum. Based on an analysis of global mass media and interviews with diplomats and journalists, the researchers have established that in the context of the above conflict the press went from the stage of an objective observer to that of an ardent advocate, becoming, in essence, a weapon of modern warfare (Kalb, Saivetz, 2007).

A new trend in the organization of contemporary military propaganda is the use of social networks. For instance, a study by A. Kohn, published in 2017 in Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies, views Instagram as a propaganda tool. The researcher exemplifies this via Instagram photos posted on the official website of the Israel Defense Forces (Kohn, 2017).

The characteristics of military propaganda in Syria have been explored by G. Simons in his ‘News and Syria: Creating Key Media Moments in the Conflict’. The researcher insists that news is not an accidental occurrence, in terms of either subject or timing. The above work provides an analysis of articles on specific issues such as the reaction to the chemical weapons attack of August 2013 and the allegations of “industrial killings” by the Syrian government, appearing in the mass media. In the researcher’s view, these two cases suggest that the timing and nature of these specific news events are not as “random” and coincidental as would seem at first glance (Simons, 2016).

In the contemporary world, military propaganda is being employed in virtually every armed conflict. Hybrid wars are no exception – here they can use cyber-attacks as a propaganda tool. Researcher Woo Pyung-Kyun examines in his work ‘The Russian Hybrid War in the Ukraine Crisis: Some Characteristics and Implications’ Russia’s hybrid wars in Ukraine, starting in 2014. The scholar draws a parallel, claiming that the Russian government has already used this weapon before – in Georgia and in Transnistria (Pyung-Kyun, 2015).

One of the latest major conflicts – the one in Ukraine – has been explored by O. Boyd-Barrett in his ‘Ukraine, Mainstream Media and Conflict Propaganda’. Based on the events that took place in Ukraine from February to October of 2014, the researcher examines the various ways in which information warfare can be waged today between nuclear powers (Boyd-Barrett, 2017).

Thus, in the contemporary period military propaganda is finding manifestation in terrorist activity, hybrid wars, and states’ activity on countering domestic and international threats.

In the early 21st century, a key characteristic of research on military propaganda was the conduct of historical-comparative research. For instance, F. Maâtoug tries to determine in ‘The United States and War Propaganda: From the Spanish-American War in Cuba (1898) to the Invasion of Iraq (2003)’, published in 2008, the general and the particular in American war propaganda (Maatoug, 2008).

4. Conclusion

In the early modern period, military propaganda was employed mainly in times of revolutions and wars of independence. This may be explained by the fact that the period’s armies did not have the institution of military propagandists in place yet. It was only as late as the Crimean War that mass media were first used to shape public opinion among the populations of the countries at war.

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
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Articles and Statements

Describing the Enemy: Images of the Turks and Tatars in “Dzieie tvreckie y utarczki kozackie z tatory” by Marcin Paszkowski

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Abstract

Political system of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth implied active participation of the nobility in the political life of the state. Literature was widely used to disseminate and popularize certain ideas. In particular, in the political literature one can find colorful descriptions of the main foreign policy enemies of the state, i.e. the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate. The article is devoted to the description of the Turks and the Tatars in the works of Polish poet and translator Marcin Paszkowski “Dzieie tvreckie y utarczki kozackie z Tatory”. The author created one of the first encyclopedias of Turkish life and traditions, describing them vividly in his work. At the same time, describing the Turks and the Tatars, Marcin Paszkowski used epithets that had a hidden meaning, but were clear to the readers of the time. Thus, the author called the Turks and the Tatars dogs and wolves. These animals were associated with the chthonic world and had mostly negative connotations. The Tatars were described as ugly people, since the outer ugliness was associated with the inner ugliness. Description of the Turks as homosexuals has Biblical roots. Since in Christianity such sexual orientation was considered sinful, this way the author was emphasizing the sinfulness of the Turks in general. Paszkowski was stressing that the Tatars did not eat bread and wine, which was not true. But for a Christian reader it was an understandable hint that the Tatars were not part of the Christian world. Political theory accuses the Turks of having no law in their state, just the right of the Sultan only.

Keywords: Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ottoman Empire, propaganda, political literature, image of the enemy.

1. Introduction

A distinctive feature of the political life of the Polish-Lithuanian state was a large amount of propaganda literature. It concerned both domestic and foreign policy of Warsaw. One of the important foreign policy issues was the Turkish issue, i.e. relations with the Ottoman Empire, which the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had never had smoothly developed. The 1610s became the time of activating anti-Turkish propaganda. After unsuccessful attempts of enthroning False Dmitry in Moscow, the troops that supported the impostors began to return. Including a large number of the Zaporozhye Cossacks. They, having received no remuneration for their service, resumed their plundering sea campaigns to the cities of the Crimean and the Turkish coasts, which,

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as expected, provoked an increase in the Tatar attacks / campaigns to the Ukrainian provinces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In such a situation, normal diplomacy between the states was out of the question, and there was a public demand for anti-Turkish and anti-Tatar literature. And since all's fair in love and war, the authors of the texts describing enemies, tried to show them from the worst side.

2. Materials and methods

The subject of this article is the ways of describing the Turks and the Tatars in political journalism as potential enemies of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It should be noted immediately that the entire body of anti-Turkish literature cannot be covered in a single study for at least two reasons. Firstly, the number of such texts is indeed huge. Among them there are both solid religious-philosophical treatises and low-grade poems. Secondly, there is no unified catalogue of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth anti-Turkish literature. Therefore, the source base of the study had to be limited.

Another comment of a methodological nature should be made. Speaking of anti-Turkish literature, I consciously combine under this term anti-Turkish, anti-Tatar and anti-Islamic literature, which, strictly speaking, have different directions in the political journalism of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Where it is important, I will clearly separate these texts.

3. Discussion and results

Against the background of a large number of anti-Turkish literature pieces, the work by Marcin Paszkowski "Dzieie tvreckie y utarczki kozackie z Tatory" ([Paszkowski, 1615](#)) stands out. There's almost nothing known about the author himself. Most likely, he came from unimportant nobility, had a good education (as evidenced by his texts). The researchers suggest that Paszkowski may have been in Turkish or Tatar captivity for some time. Peak of the writer's creative activity fell on the 1610s. The greatest glory was brought to him by the translation of "European Sarmatia Chronicles" by Guagnini. When they speak about Paszkowski as a poet, they first of all remember "Dzieie tvreckie y utarczki kozackie z Tatory". This work is not of a great, but of a continuous interest of historians and philologists in Poland and Ukraine. Ukrainian historians are interested in descriptions of Ukrainian nature in the poem, in particular, the rapids on the Dnipro, and the fighting against the Tatars in which the main character took part. The relevant parts of the work have been translated into Ukrainian several times and commented on ([Virs'kii, 2016](#)). At the same time, "Dzieie tvreckie y utarczki kozackie z Tatory" enjoy bigger popularity in the Polish historiography. Polish researchers note that Paszkowski's work was one of the first attempts of the Ottoman language studies in Europe (the language was called Turkish in the text), as the book included a small Polish-Turkish dictionary of 700 words. In general, half of the poem's text was devoted to the Turkish culture, traditions, life and religion, which made "Dzieie tvreckie..." a kind of encyclopedia ([Baranowski, 1950: 79](#)).

The work was published in the printing house of Mikołaj Lob in 1615 and was a logical continuation of the author's interest in the "Eastern issue", i.e. Polish-Turkish relations. This interest has already manifested itself in Paszkowski's first publications, and over time has become firmly established during the work on the translation of the "Chronicle" by Guagnini. There was also his interest in the Ukrainian Cossacks, and Paszkowski added a lot for himself to the translation of "Chronicles" about the Ukrainian Cossacks and their continuous struggle with the Tatars, which was not in the original.



Fig. 1. Engraving from the front page of the "Chorażew Wandalinowa" verse by J. Jurkowski (Jurkowski, 1607). In the upper right corner of the banner held by Wandalin, there is an allegorical figure of a semi-wolf (semi-dog) that symbolizes a Tatar.

Paszkowski's works were analyzed by Michał Kuran in his study on Marcin Paszkowski (Kuran, 2005), and the text of "Dzieje tvreckie y utarczki kozackie z Tatarzy" was republished in 2018 with a substantial commentary (Siemieniec-Gołaś, 2018), so there is no need to repeat it.

Nevertheless, the author and his writing were "children of their era" and shared the ideas and beliefs characteristic of their time. It is for this reason that "Dzieje tureckie" is filled with vivid images, interesting comparisons about the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate. But if you look closely, it turns out that most of the comparisons and images are the *topoi* that were clear to the contemporaries and contained information about the object.

Marcin Paszkowski, like his contemporaries, did not spare epithets to describe the enemies of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The most common characteristics of the Tatars were: blasphemous, wild, cunning, treacherous. Paszkowski called the Turks, and especially the Tatars, dogs (wild dogs). The image of a dog/wolf is often found in the mythological systems of Slavic peoples. It seems to me, Paszkowski specifically used a symbol that was understandable to his contemporaries and had negative connotations. It should be noted that the image of a dog / wolf is ambivalent and has also a positive meaning. Although Paszkowski exploited the negative meaning of the image exclusively. The image of the wolf is connected with the chthonic world and is associated with the world of the dead. It is also associated with evil spirits. Ethnographers record a Polish legend that the devil turns into a wolf, or the wolf is the devil's horse (Gura, 1997: 128-129). The Tatars and the Turks were called dogs. Negative connotations were read into this nickname as well as into the wolf's image. For example, it was believed that plague, cholera and other diseases come in the form of a large white dog. Thus, the front page of Jan Jurkowski's verse depicts the figure of a semi-wolf that symbolizes the Tatars (Jurkowski, 1607). During the Counter-Reformation and the strengthening of religious commitment, the folklore representation of the wolf as the devil, and the Tatars via it, as servants of the devil, had a fertile ground. All the more so because publicists called the Tatar attacks a punishment for the fall of morality and piety in Polish society.



Fig. 2. Engraving from the “Sem majowy” verse by Marcin Bielski (Bielski, 1889) The top part of this xylography depicts an eagle (Emperor) hovering over a wolf (Ottoman Empire) that is holding the ring of St. Stephen (symbolizing the part of Hungary conquered by the Turks) in its mouth. A pelican (The Pope) looks at it, but does not take part in what is happening. The approach of the enemy is symbolized by a crescent moon that floats along the river and approaches the shore. The Harpy (Tatars) are also monitoring the conflict, but do not interfere in it.

