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**Propaganda in the World and Local Conflicts**

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
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## Articles

### **‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ (1919): An Account of the History of Don Cossackdom for Readers from the Countries of the Entente. Part 2**

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#### **Abstract**

This work analyzes ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’, a book released in 1919 by the Don government headed by Ataman A.P. Bogayevsky for readers from the countries of the Entente (there were plans to release the book in English and French; the Russian edition of the book was intended for the Slav allies).

It is shown that the book consistently advanced the idea that the Cossacks were ideological allies of the British and the French and were committed to upholding the traditions of freedom and democracy. However, the book was inconsistent in terms of content – for the most part, the factual material did not align with the ideas; it was mainly reduced to describing Cossackdom’s military victories (the exception is the section on the Civil War). This can be explained by the fact that by 1919 there had been produced no summarizing works on the history of Cossackdom written from the standpoint of democratic and republican traditions, while it also was difficult to conduct meaningful research amid the Civil War in the country. Nevertheless, the key conceptual ideas in ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ were subsequently elaborated in the work of Don émigré historian S.G. Svatikov, who very well may have been its real author.

**Keywords:** Don Cossackdom, Almighty Don Host, Civil War, military propaganda, Entente, S.G. Svatikov

#### **1. Introduction**

The question is – Who was the author of ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’? The book was published anonymously as an official text reflecting the position of the Host administration. It even had a portrait of Ataman A.P. Bogayevsky on the inside front cover. This was not the only such work in Don historiography. ‘The Pictures of the Past Quiet Don’ by P.N. Krasnov, released in 1909, had no mention of the author’s name on the front cover either – but it did mention that it was published “at the instance of Lieutenant General Samsonov, the Host’s appointed ataman” (Krasnov, 1909: forzats). This was revealed inside the text (Krasnov, 1909: 522). By contrast, ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ contains no mention of authorship whatsoever, leaving researchers with the task of establishing it.

In the preface to his monograph ‘Russia and the Don’, a work of acclaim in Cossack émigré historiography, S.G. Svatikov states that between 1918 and 1919 he produced an essay entitled

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‘The Political-Legal Environment in the Don in the 16th and 20th centuries (1549–1919)’ (Svatikov, 1924: III). Allegedly, the book’s first part, ‘The 1549–1721 Era’, was published in 1919 by the Regional Printery of the Almighty Don Host, but it did not get to the reader as a consequence of the nearing of the front line, with most of the copies perishing at the hands of the Reds (Svatikov, 1924: III). Nevertheless, according to S.G. Svatikov, “several copies of it have been preserved and are in the possession of different individuals in South Russia” (Svatikov, 1924: III). However, the book’s traces have been found only in a number of bibliographical reference books – it must have gotten there via the mention in the preface to Svatikov’s monograph. Another person who has been unable to retrieve the text of this book is S.M. Markedonov, a researcher focused on the work of S.G. Svatikov. According to the scholar, during the Civil War, S.G. Svatikov produced a book that may have been entitled ‘Russia and the Don. The 1549–1721 Era’, which existed only as a manuscript that perished in 1920 (Markedonov, 1996: 163-173).

Thus, we may assume that during the Civil War S.G. Svatikov was working on a certain book about the political-legal situation of the Don Host, which eventually was published in 1919 by the Regional Printery of the Almighty Don Host; most of its copies perished, and not a single copy of it has been retrieved so far. That said, in 1919 the same printery published ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’, which, in essence, is concerned with the same subject. One should not rule out that ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ is actually that very lost work by S.G. Svatikov – adapted by the publisher for the Western reader. Even if it is not the case, ‘Russia and the Don’ by S.G. Svatikov and ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ have significant ideological and conceptual similarities – something that can only be explained by the influence of Svatikov’s ideas on the unknown author of ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’.

To caveat from the outset, no direct textual coincidences were found between the two texts. However, they appear to be highly similar in their appraisals of Don history, while being tangibly different from the works contemporary to them and the earlier ones. As mentioned earlier, ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ was focused on suggesting to the Western reader that the Cossacks were the chief bearers of longstanding Russian democratic traditions and “ancient Russian political freedom”. S.G. Svatikov was open in articulating similar views: “In an era when the Tsars of Muscovy were strengthening their autocratic rule on the ruins of the federation of ancient Russian principalities and northern Russian republics, the primordial Russian principle of popular sovereignty returned to life in the pristine Cossack democracies in the Don, Yaik, Terek and, temporarily, Volga regions” (Svatikov, 1924: 1). S.G. Svatikov saw as Cossackdom’s major historical achievement the creation of “Don Cossack law”, a system predicated on “the great principles of equality and freedom” (Svatikov, 1924: 529). The two texts contain some terms and cite some literature that are precisely identical. This will be examined in more detail below.

Let us take a brief look at the biography of S.G. Svatikov. Born in 1880 in Rostov-on-Don, he was a public figure of social-democratic orientation who had taken a stand against Tsarist autocracy since 1904 (Markedonov, 1996: 163-173). He supported the Provisional Government and even served as its commissar for liquidating Czarist political police who had escaped abroad. He was opposed to both Tsarist autocracy and Bolshevism (Markedonov, 1996: 163-173). Of particular importance to the present study is the fact that in 1919 S.G. Svatikov openly engaged in military propaganda during his brief tenure as Deputy Head of the Department of Propaganda of the Special Council under General A.I. Denikin (Markedonov, 1996: 163-173). According to S.M. Markedonov, “the new “Minister of Propaganda” [N.Ye. Paramonov, the newly appointed Head of the Department of Propaganda] deemed it necessary to engage in the White Movement socialists who were opposed to Bolshevism. This approach was shared by S.G. Svatikov, who considered the triumph of the monarchists an impossibility” (Markedonov, 1996: 163-173). Thus, invoking the ideas of S.G. Svatikov in White propaganda in South Russia was quite a natural thing to do. In fact, his fairly sincere socialist and democratic ideas were well-suited for popularizing Cossackdom among the Western allies.

Modern historians tend to be interested in S.G. Svatikov not as a public figure but as the author of the monograph ‘Russia and the Don’, possibly the first book to provide a consistent anti-monarchical description of the entire history of Don Cossackdom, in which the primary focus is on the civil, rather than, military, history of the Don Host. As fairly pointed out by S.M. Markedonov, “[S.G. Svatikov] dismantled the old stereotypes of describing Cossack history only as one of wars

and campaigns” (Markedonov, 1996: 163-173). The second part of the present article will juxtapose the key ideological tenets in ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ and the monograph ‘Russia and the Don’ in order to trace the presence of Svatikov’s ideas in the book under our examination.

## 2. Materials and methods

The primary source employed in this work is ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919). Unfortunately, searching the State Archive of Rostov Oblast and the Ataman Chancery holding for documents relating to the production of this book produced no results. Therefore, the present work will primarily focus on its ideological component. It will compare the book both with a set of earlier summarizing works on the history of Don Cossackdom (‘Materials on the Geography and Statistics of Russia Gathered by General Staff Officers: The Land of the Don Host’ (Krasnov, 1863), ‘A Statistical Description of the Province of the Don Cossack Host’ (Nomikosov, 1884), and ‘The Pictures of the Past Quiet Don’ (Krasnov, 1909)) and with the monograph ‘Russia and the Don’ (Svatikov, 1924), which, in essence, further develops and substantiates the ideas articulated in ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’.

Use was made of the historical-descriptive and historical-comparative methods, with foci on identifying the key differences between the concepts discussed in ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ and the views common in early-20th-century Don historiography and on revealing the inconsistencies in the book.

## 3. Results

Before we proceed any further, it will be a good idea to finish off the analysis of ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ – more so that its last two chapters contain some very interesting material worthy of discussion.

### *The Don Economy*

This chapter is not of much interest in the context of the present study. The bulk of it is made up of information on the economy and geography of the Don Host that is commonly known in early-20th-century Russian historiography. Of interest, however, is the way it is delivered to the foreign reader: facts about the Don region are regularly juxtaposed with facts about different foreign states. Specifically, it is stated after the information about the coordinates of the Host’s northern and southern boundaries that “the northern extremity [of the Don Host] lies in about the same latitude as the cities of London and Leipzig and the city of Winnipeg in Canada; on the other hand, its southern extremity lies in the same latitude as the city of Lyon, the city of Milan, the city of Trieste, and the city of Montreal in Canada” (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 91).

