


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Published in the USA
 Propaganda in the World and Local Conflicts
 Issued since 2014.
 E-ISSN 2500-3712
 2022. 9(1): 33-42

DOI: 10.13187/pwlc.2022.1.33
<https://pwlc.cherkasgu.press>



Political Agitation and Mass Party Work in the Sochi Militsiya Department of the NKVD during the Second World War (September – December 1942)

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Abstract

The paper discusses political agitation and mass party work in the Sochi Militsiya (militsiya – Soviet-time police) Department of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) in the period when a major part of the Krasnodar Region was occupied by NKVD troops (September – December 1942).

The sources used feature archival materials of the Center for Documentation of the Contemporary History of the Krasnodar Region, Krasnodar, Russian Federation, scholarly papers and publications by Russian researchers, and Soviet periodicals (Izvestia and Krasnaya Zvezda newspapers), as well as collections of archival documents and materials.

As a conclusion, the author shows that key forms and methods of mass party work included organizing political and morale building activities among the militia department personnel, raising political awareness in subdivisions, studies in groups of young communists and candidates for the membership in the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (VKPB), arranged by party workers. In addition, VKPB members ran mass party activities in the Komsomol organization of the NKVD Department. Political agitation placed an important focus on the work of the editorial board and publication of a wall newspaper. Propaganda teams were also created. Another central field of action was running patriotic and political campaigns, such as a rally in support of Red Army (Workers' and Peasants' Red Army) soldiers and raising funds to support them and purchase New Year’s gifts, as well as sewing and collecting warm clothes for the Red Army.

Keywords: political agitation, mass party work, rally, wall newspaper, political and morale building work, propaganda teams, militsiya, NKVD.

1. Introduction

The paper explores party agitation and mass party work by the VKPB¹ grassroots party organization in the Sochi Militsiya Department of the NKVD² during the Second World War. Mass party work with the personnel of the Militsiya Department was rolled out in the period when most of the Krasnodar Region was occupied by Wehrmacht troops – this was the time when Sochi functioned as a regional center.

Methods and forms of political agitation were outlined in the proceedings of party meetings held by the VKPB primary organization in the Militsiya Department. The meetings, among other things, reviewed the current situation inside Sochi, operational activities of the Criminal

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¹ VKPB – All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

² NKVD – People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs.

Investigation Department, State Automobile Inspectorate, Department Against Misappropriation of Socialist Property (OBKhSS) and other subdivisions in the Sochi Department of the NKVD.

2. Materials and methods

The materials analyzed include the assemblages of the Center for Documentation of the Contemporary History of the Krasnodar Region, Krasnodar, Russian Federation, which encompass the activities run by the VKPB's primary party organizations.

Additionally, the paper relies on Soviet periodicals ([Izvestiya, 1942](#) and [Krasnaya Zvezda, 1942](#)), and collections of archival documents and materials ([Sbornik..., 1944](#); [Kuban'..., 1965](#); [Kuban'..., 2000](#)).

The study utilizes both general research methods and specialized methods of historical research.

The toolkit of the specialized historical research methods was comprised of the systemic analysis method (analysis of political agitation and mass party work of the Sochi Militsiya Department of the NKVD, contextualized in the political and military situation in the USSR¹ in the chronological period under review); genetic method (examination of the propaganda forms and methods, leveraged by the Sochi Militsiya Department of the NKVD, as resulting from previous historical events); historical retrospection (enabled a simulation of and investigation into the historical environment connected with the agitation and party work of the Sochi Militsiya Department of the NKVD).

Non-conventional historical methods were also employed, namely the semiotic method that implies the use of historical and military history terminology in the context of the events described.

Speaking of the general research methods, those were historiographic and source analysis plus systemic analysis.

3. Discussion

The Russia-time source, which we previously published ([Taran, 2018](#)), can be defined as relevant for the historiography of the study into political agitation and mass party work in the Sochi Militsiya Department of the NKVD because political agitation took place in the extermination battalions which operated in Sochi, Adler and Shapsugsky districts in the Krasnodar Region.

The extermination battalions, established in the Greater Sochi in the Great Patriotic War, were accountable to the NKVD Departments, and therefore sources, describing activities of the extermination battalions, can also be of certain interest ([Cherkasov, 2007](#); [Cherkasov, 2008a](#); [Cherkasov, 2008b](#); [Taran, 2019](#); [Mamadaliev, Taran, 2021a](#); [Mamadaliev, Taran, 2021a](#); [Mamadaliev, Taran, 2022](#)).