Describing enemies, poets and writers often focused on their terrible appearance. And Paszkowski was no exception:

*And the face, if you look, is terrible
a z twarzy strażni na poyrzeniu (Paszkowski, 1615: 3)*

Perhaps it was a simple binary opposition: we are handsome, our enemies are ugly. But, in my opinion, the roots of this characterization should be sought in the aesthetic ideas of the late Middle Ages and early Modern Age, and they go back to Antiquity. In accordance with the ancient principle of *kalokagatia*, everything in man should be harmonious, outer beauty should be supplemented by the inner one. If the author was pointing out the outer "ugliness" of the Tatars, he wanted to show not their anatomical features, but their inner ugliness.

It was remembered several times in the text of "Dzieie tvreckie" that the Turks were sodomites. The author was emphasizing this specifically when describing the main character's stay as captive. The main character killed the young son of his master when he tried to persuade him to homosexual relationship. I believe that repeated mentioning of homosexuality of the Turks should have strengthened the reader's thoughts about the sinfulness of the entire people (Turks and Tatars). And here the historical authenticity was to give way to the ideological component of "Dzieie tvreckie". In fact, Paszkowski knew Islamic traditions quite well and most likely knew that homosexuality is considered a sin in Islam, just like in Christianity.

An interesting way to demonstrate the nasty nature of the Tatars was to say that they did not consume wine and bread (Paszkowski, 1615: 3), which, of course, was not true. The author's statement has Biblical roots. For a Christian reader, wine and bread meant the body and blood of Christ. Paszkowski was showing in such an exquisite way that the enemies of Poland were not Christians.

Many of the images used by Paszkowski come from the political theory of the time. The poet wrote that the Turks and Tatars do not have an established law and legislature:

*A very cruel people who live a filthy life,
Have no honesty or law.
Find justice in the square
Mars attends to matters in a contest.
Narod to zbyt okrutny, żywota sprosnego*

*Wiary y Cnoty niema, ni prawa żadnego.
... Naydzie tam sprawedliwość pretką na rynku,
Mars sprawę wnet odprawi w takim pojedynku* (Paszkowski, 1615: 2-3).

For a Polish nobleman, the absence of law in a country was impossible. If there is no law in the state, it ceases to exist. The nobility constantly emphasized that *nierzqd* (disorder, bad state of law) is better than *biezrzqd* (lack of law, anarchy), since a bad condition of law can be improved by good laws. The right, in the understanding of the law, was respected by the nobility unequivocally. According to the nobility, the law is the sovereign in the state (*prawo pospolite*), and not the King who is a mere servant of the law.

As a consequence of the lack of law, the Turks and the Tatars were subject to the unlimited power of the Sultan:

*It is only by the will of the Sultan that everyone acts,
If he tells them to kill, they will kill, slaughter, burn and poison
Lecz wolą Cesarzką wszyscy postępuią,
Każe zabić zabią, zetną, spalą, struą.*

Opposite this verse, there is a note of explanation in the text: *Such a terrible thing in Turkey is the will of the Sultan* (Paszkowski, 1615: 49). This situation of rightless existence in the state was absolutely unacceptable for the Polish nobility who considered the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth administration model (*monarchia mixta*) ideal.

Paszkowski called the Tatars a nomadic people. On the one hand, this is an obvious statement. On the other hand, in the political theory of the 16th and 17th centuries nomadic peoples were considered to be humble in origin compared to settled farmers. This way the author once again demonstrated the Polish advantage over their opponents.

4. Conclusion

Thus, Marcin Paszkowski in his poem "Dzieie tvreckie y utarczki kozackie z Tatory" tried to create one of the first country-research descriptions of the Ottoman Empire in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The narrative to which the author was beading the information was the story of "a simple, not noble man whom his fate sent to different parts of the Ottoman Empire" (Kuran, 2005: 51). Despite the obvious successes and independence, the non-compilativity of the work, the author could not free himself from the prejudices of his time. First of all, they concerned the descriptions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth ancestral enemies, i.e. the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate. Part of the text had subtext, and had to convince the Polish reader of Warsaw's advantage over Istanbul. To do this, Paszkowski used a system of topoi which was clear to the reader. These topoi were coming from the religious worldview, ethical, aesthetic and political theories of the late Middle Ages and the early Modern Age.

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
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Military Propaganda in the Russian Navy in the Period 1914–1915

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Abstract

This paper looks into the organization of military propaganda in the Russian Imperial Navy in the period 1914-1915. The author examines the rivalry in hostile propaganda between Russia and Germany during World War I in the Baltic and Black Sea theaters of military operations. The paper describes some of the key propaganda techniques employed by the nations of the Entente and those of the Triple Alliance; explores the rivalry in hostile propaganda between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire; discusses the attitude toward World War I among the Navy's lower ranks and officers; provides an insight into the rationale behind patriotic sentiment among the personnel of the Russian Imperial Navy during the initial period of World War I; examines the role of Emperor Nicholas II and the State Duma in Russia's propaganda campaigns in its World War I fleet; illustrates how advantage was taken of the feats of clergymen, sailors, and officers in the Russian navy for propaganda purposes. Using specific examples from popular publications of the World War I period, the author touches upon how the media in pre-revolutionary Russia exploited the atrocities committed against the civilian population by Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey to spread military propaganda among the personnel of the Russian Imperial Navy. At the end of the paper, the author summarizes the key characteristics and principles of the organization of military propaganda in the Russian Imperial Navy in the period 1914–1915.

Keywords: Russian Imperial Navy, propaganda, World War I, German fleet, sailors, officers.

1. Introduction

As a general assessment of Russia's naval propaganda during World War I, it is worth noting its low efficiency. Importantly, during that time it was a part of the Russian Empire's overall military propaganda.

During World War I, much of the military propaganda within the Russian Imperial Navy was spread through the journal *Naval Digest* and a set of special publications from the Russian military establishment.

2. Materials and methods

The author drew upon materials from the repositories of the Russian State Naval Archive (Saint Petersburg). Use was also made of publications from the journal *Naval Digest* and several research studies.

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The work employed a set of research methods that are common in research on military propaganda in the Russian Imperial Navy. In addition, the author made use of a set of general methods of research too. A special use was made of the historical-situational method – to compare the propaganda techniques employed in the Russian and German navies.

3. Discussion and results

The August issue of Naval Digest opened the topic of World War I with Nicholas II's manifesto announcing the beginning of warfare against Germany ([Manifest, 1914](#)).

Yet, there were some appeals in the navy that even eclipsed the tsar's manifesto in patriotism. For instance, on August 1, 1914, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Baltic Fleet N.O. Essen approached the fleet's personnel with the following mandate:

“Officers and members of the crew!

From this day out, each one of us must put our personal matters aside and try to concentrate all our thoughts and will on the sole objective – to protect our motherland from enemy intrusion and confront our enemies without hesitation, thinking only about dealing them the heaviest blows possible.

A war is decided on the battlefield. We need to exert all our powers, both physical and spiritual, and employ all our experience and ability on the day of a battle to ensure that our shells and mines cause destruction and demise across the enemy's battle lines and ships.

The enemy has immense power and experience. It will try to exploit our weaknesses and errors straightaway. We need to do our best to prevent that from happening as much as possible.

Remember that the only way for us to be of maximum help to each other in a battle is to amplify our offensive production and try to keep up the pressure on the enemy with a view to dealing it as heavy blows as possible, by employing all our available forces and combat resources. May each of us fulfill our greatest duty to our motherland – protect it with our life, and follow in the footsteps of those who, alongside the great Emperor, set our navy in motion 200 years ago with their feats and blood in these waters” ([Zolotarev, Kozlov, 1998](#)).

Through World War I, military propaganda in the Russian fleet would take on a more professional form. More specifically, in September of 1914 Naval Digest carried an insightful article entitled ‘The World War: The Casus Belli and the Course of the Diplomatic Negotiations which Led to the Breach’ ([Mirovaya voina, 1914](#)). As a logical sequel to this publication, there came out the following sections: Russian Official Communiqués on the War ([Russkie ofitsial'nye soobshcheniya..., 1914](#)), Naval Chronicle ([Morskaya khronika, 1914. № 9](#)), and Feature Stories about the World War’ ([Klado, 1914](#)). Imbued with a sense of patriotism, all of these sections covered military action on the sea, and all of them accused Germany of bringing about a global catastrophe. Note that the last three sections remained in place virtually throughout the period the Imperial Russian Navy was in operation as a military unit, i.e. from 1914 to early 1917 ([RGA VMF. F. 431. Op. 1. D. 714. L. 110–111](#)).

Apart from Naval Digest, there were also in place a number of publications from the Naval Ministry of Russia. For instance, in December of 1914, they launched into circulation in Petrograd an illustrated military journal entitled ‘The Army and the Navy’, which would appear twice a week under the editorship of A.D. Dolmatov ([Russkaya voennaya periodicheskaya..., 1959](#)).

Initially, the Russian military propaganda machine focused its activity on the Baltic theater of military operations ([RGA VMF. F. 1. Op. 1. D. 5. L. 15](#)). A practice employed to accentuate the role of the Baltic fleet in the warfare was citing the foreign press. For instance, it was reported that on August 7, 1914 a British newspaper wrote the following: “The German navy is outside the boundaries of the Baltic Sea, forced to stay at the ports” ([Voina: Khronika i otkliki, 1914. № 1](#)). Just a few days later, the official propaganda machine stated the following in a report quoting an English source: “The Russian navy has sustained no losses in personnel” ([Voina: Khronika i otkliki, 1914. № 2](#)).

Soon, the Baltic fleet enjoyed a series of substantial successes. In late July and early August of 1915, the opponent undertook several attempts to break through to the Gulf of Riga. Covered by the battleships, the minesweepers started to sweep the channel in Irbe Strait. The Baltic fleet bravely engaged in a battle against the outnumbering opponent. In the early hours of August 4, the destroyer Novik attacked the new German destroyers V-99 and V-100 and had them on the run ([Krasnoznamennyi Chernomorskii flot, 1987](#)). During the pursuit, one of the ships was damaged by

artillery fire, and the other one ran into a mine barrier, blew up, and sank. The crew of the gunboat Sivuch fought a successful battle against the cruiser Augsburg and two German destroyers (RGA VMF. F. 716. Op. 1. D. 187. L. 112) (Fig. 1).