The text contains only one nuance worthy of special notice. The Don Host is regularly compared with small states. In each such case, it is stated that the Don Host surpasses its counterpart in area size, population size, the development of certain sectors of the economy, and so on. Incidentally, the author’s selection of the countries is somewhat strange, even factoring in the geopolitical state of affairs in 1919, when certain national borders had yet to be defined after the end of World War I. For instance, among the states that the Don Host surpasses in area size the author mentions Saxony and Bavaria, while Saxony is also mentioned among those it surpasses in population size (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 91). It would be somewhat odd to place these German principalities, which had long been part of the German Empire, alongside, say, Belgium or the Netherlands. In addition, Belgium and the Netherlands are mentioned exclusive of their colonies, and that reduces their area size by several times (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 91). Finally, Serbia and Yugoslavia are mentioned as two separate states (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 91). Thus, while the author of ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ undertook to substantiate a perfectly legitimate suggestion – the idea that the Don Host was comparable economically and geographically to a small country, it was not done without errors.

The takeaway from this chapter is that the Don Host was “quite capable of sustaining an independent economic existence” (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 96-97). Thus, it appears as though the Don did not need Russia – the Don Host was being presented in ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ as a region much more developed both economically and politically than the rest of Russia. The final chapter was to provide the Western reader with a



glimpse into the future of government in Russia through the lens of the interests and historical traditions of the Don Cossacks.

#### *The Don's Political Aspirations*

'An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host' was written at a time when the White Movement was highly successful. It directly tells the reader that "the victorious armies of the Southern Front are approaching Moscow", so "the day is near" when decisions must be made about the form of government in a new Russia (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 99). In the light of what has been said above, it can be admitted that the author of 'An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host' sought to manipulate the reader into believing that the Cossacks had a perfect idea of what this new Russia was to be like, with the administrations of Atamans A.M. Kaledin, P.N. Krasnov, and A.P. Bogayevsky having been perfectly consistent in carrying out a single policy ("Right from the outset of the revolution, the Don assumed a clear stance, to which it has remained true over the course of 2 years" (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 99)). The basis for these conclusions was the statement released in 1917 by the Host's Krug saying that there were plans to turn Russia into "a united, undivided democratic republic built on the principles of self-determination of the peoples and wide local autonomy in particular parts of the state" (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 99). That said, as early as the spring of 1918, the administration of P.N. Krasnov declared the Almighty Don Host "a sovereign state" (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 100). However, in the interpretation of the author of 'An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host', the declaration of sovereignty did not contradict the Krug's earlier statements about the region's intentions to be part of a democratic Russia but was aimed against the "ambitions of the German leadership and the Ukrainian State" (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 101). Thus, here too the Don was acting in the interests of the Entente, and its executives were displaying "great courage and resolve" (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 101). And in 1919 the Krug again articulated its vision of a future Russia as a "united and free democratic nation", the only imperative condition being that the Don Host be "an autonomy within the state" (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 101).

The Don Host being a future "*autonomy within the state*" is what was being substantiated in the final pages of the book. Special emphasis was laid on needing a completely novel form of autonomy, one that had no comparable counterparts in existing law (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 102). Ordinary self-government, which in the text is construed as "a legal state where a part of a country is governed by a local government put in place by the central government and based on legislation that is, too, put in place by the central government" (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 102), was rejected as a possible future form of government for the Don Host due to its "conditional nature", meaning that under such a system the central government would continue to wield too much sway over the region (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 103). The system that the author of 'An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host' saw as best suited for the Don Host was the autonomy, i.e. "self-government based on the area's own laws, rather than those imposed by the state" (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 103). That said, the then-available examples of the autonomy (e.g., the Grand Duchy of Finland within the Russian Empire, the dominions of the British Crown, and the principalities of the German Empire) were different from the Don Host in that they were "inescapably non-sovereign states" (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 103-104). By contrast, in the interpretation of 'An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host', the status of the Don Host as a sovereign state was an "inescapable fact" as of 1918 (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 104). And, while the Don was not just ready but desired to give up its sovereignty for the sake of becoming part of Russia, it also wished to retain its "primordial historical right to autonomy" (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 104).

We are talking here about being part of Russia based on "voluntary allegiance" – similar to how it was done by the first Cossacks, who "were happy to serve the state without taking an oath of allegiance to it" (Ocherk politicheskoi istorii..., 1919: 104). The only possible way to do this would have been through a "reciprocal agreement", i.e. incorporating the Don Host into a new Russia on conditions that would suit the *Cossacks* first and foremost. Thus, it was about some sort of extreme form of autonomy unprecedented at that time.

Naturally, earlier popular essays on Don history and officially published historical-statistical descriptions of the region contained no statements about a willingness to see the Don Host as an autonomy within the Russian Empire. However, most of this material did align with the aspirations

of some of the local elite – starting at least in the 1860s. As early as then, a Don public figure named I.S. Ul'yanov wrote that “the efficiency of the Don Cossacks’ indigenous institutions cannot be assessed from the standpoint of being up-to-date – it can only be assessed from the standpoint of the extent to which Cossacks using them are constrained in their primordial rights” (GARO. F. 243. Op. 1. D. 28. L. 229-229ob.). During the same decade, representatives from the stanitsas of Khoper District raised before a government commission the issue of “the need for any future changes to the Regulation with regard to service, land ownership, and other rights and privileges granted to the Host by the Monarchs to be agreed with deputies from all over the Host” (GARO. F. 55. Op. 1. D. 240. L. 79-79ob.). In fact, elected Host deputies admitted into the commissions regularly solicited the government to grant the Don Host statutory autonomy and sign into law a measure requiring all new laws dealing with Cossackdom to be agreed with some sort of local elective body. The chairman of one of the commissions, General N.A. Maslakovets, simply took proposals of this kind off the voting agenda, citing “their unprecedentedness in local and national governance in the Empire” as a reason (Maslakovets, 1899: 10). Thus, not only did members of the Don elite seeking wide autonomy for the region know exactly what they wanted, something they had been articulating over the course of half a century, but they also wished the potential Don autonomy to be something “unprecedented”. As we can see, the author of ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ wrote about this quite openly, admitting that the kind of autonomy that was desired for a future Don would have no comparable counterparts in international law.

Let us now move on to the paper’s most controversial narrative. We already know that ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ is a text that is internally discrepant and inconsistent in terms of content – many of the facts it provides do not align with the ideas it declares. However, regardless of whether the text’s author was, indeed, S.G. Svatikov or an unknown propagandist with similar views, the causes behind those discrepancies and inconsistencies must not be reduced to a deliberate distortion of reality in a propagandist narrative or even a genuine misconception. The conceptual foundations of ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ are quite adequate, even if suited to a particular, democratic, view of the history of Cossackdom – something that was proven in 1924 by S.G. Svatikov, who substantiated these views in his monograph, ‘Russia and the Don’, in a fairly academic fashion. That said, as mentioned earlier, as at 1919 there, as of yet, were no summarizing works on the history of Don Cossackdom written from a similar perspective. On the other hand, some of the Don elite had sought to have a political autonomy with democratic representation from the stanitsas since the 1860s, while claims of the first Cossacks having had a “republic” were not uncommon in Don historiography. Therefore, with the abolition of political censorship in Russia in 1917 (even irrespective of the existence of a “sovereign” Almighty Don Host between the 1918s and 1920s), the way had been paved for members of the democratic wing of the local elite to engage in propagandizing and popularizing their views of the past of Don Cossackdom. Incidentally, S.G. Svatikov openly wrote in the preface to his ‘Russia and the Don’ that both himself and the publisher of his book, the Don Historical Commission, were pursuing not only academic objectives but wished to “eliminate the many misconceptions and prejudices and establish a view of Cossackdom that is aligned with its purpose and role in the history of the Russian state” (Svatikov, 1924: VI). According to S.G. Svatikov, this role was, once again, not about the Cossacks serving the Crown and their motherland, as claimed by monarchical historiography and propaganda, but about creating “Don Cossack law”, a system predicated on “the great principles of equality and freedom”.