4. Results

The Wehrmacht's Army Group A rapidly moved from Rostov in the southern direction so that the vanguard elements of the Axis powers' troops reached the northern spurs of the Main Caucasian Range as early as in mid-August 1942. Army Group A outnumbered Red Army units in many aspects – in the personnel, machinery, vehicles and aviation. The left flank of the Soviet forces – from the Taman Peninsula to the Fisht-Oshthen Massif – was defended by the troops of the North Caucasian Front under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon M. Budyonny ([Taran, 2020: 67](#)).

Around 70 % of the Krasnodar Region was occupied by Third Reich troops. In late August, Wehrmacht troops took over the Taman Peninsula, the Anapa city and the central part of Novorossiysk in September with Novorossiysk's southeastern outskirts controlled by the 47th Army of the Red Army. The cities of Gelendzhik, Tuapse, Sochi, Adler and Shapsugsky districts, as well as parts of the Armenian and Tula districts, which were on the forward edge of the battle area and in close proximity to combat zones, remained unoccupied by German troops ([Mamadaliev, Taran, 2021a: 34](#)).

Evacuation was under way during August 1942 to transfer material resources and Krasnodar Region population from northern areas to the Black Sea coast. A resolution by the Military Council of the Transcaucasian Front, dated 28 August 1942, created a Sochi Defense Committee headed by

¹ The USSR – the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

P.K. Bychkov, the Second Secretary of the VKPB Regional Committee. Since the Shapsugsky and Adler districts were subordinate to the Sochi Defense Committee, and the city sheltered regional party bodies and institutions evacuated there, Sochi was the regional administrative center during the German occupation (Mamadaliyev, Taran, 2021a: 35-36).

The territory controlled by the Sochi Defense Committee was packed with refugees, among whom there were criminals released from prisons before the Germans came, Red Army draft evaders and deserters. As a consequence, crime rates went up in Sochi, and this, in turn, affected the operational activities of the Sochi militsiya (TsDNIKK. F. 2357. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 1).

The primary party organization of the Sochi Militsiya Department of the NKVD carried on its party agitation and mass party work in this troubling operational environment, aiming to not only bring up political awareness level among the militsiya personnel, but also improve performance indicators for the crime solving rate.

On 17 September 1942, a closed party meeting of the Sochi Militsiya Department was conducted with 34 VKPB members and 22 VKPB candidate members in attendance. The meeting's chair was Dubkov, the secretary – Tsibizova. There were two items on the agenda:

1. Objectives of the party organization on the forward edge of the battle area (a report by Buevsky);

2. Elections to the Party Bureau of the Sochi Militsiya Department (a report by Orlenko).

After Buevsky's report, the floor was taken by Ozerova. She pointed out that it was imperative to build on the experience of the Krasnodar party organization. It created units to defend Krasnodar but failed to take any decisive measures to repulse the attack as soon as Wehrmacht troops approached the city – the party organization was confused and abandoned the units without leadership. Ozerova cited the example of the party leaders of the Khosta resort village, who slaughtered cattle, salted meat for personal use and were going to flee Khosta. Further, Ozerova said that kolkhoz collective farms and sovkhoz state farms needed help to harvest fruit crops because the produce rotted, and there was no one to collect them.

Next, the Head of the OBKhSS¹, Kiyashko, put forward a proposal to act on the discipline violations by the militsiya personnel, whose duty was to wage a fierce fight against thieves, swindlers and deserters, as well as plunderers of socialist property as their numbers in Sochi increased after prisons were dissolved during the retreat of the Red Army units.

In his speech, a VKPB member, Duntsev, pointed out that the party organization was not strongly engaged in building morale and improving living conditions of the militsiya personnel. Criminal Investigation officers, who came from the occupied areas of the Krasnodar Region, were not provided with food, they visited various canteens in search of food, their dormitory was totally unequipped, so some of the personnel abused their official position, and this undermined the work and reputation of the Soviet militsiya. The wall newspaper, according to Duntsev, was inert, while central newspapers were not delivered, which negatively affected the militsiya personnel.