Fig. 1. Gunboat Sivuch

Generally, the Russian military propaganda machine employed the technique of citing the allies' press in relation to the Russian navy quite often during World War I. For instance, in September of 1915 the journal *Naval Digest* cited the delight of foreign publications with the heroism of sailors in the Russian navy: "The English press has called the valiant behavior of the commander and the entire crew of the gunboat Sivuch epic heroism" [this was regarding the battle with the German navy in the Gulf of Riga in August of 1915]. Here are a few other quotes from the journal: "The papers are likening the behavior of the Sivuch crew to that of the crew of a small English vessel that in the 16th century destroyed a large Spanish brig off the Azores, quoting extracts from poems devoted to this glorious cause"; "The Star has stated in a passionately written story that the world is certain to remember the heroism of the Sivuch crew long after all other events of this titanic war are consigned to history"; "The victory of the Russian navy in the Gulf of Riga and the successful assistance of the English submarines have produced a burst of inspiration within London" (*Morskaya khronika*, 1915. № 9).

The Baltic fleet undertook active action with regard to the enemy's sea-lanes. In the southern and southwestern parts of the sea, the cruisers and destroyers were active up until mid-February in setting up mine barriers, which would help hamper the German navy's military and transportation activity in the Baltic Sea. It is these barriers that helped blow up the German cruisers Danzig, Bremen, and Lübeck and a German destroyer.

By the fall of 1915, the Baltic fleet had 14 submarines. In the course of the campaign, these attacked German combat and transport ships 53 times. This included the armored cruiser Prinz Adalbert, the cruiser Undine, a torpedo boat, and 15 transports (RGA VMF. F. 736. Op. 1. D. 318. L. 27).

The activity of Russian submarines was a matter of deep concern to the German leadership. In October of 1915, the steam navigation companies announced the cessation of navigation in the Baltic Sea. In this regard, the German leadership had to fortify Germany's underwater defense in the theater. It also resolved to conduct most of Germany's transportation activity via Swedish territorial waters.

In 1915, the German navy failed to achieve any of its objectives, losing in the Baltic Sea three cruisers, seven destroyers, a submarine, a minelayer, seven minesweepers, five patrol and lookout ships, and 24 transports (RGA VMF. F. 759. Op. 1. D. 35. L. 84). Damage was done to a battlecruiser, three cruisers, three destroyers, and four minesweepers.

By contrast, the Russian Baltic fleet did achieve its objectives. Its losses were relatively minor – two gunboats, two minelayers, three minesweepers, and eight auxiliary vessels and transports.

Note that the Naval Chronicle section of Naval Digest started to publish adverse material about the German navy right from the war's outset: "It has been reported that the cruiser Augsburg started to bombard Libava [Liepāja] at a time the city was living the common life of a resort. At that moment, the beach was, naturally, full of people, many of whom were ordinary Germans. After firing a few shells at the port, with several of them purposefully directed at a hospital, the troublemaker cruiser was unable to resist the temptation of doing some more damage and fired two more shells in the direction of the public on the beach. Fortunately, both shells burrowed into the shore's ground, sending heavy plumes of sand into the air; there were no casualties ... The moral outcomes of the feat accomplished by the cruiser Augsburg need no comment. The prestige of the German navy could not but be compromised in the eyes of Russian Baltic Germans learning that their children, wives, and sisters could at any moment become an aimless victim of German cruelty" ([Morskaya khronika, 1914. № 9](#)). Another example is the following statement by N.L. Klado in his 'Feature Stories about the World War': "The German race is contaminated with haughty contempt for other peoples" ([Klado, 1914](#)). This sentiment was picked up in a work by N. Kolychov entitled 'The Capital Sin of the German Nation', which started to be published in Naval Digest in April of 1915. The work condemned Germany's aggression against the Slav world ([Kolochoy, 1915. № 4](#)). It was completed only in December of 1915, concluding in the following words: "While calling itself the carrier of genuine humanity and the most consistent expressor of the ideas of primordial Christianity, the German nation has totally forgotten that it is not in vain that Christianity lists envy, pride, and wrath among the deadly sins, i.e. some of the mankind's gravest sins. Having resigned themselves to the control of their sinful feelings, the German people have come to believe they can do whatever they want, so murder follows naturally from their concept of the state.

Having, thus, placed themselves above the law, the German people have doubly committed a great mortal sin.

They have committed a great crime against the neighboring states, having exposed millions of people to untold misfortunes from fire and sword.

They have also committed a mortal sin against themselves, having strangled in themselves the principles of humanity, whereby they have condemned themselves to spiritual and physical death" ([Kolochoy, 1915. № 12](#)).

In general, the moral appearance of the enemy in the Baltic Sea was being painted in quite dark colors. For instance, there was the following brief communiqué of August 27, 1914: "In the North Sea, fishing boats disguised as Belgian vessels were scattering mines" ([Voina: Khronika i otkliki, 1914. № 2](#)).

Interestingly, while not paying due attention to the destruction in the Baltic Sea of the German cruiser Magdeburg, Naval Digest released a more original article, one entitled 'Whips and Brushes'. Here is an excerpt from it: "In looking over the German cruiser Magdeburg, blown up off our coast, a curious circumstance was discovered that shed light on certain practices common in the German navy. In each of the officer's cabins, government-issue whips were found, which were stamped and registered in the ship's stock record" ([Pleti ili shchetki, 1914](#)). This implied harsh treatment of members of the lower ranks by naval officers in the German navy. The success of the Baltic fleet, expressed in the sinking of the cruiser Magdeburg on August 13, 1914, found reflection in the pages of the patriotic publication War: Chronicle and Responses ([Voina: Khronika i otkliki, 1914. № 1](#)) ([Fig. 2](#)).



Fig. 2. Sinking of the German cruiser Magdeburg (postcard).

As early as November of 1914, they started to publish the roster of officers in the Russian navy who died, were wounded, or went missing as a result of battles during World War I ([Spisok ofitserov flota..., 1914](#)).

However, soon after the start of the war, Russia's military propaganda became concentrated on the Black Sea theater of military operations. Most importantly, the clash with Turkey was to help achieve the Russian Empire's objectives in World War I. According to participants in the 130th Congress of the Slavic Union, held in Saint Petersburg on August 1, 1914 (on a side note, the empire's capital was renamed into Petrograd on August 18, 1914, which was done for propaganda purposes as well), the following step was decided upon at the concluding dinner: "To be able to achieve the Union's economic objectives, we need to ensure free egress from the Black and Baltic Seas, with the keys from the Black Sea being in the hands of Russia" ([Voina: Khronika i otkliki, 1914. № 1](#)). The sentiment of Slavic Union delegates was echoed in an article by N. Nordman entitled 'The War with Turkey and Its Implications', published in Naval Digest, which suggested that the objective of ensuring Russia's control over the Black Sea straits be achieved by way of arms ([Nordman, 1914](#)) (Fig. 3).




Fig. 3. Sultan Mehmed V (postcard)

In addition, the Turkish navy was a rather advantageous target for Russian military propaganda. This fact was best expressed by Academician M.N. Pokrovsky: “If Russian admirals do not make preternatural errors, our edge over the Turkish fleet will well be assured” (Pokrovsky, 1928).

A condescending tone toward the new enemy is present even in the imperial manifesto announcing Russia’s declaration of war on Turkey: “The Turkish navy led by the Germans has dared to treacherously attack our Black Sea coast... We are adamant in our belief that Turkey’s reckless interference with military action will only speed up the disastrous course of events for it and open Russia a way to achieving the historic objectives in the Black Sea bequeathed to it by our forefathers” (Vtoraya Otechestvennaya voina..., 1916).

When it comes to Turkey, the Russian military propaganda machine always tried to present it to the navy as a weak opponent. This may be illustrated by the following piece in Naval Digest, published in the Naval Chronicle section: “On the night of November 29, 1915, a detachment of 25 men, captured in Tarutino, was transported to Odessa. These Turks look miserable” (Morskaya khronika, 1915. № 1).

However, not everything was going so smoothly in the war with the Turks at sea. On October 15, 1914, an official news report stated that the Black Sea fleet did not meet up with the enemy at sea and had to return to Sevastopol (RGA VMF. F. 417. Op. 5. D. 710. L. 21). In reality, during that time there took place two major battles. The first one was a raid by two Turkish torpedo vessels into the port of Odessa on October 16, which ended in the sinking of the gunboat Donets, the damaging of the gunboat Kubanets, several merchant ships, and an oil tank, and the shelling by the cruiser Goeben of Sevastopol, the Black Sea fleet’s main base. A special focus was laid by the military propaganda machine on the enemy’s cruelty: “One shell [during Goeben’s shelling of Sevastopol] got into the coal warehouses, another hit the railbed, and another exploded near a naval hospital, killing two of the patients and wounding eight members of the lower ranks” (Voina: Khronika i otkliki, 1914. № 1). Note that the official bulletin provided an objective account of the losses incurred by the Russian navy in the battle: “Two officers, a priest, 26 members of the lower ranks dead on the transport Prut; seven members of the lower ranks dead and seven wounded on the torpedo boat Lieutenant Pushchin; seven members of the lower ranks wounded on the gunboat Kubanets and the ship’s doctor dead on the gunboat Donets”. Concurrently, mention was made of

the heroic death of lieutenant Roguzsky, who blew up the transport Prut, which was not armed with artillery, to prevent it from being captured by the Turks, and the desperate attack of the torpedo boat Lieutenant Pushchin on the cruiser Goeben.