In other words, there is no doubt that ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ reflected the real self-identification of the democratic wing of the Don Cossack elite. What is more, not only did its members wish to reap situational gains from the presentation of their democratic ideals to British and French readers – they also wished to shake the prejudices of the Russian reader through historical research proving the natural democratism of Cossackdom. However, all this required time and effort. According to his own confession, S.G. Svatikov made some serious changes to ‘The Political-Legal Environment in the Don in the 16th and 20th centuries (1549–1919)’ while in emigration. For instance, its volume changed – in its 1919 edition, ‘The Political-Legal Environment in the Don in the 16th and 20th centuries (1549–1919)’ had 110 pages, while the size of the monograph ‘Russia and the Don’ was 592 pages (and that is considering that it covered events only up to March 1, 1917) (Svatikov, 1924: III)! Incidentally,

‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ had about 110 pages (its last numbered page being Page 105, followed by a blank page and three contents pages), which once more suggests the possibility of it being that very lost work by S.G. Svatikov.

So, despite the desire of the democratic wing of the Don Cossack elite to substantiate its view of the history of Cossackdom and spread it among the reading audience, the corresponding research by S.G. Svatikov was in 1919 still far from completion. The situation was calling for action – with White regiments approaching Moscow, the downfall of the Bolsheviks seemed imminent, so decisions needed to be made about the form of government in a future Russia, with S.G. Svatikov working for the Department of Propaganda of the Special Council under General A.I. Denikin at the time. So, in that situation, the Don authorities resolved to produce a logically inconsistent text that, nevertheless, would give one an idea of their ideals and aspirations. They were aware of imperfections in the book they were releasing – it is stated in the preface to ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ that the “publisher is fully aware of imperfections in this edition, both in content and in form” (*Ocherk politicheskoi istorii...*, 1919: I). So, it is no wonder that ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ was internally discrepant. Members of the democratic wing of the Don elite had a perfect idea of what the Don was to them – a historically sovereign republic where the deepest roots had been struck by the ideals of democracy and freedom, a republic keen on having maximum autonomy within a single Russia. However, the material needed for such a description of the Don Host had not been gathered yet, “the old stereotypes of describing Cossack history only as one of wars and campaigns”, as put by S.M. Markedonov, had not been dismantled by S.G. Svatikov yet, and the factual part of ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ had been constructed along the lines of conservative-monarchical popular essays on Don history available at the time, with a focus on Cossackdom’s military exploits committed for the glory of the Crown and the motherland.

Therefore, it may be worth concluding the present study by comparing ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ with the monograph ‘Russia and the Don’ by S.G. Svatikov, inasmuch as the latter further develops and substantiates the ideas articulated in the former. To caveat from the outset, we will not dwell here upon individual physical overlaps in the two texts, although there are some. For instance, in analyzing the various types of autonomy in international law, both ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ and ‘Russia and the Don’ rely upon ‘Essays on Russian State Law’ by B.E. Nolde (*Ocherk politicheskoi istorii...*, 1919: 103; Svatikov, 1924: V). Our main interest is the conceptual similarities and differences between the two.

S.G. Svatikov wrote extensively and in depth about the form of government in the Don Host in the earliest days of Cossackdom, devoting to this narrative an entire chapter – ‘The Power of the Don’ (Svatikov, 1924: 33). The principal idea promoted by S.G. Svatikov was fully aligned with the narrative in the earlier text: “The aspiration to resolve common matters through collective consultation and agreement, so typical of the Slavic peoples, ethnic Russians in particular, which had been subject to eradication in the Muscovite state, continued to live in the hearts of free craftsmen, warriors, and hunters leaving the Tsardom for the Wild Fields. The Cossacks were natural-born republicans” (Svatikov, 1924: 33-34). However, in Svatikov’s text this tenet stops hanging in the air and is substantiated through a number of specific examples. S.G. Svatikov cited specific documents (‘Don Affairs’) and the works of S.M. Solov’yev, amateur Don historians A.A. Leonov and V.D. Sukhorukov, and others (Svatikov, 1924: 33-36). Thus, the form of government in the Don Host was described not by way of analogy to Swiss cantons but directly. While Svatikov’s text has no references to the Western experience of the Swiss and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, it mentions the ancient Russian *veche* as the prototype of the Host’s *krug* (Svatikov, 1924: 33-35). That said, Svatikov’s text does attempt to modernize and liken the early Don republic to modern Western democracies. For instance, in one place in the text the ataman is referred to as “the elected president of the Don Republic”, while at the end of the chapter the author postulates the existence in Cossack society of fully functional “legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government” (Svatikov, 1924: 38, 40). Finally, there is even a partial textual similarity between the chapter’s general conclusion and what we find in ‘An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host’ – it says that in its early days the Don Host was “an *ordinary* (not federative) *immediate democratic republic* [original italics]” (Svatikov, 1924: 41). So, as already mentioned earlier, a tenet that hung up in the air in 1919 was substantiated academically in 1924. By all means, Svatikov’s



view of the early history of Cossackdom remains debatable. However, despite its author's obvious political preferences, this text is not a politically discrepant one and is one done to a level that is in line with early-20th-century Don historiography.

As a specific example of internal discrepancies in the narrative in 'An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host', we considered in the first part the uprising of Stepan Razin. Svatikov's text, which devotes an entire chapter to it, contains no logical discrepancies in this respect. Its account of the uprising of S. Razin is fairly consistent, although it does contain elements of modernization. It describes it as a "red" riot of the anarchic poor against the "white" reactionary government (e.g., "The reign of Alexey Mikhaylovich was an era that saw a strengthening of the autocratic and serf-owning regime in Russia" (Svatikov, 1924: 98); "Razin wished to annihilate everybody who stood above the poor; his men were keen to plunder and divide the spoils" (Svatikov, 1924: 103); "Autocratic and serf-owning Russia responded to the red terror of the proletariat and the insurgent peasantry, lured by Razin's proclamations ("cunning conspiratorial letters written with larcenous intent"), with white terror" (Svatikov, 1924: 104)). Thus, while, just like 'An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host', Svatikov's text describes the uprising of S. Razin as that of "the utter destitute", it contains nothing suggesting a change in "the image of brigand Razin in the public consciousness" and his movement being "a precursor to a great public protest against autocratic power". Quite the opposite, throughout the corresponding chapter Razin's followers are viewed as predecessors of the Bolsheviks. It is in this context, rather than the context of Cossackdom's military victories, that the text considers the Cossacks' first official swearing of fealty to the Tsar subsequent to the Razin uprising. It views this step as destroying a well-developed and modern democratic republic and subjugating it to autocratic and serf-owning Moscow (Svatikov, 1924: 108-109). Cossackdom's subsequent military achievements are simply not mentioned, i.e. the text is reticent about the link between these achievements and the swearing of fealty to the Tsar.

The bulk of Svatikov's book is devoted to the imperial period in Don history. It describes in a consistent manner the central government's encroachment upon the Cossacks' rights and privileges. The first part of the present article considered as a case in point the public administration reforms in the Don Host that followed the Pugachev uprising. As a reminder, in Don historiography they were viewed up to 1917 as "the installation of a proper system of administration and governance" by the Host. Therefore, there is no mention of them in 'An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host' whatsoever. S.G. Svatikov described these reforms in much detail, a lot more detail than they had been described in before, and in full accordance with fully established facts, while giving those facts new explanations based on documentary sources. S.G. Svatikov cited G.A. Potemkin, who had attributed the need for new regulations for the Don Host not just to the imperfection of the then-existing institutions and the absence of laws that would regulate their work but to the fact that "regional and local matters are handled in their [Don Cossack] society not in accordance with national laws applicable to all citizens but, just like military matters, are decided by the Ataman in a purely arbitrary manner" (Svatikov, 1924: 229). S.G. Svatikov agreed with this assessment and, just like his predecessors, acknowledged that the 1770s reforms subjugated Don atamans and the Don administration as a whole to the law. That said, he argued that the very emergence of unlimited ataman authority was the consequence of imperial government's encroachment upon the republican traditions of the Don and took place after the abolition of elections for the post of ataman: "He [G.A. Potemkin] overlooked the fact that the unlimited authority of the ataman was the result of the abolition of ataman elections and saw as a cure for this evil the strengthening of administrative control" (Svatikov, 1924: 229). And, more to the point, while G.A. Potemkin was not a proponent of imperial laws regulating life in Cossack society, he openly argued that "above all else, there was a need for a leader of proven loyalty and ability", i.e. a Don ataman absolutely loyal to the government (Svatikov, 1924: 229).