The Deputy Head of the City Militsiya Department of the NKVD, Head of the Extermination Battalion, Lieutenant Ignatenko, said that while it was vital for the NKVD to identify cowards and panic-mongers in their ranks, who planned to flee the city, the organization also had to ensure a trouble-free and smooth operation of the Soviet rear. Regarding the militsiya personnel, which arrived from the Krasnodar Region's territory occupied by German troops, Ignatenko made a point that the people were not in fact engaged in the activities, while Sochi recorded 3-4 cases of theft every day, meaning the regional personnel should be engaged in the operational work.

Speaking on living conditions, Ignatenko said that he had repeatedly told the criminal investigation personnel where to receive beds and bedlinens but the people failed to follow his instructions. The militsiya personnel were fully provided with meals because they were assigned to a canteen organized in Sanatorium No. 1 of the NKVD, and transport was arranged for them to get to the site. At the same time, some of the militsiya personnel, instead of going and having lunch, persistently plagued directors of Sochi enterprises with requests to give them alcoholic drinks.

The meeting imposed a responsibility on the Head of the Agitation Board, Buevsky, to redouble morale building activities among the militsiya personnel and mobilize them to help collective farms and state farms to harvest fruit.

¹ OBKhSS – Department Against Misappropriation of Socialist Property

Shabaev said at the meeting that although the canteen for militsiya personnel was organized, food deliveries were irregular, so the Sochi militsiya leadership should focus on ensuring systematic food product supply to the canteen and improving the quality of the personnel's nourishment.

On the second item, the Head of the Sochi State Automobile Inspectorate, Orlenko, recommended that Neznaenko and Gorban of the militsiya personnel be elected instead of two drop-out members of the Party Bureau. Based on secret ballot, the individuals were unanimously granted membership in the Party Bureau (TsDNIKK. F. 2357. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 1-1ob.).

On 25 September 1942, the party organization of the Sochi Militsiya Department carried out an open general meeting with 35 VKPB members and 22 VKPB candidate members in attendance. Gorban presided over the meeting, and Sukhikh was the secretary. The agenda included two items:

1. On the pre-October socialist emulation;
2. On warm clothes collection for Red Army soldiers.

After Buevsky's speech on the pre-October socialist emulation, the floor was taken by Shutov who stressed the important role of socialist emulation in wartime and proposed to extend the reach of socialist emulation to the militsiya personnel from the Regional Directorate of the NKVD and districts of the Krasnodar Region.

The meeting resolved to approve the call by workers at the Ilyich Plant No. 70 for the pre-October socialist emulation. The Head of the Agitation, Buevsky, was instructed to draw up a work plan and launch mass agitation efforts among the personnel of the Militsiya Department. Agitation and political work before the 25th anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution was designed to enhance operational performance and reduce the absence of disciplinary measures. The meeting approved the draft socialist agreement for participation in socialist emulation, submitted for consideration, and elected a commission to sign the document, consisting of: Buevsky, Lebedinsky, Nikitenko, Orlenko, Kurdyban, Neznaenko and Sytenky.

After Orlenko's presentation on the progress in collecting warm clothes for Red Army soldiers, Neznaenko, the Secretary of the Party Bureau, took the floor. He made a sharp observation that after the commission for warm clothes collection was set up, no specific activities were carried on for five days. Meanwhile, commission members continued to stay in their offices and waited when warm clothes would be brought to them. Further, Neznaenko suggested to Commission Chair Orlenko and commission members that they should use a more serious approach to the warm clothes collection for Red Army soldiers and proposed utilizing fabrics belonging to the Militsiya Department, processing them and making warm clothes.

After the vote, the party meeting suggested to Commission Chair Orlenko making use of curtains and draperies in the department to sew clothes and organize a sewing group, if required, to deliver on the warm clothes collection plan. The editor was requested to release a wall newspaper with a report on the progress in warm clothes collection (TsDNIKK. F. 2357. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 2).

The socialist emulation to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the October Revolution was initiated by workers at Vladimir Ilyich State Machine-Building Plant No. 70, which was evacuated to the east in 1941. The initiative group proposed increasing product output, cutting production cost, reducing energy consumption and achieving economy in consumable material use as well as took on other commitments (Izvestiya, 1942; Sbornik..., 1944: 190-192).