In light of the tragic circumstances, with participation from an archpriest of naval clergy, the official propaganda machine commemorated the heroic death of 70-year-old hieromonk Antony, who was a chaplain on the transport Prut: “At the time the transport Prut was sinking, hieromonk Antony was on the deck blessing members of the crew with a cross in his hand. Some of the crew made passionate attempts to convince Antony to escape in a lifeboat. However, the hieromonk categorically refused to do so, choosing to give up his place on a lifeboat for a crewmate. He descended from the deck to the cabin, put on his vestment, and ascended back to the deck, where he started to bless the crew, holding a cross and a gospel-book. Once the entire crew was taken off the ship, Antony headed to the cabin. A few moments later, the ship began to sink. On a side note, the late clergyman came from a religious family in the Samara Diocese. Educated in the Samara Ecclesiastical School, he lived for a dozen years in various monasteries as a regular monk. In 1909, Antony was assigned to the transport Prut as a clergyman” ([Voina: Khronika i otkliki, 1914. № 1](#)).

To mitigate the negative impression from the incursions made by the Turkish navy on October 29, 1914, the Russian military propaganda machine focused on glorifying the local success of the Black Sea fleet: “Having approached the port of Zonguldak, the fleet’s commander sent two ships with torpedo-boats to destroy the port facilities and repair shops. This objective was accomplished successfully, and, on top of that, we were able to sink a steamer that was at the wharf. In the meantime, our lookout cruiser spotted a Turkish troopship with soldiers aboard. Seeing the transport rush for the shore in an attempt to save the troops it was transporting, the cruiser overtook it, opened fire at it, and sank it. After that, the fleet retreated into the sea. Some time later, they noticed in the fog two vessels on the fleet’s left flank, which turned out to be the enemy’s transports. One of them, Midhat Pasha, was running under a military flag. The torpedo vessels sent to destroy these two transports soon detected a third one as well. All three, loaded with equipment for troops, automobiles, aeroplanes, and heavy guns, were sunk. From the sinking transports the Russian crew picked up and captured 248 men, including several German officers and one staff officer with some documentation on him. Based on the captives’ testimony, the transports were going to the port of Ünye, and from there they were to reengage in transporting the troops to Trebizond”. On November 6, 1914, there was an official report of the Black Sea fleet shelling the enemy’s barracks and wireless telegraph in Trebizond. During this operation, aimed at having the Black Sea fleet to destroy the ports of Trebizond and Zonguldak, the official military propaganda machine made note of the Turks’ atrocities committed against the Christian portion of the ports’ population: “Frustrated with their failures, the Turks began to see in any non-Moslem a traitor and a secret agent working for an opposing superpower. Quite naturally, the Turks did not yield to the Germans, their friends and allies, in means of reprisal. For instance, in Zonguldak and Trebizond, subsequent to the bombardment of these ports by the Black Sea fleet, the Turks hanged several dozen Armenians over suspicions that they had signaled to the Russian ships, with the corpses of some of the executed impaled to the masts of sailing ships to be left there, with colored lanterns and flags inserted in their eye-sockets, until they were defleshed by vultures” ([Vtoraya Otechestvennaya voina..., 1916](#)) ([Fig. 4](#)).



Fig. 4. Atrocities by the Turks

Special attention was devoted to the success achieved on November 7, 1914 by coastal artillerymen in the city of Tuapse during a shootout with the Turkish cruiser *Hamidiye*. The article states that the artillerymen managed to defend the city, whilst the Turks achieved only insignificant results – just one dead civilian and a dozen wounded. In addition, among the wounded were three men from the lower ranks and a nurse.

Quite a detailed account was provided of the battle between the battlecruiser *Goeben* and the Black Sea fleet's command ship *Evstafi* on November 7, 1914. The account mentions the losses incurred by the Russians: "The battle left the following dead: lieutenant Yevgeny Myazovsky, sublieutenants Nikolai Eiler, Nikolai Semenov, and Sergei Grigorenko, and 29 members of the lower ranks. A serious wound was suffered by sublieutenant Nikolai Gnilyosyrov. Among the lower ranks, 24 were wounded, with 19 of these wounded seriously" ([Voina: Khronika i otkliki, 1914. № 1](#)). The military propaganda machine utilized official documents as well. For instance, use was made of the following telegram sent by Supreme Commander of the Russian Army Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich after the battle of *Goeben* and *Evstafi*: "I am happy to communicate to you the contents of a telegram from our His Majesty the Emperor: 'Extend to the Black Sea fleet my gratitude for its successful actions and the zealous service of its crew. Nicholas.'" ([Vtoraya Otechestvennaya voina..., 1916](#)).

On December 1, 1914, the official propaganda machine singled out as a success the sinking of the large German steamer *Derintie*, which significantly complicated for the Turks the transportation of military freight to the port of Trebizond ([RGA VMF. F. 418. Op. 1. D. 127. L. 12](#)). Impressive figures for Russia's propaganda were provided by the Black Sea fleet's attack on December 27, 1914 on the bays of Sürmene and Rize, which destroyed 51 enemy ships. That being said, it was not mentioned anywhere which class the sunken ships were – most of them were likely to have been of little military or strategic value in terms of the organization of freight transportation.

In parallel with creating a negative image of the enemy, the military propaganda machine was cultivating a positive image of the Russian navy's lower ranks. In this context, of interest is the following description of a Christmas celebration during a campaign by the Black Sea fleet, which quotes the sailors as exclaiming: "Let's set up a Christmas tree for the captives, if we get any!... We sure will, 'cause we've never come back without prisoners!..." (*Vtoraya Otechestvennaya voina...*, 1916).

However, the period's official publications did not strictly write about how cunning the Germans were – sometimes, they were openly spoken of with generosity as well. For instance, it was reported that on October 16, 1914 a group of German officers had had the following note delivered to the person in charge of the harbor of Theodosia: "Inform the civilian population – males, females, and children – that in two hours we will start bombarding government-issue buildings and private warehouses, tracks, and structures" (*Vtoraya Otechestvennaya voina...*, 1916). Note that overall the Russian military propaganda machine presented the Germans to the Russian navy in a more negative light than it did the Turks (e.g., "At the very edge of the embankment there stood five men, two of whom were dressed as Turkish officers. Next to them stood a third man, who was wearing German uniform; these were officers from a cruiser that had caught my eye in the bay. The officers were having a lively chat with members of the local administration and the Turkish consul. The officer in German uniform did not take part in the conversation, as he was busy observing the city and its outskirts through his binoculars. Curiously, the crowd was not angered as much at the sight of the Turks as it was at the sight of the German. Having discerned his uniform, they reacted with loud grumbling".) (*Vtoraya Otechestvennaya voina...*, 1916).

In 1915, the Russian navy was supplemented by a few new ships. On June 24, they put into operation the battleship Empress Maria, and on October 5 they introduced Empress Catherine the Great, a battleship of the same class. This class of ship had a displacement of 22,600 tons and a speed of 21–23 knots, was armed with 12 305 mm and 20 130 mm guns, and was built with heavy 102–305 mm thick belt armor. Between May and September, the fleet was also supplemented by the destroyers *Bystry* ['fast'], *Gromky* ['loud'], *Schastlivy* ['happy'], *Pylky* ['ardent'], and *Pospeshny* ['hasty'], six submarines, and the sea-plane carriers *Nicholas I* and *Alexander I* with sea-planes aboard. Adding these ships provided a significant boost to the navy's military potential (*Krasnoznamennyi Chernomorskii flot*, 1987).

By 1915, the Black Sea fleet's upper hand became increasingly stronger, which enabled the military propaganda machine to assume a more vigorous tone (*RGA VMF. F. 431. Op. 1. D. 755. L. 57*). An article published on October 15, 1915 in the patriotic publication *War: Chronicle and Responses* gave a depreciatory estimation of the potential of the Turkish sailors: "In the Black Sea, the Turkish navy was being concentrated in its base, in the straits, in an attempt to avoid engaging in battle with our fleet" (*Voina: Khronika i otkliki*, 1915. № 4). Later on, as part of its coverage of events in the Black Sea theater of naval operations, *Naval Digest* reported: "The Black Sea sailors are delighted with the pilots' bravery and prowess. Helping adjust the artillery fire of our vessels during the bombardment of the Bosphorus, the air squadron kept the whole time over the enemy's batteries, which started shooting at it, the fire accompanied by salvos from the infantry guns – testimony to confusion among the Turks. Out of all the shells fired at our airplanes, just four bullets hit one of them. Each of the pilots got off without a single scratch" (*Morskaya khronika*, 1915. № 5).

Apart from covering the course of military action, *Naval Digest* also commemorated all major events associated with the Russian navy. For instance, in June of 1915 an article by K. Zhitkovich entitled 'Admiral N.O. Essen' pays tribute to the memory of the prominent Russian naval commander (*Zhitkovich*, 1915).

A month later, in July of 1915, the journal's *Naval Chronicle* section presented the following picture of heroic togetherness among the crew of the transport *Yenisei*, destroyed by a torpedo fired from a German submarine: "Strong in spirit and inspired by the example of their superiors, the crew exhibited total equanimity, courage, and exemplary discipline. Benumbed by the ice-cold water, the drowning men found the courage, in the teeth of death, to exclaim "Hurrah!" in honor of their ship even at the moment their crewmates were getting submerged below the surface of the water" (*Morskaya khronika*, 1915. № 7).

Naval Digest also wrote about the feats of members of the navy's lower ranks who fought in the land forces. For instance, there was a story about the heroism of Petr Semenishchev, a sailor-electrician in the Baltic fleet who distinguished himself by helping overcome the mine barriers laid

by the Austrians in the River Vistula. For this, he was decorated with a Fourth Degree Cross of St. George (*Morskaya khronika*, 1915. № 10). Afterwards, he would receive a Second Degree Cross of St. George from the hands of Emperor Nicholas II himself for his courage in hand-to-hand fighting.

Another event that the military propaganda machine took advantage of is the demise of the ocean liner *Lusitania*, sunk by a German submarine. In this context, *Naval Digest* carried the following unusual communiqué: “A local peasant named Yurchik, who was aboard *Lusitania* crossing the ocean, is back in Pinsk from America. It has become known that after the blast Yurchik flew over board and had to stay afloat for four hours using a piece of wood. He then became unconscious. Yurchik’s stories about the last minutes of *Lusitania* suggest a horror that defies description. Thousands of men, women, and children were scurrying around the deck in sheer consternation and jumping into lifeboats and the water, with heartrending cries for help. The steamer kept afloat for five minutes and disappeared into the depths of the sea, taking with it the numerous victims of German atrocities. Out of the 77 peasants from Minsk Governorate who had accompanied Yurchik, just two survived” (*Morskaya khronika*, 1915. № 12). (Fig. 7).