Thus, there appear to be no conceptual differences between 'An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host' and the monograph 'Russia and the Don' by S.G. Svatikov. The difference between these two books boils down to the genre (a popular propagandist essay versus a serious historical-legal study) and the fact that the first one was produced in haste, using unsuited materials and ideological constructs, and the second one was the result of extensive research by the author. It is based on the second edition that we get an idea of what the future

representation of the Almighty Don Host in the international arena would have been in the event of the Whites' victory – a historical democratic republic whose ataman had resembled the president of a Western democratic state since as early as the 16th century, as opposed to a land of warriors whole-heartedly devoted to the Monarchy.

#### 4. Conclusion

The key ideological concepts in 'An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host' did align with the self-consciousness of some of the Cossack elite. Starting in the 1860s, elected representatives on various local commissions and certain Don public figures advocated for an autonomous Don via an elective body. The opinion that the early Cossacks had a republic had been voiced going further back – since the early 19th century. It was not until after the Civil War that a Don political figure named S.G. Svatikov wrote, in 1924, a research monograph entitled 'Russia and the Don', in which he made the case for the existence of democratic and republican traditions in Cossack society. Thus, although 'An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host' contains obvious exaggerations and incorrect statements, the sincerity of its author in terms of the treatment of general concepts can hardly be doubted.

In fact, there is a likelihood that 'An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host' was written by S.G. Svatikov himself. What also speaks to this assumption is the ideological affinity between this text and the monograph 'Russia and the Don', as well as the use in the books of the same literature (reliance upon 'Essays on Russian State Law' by B.E. Nolde on legal issues) and the same terms (e.g., "the immediate republic" of the early Cossacks). Note, furthermore, that S.G. Svatikov worked for the Department of Propaganda of the Special Council under General A.I. Denikin. During the Civil War, he published a book on the history of Cossackdom – it matches 'An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host' in size and in place and year of publication. According to S.G. Svatikov, it was entitled 'The Political-Legal Environment in the Don in the 16th and 20th centuries (1549–1919)'. However, no copies of it have been found to date. Hence, it can be argued with a high degree of confidence that 'An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host' is the same book as 'The Political-Legal Environment in the Don in the 16th and 20th centuries (1549–1919)' by S.G. Svatikov – the latter appears to have been adapted for the foreign reader and renamed amid the tumult of the Civil War.

What hastened the release of 'An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host' by the Don government was its hope that the Bolsheviks would fall soon. At the time the text was being written, with the White Armies approaching Moscow, there were important decisions to be made about the form of government in a new Russia, so the Bogayevsky administration sought to substantiate its preferences on this to the Western reader. This is where 'An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host' would have come in handy. It was to demonstrate to the Western reader that, as bearers of longstanding democratic traditions and successors to the independent republic of the early Don Host, the Don Cossacks were ready to be part of Russia only as inhabitants of a democratic republican autonomy, and their autonomy would need to be as wide as possible at that. However, despite the hypothetical ability of 'An Essay on the Political History of the Almighty Don Host' to help popularize the idea in the mind of the Western reader and enlist the Entente's support for the cause of an autonomous Don, the victory of the Bolsheviks in the Civil War not only put paid to the political future of the Don Host but prevented the book under examination from reaching libraries and bookstores in the French Republic and the British Empire.

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
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## The Methods and Principles of Propaganda Employed by the Soviet Pro-Nazi Collaborationists during World War II (Based on Materials From the *Roul* Newspaper)

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### Abstract

This paper, which focuses on anti-Soviet propaganda during World War II, examines the methods and principles of agitation and propaganda employed by the Soviet pro-Nazi collaborationists at the time based on materials from the *Roul* newspaper. The study's chronological scope is November 1943 through June 1944, i.e. the end of the war's second stage, marked as the tipping point in it, and the start of its third stage, marked by the victory over the Nazis.

The study produced the conclusion that the *Roul* newspaper was fairly effective as an ideological weapon employed in Soviet areas occupied by Nazi Germany. The target audience for this medium was opponents of the Soviet regime.

*Roul* made use of the entire spectrum of the principles of military propaganda. The principles that were employed the most included 'our adversary's leader is inherently evil and resembles the devil', 'we suffer few losses, and the enemy's losses are considerable', and 'our cause is sacred'. The strenuousness of the Nazi propaganda efforts unleashed to influence the residents of the USSR's German-occupied areas is attested by the fact that the Russian collaborationists fought on until the end of the war.

The research reported in this paper revealed that, despite similarities in the principles, technologies, methodologies, and methods of conducting ideological warfare employed by Nazi Germany and the USSR, the bulk of German propaganda was geared toward a more or less educated audience, whereas its Soviet counterpart was mainly oriented toward the working class. This conclusion was based on an analysis of phrases used in German and Soviet media reports at the time.

**Keywords:** military propaganda, agitation, media, *Roul* newspaper, collaborationism, anti-Soviet propaganda, USSR, World War II.

### 1. Introduction

In any country and under any government, there are both supporters and opponents of the current regime. The percentage ratio of the regime's supporters to its opponents is a factor that determines the stability of the system of government in the country. During times of crisis in government (e.g., economic crises, interventional or civil wars, revolutions, or coups), regime opponents tend to press forward, trying to install their own political regime and/or form of government. Wide use in such situations is often made of agitation and propaganda – a tried-and-true weapon for waging war that does not directly result in victims, does not cost too much to

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implement, and does not require engaging much of the population. Of particular interest in this context is collaborationism in the Soviet Union during World War II, when some opponents of Soviet power collaborated with the enemy. An effective propaganda tool used at the time was the *Roul* (Russian: “helm”) newspaper, issued in Berlin, Germany. This paper will examine the methods and principles of agitation and propaganda employed by the Soviet Nazi collaborationists at the time based on materials from the *Roul* newspaper.

## 2. Materials and methods

The key source used in this study is *Roul*, an anti-Bolshevik Russian-language daily newspaper issued in Berlin, Germany. An analysis was conducted of 42 issues of the newspaper, spanning the period between November 1943 and June 1944, which are held in the electronic library of Cherkas Global University (Washington, DC, USA). Some of these sources were introduced into scholarly discourse for the first time by way of this study.

The work utilized a combination of historical and general research methods.

The following traditional historical research methods were used: historical-systems, historical-typological, and historical-genetic. The only non-traditional historical research method employed was historical semiotics.

The following general research methods were used: historiographical analysis and systems analysis.

## 3. Discussion

Issues of propaganda have been explored extensively and by representatives of different disciplines, including political scientists, historians, psychologists, philosophers, and opinion writers.

The foundational theories of propaganda were developed by scholars W. Lippmann, H.D. Lasswell, and J. Dewey.

W. Lippmann argued for the need for government regulation of propagandist and agitational activity. In his view, organized work will help filter content and ensure that as much information is presented to the broad masses of the people as necessary and as much to the government’s advantage as possible. The scholar was convinced that getting all of the information would be harmful for the populace and ought to be the privilege of the elites only (Lippmann, 1922).

H.D. Lasswell is credited with having provided a theoretical substantiation for the centuries-old phenomenon of demonizing the enemy as an effective propaganda tool (Lasswell, 1938). In his view, the essence of propaganda lies in that it can affect vulnerable elements in a person’s consciousness (e.g., fearing for the life and health of themselves and their family, worrying about their financial well-being, or being worried about becoming dependent on someone or something) (Lasswell, 1927).

In the view of J. Dewey, every educated person must be able to discern credible information from misinformation in today’s information-packed world; letting a nation’s elites control information can lead to the people becoming intellectually weaker and enable its enemies to manipulate it with ill intentions (D’yui, 2000; D’yui, 2002).

While there are other theories of propaganda, the scope of this paper limits us to the three mentioned above, more so that, in essence, all of them are based on those three.

Military propaganda is examined as a separate type of propaganda in ‘The Basic Principles of War Propaganda’ by A. Morelli (Morelli, 2001), which is based on ‘Falsehood in War-Time’ by A.A.W.H. Ponsonby (Ponsonby, 1928) and ‘Les Responsabilités de la Guerre. Le Patriotisme et la Vérité’ (Demartial, 1916), ‘La Guerre de 1914: La Mobilisation des Consciences’ (Demartial, 1922), and ‘Le Mythe des Guerres de Légitime Défense’ (Demartial, 1930) by G. Demartial. These principles were examined in practice in our paper ‘An Analysis of the Principles of Military Propaganda Employed by the Soviet Union in January 1942 (Based on Materials From the *Krasnaya Zvezda* Newspaper)’ (Stelnykovych, 2022).