The socialist emulation initiative received support at Soviet enterprises and institutions, and the personnel of the Sochi Militsiya Department was no exception. Carrying out a socialist emulation and driving engagement was also an element of mass party activity, implemented under the leadership of party organizations.

In October 1942, the mass party work plan for November 1942 was approved for the VKPB primary party organization of the Sochi Militsiya Department and signed by Secretary of the Party Bureau Neznaenko (Table 1).

The Soviet Information Bureau announced to Soviet citizens via the Soviet periodical press that units and formations of the Red Army emerged victorious in the Stalingrad area and liberated several settlements near Vladikavkaz in the North Caucasus (Krasnaya Zvezda, 1942).

Table 1. Plan of mass party work for November 1942 (TsDNIKK. F. 2357. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 49-49ob.)

No.	Date	Type of work	Who implements	Where to implement	Completion status
1	2	3	4	5	6
1	Every second day	Communicating political information to subdivisions and departments	Political Information Officer	Subdivisions	
2	9.11.42	Party bureau meeting: Agenda: 1. Reviewing materials on VKPB candidate members Ryzhenko and Popov. 2. On VKPB candidate member Bugaenko and VKPB member Zubov /report by Gorban/ 3. Information from Commission Chair Orlenko on the progress in warm clothes collection, and from Commission Chair Kiyashko, on gift collection for the Red Army. 4. On the militsiya's 25th anniversary /Buevsky/. 5. Approving a work plan.	Party Bureau Secretary	Room No. 1	
2	13.11.	Closed party meeting. Agenda 1. On the political and morale building work among the personnel / report by Bogucharsky/. 2. Approval of the party bureau proceedings dated November 9	Party Bureau Secretary	Club	
3	20.11.	Party bureau meeting Agenda 1. Granting party membership 2. Presentation on the work done by the editorial board /Ivashchenko, Forshnev/. 3. On self-improvement – Arnautov, Karagodin, Gorlov, Talalaev	Party Organization Secretary		
5	25.11.	Opened party meeting Agenda 1. Granting party membership 2. Presentation on the militsiya station performance / Saveliev / 3. On the activities in Rzhevsky and Chetverikov's task area	Party Bureau Secretary	Club	
6	10 and 24.11.	Learning session with young communists and VKPB candidate members in study groups	Study Group Leaders	In classrooms	
7	By 10, 20 and 30.11.	Releasing the wall newspaper	Responsible Editor		

Citizens of the Soviet Union felt exalted and enthusiastically hailed the battle victories of the Red Army against German troops, and with the leadership of party workers, cities, towns, enterprises and institutions carried out rallies throughout the country. The personnel of the Sochi Militsiya Department, the NKVD Directorate for the Krasnodar Region (UNKVD KK), also conducted a rally to pass the following resolution:

“Resolution

by the rally of the personnel of the Sochi Militsiya Department, NKVD for the Krasnodar Region,

dated 24 November 1942

The Soviet Information Bureau has brought us joyful news, which has filled us with gleeful excitement to bottom of our heart, about the successful advance of our heroic Red Army near Stalingrad.

This is the point where we have commenced to fulfil the great task set by Comrade Stalin in his November order:

‘We can and must clear our Soviet soil of the Hitlerite filth.

Near Vladikavkaz and Stalingrad, the accursed enemy has already experienced the power of the Red Army’s new strikes that will grow harder and harder every day and will give no rest to the Fascist beasts. The enemy will find its grave in the snows of our Soviet land instead of “expansion space”.

The final defeat of the enemy will still require exerting all the strength of the army and people, of the front and the rear.

With heartfelt greetings sent to the heroic defenders of Stalingrad, we, the personnel of the Sochi Militsiya Department of the UNKVD KK, firmly believe that the heroic Red Army, guided by our beloved leader and commander, the great Stalin, will defeat the Nazi scum and cleanse the Soviet land of the hated enemy.

We will strain all our efforts to further strengthen the rear and help the Red Army, and will scale up operational work and the fight against crime to the maximum.

We shall have our day too!

Long live our dear heroic Red Army!

Long live our wise leader and commander Comrade Stalin!” (TsDNIKK. F. 2357. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 12).

In November, Party Bureau Secretary Neznaenko signed the plan of mass party work for the primary party organization of the Sochi Militsiya Department for December 1942 (Table 2).