Fig. 5. Commanding officer of the merchant submarine *Deutschland* Paul König (postcard).

In late 1915, the journal *Naval Digest* published, as part of propaganda used to foster a spiritual bond between the leadership and the people in pursuit of war objectives, a report about a visit of State Duma deputies to the fleet: “...Yesterday morning, a group of deputies returned to Petrograd after having presented the Baltic fleet with an icon of St. Nicholas on behalf of the members of the State Duma who had sailed a year and a half ago aboard the squadron’s ships and looked over Revel and the skerries. The trip participants included the following six members of the State Duma: Skoropadsky, Count Kapnist, Nechaev, Gorstkin, Khanenko, and Lashkevich. The deputies visited Revel and Helsingfors. In doing so, they traveled between the two towns by sea, aboard one of our cruisers. The deputies looked over the squadron’s vessels. They were delighted with what they saw. The sailors’ high spirits made a most positive impression on them all” (*Morskaya khronika*, 1915. № 10).

4. Conclusion

During the period 1914-1915, military propaganda was carried out in the Russian navy using a plethora of techniques, including fostering togetherness between the government and the people, cultivating the image of an impudent, ruthless enemy, spreading examples of heroism displayed

daily by sailors and officers, and providing examples of praise of the Russian Imperial Navy from the foreign press. Many of the techniques employed were unprecedented in the practice of information war against the opponent. That being said, through the course of World War I the Russian official propaganda machine would be in for a real test – an upsurge in anti-war sentiment both behind the lines and at the front.

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
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Foreign Units in the Russian Army during World War I. Formation of Armenian Vigilante Units in the Caucasian Front

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Abstract

The article analyzes the reasons and methods of forming Armenian vigilante units as part of the Russian Army in the World War I in the Caucasian Front. It is emphasized that according to the plan of the Caucasus Corps Command, Armenian vigilante units should have been not just auxiliary units of the Russian Army that were familiar with the area, providing all possible assistance to the troops, but they also had to resolve issues independently where it would have been impossible to use the Caucasus Corps Units for political or other reasons. Among other things, they were charged with maintaining order in the territory of Turkish Armenia after the victory and the transfer of Russian military units to other fronts. The article also provides detailed information about the combat training arrangements of these units.

Keywords: World War I, formation, Armenian vigilantes, Caucasian Front.

1. Introduction

One of the important goals in the World War I that was set by the government of Tsarist Russia was to solve the so-called Eastern question. The Tsarist government, seeking to weaken Ottoman Turkey in every possible way, considered it necessary to provide military support to the entire Christian population of the Ottoman Empire. One of the effective means of this struggle in the Caucasian Front was the formation of Armenian, Assyrian and Greek vigilante units within the Russian parts of the Caucasus Corps (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 646. L. 670b). Another important goal of the Armenian vigilante units formation was to create a basis of the future army of a new state, which according to the plans of the Tsarist government was to emerge after the war under the protectorate of the Russian Empire in Turkish Armenia (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 646. L. 49). Later in 1916, after the Russian troops succeeded in regaining control over Western Armenia, Emperor Nicholas II issued a decree establishing a new autonomous entity within the Russian Empire in the liberated territories with its center in Erzurum. In January 1917, the Euphrates Cossack Army was established by the order of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, the Caucasus Governor (Kersnovskii, 1999: 692). According to the plan of the Russian Empire military and political leadership, the new Cossack Army was to include Armenian refugees who survived Armenian genocide organized by the Ottoman authorities in 1915.

But in addition to political goals, Russia's military leadership also pursued quite practical ones. According to the plan of the Caucasus Corps Command, Armenian vigilante units should

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have been not just auxiliary units of the Russian Army that were familiar with the area, providing all possible assistance to the troops, but they also had to resolve issues independently where it would have been impossible to use the Caucasus Corps Units for political or other reasons. Among other things, they were charged with maintaining order in the territory of Turkish Armenia after the victory and the transfer of Russian military units to other fronts.

It was also important in the formation of foreign units in the Caucasus War Theatre that with the beginning of the war, the Russian Command sent most of the Caucasus Military District troops to the Austrian-German front (Zaionchkovskii, 1938: 286).

Military development constantly required formation of new units. With the outbreak of World War I, the total composition of all priority units of the Caucasus Military District consisted of 118 battalions and militia units, 92 squadrons and militia hundreds. Of these, 72 battalions and militia units and 44 squadrons and militia hundreds were sent to the Western Front. 56 battalions and militia units and 48 squadrons and militia hundreds remained within the Caucasus area respectively. On October 15, 1914, 137 additional battalions of militia units and 175 squadrons and militia hundreds were deployed in the Caucasus Army. Military operations constantly required formation of new units, and by October 15, 1916, the Caucasus Army and the district already had 291 battalions and militia units and 294 squadrons and militia hundreds. The Caucasian Front also included three armored vehicle platoons, including an armored detachment of the English Admiralty (Cherkasov, 2009. F. 2168. Op. 1. D. 88. L. 2).

The militia groups formation also included subjects of the foreign countries, such as Turkey and Persia. The formation of Armenian, Greek and Assyrian militias in the Caucasian Front was an effective means of fighting against Ottoman Turkey (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 646. L. 67ob.).

2. Materials and Methods

2.1. Documents from the collection of the Russian State Military Historical Archive served as materials. An important place is occupied by modern research on the history of the formation of ethnicity-based units in the Russian army during World War I.

2.2. Methodological basis of the work was the fundamental methods of objectivity, consistency and dialectical interrelation of phenomena, methods of historicism, comparative analysis and synthesis, contributing to a critical and analytical understanding of events and facts of the distant past, critical attitude to sources, making judgments as a result of the analysis of the totality of facts, as well as showing the phenomena in the development and context of the historical situation.

The validity and reliability of the study is based on the analysis of a large number of archival materials and literature sources and is ensured by the scientific methodology, the integrated nature of the study, the systemic approach and is confirmed by the strict logic of conclusions in accordance with the goals and objectives set.

The results of the study can be used in educational process of higher education institutions, as well as a reference and analytical material for the specialists.

3. Discussion

In general, the topic of formation and participation of Armenian vigilante units in World War I as part of the Caucasus Corps was not given due attention neither in the domestic nor, especially, foreign historical literature. Usually this issue was only mentioned in passing, even in fundamental historical works. (Zaionchkovskii, 1938) So far, there have been no generalizing works that would objectively and comprehensively consider the issues of formation, combat training and combat use of the Armenian vigilante units in the Russian Army during World War I. Although it is not possible to say that this topic has gone completely unaddressed. For example, in the modern Russian historiography the issue of formation of Armenian vigilante units as part of the Caucasus Corps was considered by Professor A.A. Cherkasov in his article devoted to the participation of ethnic minorities of the Russian Empire in the World War I (Cherkasov, 2009: 21), as well as by S. Bazanov in the article "Complete Defiance of Death. Ethnic-based vigilante units in the Russian Army during World War I" (Bazanov, 2006).

At the same time, the study of available publications on the mentioned topic testifies to the fact that in their articles the authors, as a rule, considered Armenian vigilante units along with other ethnic-based military formations of the Russian Imperial Army, and no analysis of the

principles of their military organization, ways of manning, arrangements of combat training and armament was conducted. The purpose of this article is to complement precisely these issues of the already existing pieces of the authors who conducted their research on Armenian vigilante units in the Caucasus Corps.



Fig. 1. I.I. Vorontsov-Dashkov (1837-1916)

As early as in autumn of 1914, the Warrant Officer Badmayev of the Novocherkassk Regiment, a hero of the Russian-Japanese War, who was well acquainted with the Asian Turkey, petitioned the Minister of War to form a Turkish partisan detachment of Armenian vigilantes to act against Turkish troops. Preliminary formation was proposed to be carried out in Petrograd, combat training to be conducted with the help of trained instructors, i.e. Armenian students of the higher education institutions of the city and having a permanent residence in the areas where military operations were taking place. The petition was approved (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 729. L. 16).

At a special meeting with the Caucasus Governor Count Illarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-Dashkov (1837-1916) in early September 1914, General Alexander Zakhariyevich Myshlayevsky, chamberlain Nikolai Leonidovich Peterson, chief of staff of the Caucasus Military District General Nikolai Nikolaevich Yudenich, Tiflis Diocesan Chief Bishop Mesrop, Tiflis mayor A.I. Khatsov, chairman of the Armenian National Committee S.S. Arutyunov were involved. S.S. Arutyunov and Dr. Ya.H. Zavriev proposed to start the formation of special Armenian units called khumbs, under the command of the Armenian ethnic leaders (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 646. L. 60).

Already in mid-September 1914, the Armenian National Council in Tiflis was given permission to form Armenian vigilante units in the Caucasus, however, with limited forces. At the end of October 1914, on the orders of the Caucasian Front Command, a draft appeal to the Turkish Armenians was prepared. The address stated that in case of entry of Armenian troops organized in Echmiadzin to the territory of Turkey "...The powerful leader of the Russian land guarantees the Armenian people the Autonomous Armenia establishment within the limits of six Armenian vilayets and inextricably linked to them Cilicia under the powerful protectorates of Great Russia..." (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 535. L. 116). At the same time, on October 5, 1914, 120 Mannlicher rifles and 200 live rounds per rifle were issued to arm the local Armenian vigilantes to defend the Echmiadzin monastery (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 729. L. 7-8). In the first months of the war, 1,200 Berdan rifles and 24,000 rounds of ammunition were secretly transferred to Turkey for arming the Armenian troops (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 558. L. 135-135ob.). The total number of people in Armenian khumbs as of November 30, 1915, was 3,150. There was also a special squad of

Armenian scouts. Soon the formation of Armenian vigilante units will begin in the Russian Army to replace the disbanded Armenian khumbs (RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 2. D. 235. L. 29).