To ensure accuracy in terminology employed, use was made of ‘The Great Soviet Encyclopedia’ (БСЭ, 1975) and the encyclopedic dictionary ‘Philosophy’ (Filosofiya..., 2006).

Certain aspects of the theory and practice of military propaganda were also explored in some of our own works, more specifically in the context of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (Mamadaliyev, 2020a; Mamadaliyev, 2020b; Mamadaliyev,



2021a; Mamadaliev, 2021b). Researcher K.V. Taran has explored the military propaganda conducted during World War II by the Sochi Militsiya Department of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Taran, 2022).

#### 4. Results

*Roul* was a daily Russian-language émigré newspaper. Its first issue came out on November 17, 1920. According to G.L. Arosev, a biographer of V.D. Nabokov, it was issued between 1920 and 1931 in Berlin, Germany, with a run of around 20,000 copies. Its editors were I.V. Hessen and V.D. Nabokov, who considered themselves the leaders of the Cadet party abroad. Initially, the newspaper consisted of four pages. Later, the number increased to six. In terms of content, it carried news items, articles, analytical reports, and advertisements. At some point, it started to carry literary works as well. Specifically, it would publish poems by V.D. Nabokov under the pen name Sirin. According to the biographer, following its move from Berlin, the main center for Russian emigration at the time, to Paris, *Roul* eventually ceased to be of interest and was discontinued in 1931 (Arosev, 2021).

However, we managed to get hold of 42 copies of *Roul*, spanning the period between November 1943 and late June 1944, which are held in the electronic library of Cherkas Global University (Washington, DC, USA). It appears that during World War II the newspaper was relaunched in Germany as an ideological weapon against the Soviet Union. It was characterized on its front page as a “Russian anti-Bolshevik newspaper” (later “Russian anti-Bolshevik sheet”). Initially, the newspaper consisted of four pages (sometimes six) and came out daily. Later, it was issued irregularly (from twice a week to once every 2 weeks). Starting with Issue 118 (of April 5, 1944), the newspaper began to come out on Wednesdays and Saturdays and be referred to as a “Russian anti-Bolshevik newspaper” again (Rul', 05.04.44); there also were some changes to the design of its front page. The price was 1 ruble. Judging by the currency listed, it was distributed in the USSR's German-occupied areas. The special 115th issue (of March 14, 1944) does not list the price. It can be assumed that it was distributed free of charge in conjunction with a worsening situation in the front line. In addition, it can be suggested that it also was distributed in the USSR's German-occupied Belarusian areas through the Belarusian Home Defense Force<sup>1</sup>.

We will now examine the use of the principles of military propaganda identified by A. Morelli (Morelli, 2001) and ourselves in the *Roul* newspaper.

The first page and a portion of the second page of the issue of November 27, 1943, are devoted to the speech delivered by A. Hitler on November 9, 1943, in Munich. The very first, and main, item in this issue, written by V. Lonov, is entitled ‘We Can Look to the Future With a Quiet Heart’. It has the following subsections: ‘Europe Has Just Been on the Brink of Demise’, ‘The Bolshevik's Pressure’, ‘Italy's Tragedy’, ‘The Struggle in the East’, ‘The Spiteful Enemy Is Helpless’, ‘The Day of Reckoning Is Near’, ‘Composure, Courage, and Faith in Victory’ (Rul', 27.11.43a: 1-2), and a few others. These correspond to the main focal points of A. Hitler's speech. We can trace the following principles of military propaganda across them:

– ‘we don't want war – we are only defending ourselves’ and ‘our adversary is solely responsible for this war’: the leader of the Third Reich is trying to convince one that it was not Nazi Germany who started the war, pointing the finger at “Bolshevik Russia” and accusing it of treacherously attacking Poland; the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is, of course, not mentioned anywhere;

– ‘we are defending a noble cause, not our particular interests’: Germany is saving all of Europe from Bolshevism and is on the forward edge of the battle area; no mention is made of the fact that many European nations are neutral in the war, while certain nations (Great Britain, France, and others) are fighting Germany alongside the USSR;

<sup>1</sup> The Belarusian Home Defense Force (BKA) was a military collaborationist unit that fought on the side of Nazi Germany under a three-striped white-and-red flag. It was formed on February 23, 1944, by the Belarusian Central Council, a pro-Nazi Belarusian self-government within Reichskommissariat Ostland during World War II. The unit was formed after the Wehrmacht suffered two major strategic defeats at Stalingrad (in February 1943) and at Kursk (in August 1943) as a way for the Germans to gain a foothold in Belarus through the help of the Belarusian collaborationists. Prior to that, the Nazis did not consider Belarus as an ally.

– ‘the enemy is purposefully committing atrocities; if we are making mistakes this happens without intention’: “There are millions of Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Tatars, and members of other ethnic groups on the other side of the front line. They have had the opportunity to see who the real enemy is. ...The best sons of these peoples are asking for arms so that they can join the German army in the battle against the Bolsheviks, who pose a dire, murderous threat to society. ...This grueling, slaughterous strife goes on” (Rul', 27.11.43a: 2);

– ‘our leader has the unconditional support of all the people in the country (the ‘draw the nation together’ effect)’, ‘feats of courage being committed on a mass scale, with every single of our combatants being ready to commit one’, and ‘our cause is sacred’: “The hour is near when decisive battles will be fought, and we stand beside Germany, beside Adolf Hitler with faith in the triumph of a righteous cause, in the name of which we are undertaking this arduous military effort. ...This struggle is hard. It requires sacrifice. It changes the course of the lives of millions. And yet, as put by one great German poet, ‘Of freedom and of life he only is deserving who every day must conquer them anew” (Rul', 27.11.43a: 2).

Overall, it can be concluded that both A. Hitler’s speech and the article mentioned above are distorting the history of the conflict and the real situation in the front line, which is another method of conducting aggressive propaganda among domestic residents and people in other countries who have limited access to information.

The items ‘National China and the Jews’ (Rul', 27.11.43b: 2), ‘The Recognition of a Free India’ (Rul', 27.11.43c: 2), ‘The End of One Bolshevik Undertaking’ (Rul', 27.11.43d: 2), ‘A Double-Edged Sword’ (Rul', 27.11.43e: 2), ‘The Law of Deathsmen’ (Rul', 27.11.43f: 3), ‘Jewelers From the Kremlin’ (Rul', 27.11.43g: 3), ‘Stakhanovite Lavrentiy Beriya’ (Rul', 27.11.43h: 4), ‘Soviet Terror’ (Rul', 27.11.43i: 4), and ‘Within a Volunteer Detachment’ (Rul', 27.11.43g: 4) engage the following principles of conducting ideological war: ‘whoever casts doubt on our propaganda helps the enemy and is a traitor’, ‘our adversary’s leader is inherently evil and resembles the devil’, ‘our leader has the unconditional support of all the people in the country (the ‘draw the nation together’ effect)’, and ‘we have the active support of the world community’.

The use of each of the above principles of military propaganda is illustrated below through example based on materials from the rest of the issues of the *Roul* newspaper. Let us begin with the principles identified by A. Morelli:

1. The principle ‘we don’t want war – we are only defending ourselves’ (Morelli, 2001) is employed in the items ‘Yet Another “Historic” Speech’ (by L. Vladimirov) (Rul', 23.12.43b: 2), ‘A Beast in Full Dress Uniform’ (Rul', 06.02.44b: 1), ‘The Truth Will Out’ (Rul', 12.04.44a: 3), ‘For Free Labor, for Joy, and for Spring. The Struggle in the Rear: The Soviets Won’t Be Able to Douse the Fire of the Uprisings’ (Rul', 29.04.44a: 1), ‘Against the Bolsheviks’ and for Our May Day’ (Rul', 29.04.44b: 2), and ‘Bolshevism Will Die Out, and Russia Will Live On’ (Rul', 20.05.44b: 3).

2. The principle ‘our adversary is solely responsible for this war’ (Morelli, 2001) is employed in the items ‘Von Ribbentrop on the Military and Political Situation’ (Rul', 23.12.43a: 1), ‘Red Army Commanders Speak Out’ (Rul', 06.02.44a: 2), ‘The Price of the Bolshevik “Success” – Advice to Take Heed of En Route to Defeat’ (Rul', 24.02.44a: 1), and ‘Neither the Power nor the Rascality of the “Allies” Will Help. Rascality and Hypocrisy: The Anglo-Americans Are Wooing Russian Volunteers’ (Rul', 24.05.44a: 1).