Table 2. Plan of mass party work for December 1942 (TsDNIKK. F. 2357. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 50-50ob.)

No	Date	Type of work	Who implements	Where to implement	Completion status
1	2	3	4	5	6
1	Every second day	Communicating political information to subdivisions and departments	Political Information Officer	In subdivisions	
2	4.12.42	Party bureau meeting Agenda: 1. Granting party membership 2. Information on the propaganda team organization 3. Information on the results of the evacuation of families of the personnel 4. Making provisions for military defense works	Neznaenko Buevsky Kardybaev and Aniskov Neznaenko	Room No. 2	
3	11.12.42.	Party meeting Agenda 1. Granting party membership 2. Information on the propaganda board organization 3. Presentation on the work of the State Automobile Inspectorate	Neznaenko Buevsky, Gromov Orlenko	Club	
4	17.12.42	Party bureau meeting Agenda 1. Granting party membership			

		2. On the work of the Komsomol organization 3. On the results of the military defense works accomplished	Neznaenko Kurdyban		
5	28.12.	Party meeting Agenda 1. Granting party membership 2. Presentation on the work of the OBKhSS for the second half-year of 1942	Neznaenko Kiyashko, Shutov, Malyshev	Club	
6	9 and 23.12.42	Learning sessions with young communists and VKPB candidate members in study groups	Study Group Leaders	Classes	
7	10, 20, 30.12.42	Releasing the wall newspaper	Responsible Editor		

On 28 December 1942, the primary party organization of the Sochi Militsiya Department carried out a closed general meeting with 32 VKPB members and 25 VKPB candidate members in attendance. The meeting's chair was Shutov, the secretary – Konchakov. The agenda included three items:

1. Granting party membership to VKPB candidate members Dachevsky and Bautin
2. Information item by Kiyashko on the New Year's gift collection for Red Army soldiers
3. Report by Kiyashko on the work of the OBKhSS for the second half-year of 1942

Speaking on candidate Aleksandr Yakovlevich Bautin, who applied for the full VKPB membership in April 1940, Neznaenko noted that Bautin showed not enough commitment to the work of the wall newspaper editorial board. The meeting took into account Bautin's positive characteristics and unanimously voted to accept Bautin as a full VKPB member.

Speaking on candidate Prokofy Prokofievich Dachevsky, who applied for the full VKPB membership in July 1941, Shutov said that although Dachevsky had no negative aspects, he was engaged in socialist emulation, had only a socialist emulation agreement, and, as a result, received no assessment of his work because no monthly performance reviews were carried out among drivers.

In his speech, Buevsky pointed out that Dachevsky was on the record as a driver in the NKVD department, and his work should be assessed against the social obligations he had taken by the garage personnel of the NKVD Department. Other drivers, in particular Makushchenko, Kosenko and others, were assigned to the subdivisions of the NKVD Department, which evaluated their work.

Kroshka spoke in defense of Dachevsky and said that he had only known Dachevsky for 4 months and noticed he maintained the car, entrusted to him, with great care and therefore Dachevsky deserved to be a member of the VKPB.

The party meeting unanimously resolved to accept Dachevsky as a full VKPB member (TsDNIKK. F. 2357. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 18).

The second item – on the progress made in collecting New Year's gifts for Red Army soldiers – was elaborated on by Kiyashko who said that the ongoing political campaign in the city department was successful, and raised 4,683 rubles to buy gifts.

In his speech, VKPB Member Gorban said that Commission Chairman Kiyashko had not played an active role in the commission leadership and did not specified in his speech the number of NKVD department employees that remained outside the political campaign.

Afterward Ermolenko took the floor and said that commission members had been responsible for the task areas assigned to them, and the commission had handled well the assigned tasks from the first days of their work. Despite this, there were some incidents when the commission purchased goods and products for a sum that exceeded the sum raised.

Speaking on the New Year's gift fund raising, Kroshka said that the political campaign had been rolled out without relevant preparatory and information activities among the personnel, and that was why it had failed to cover 100 % of the Militsiya Department.

Upon hearing all arguments, the meeting resolved to recognize that the work done by the fund raising commission to purchase New Year's gifts for Red Army soldiers was satisfactory, and suggested that the commission raised additional funds from the entire militsiya personnel to compensate for the overspend.