The Armenian units began to enroll volunteers mainly from Turkish subjects, the main number of Armenian subjects of the Russian Empire volunteered for the Russian Army. Enrolment of Armenian volunteers started literally all over the world in America, Great Britain, France, Romania, Bulgaria and Egypt (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 646. L. 61). A telegram of the Envoy of the Russian Empire in Bucharest city, No.77 dated January 9, 1915, listed 135 Turkish subjects of Armenian ethnicity as volunteers wishing to join the Caucasian Front (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 558. L. 95–95ob.).

The main organizers of the Armenian vigilante units formation abroad were the active Armenian churches. At the same time, mass desertion of Armenian soldiers from the Turkish army began. Armenians from Turkish units deserted with their weapons making their way to the Russian Empire in order to join the Armenian militia being formed. Thus, on January 19, 1915, Armenians that deserted from the 4th regiment of the 2nd Turkish Corps were a sergeant-major, two non-commissioned officers and two privates (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 558. L. 67, 71, 77).

On January 13, 1915, a petition was filed in the name of the Caucasus Governor, Count Vorontsov-Dashkov, by the inhabitants of Kars who came from emigrants living in the Tez-Harab magal..." by Abraham Alexeyevich Kayamashev. It spoke about the permission to form an Armenian mounted flying squad of 300 people in the Caucasus Army, in the interests of the entire Christian population, against the ancestral enemy of Turkey. It proposed undergoing combat training according to the crash four-week program and then being at the disposal of the military authorities of the Caucasus Army. It asked to provide for the supply and armament at the expense of the treasury. Many of the newly recruited were Armenian immigrants from Turkish Armenia, who were well versed not only in Armenian, but also in Russian, Kurdish and Greek, and were familiar with the area as well. They also asked to assign officers of the Kars Station as instructors for training the vigilantes (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 558. L. 19–19ob.).

In February 1915, representatives of the Armenians of the Turkish city of Zeytun addressed the the Caucasus Army Command and informed them that there were about 15,000 people, volunteers, ready to block the supply routes of the Turkish Erzurum Army, but did not have enough weapons and ammunition to do so, and for this purpose they asked to allocate enough weapons and ammunition to the Armenian vigilantes (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 558. L. 172).

Another source for the formation of Armenian vigilante units was the Gnchak Armenian Social Democratic Party. On January 17, 1915, its activists formed a vigilante unit of 500 people, 50 of which were mounted. Military compensation of the vigilantes was 10 Rubles. (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 558. L. 65). The Gnchak Central Body in the U.S. additionally sent 5,359 Rubles for military allowances. (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 557. L. 133).

According to the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief No. 65, dated January 29, 1915, a squad of Armenian scouts was formed (point 2) (Table 1). 163,705 Rubles were allocated for the formation and allowance of five Armenian squads (khumbs, point 3), the Salmas, Erivan, Kağızman, Sarıkamış and Oltin, and 10 Rubles per month were allocated for each squad (RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 2. D. 306. L. 241).

Table 1. Temporary staff of the Armenian scouts special squad

No.	Rank names	Number	Notes
1	Squad commander, company officer	01 people	Receives a salary from the treasury by rank
Vigilantes			
2	Dismounts	100 people	
3	Mounted	100 people	
4	Total:	200 people	
5	Riding horses, state-owned	101	

Firearms and ammunition were supplied to the squad at the expense of the treasury. 130 Rubles were allocated to a mounted vigilante, 65 Rubles were allocated to a dismount for buying

uniforms, equipment and cold weapons. Allowance of the squad was at the expense of the treasury based on the calculation of 10 Rubles per month (RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 2. D. 306. L. 2410b.).



Fig. 2. Andranik Ozanyan (1865-1927)

On the orders of the Caucasus Army Field Staff Chief, the following Armenian units were formed:

- 1st Armenian squad under the command of Andranik Ozanyan (1865-1927) in Persia;
- 2nd Armenian squad under the command of Drastamat Kanayan (Dro) (1883-1956), later under the command of Armen-Garo in the city of Iğdır;
- 3rd Armenian squad under the command of Amazasp Srvantstyan (Servastyan) (1873-1921) in Kağızman;
- 4th Armenian squad under the command of Arshak Gafavyan (Keri) (1858-1916) in Sarıkamış;
- 5th Armenian squad under the command of a Russian Army Lieutenant of Armenian origin in Kars;
- Reserve for manning Armenian vigilante units under the command of Vartan in Alexandropol;
- a detachment of scouts under the command of the Russian Army Staff-Captain Gagemov at the headquarters of the 1st Caucasus Army Corps (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 558. L. 99).



Fig. 3. Drastamat Kanayan (1883-1956)

The total number of Armenian units was 2,500 vigilantes, and 600 more vigilantes as the reserve force. All the commanders of the Armenian units were leaders in the political struggle of the Turkish Armenians against the Ottoman government and troops even before the war. From January 29, 1915, the first two Armenian units were subordinated to the Commander of the 4th Caucasus Army Corps. The 3rd, 4th Armenian units as well as a squad of scouts were subordinated to the Commander of the 1st Caucasus Army Corps, the 5th Armenian unit was subordinated to the Commandant of the Kars fortress. The reserve was subordinated to the head of the Alexandropol Station (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 558. L. 99ob.).



Fig. 4. Amazasp Srvantstyan (1873-1921)

Armenian units were armed with Mannlicher rifles and 140 rounds of ammunition on them (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 558. L. 20). The Alexandropol units were armed with Berdan rifles (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 558. L. 157). In January-February 1915, the command took a number of

measures aimed at some reorganization of the Armenian units in order to unify their composition, improve combat training, equipment and supplies. General of Infantry Peter Oganovsky (1851-1917) developed a project according to which each squad was to consist of 1,000 soldiers: 750 regulars armed with Russian three-line rifles and 250 irregulars armed with the Austrian rifles of the Mannlicher system. Also, cavalry units of up to 100 servicemen could be assigned to Armenian vigilante squads for reconnaissance, communication and special tasks. It was planned to send Armenian officers from regular units of the Russian Army as company commanders and instructors to conduct quality combat training in the Armenian squads. The Armenian units staffing was approved by order of the Chief of Staff of the Caucasus Army sent to the Directorate of the Quartermaster General, No. 1498 of February 24, 1915:

1. The unit consisted of four companies; each was to have a sergeant-major, a quartermaster, two chief and eight junior under-officers, 10 privates first class, a trumpeter, 200 vigilantes, 23 unarmed;

2. Among the regular vigilantes it was supposed to have 10 mounted warriors for messenger service; units (Tables 2, 3). The combined four Armenian vigilante units were named the Ararat Detachment, and came under the general command of Vartan who worked a lot in the partisan organizations of Turkish Armenia (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 66. L. 66). In the same period the 6th Armenian vigilante unit was formed. As of May 03, 1915, it included 700 vigilantes (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 555. L. 302).

3. Each company, except the company trumpeter, was assigned a soldier to signal the formation. They were provided with signal horns along with other equipment (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 558. L. 22). On April 06, 1915, the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Front approved the draft staffing of the Armenian vigilante units prepared by General Oganovsky.



Fig. 5. Oganovsky (1851-1917)

Deserters from the Turkish army as well as surrendered Armenians were included into formation of Armenian units. After their appeals to Emperor Nicholas II via the Chairman of the Armenian Society of Petrograd to give them an opportunity to serve in the Russian Army and to test their trustworthiness, they were enrolled in the Armenian vigilante units being formed (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 558. L. 373-379). The 6th Armenian squad was formed independently and had no connection with the four Ararat units (Fig. 7). The squad was part of General Nikolai Nikolaevich Baratov's detachment. This squad made many feats in the battlefield. The squad was formed on the initiative of the Gnchak Party and consisted mainly of members of this party. Permission for its formation was given by the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasus Army.

During the formation of this squad, an officer of the Russian Army, Armenian captain Dzhanpoladyan was appointed the head of the squad, and an Armenian, a Turkish subject Safaryan nicknamed Pandukht was appointed as his assistant (RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 5. D. 66. L. 66).



Fig. 6. Arshak Gafavyan (1858-1916)

Table 2. Staffing of Armenian units

Rank names	Number of ranks	Allowance		Food money
		Main	Improved	
Officers				
Squad, company commanders and officer corps recruited From the squad	01 people			
Class ranks				
Clerk for the economic part	01 people	300 Rubles		300 Rubles
Treasurer aka quartermaster	01 people	300 Rubles		300 Rubles
Total of class ranks:	02 people			
Lower ranks				
Sergeant-major	04 people	108 Rubles		-
Quartermaster	05 people	72 Rubles		-
Chief Under-Officer	08 people	72 Rubles		-
Junior Under-Officer	33 people	18 Rubles		-
Squad trumpeter	01 people	72 Rubles		-
Company trumpeter	04 people	10 Rubles 30 kopeks		-
Squad signalist	01 people	72 Rubles		-
Private first class	40 people	19 Rubles 80 kopeks		-
Vigilante	856 people	09 Rubles		-
Total lower regular ranks:	952 people	-		-
Lower irregular ranks				
Squad scribe	01 people	108 Rubles		-
Senior scribe	01 people	72 Rubles		-
Junio scribe	02 people	18 Rubles		-
1	2	3		4
Senior paramedic	01 people	72 Rubles		-

Junior paramedic	01 people	72 Rubles	-
Company paramedic	04 people	72 Rubles	-
Gunsmith	01 people	09 Rubles	-
Junior workman	03 people	09 Rubles	-
Supply-train vigilante	18 people	09 Rubles	-
Total irregular ranks:	32 people	-	-
Total lower ranks:	984 people		
Scout squad			
Cavalry sergeant-major	01 people	108 Rubles	-
Chief Under-Officer	02 people	72 Rubles	-
Junior Under-Officer	04 people	18 Rubles	-
Private first class	06 people	10 Rubles 80 kopeks	-
Vigilante	58 people	09 Rubles	-
Total lower regular ranks:	71 people (RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 2. D. 235. L. 2–22ob.)		