3. The principle ‘our adversary’s leader is inherently evil and resembles the devil’ (Morelli, 2001) is employed in the items ‘The “Living Principles” of the Soviet Union’ (Rul', 03.12.43a: 1), ‘Caucasian Hospitality – They Like Russian Blood!’ (Rul', 15.01.44a: 1), ‘A Russian Airwoman Against Stalin’ (Rul', 17.02.44a: 1), ‘Stalin Holds Nothing Sacred’ (Rul', 02.03.44a: 1), ‘Stalin Trades in Russian Blood. Russian Blood on Sale Again: Stalin Sends Troops Into Italy’ (Rul', 20.05.44a: 1), and ‘Stalin Is the People’s Worst Enemy. Hard Forced Labor – the NKVD Suppresses the Unrest’ (Rul', 31.05.44a: 1).

4. The principle ‘we are defending a noble cause, not our particular interests’ (Morelli, 2001) is employed in the items ‘Why the Bolsheviks Are Rushing to End the War’ (Rul', 03.12.43b: 1), ‘Against Stalin’ (Rul', 20.01.44a: 1), ‘The NKVD’s Hand. A New Victim of Murderous Terror’ (Rul', 17.02.44b: 2), ‘In the Name of the People! The Idea Is the Motherland and the Goal Is Victory’ (Rul', 02.03.44a: 1), ‘For Peace and for Freedom!’ (Rul', 02.03.44b: 2), and ‘The Dirty Teheran Deal’ (Rul', 14.06.44b: 3).

5. The principle ‘the enemy is purposefully committing atrocities; if we are making mistakes this happens without intention’ (Morelli, 2001) is employed in the items ‘The Soviets’ Bridgehead in Kerch Destroyed’ (Rul’, 16.12.43a: 1), ‘Belarus Protesting: The Belarusian People Will Not Fall to Bolshevik Bondage’ (Rul’, 02.03.44a: 3), ‘People Staying Underground’ (Rul’, 25.03.44b: 2), and ‘The Chief Enemy’ (Rul’, 15.04.44b: 3).

6. The principle ‘the enemy makes use of illegal weapons’ (Morelli, 2001) is employed in the items ‘An Award for Plunder’ (Rul’, 31.12.43e: 4), ‘One Hand Washes the Other’ (Rul’, 20.01.44b: 2), ‘Captives – Fighting for The Enemy’ (Rul’, 24.02.44b: 2), ‘Bolshevik Predators’ (Rul’, 05.04.44b: 2), ‘An Act of Carnage by the Bolsheviks’ (Rul’, 08.04.44b: 1), and ‘Cut-Throat Methods of Warfare’ (Rul’, 10.05.44b: 2).

7. The principle ‘we suffer few losses, and the enemy’s losses are considerable’ (Morelli, 2001) is employed in the items ‘A Conference That Can Change Nothing’ (Rul’, 03.12.43c: 3), ‘Stiff Defensive Battles in the Southern Section of the Eastern Front. Failed Soviet Offensives West of Kiev and in the Vicinity of Korosten’ (Rul’, 03.12.43d: 3), ‘850 Soviet Tanks and 226 Guns Captured or Destroyed’ (Rul’, 31.12.43a: 2), ‘A Fissure in the Anglo-American Camp’ (Rul’, 25.03.44a: 1), ‘Air Thugs Rebuffed’ (Rul’, 03.06.44b: 2), ‘Anglo-Americans Invade Europe. Aggressor Repelled Fiercely. – German Troops Leave Rome. – German-Romanian Units Successful Northwest of Jassy’ (Rul’, 10.06.44a: 1-2), and ‘Germany Defending Europe: Enemy Suffers Heavy Losses at Sea and in Air’ (Rul’, 14.06.44a: 1).

8. The principle ‘recognized intellectuals and artists support our cause’ (Morelli, 2001) is employed in the items ‘Vyshinsky at Work’ (Rul’, 31.12.43b: 3), ‘Belarusian Metropolitan Exposes Stalin’s Deceitful Religious Policy’ (Rul’, 31.12.43c: 3), ‘The People Are Against Bolshevism. Ukraine’s Struggle for Life. – Stalin “Amnesties” the People’ (Rul’, 06.05.44b: 3), ‘In the Lead-Up to the Crisis’ (Rul’, 10.05.44a: 2), ‘England Face to Face With the Enemies and the “Allies”’ (Rul’, 24.05.44b: 2), and ‘Social Antagonisms in America’ (Rul’, 21.06.44a: 2).

9. The principle ‘our cause is sacred’ (Morelli, 2001) is employed in the items ‘German Defensive Positions Succeed Brilliantly. Germany Responds to Air Terror With Shattering Blows’ (Rul’, 20.01.44c: 1), ‘In the Name of the People! The Idea Is the Motherland and the Goal Is Victory’ (Rul’, 02.03.44a: 1), ‘An Appeal for Struggle Against Bolshevism’ (Rul’, 19.04.44b: 2), ‘Sacred Hatred’ (Rul’, 26.04.44b: 4), ‘It’s the Kikes Who Need The World Revolution. Ukrainian Clergy Visit Dr. Frank’ (Rul’, 27.05.44a: 1), ‘Revisiting the World Revolution’ (Rul’, 27.05.44b: 1), and ‘Germany Will Defend Europe. The Greatest Struggle in World History Begins!’ (Rul’, 10.06.44b: 1).

10. The principle ‘whoever casts doubt on our propaganda helps the enemy and is a traitor’ (Morelli, 2001) is employed in the items ‘We Share One Path’ (Rul’, 09.12.43b: 1), ‘Sobering Up’ (Rul’, 27.01.44a: 1), ‘A Deal With a Specter’ (Rul’, 27.01.44c: 3), ‘“Reforms” in the USSR – Yet Another Hoax. A New Ordinance on Russian Workers’ (Rul’, 26.04.44a: 1), ‘Fettered Words’ (by I. Veresov) (Rul’, 06.05.44a: 1-2), and ‘Ideological Foundations of the Russian Liberation Movement (ROA Major Dorov)’ (Rul’, 17.06.44a: 1).

We will now examine the use in the *Roul* newspaper of the principles identified by ourselves:

1. The principle ‘infallibility of our leader (what may seem an unwise decision on his part at first glance is actually part of a clever long-term strategy)’ is employed in the items ‘Von Ribbentrop on the Military and Political Situation’ (Rul’, 23.12.43a: 1), ‘Germany Ready to Confront the Enemy’ (Rul’, 27.01.44b: 2), ‘We Fanatically Believe in Our Victory’ (Rul’, 12.04.44b: 1), ‘Adolf Hitler Leading Us to Victory’ (Rul’, 19.04.44a: 1), ‘On the Threshold of National Revival’ (by I. Mironov) (Rul’, 13.05.44b: 1), and ‘The Hour of a Compelling and Formidable Challenge’ (Rul’, 21.06.44b: 3).

2. The principle ‘whatever military, economic, or social setbacks we have had, it is all just temporary, as we are superior to the enemy strategically’ is employed in the items ‘A Conference That Can Change Nothing’ (Rul’, 03.12.43c: 3), ‘War’ (Rul’, 15.01.44b: 1), ‘A Spider at Work’ (Rul’, 10.02.44b: 1-2), ‘A War Prisoner Speaks Out’ (Rul’, 17.03.44b: 4), ‘Illusive Happiness’ (Rul’, 15.04.44a: 2), ‘We Will Overthrow the Accursed Bolsheviks. The Hour of Liberation Drawing Near’ (Rul’, 13.05.44a: 1), ‘An Answer to Unarticulated Questions’ (Rul’, 31.05.44b: 1-2), and ‘Exalted Roar’ (by L. Vladimirov) (Rul’, 07.06.44b: 3).