In his presentation, Kiyashko informed the party meeting of the results achieved by the OBKhSS in the second half-year of 1942. After that, Ignatenko took the floor and said that although Kiyashko reported on the work done, he did not specify what further measures were planned to improve the OBKhSS' performance. In the second half of the year, the OBKhSS significantly improved its results, but the progress was made thanks to the activities of the personnel of the regional OBKhSS apparatus. Ignatenko believed that the OBKhSS' primary pain points were unsatisfactory work on cases under investigation, which often led to cases being dismissed or returned for additional investigation, no operational record-keeping processes and inefficient operational work on the markets. Therefore, a 1943 plan should necessarily include operational measures and steps to put a practice in place to conduct conversations on production sites and encourage citizens to help the militsiya combat embezzlement and theft of socialist property. It was also important to set up prompt coordination between NKVD departments and the prosecutor's office (TsDNIKK. F. 2357. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 18ob.-19).

After Ignatenko, Malyshev made a critical review of the OBKhSS' work and pointed out that the OBKhSS leadership dragged on the processing of the cases under investigation that were to be closed within 3 or 5 days. Malyshev confirmed Ignatenko's comment that investigative proceedings were conducted unsatisfactorily, and as a consequence many cases were sent back by the prosecutor for additional investigation. When signing cases, Kiyashko disregarded the formal execution of cases, and as a result there were situations when the prosecutor returned cases only because interrogation protocols were not signed by witnesses or investigators.

In his speech, Neznaenko underscored the existing gaps in the OBHSS operations because with no efficient operational record keeping process and inadequate control of markets, the rate of speculative trading in commodities rose in Sochi. Sochi markets openly sold soap, matches, herring and other items that were in deficit in city stores. Further, Neznaenko drew the meeting participants' attention to the unsatisfactory communication the OBKhSS leadership maintained with the personnel of the prosecutor's office, which affected investigative processes.

The participants of the party meeting resolved to take into account Kiyashko's report on the work of the OBKhSS for the second half of 1942, and made the following proposals:

1. Formulate a unified plan of operational work in the OBKhSS and introduce an operational record-keeping process.
2. Carried out activities in cooperation with all operational departments of the NKVD and the prosecutor.
3. At enterprises, conduct conversations on combating embezzlers of socialist property and speculators.
4. Improve the quality of investigative cases by eliminating violations of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which resulted into case dismissal and return for additional investigation.
5. Hold a meeting with heads of enterprises on better protection of socialist property.
6. Together with Heads of the Criminal Investigation and the OBKhSS, hold a briefing with heads of enterprises on providing support to the Sochi Department of the NKVD in wartime conditions.
7. Strengthen operational control of Sochi markets (TsDNIKK. F. 2357. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 19).

In January 1943, Wehrmacht troops started pulling out their units from the North Caucasus. Accordingly, the Soviet troops initiated the offensive and as early as in February 1943 liberated Krasnodar, the regional center, where the party leadership and regional institutions returned from Sochi. This alleviated the operational load on the personnel of the Sochi Militsiya Department. Mass party work and party agitation continued among the personnel of the NKVD Department but on a smaller scale.

5. Conclusion

Hence, political agitation and mass party work stepped up among the personnel of the Sochi Militsiya Department of the NKVD during the occupation of the most of the Krasnodar Territory by the Third Reich army. Political agitation activities were mainly managed by the Political Bureau of the VKPB's primary party organization.

Key forms and methods of mass party work included the following: organizing political and educational activities among the militia department personnel, raising political awareness in subdivisions, arranging studies by party workers in groups of young communists and candidates

for the membership in the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (VKPB). In addition, VKPB members ran mass party activities in the Komsomol organization of the NKVD department. Political agitation placed an important focus on the work of the editorial board and the publication of a wall newspaper. Propaganda teams were also created. Another central field of action referred to running patriotic and political campaigns, such as a rally in support of Red Army (Workers' and Peasants' Red Army) soldiers and raising funds to support them and purchase New Year's gifts, as well sewing and collecting warm clothes for the Red Army.

In addition to political agitation and mass party work, party meetings discussed the current situation in the city in the context of the front-line reality because crime increased as criminals, deserters and individuals who evaded conscription in the Red Army swarmed the city. Another major emphasis was placed on the operational performance of subdivisions inside the NKVD department, and solutions were proposed to efficiently fight crime.

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