Fig. 7. Organization of the Armenian Vigilante Unit

Table 3. Staff of the Armenian Vigilante Company

No.	Name	Number
Officer corps		
1	Chief Officer	04 people
Lower ranks		
2	Junior Under-Officer	16 people
3	Sergeant-major	01 people
4	Private first class	20 people
5	Private	235 people
6	Total personnel (RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 1. D. 557. L. 309–314)	276 people
7	Scout squad (RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 5. D. 178. L. 130–131)	71 people
8	Squad total:	1,175 people

4. Conclusion

The reason for the formation of Armenian vigilante units was the military and political situation in the region and the lack of own combat-ready units in the Caucasian Front. It can be concluded that the formation of Armenian vigilante units has several key features. First, it took place taking into account the traditions of the Armenian ethnic-based resistance groups, the khumbs, but at the same time, it was done according the procedures of the People's Militia of the Russian Empire. Secondly, the units were manned by representatives of the numerous Armenian

Diaspora around the world, not specifically particular region. In this regard, the squads were being manned easily throughout their existence.

Thirdly, a significant portion of the equipment and further maintenance of the vigilante units was provided by representatives of Armenian political parties and the Armenian Church (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 1. D. 178. L. 133), which, in turn, allowed the Caucasian Front Command to complete the training of Armenian squads and begin their combat use in the shortest possible time. Undoubtedly, the formation of Armenian vigilante units in the Caucasian Front should be considered fully successful.

The combat effectiveness of the Armenian vigilante units was low, especially in the initial period of military operations. Armenian units could only act effectively in cooperation with the Russian units (RGVIA. F. 2100. Op. 3. D. 501. L. 35). But later on, gaining certain combat experience, these formations were equally successful both independently and interacting with the Caucasus Corps units. The units were able to conduct offensive and defensive combat operations and were indispensable in a variety of combat uses. This particularly concerned reconnaissance operations and special events in the difficult terrain in the mountainous areas of the Caucasus Theatre of War (RGVIA. F. 1082. Op. 2. D. 209. L. 3). In general, Armenian vigilante units have shown their high combat efficiency during the military operations. They were deployed in close cooperation with regular military units of the Caucasus Corps and separately. As a result, the Caucasian Front Command decided to give the Armenian vigilante units the status of regular troops. In December 1915 it was decided to disband the Armenian vigilante units and form Armenian rifle battalions on their basis. On December 13, 1915, by order of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, No. 366, the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasus Army was granted the right to form these battalions. Six Armenian rifle battalions were formed from six Armenian squads (RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 2. D. 325. L. 5).

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
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The Influence of the Legal Press on National-Cultural Life in Chernihivshchyna during the Period of German Occupation (1941–1943)

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Abstract

This paper addresses the effect of the legal press on the national-cultural life of Chernihivshchyna during the period of German occupation (1941–1943), as well as its significance for the local population in tough wartime conditions. The author researched the major newspapers that shaped public opinion in the region at the time. In researching the press, the author identified some of the key areas linked to deploying a new ideology – and, as a consequence, a new worldview – in society (e.g., anti-Semitic agitation, all-out criticism of the Soviet system, touting the delights of living in Germany, stimulating relocation to Germany for work, etc.). To this day, there remains open the issue of the locals' real attitude toward the occupiers, as well as the reasons behind the local population's active collaboration with the Germans. For the most part, this was associated with some of the locals having had a problem with the law during the pre-war period, some having fallen victim to Stalin's repressions, some having been variously oppressed by Soviet power, some just trying to survive in tough wartime conditions, etc. It is also important to note that a nascent hope was kindled among the locals that with support from the German leadership it would be possible to have an independent Ukraine. Up until a certain point, the Fascists were tolerant of the unfolding Ukrainization process in the occupied areas (e.g., use of the Ukrainian language in the media and in the cultural-enlightenment sector; coverage of nationalist ideas and slogans; establishment of clubs, theaters, and schools; preferential treatment in employment based on ethnicity).

Thus, the activity of a major portion of Ukrainian newspapers during the occupation period was of a propagandist nature. The most welcome topics to hear about included news about events at the front, victories won by German troops, support for the ideas of Fascism, and agitation for cultural-artistic and awareness-raising activity, which, where done properly, was instrumental in heightening the Ukrainians' sense of national consciousness. This type of source has proven to help gain a deeper insight into the prevailing sentiment of society and explain the locals' attitude toward the "new order".

Keywords: newspaper, authority, occupation, regime, mass media

1. Introduction

At present, a fair amount of attention is devoted to exploring the occupation period's mass media, a historical source that can provide a deeper insight into the events, social phenomena, and

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people of the tough period of 1941–1943. There is a wide pool of publications of a local and regional nature on the subject that remain to be researched.

Relatively recently, in 2007, the pool of research on the subject was supplemented by a historical-bibliographical study by K.M. Kurilishin entitled ‘The Ukrainian Legal Press during the Period of German Occupation (1939–1944)’. The work investigates the period’s Ukrainian legal press as an integral and independent phenomenon in the occupied areas – General Governorate, Zakarpattia, Reichskommissariat Ukraine, and Transnistria (Kurilishin, 2007). A list of newspapers is provided in an article by B.I. Chernyakov, ‘The Periodical Press in Occupied Ukraine’, without dwelling in detail on any specific periodical (Chernyakov, 2005). G.E. Grechenko provides information on certain occupation-period newspapers in his work ‘Chernihivshchyna in the Pages of the Occupation-Period Newspapers’ (Grechenko, 1999). V.M. Negoda has singled out from The Ukrainian Polesye 12 major sections containing some of the more interesting materials on the period’s life in Chernihiv Oblast (Negoda, 2012).

Much of the print material in the archives of Chernihiv has been preserved to our day, containing quite a large number of articles related to the subject under examination. The media’s effect on the people’s consciousness and actions in any period is beyond question. It, therefore, makes sense to continue researching this particular type of source when it comes to exploring a certain period in history. The pages of the occupation-period press provide information with regard to various events that took place around the world at the time, manifestations of xenophobia against Jews and Roma, sharp criticism of Soviet power and its cultural-enlightenment and economic policies, and other awareness-raising topics.

2. Materials and methods

Most of the material on the subject was derived from the following occupation-period newspapers: The Ostershchyna News (regional news), The Pryluky News (urban and rural news), The Ukrainian Polesye (provincial news), which in February of 1942 was renamed into The Chernihiv Courier, The Nizhyn News, The New Path, The New Snovsk Newspaper, The Novgorod-Sivershchyna Ukrainian News, and The Voice of Novgorod-Sivershchyna. Worthy of particular attention are The Ukrainian Polesye, The Ostershchyna News, The Pryluky News, and The Nizhyn News, which, apart from covering news from the front lines and from around the world, devoted a significant amount of attention to the popularization of Ukrainian culture. Of major importance is the way living in Germany was covered in the ‘Letters from Germany’ section, which told the reader about how comfortable it was to live in Germany, how clean German streets and how great German roads were, how beautiful houses were in German cities and villages alike, etc. For example, here is an excerpt from a letter published in The Pryluky News: “We didn’t have to be told or pointed to the fact that we were entering an area run by the Reich – it is a thrilling experience for anyone visiting Germany for the first time. There is a huge difference between Ukraine and this country! Each of their villages looks like a town, with their neat little houses all arranged in a smooth manner, as if spaced out along a cord – not like ours, always scattered around without order. They have lots of flowers on their windows and by the roadside. What I have always found particularly awesome about this land is how clean everywhere is ...” (‘Visti Priluchchini’, 1943. № 19. P. 1). It is hard to tell how many people exactly relocated to Germany in hopes of a better life during that time after having read about it in the papers – what is for sure is that there were many. For comparison or for another reason, the local papers spoke about the boorishness of the locals, their lack of safety arrangements in daily life, etc., which was attributed to their Soviet upbringing.

Materials from the press can help get an idea of the state of affairs in the period’s education sector. The fall of 1941 witnessed the implementation of school reform, with secondary and incomplete secondary schools closing down and elementary four-grade schools and educational institutions focused on turning out graduates for blue-collar jobs opening up. There was a particular focus on putting in place courses for turning out agronomists and courses of the German language. There were in operation a number of institutions of higher learning. The period’s newspapers devoted a large amount of attention to the activity of Prosveshchenie [‘enlightenment’], a non-governmental organization with a cultural-enlightenment focus. The Pryluky News carried an article entitled ‘A Revival of National Culture’, devoted to its establishment: “<...> Today, when the doors are wide open for us to engage in productive labor, all

of the general public, with assistance from the district's Council of Prefects and the Department of Education, must set out, as soon as possible, to organize in each district and village the work of the Ukrainian society Prosveshchenie. The purpose of this organization is to help meet the spiritual needs of the Ukrainian people and unite the masses to combat ignorance and boorishness. The rural branches of Prosveshchenie must identify and bring together talented people, and put the time and effort into creating the national chorus, orchestra, and theater. In turn, the district organization of Prosveshchenie, which has at its disposal better cultural means, can assist the rural branches in organizing lectures on general educational and professional topics. Ideally, it should be ensured that all this work gets as much visibility as possible. In addition, there is a need to organize mobile sound cinema and arrange tours by the Ukrainian city theater so that country folk can enjoy top acting. We are convinced that, as the hearth of the spiritual culture of the Ukrainian people, Prosveshchenie will find a broad response among the majority of residents in our district" (*«Visti Priluchchini»*, 1941. № 11. P. 1).

In working with the period's newspapers, the author primarily employed analysis and synthesis, with use also made of content analysis – to trace key trends in the emergence of particular thematic articles.

The author's analysis of the legal press helped identify the following essential tenets promoted in the period's newspapers: applauding the present and condemning the former leadership, anti-Semitism, and Ukrainization. Consequently, not all newspapers of the period continued operation after the German occupiers had been ousted. Nonetheless, there are quite a large number of copies that have survived to this day, which can provide an informative window into the period's events.