3. The principle ‘our leader has the unconditional support of all the people in the country (the ‘draw the nation together’ effect)’ is employed in the items ‘Stalin Among Capitalists – Hitler

Among Workers' (Rul', 23.12.43c: 3), 'For a Happy Motherland – Into Battle Against the Bolsheviks!' (Rul', 10.02.44a: 2), 'Dictate? The Soviets Are Helpless – the Initiative Is With Germany' (Rul', 09.03.44a: 1-2), 'A Self-Sacrificing Deed' (Rul', 05.04.44a: 1), 'Self-Help Is the Best Help!' (Rul', 08.04.44a: 1), 'The Demise of Bolshevism Will Save Russia. The Firm Nerves of the German People' (Rul', 17.05.44a), and 'Youth in the Struggle' (by N. Veresov) (Rul', 03.06.44a: 1).

4. The principle 'we have the active support of the world community' is employed in the items 'Turkish Policy Remains Unchanged' (Rul', 16.12.43c: 2), 'History Teaches...' (Rul', 16.12.43d: 2), 'Horse Left the Barn' (Rul', 16.12.43e: 2), 'The European Fortress Is Impregnable' (Rul', 24.02.44c: 3), 'Bolshevism Will Die Out, and Belarus Will Live On' (Rul', 02.03.44b: 1), 'A Fissure in the Anglo-American Camp' (Rul', 25.03.44a: 1), 'An Ignominious End: King Victor Emmanuel Abdicates the Throne' (Rul', 23.04.44b: 3), 'A Day That Shook the World' (Rul', 24.06.44b: 1), and 'The Will for Peace and the Will for War' (Rul', 28.06.44b: 1).

One more principle of military propaganda that is worthy of particular note is 'the enemy keenly spreads fake news, while we only tell the truth', which was employed during World War II nearly as widely as it is today. It is employed in the following items in the *Roul* newspaper: 'Stalin's Fables for Foreign Dupes' (Rul', 09.12.43a: 1), 'A Rogue Union' (Rul', 16.12.43b: 1-2), 'A Trial of Traitors' (Rul', 15.01.44c: 3), 'Ehrenburg Calling' (by I. Frolov, S. Tikhonov, and S. Mikulovich) (Rul', 02.03.44c: 4), 'On the Other Side' (Rul', 17.03.44a: 3), 'A Fissure in the Anglo-American Camp' (Rul', 25.03.44a: 1), 'All-Conquering Truth' (Rul', 23.04.44a: 1), 'When All Hope Has Been Lost' (Rul', 17.05.44b: 3), 'The Allies on the Brink of Defeat. Lost Illusions' (Rul', 07.06.44a: 1), 'Round One Lost' (Rul', 17.06.44b: 2), 'London Under Continuous Gunfire. Fierce Fighting in Normandy. – Fruitless Offensives by the Soviets. – Horrendous Explosions, Fires, Wreckage. – War to the Victorious End' (Rul', 24.06.44a: 1), and 'The Bolsheviks Advancing. Fierce Fighting in the Middle Section of the Eastern Front. – London Remains Under Gunfire. – Stalin Is a Jew. – German Aviation Attacks Enemy Positions' (Rul', 28.06.44a: 1).

Overall, it can be concluded that the "ideological machine" that was up against the Soviet propaganda system employed pretty much the same roster of principles, technologies, methodologies, and methods of conducting propagandist activity. Taking into account that Nazi Germany (unlike Fascist Italy) fought hard all the way to its capitulation (and even beyond), it must be acknowledged that the Third Reich's propaganda system was efficient.

## 5. Conclusion

The study produced the following conclusions:

1. The *Roul* newspaper was issued as an ideological weapon against the USSR and was distributed in its Nazi-occupied areas. The target audience was opponents of the Soviet regime.
2. The newspaper utilized the entire spectrum of the principles of military propaganda. Some items employed as many as several of these principles. The principles that were employed the most included 'our adversary's leader is inherently evil and resembles the devil', 'we suffer few losses, and the enemy's losses are considerable', and 'our cause is sacred'.
3. The Third Reich's military propaganda efforts were, overall, efficient, as was its military propaganda work through the *Roul* newspaper, in particular. This is attested by the fact that the Russian collaborationists fought on until the end of the war.
4. Despite similarities in the principles, technologies, methodologies, and methods of conducting ideological warfare employed by Nazi Germany and the USSR, the bulk of German propaganda was geared toward a more or less educated audience, whereas its Soviet counterpart was mainly oriented toward the working class. This conclusion was based on an analysis of phrases used in German and Soviet media reports at the time.

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


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## Weapons of Propagandists

### From the Experience of Using Powerful Sound Broadcasting Stations by the Red Army in 1943

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#### Abstract

The article considers some experience of the use of sound broadcasting stations by the Red Army in 1943 on the Eastern Front of World War II. The attention is paid to the circumstances of the emergence of a document on the conservation of sound broadcasting installations at the front – “A memo on saving loudspeakers and trench installations from enemy fire”.

There were used as materials the documents from the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (Podolsk, Russian Federation). Case 91 was used – the Documents of the 7th department of the political department of the 33rd Army on the organization of propaganda and agitation (bulletin “Sharing of experiences”). 1944 year.

After the Red Army's offensive operations in 1943, there were recorded among troops the cases of the destruction of sound broadcasting stations PLI-39. The fact of the destruction of these powerful loud-speaking installations led to the investigation of this case in the political department of the Red Army. During the proceedings, the reasons for the death of the equipment were clarified and, ultimately, on January 7, 1944, “A memo on saving loudspeakers and trench installations from enemy fire” was developed.

**Keywords:** a powerful sound broadcasting system, Red Army, combat use, 1943, World War II.

#### 1. Introduction

1943 is a year of transition of the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front from Germany to the Soviet Union. This then predetermined the resumption of the use of Powerful Loudspeaker Installations (PLI, in Russian abbreviation MGU) at the front. At that time, PLI were used both to generate noise (for example, the sound of armored vehicles moving), such a sound was put to misinform the enemy about the concentration of tank units in the immediate rear, or vice versa, classical music was put to drown out the noise from the movement of equipment. Furthermore, PLI were also used for propaganda broadcasting to the front line of the enemy, in order to demoralize him. The use of PLI at the front soon led to the death of such installations ([TsAMO RF. F. 388. Op. 8719. D. 91. L. 32](#)). If we take into account that this equipment was a piece of no more than two installations for the army, then this was the reason for the proceedings in the 7th department of the Main Political Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

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## 2. Materials

There were used as materials the documents from the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (Podolsk, Russian Federation). In particular, Case 91 was used – the Documents of the 7th department of the political department of the 33rd Army on the organization of propaganda and agitation (bulletin “Sharing of experiences”). 1944 year.

## 3. Results

So, in the second half of 1943, several deaths of PLI (Figure 1) were registered together with the service personnel. During the proceedings, it was found out that these installations were noticed by the enemy's sonometric devices and covered with the fire of his mortars or artillery. The reasons for the death of these installations were insufficient camouflage, incorrect choice of position or prolonged broadcasting from one point.



**Fig. 1.** PLI-39 Sound Broadcasting Station

The head of the 7th department of the political department of the 33rd Army, Major Rosenstein, noted that in their army, the culprits of losses in most cases were senior instructors of political departments for work among enemy troops at division headquarters, who were extremely irresponsible about the organization of the work of the sound station, ignoring instructions on the need for a thorough study of their front line and the preparation of convenient places for works of PLI and trench loudspeakers (TL, in Russian abbreviation OGU) (TsAMO RF. F. 388. Op. 8719. D. 91. L. 33).

Senior instructors of political departments often did not care at all about the advance preparation of places for transmissions from PLI and TL (providing shelter for the station, careful masking of equipment and horns, the allocation of fighters to guard the station, etc.). Often the PLI crew has to hastily choose a position to work without sufficient knowledge of the terrain and the situation, which lowers the quality of work stations and leads to the failure of equipment losses in men (TsAMO RF. F. 388. Op. 8719. D. 91. L. 33).

Especially for the preservation of sound stations, a guidance note was drafted, which was called “A memo on saving loudspeakers and trench installations from enemy fire”. We will cite this document full:

A memo on saving loudspeakers and trench installations from enemy fire.

January 7, 1944

1. For successful operation of the installation and saving it, it is necessary to choose the right position, skillfully use it tactically.

The senior instructor for work among enemy troops, Podiva, (political department) is a responsible for choosing the workplace of the station, its disguise, as well as protection.

2. In all cases, the PLI car and remote speakers should be placed secretly from the enemy's observation and well masked on the spot with improvised means.

The TL are located secretly in a dugout, but no closer than 200-250 m from the front line of the enemy.

3. It is better not to place the PLI remote horns directly on the ground, but to hang them in tree branches, but not on a free-standing tree – this will increase the range of audibility and make it difficult for the enemy to detect their location.

The TL horns should be placed as close as possible to the front line of the enemy, but no closer than 100-120 meters and carefully camouflaged.

Taking into account the insignificant range of audibility of TL horns, they should be placed covertly on the crests of hills, trees, under the roofs of large buildings, in the embrasures of destroyed buildings, etc.

4. A powerfully speaking station and horns should never be placed directly at the edge of the forest, along glades, hollows, streets, because in these cases the enemy will be able to easily locate the installation.

5. It should never be placed the installation along the axis with the direction of the horn, but always away from it (at an angle), and you should also not position the horn along the axis of the location of your command posts, ammunition supply points, batteries, etc.

If it is possible, the conductors going to the horns should be placed covertly in trenches, ditches, kerbs in order to protect them from damage by fragments of mines and shells.

6. The duration of transmission from one position should not exceed 8-10 minutes.

When operating the TL in populated areas, it is desirable to change the location of the horns as often as possible or give them different directions, considering the special conditions of sound propagation under these circumstances.

7. If there are no natural shelters or a pit suitable for use at the PLI workplace, a special pit should be dug to shelter cars, as well as slit trenches for shelter crew of the sound station.

8. At the end of the PLI work from this position, the installation is immediately set aside.

9. The horns must be constantly guarded by snipers or machine gunners. The work of the installation, if necessary, is covered by arrows and mortar fire of the units ([TsAMO RF. F. 388. Op. 8719. D. 91. L. 34-37](#)).

#### **4. Conclusion**

After the Red Army's offensive operations in 1943, there were recorded among troops the cases of the destruction of sound broadcasting stations PLI-39. The fact of the destruction of these powerful loud-speaking installations led to the investigation of this case in the political department of the Red Army.

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
[TsAMO RF](#) – Tsentral'nyi arkhiv ministerstva oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Central archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation].

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## Letter to the Editor

### About the Organization of Russian Propaganda in Allied and Neutral States during the First World War

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#### Abstract

This paper examines Russian propaganda directed towards allied and neutral states during the First World War. The attention is paid to the experiences of both allies (England and France) and adversaries (Germany) in the realm of military propaganda. The sources for this study include documents from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (Moscow, Russian Federation) and the Russian State Military Historical Archive (Moscow, Russian Federation). These documents are introduced into scholarly circulation for the first time.

The author states that during World War I Germany was the first country among the participating nations, which put the periodical press at the service of the state and turn it into the fourth type of weapon. German agents not only in allied countries, but also in neutral ones, managed to create numerous printed publications that formed pro-German public opinion. In 1915–1916, this experience was actively applied by the Entente countries. In 1915–1916, the Entente countries began to actively apply this experience. By the end of 1916, Russian propagandists had planned to widely use not only the press, but also cinema for military propaganda purposes. There was also a project to send officers from each regiment of the Russian Army from the Eastern to the Western Front to build camaraderie between Russian, English, and French officers. However, the events of February 1917 prevented Russia from implementing these initiatives.

**Keywords:** propaganda, First World War, Russian Empire, Entente, 1914–1918.

#### 1. Introduction

The issues of military propaganda during a local or global conflict is of great importance in organizing a stable morale-psychological state of one's own troops and rear, as well as various means of influencing the troops and rear of the enemy, seeking to break their morale and psychological spirit. During the First World War, Germany was the legislator of fashion in the field of military propaganda, calling propaganda (primarily print) the “fourth type of weapon” along with infantry, cavalry and artillery (RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 1. D. 1484. L. 75). In this work, we will attempt to analyze some initiatives of the Russian military command in the field of military propaganda.

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## 2. Materials and methods

This study relies on documents from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (Moscow, Russian Federation) and the Russian State Military History Archive (Moscow, Russian Federation). These documents are being introduced into scientific circulation for the first time.

Methodologically, the study is based on the principles of historicism, systematicity, and objectivity. By applying these principles in conjunction, the events of the First World War and the organization of military propaganda should be considered in the context of related historical events. For example, the history of Russian military propaganda must be viewed in light of the accumulated German experience in this area.

## 3. Discussion

This research topic was actively studied in the early 21st century. As an example, we will only mention some works. Thus, the issues of the Russian right-wing periodical press during the period of the First World War were considered by D.I. Stogov (Stogov, 2011). In turn, L.G. Polyakova addressed the topic of the periodical press as a means of studying the activities of the rear during the First World War. At the same time, the author used the example of the Black Sea Province (Polyakova, 2012).

The topic of Russian military press during the Great War of 1914-1918 was explored by D.G. Guzhva (Guzhva, 2007). S.V. Buryan (Buryan, 2010) also focused on the military periodical press of the Russian army during World War I.

O.Yu. Starodubova (Starodubova, 2014) examined the coverage of the military successes of the Russian army, specifically the Brusilov Offensive, in the Russian periodical press of 1916. Finally, I.V. Kryuchkov studied Austria-Hungary in the reviews of foreign press of the Russian General Staff, based on materials from the end of 1915 (Kryuchkov, 2016).

## 4. Results

During World War I, Russian military officials noticed that German newspapers were almost always more widespread in neutral countries than English or French newspapers. At the same time, German newspapers never contained anything that could compromise Germany, whereas compromising material on their own governments was often published in English and French newspapers. During the war, the German press never questioned the righteousness of their supreme commander. Some freedom of the press was only allowed on issues related to food supply for the population, where different interpretations of government orders and their assessment were allowed. Germans only published limited information about the internal situation of their country, while a lot of information about the situation abroad was published. At the same time, the main articles in individual issues of newspapers were invariably written in a heightened tone, and everything related to Germany was presented in an embellished form (RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 1. D. 1484. L. 75-75ob.).

During the First World War, even with a delay, the Russian government paid great attention to the issues of promoting the image of the Russian Empire abroad. According to Russian officials, such propaganda should create a positive foreign public opinion in favor of Russia and thereby contribute to the inflow of arms and credit. It is important to note that it was Germany that took this path, dispatching its agents to Switzerland and the United States to create a negative image of Russia in neutral countries.

In both allied and neutral countries, during the first two years of the war, public lectures and cinema had almost no effect on public opinion (AVPRI. F. 140. Op. 477. D. 812. L. 59ob.). However, Russian officials believed that cinema could become a highly effective weapon for propagandists, if used correctly, for example, to popularize Russian successes on the Eastern and Caucasian fronts.

By the end of 1916, the French and British governments had established semi-official committees in Petrograd and Moscow, consisting of military and civilian officials, experienced specialists, and promoters of the film industry. These committees were tasked with disseminating important information about Russian allies and their military-economic potential in the Russian press and society. The experience gained by these committees was significant.

In addition to cinema and public lectures, other propaganda measures were planned, such as sending Russian officers for training to the allies in their theaters of war (AVPRI. F. 140. Op. 477. D. 812. L. 59ob.). This proposal was actively supported by the French and British ambassadors in



Petrograd. According to this initiative, it was planned to send one front-line officer from each infantry regiment, artillery brigade, sapper unit, and cavalry division for three months to England and France: one month was intended for travel and visiting military factories, and two months for staying with the corresponding units at the front (AVPRI. F. 140. Op. 477. D. 812. L. 59ob.-60).

Frontline officers were supposed to travel in groups of about 25 people in special cars from Haparanda to Bergen, and then under the protection of the British to England. During their stay abroad, the officers were to be under the supervision of the British and French military authorities. (AVPRI. F. 140. Op. 477. D. 812. L. 60).

Without any doubt, the proposals of the Russian military officials on the development of propaganda activities were of significant interest, but due to the fact that the revolution took place in February 1917, these proposals were never implemented.

## 5. Conclusion

So, during World War I Germany was the first country among the participating nations, which put the periodical press at the service of the state and turn it into the fourth type of weapon. German agents were able to create numerous printed publications not only in countries allied with Germany but also in neutral countries, which formed a pro-German public opinion. In 1915–1916, the Entente powers began to actively use this experience. By the end of 1916, Russian propagandists had planned to use not only the periodical press but also cinema for military propaganda. There was also a project to send officers from each regiment of the Russian army from the Eastern to the Western front to foster brotherhood between Russian, English, and French officers. However, the events of February 1917 prevented Russia from implementing these initiatives.

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