3. Discussion and results

Anyone looking through the pages of the period's newspapers will notice the active use of the Ukrainian language, which may have been a key factor behind the locals' desire to use this particular mass medium. In addition to the above-mentioned areas of propaganda, the period's newspapers were also instrumental in drawing the people's attention back to religion, theater and cinema, and Ukrainian literature, which helped cultivate in the locals an accepting attitude toward the new leadership. The following excerpt from an article entitled 'Down with Bolshevism', published in *The Ukrainian Polesye*, serves to illustrate the criticism of Soviet power: "<...> This pathetic Marx–Lenin–Stalin doctrine has sought to assault both the body and spirit of our nation. Russian Bolshevism, in association with the Jews, have been feeding to us all kinds of high-sounding slogans about "a happy, well-off life under the sun of the Stalin constitution", declaiming to the world that they stand for peace and harmony in the world. Bolshevism has always been portrayed as if it were a single, direct protector of people. Yet, they have never told us what they have done with the billions earned with the rough hands, sweat, and blood of our workers and peasants and at the expense and deprivation of the intelligentsia" (*«Ukrains'ke Polissya»*, 1942. № 3. P. 1). To draw the attention of the peasantry, a large amount of consideration was given to the subject of the Holodomor, including the causes and effects thereof. Considering that most of the peasantry did not have access to quality primary education and could only base their judgment on what the media told them, bringing the subject up had given rise to questions and doubts regarding Soviet power among many of them.

The occupation leadership had a well-thought-out tactic to draw the locals' attention to its programs. For instance, an article entitled 'In the Town Square' covers an event that is based on an action scenario designed to facilitate the desired result: "<...> At 11 a.m., the bullhorns started to summon residents to the town square, which was decorated with national German flags. By the local commandant's office, a loudspeaker system had been set up on a vehicle to replay music at a designated time. They replayed various German songs and marches, and some time later, via the same loudspeaker, they read out the text of Adolf Hitler's new agricultural law, with consecutive translation into Ukrainian provided. The locals gathered at the commandant's office were handed out postcards and portraits of their liberator Adolf Hitler, brochures entitled 'Ukraine in Jewish Claws', and other materials to take home" (*«Visti Priluchchini»*, 1942. № 37. P. 1). The article notes the presence at the event of a large crowd of residents, who appear to have enjoyed it. Covering the event in the paper was aimed at reinforcing the locals' awareness of the German

leadership's "solicitude" for their well-being. The newspaper sought to have an additional effect on the locals to inspire them with a belief in their victory.

A special place in the period's newspapers was occupied by articles devoted to the region's cultural life. For instance, The Nizhyn News carried a story about the birth of the Kropivnitsky Ukrainian National Drama Theater and its repertoire: "<...> The Nizhyn City Theater went into operation on October 26, 1941 with a comedy entitled 'Ostalis' v Durakakh' ['the duped']. Over the period the theater has been in existence, it has staged plays such as 'Natalka Poltavka' ['Natalka from Poltava'], 'Zaporozhets za Dunaem' ['a Zaporozhian beyond the Danube'], 'Naimichka' ['a hired girl'], 'Bestalannaya' ['a hapless maiden'], and other classic Ukrainian plays". D. Stepnoi, the article's author, goes on to give a critical assessment of the actors' performance and point out the flaws. The article concludes with the following: "<...> The repertoire should include plays by Western European playwrights, but not potboilers like the insipid 'Synochek' ['sonny']. In the future, our theater must break out of the narrow bounds of ethnographism and depiction of everyday life (with its kielbasa and liqueur glasses) and embark on a broad path of realism and historicism, with a focus on the heroic past of the Ukrainian people" ([«Nizhins'ki Visti», 1942. № 4. P. 2\).](#)

Later issues published the theater's repertoire and the names of the main actors. For instance, on January 6, 1943 The Nizhyn News displayed the following information under the headline 'The Ukrainian Drama Theater': "January 6 – 'Voskresenie' ['Sunday']; January 7 – Concert; January 8 – Concert of the Kharkov Troupe; January 9 – 'Za Dvumya Zaitsami' ['after the two hares']; January 10 – 'Svatan'e na Goncharovke' ['matchmaking in Goncharovka']. Beginning 4:30 p.m." ([«Nizhins'ki Visti», 1943. № 2. P. 4\).](#)

An indispensable element in the residents' cultural life was cinema. The Nizhyn News reported about the plans to show a number of newly released movies, like 'Veselye Brodyagi' ['happy vagabonds'] and 'Malye Devushki – Bol'shie Khlopoty' ['petit ladies – major nuisances']. ([«Nizhins'ki Visti», 1942. № 4. P. 1\).](#) It was not without criticism of Soviet culture and its tastes, of course. For instance, an article entitled 'Bring on New Movies' stated: "<...> The whole time, Bolshevik filmmakers produced "politically consistent" movies, intended to educate the viewer in a Communist spirit. All the viewer was shown was the country's "successes" and "achievements". He was shown bountiful crops in the fields – yet, he had no bread at home; he was shown large department stores – yet, there was nothing to buy; he was shown luxurious resorts – yet, he had never been there; he was shown abundant fish catches – yet, he had forgotten what fish tastes like. He was continually reminded of the watchful eyes of the NKVD, always engaged in the fight against "enemies of the people", who were everywhere. <...> Our viewers have already seen a number of foreign films. What may strike them is the absence of political lies in them. The movies are based on daily life in the West; they are full of good humor, easy to watch, and relaxing" ([«Nizhins'ki Visti», 1942. № 7. P. 2\).](#) The use of theater and cinema, the two essential strands in the propaganda aimed at promoting Ukrainian culture and Western lifestyles, helped reshape the locals' attitude toward the relatively new leadership.

Another major area of focus for the newspapers was Ukrainian folklore, which was gradually fading into oblivion under Soviet power. For instance, an article entitled 'Collecting Folklore' stated: "As the unwritten lore of the people, folklore is rightfully seen as a mirror of social-political life in a given era. <...> To the endless robbing of the Ukrainian peasantry, committed at the behest of Moscow, the people have responded: "Give us bread, give us salo". To which they have only heard: "There isn't much to give". Much of the caustic writing is aimed at the collectivization process. For instance:

Ukrainian	English translation
"<...> V Berezivtsi doshch ide, V Yaroshivtsi sliz'ko – Ne khodit' v kolgosp, Bo viselitsya bliz'ko"	"<...> It's raining in Berezovka, It's slippery in Yaroshovka – Don't go to the kolkhoz, Lest you be hanged soon".

Another major subject covered in the period's folklore was the tragic events of the Holodomor:

Ukrainian	English translation
“<...> Sedit' baba na ryadni I rakhue trudodni – Nema korovi, nema svini, Odin Stalin na stini”.	“<...> There’s a woman sitting on her bed- cover She’s counting her workdays – She’s got neither a cow, nor a pig, Just a portrait of Stalin on the wall”.

The article notes that kolkhozes had more layabouts in them than hard-workers:

Ukrainian	English translation
“<..V kolkhoze khorosho zhit', – Odin rabotaet – sem' lezhit”.	“<..It’s so nice working in the kolkhoz, – With one guy working – and seven guys lying down”.

Attention was inescapably drawn to the moral decay in society as well:

Ukrainian	English translation
“<...> Na to volya dana vsem, chtob zhenilis' raz po sem”.	«<...> Being married seven times, is what liberty is all about”.

Some of the period’s “Soviet citizens” were capable of making a rather bold joke, too:

Ukrainian	English translation
“<...> Blagodarim ottsa – gruzina, za to chto obul nas v rezinu”.	“<...> Let’s thank our father, the Georgian guy, for shoeing us in rubber”.

At the end of the article, the author speaks of the need to gather folklore as something of great literary and historical value. The author calls folklore the pearl of the Ukrainian soul, and suggests engaging the intelligentsia and teachers in the process of gathering folklore material (*«Nizhins'ki Visti», 1942. № 6. P. 3*).

The period’s legal press sought to extol the new leadership and discredit the former one. It did not cover the occupiers’ atrocities. For instance, the newspapers provided zero coverage of the mass murder of Jews in Pryluky in May of 1942. Considering that most of the locals had witnessed and knew about those tragic events, the newspapers chose instead to focus attention on spring work, on improvident actions on the part of Soviet power, on the delights of living in Germany, etc.

The press played a significant role in the life of residents in the occupied areas. It kept them distracted and entertained, exposing them to all kinds of information aimed at winning them to the side of the Germans. Many of the residents in the occupied areas supported the German leadership. These individuals feared the return of Soviet troops, many feeling deep concern at the prospects of possible retribution from the Red Army. Kiev resident N.V. Gerasimova wrote in her diary about how rumors of the Soviets approaching sent shivers down the spines of some of those people. The punishment was persecution, arrest, and torture, which also could be faced by women found to have had a relationship or sexual intercourse with the enemy. There were cases of entire families willing to relocate to Germany due to fear and uncertainty (*Ribchenko, 2013: 133*). These sentiments were the result of the people being tired of hardship after having been continually harried by peril, insecurity, and fear.

4. Conclusion

What gives relevance to exploring the subject through the prism of media coverage during the occupation period is that it helps restore historical memory, achieve accurate and balanced assessments of past events, and reconstruct the daily life of ordinary Ukrainians at the time. A focus on resolving a range of issues, finding answers to various questions, conducting awareness-raising activity aimed at ordinary citizens, and providing the basic emotional and moral support they needed in tough wartime conditions – this pretty much sums up the media’s activity in the period 1941–1943. In addition, of importance was the presence of nationalist ideas, which had found their way into the newspapers to stir up the people’s patriotic sentiment and give them hope for independence. The use of the Ukrainian language in cultural-enlightenment activity and in the media played a major role in boosting the Ukrainians’ self-image, helping revive and promote their ethnic culture. The revitalization of church life and revival of traditional Ukrainian customs and

practices helped remind representatives of that generation of Ukrainians of and reinforce in their memory the many pages of national history. The focus on invoking the top names in Ukrainian literature and representatives of the national-patriotic movement and attempts to familiarize the population with European culture played a definite role in shaping patriotic sentiment in Ukraine.

Based on the above, at present there is relevance in the issue of the state's information policy. Of continuing importance for all categories and ages in society are the areas of national-enlightenment activity by the media dealing with popularization of national culture, exploration of national history, analysis of national errors, and utilization of the national experience in all areas of domestic and foreign activity. In the future, information resulting from independent (as much as it is possible) and objective activity by the media will help reconstruct past events and restore the people's historical memory.

Factoring out Fascist ideology, which permeated most of the information at the time, one can learn from the occupation-period newspapers that during that time the locals, likewise, attended school, read, went to the cinema and theater, followed the events with empathy, showed compassion and dignity, planned, and dreamt – i.e., life went on. While certain pages in the lives and history of their people will never be known, it may still be possible to trace a number of common trends and then draw meaningful conclusions based on them.

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