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
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## Articles and Statements

### Political Caricature during World War I (based on the Examples of Positive Visualization of the “Friends” and Negative Visualization of the “Foes” in the Don Periodical Press Satirical Cartoons)

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#### Abstract

The article deals with the problem of political caricature as a visual-content component of the mass propaganda during the international military-political crisis of World War I, based on the analysis of the satirical drawings presented on the pages of the Don periodical press during the war. We analyze the positive visualization of the “friends” and the negative visualization of the “foes” in the satirical cartoons in the Don periodical press during World War I. We considered the most typical examples of a political caricature, as well as their content and the connection between their visual image and the content. In conclusion, the authors note that the visual sources analysis suggests the artistic primitiveness of the “image of the enemy”. The cartoonists intentionally made the “image of the enemy” artistically unattractive. The worse it was, the greater effect it achieved and the more revealing was the absurdity and vulgarity of the enemy. Thus, it weakened the physical and moral strength of the enemy.

**Keywords:** Political caricature, propaganda, visualization, World War I, Don periodical press.

#### 1. Introduction

The article attempts to trace visualization specifics and describe the strategies of inclusion and exclusion of the terms “friends” and “foes” in satirical works of the Don periodical press during World War I.

Newspaper cartoons were primarily created for the urban educated classes, for the liberal society part that was characterized by moderate free-thinking, and did not participate in the disputes of the party. Its target were the educated citizens who were interested in politics. The satirical graphic art depicted all stages of the escalating hostility – from the “strangers” to the “enemies”.

It is important to take into account the dual nature of periodicals: it served as a tool for shaping the public mood and, at the same time, it was its indicator. In 1914 the “Great War” with its goals, course, prospects, opponents and allies of Russia attracted the attention of the newspaper world – publishers, editors, publicists, cartoonists, as well as the reading public. The readers’

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demand for war-related daily information increased at that time. There was a growing interest in the periodical press, and, consequently, its influence on the "public opinion of the home country and its allied, neutral and hostile states" grew as well (Senyavskaya, 2006: 63). "All the means" of the press were focused "on the main line – the formation of the image of the enemy" (Senyavskaya, 2006: 63). In our study of the "enemy image", here Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and accordingly German, Austro-Hungarian and Turkish troops are the external enemies. "The image of the enemy is a product of propaganda, which demonizes the political and ideological enemy by using semantic, optical and graphic means in order to (as a rule) legitimize their own domination" (Buchbender, 1989: 18).

We studied the leading Don periodical socio-political publications: liberal newspapers "Priazovsky krai", "Yuzhny Telegraf", "Rostovskaya rech", "Taganrogsky vestnik"; pro-monarchist periodicals "Donskoi krai", "Rostovsky na Dony listok"; official periodical "Donskie vedomosti"; satirical papers "Fugas" and "Falanga" as well as special illustrated supplements of some of the listed periodicals.

The analysis of the Don periodical press revealed that caricature as a phenomenon was absent in a number of newspapers. "Priazovsky krai" and "Yuzhny Telegraf" were the leading mass media in the Don region during World War I, for their content and visual materials. They published military and political caricatures of a high content and on a high graphic professional level.

## 2. Materials and methods

The article contains the Don region periodicals of different political orientation of World War I period. Materials of domestic and foreign historiography on the problem of studying satire as a visual-content part of mass propaganda during World War I were used in the article. In our work we used a multi-factorial approach, a historical-system method that allows studying the object of the research by isolating its individual structural elements, their direct and indirect functions, their connection with each other and with the whole and the scientific-critical analysis.

## 3. Discussion

The satirical caricature as an element of political propaganda, especially in the period of acute political and military crises, has relatively recently become an independent subject of special historical studies (Golikov, Rybachenok, 2010; Tsykalov, 2012; Tsykalov, 2012; Obolenskaya, 2001; Lazari et al., 2013; Ryabov, 2005; Kuptsova, 2008; Porshneva, 2001). The prospect of researching satirical graphics in regional periodicals is still relevant, for example, a research of a large mass of poorly studied regional caricature in the Don region during the crisis period of 1914–1917. In addition, the study of visual satire as a historical source is one of the tasks of modern source studies.

## 4. Results

Caricature is a semiprofessional genre, with an opportunity for collective creativity. Like no other, this genre is close to folklore, which makes it suitable for mass distribution. It seems to us that the visual satire of the studied period was characterized by "folklorization" - the desire to make the solidarity that was created "permanent" and, consequently, national. Visual messages are attributed to have casual connection with reality, and therefore they play a decisive role in visualizing "friends" and "foes". Caricature, as well as photography, forms the image of an "enemy". But the caricature provides its viewer with a prepared image that supports identity, proves its own superiority and thereby contributes to the victory. The "image of the enemy" was formed simultaneously "from below" and "from above", both in the historical memory of society and in the ideological policy of the authorities. Propagandistic images of the states of the Quadruple Alliance in many ways were a continuation of the traditional stereotypes that existed before the war: "The old ideas of the East as something exotic and as an object of expansion influenced the image of a stupid, unfortunate sultan who lives in fantastic luxury. The images of a weak, collapsing empire reflecting rivalry with Austria were projected onto the figure of the old and weak Franz Josef" (Jahn, 1995: 173). The dominant role of Wilhelm in this trio and his supposedly satanic character reflect the Russians' perception of Germany as the most dangerous enemy against which all the greatest efforts should be directed.

Public discourse in the first year of military operations presented the imaginary war in a “hurray-patriotic” way. Propaganda tried to impose on the population a certain pre-designed “image of the foe”, but its concepts were often too abstract (Slavs, Russia's honor, the glory of Russian arms, etc.). The image of the Germans as an enemy during World War I was remade and the caricature referred the informed reader to the earlier era. A German, as a generalized image traditional for Russian society before the military confrontation had a positive character: a teacher of European wisdom, a kind of kulturträger (Filippova, 2012). The anti-German images of the enemy were almost not common in pre-revolutionary Russia. This was due to the fact that Germany was a positive cultural orientation for Russia for a long time and both German culture and German language were significant for the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia. Anti-German caricatures were very rare in Russia in the second half of the XIX century. Even at the beginning of World War I, in the midst of anti-Russian agitation and the “corresponding” image of Russians on caricatures, the situation in Russia did not significantly change. Thus Germany was allegorically depicted as a greedy woman with megalomania, ridiculed by her love for the pay book in the Don caricatures at the beginning of the war.

Russia was also portrayed in an allegorical form, usually as a radiant young man. Both visual concepts did not pursue any immediate demonization goals, but were set up within a distance-setting satirical procedure that sought to belittle the enemy and minimize its threatening potential.

In the initial period of the war caricatures did not pursue any agitation goals and were not aimed at creating horrifying images of the enemy; they were made to expose and ridicule the enemy, often a means of entertainment than means of spreading hatred. The German military was most often depicted in the Don region drawings as miserable, crippled or children.



**Fig. 1.** Caricature "Dreams and reality" (Priazovsky krai, September 3, 1914)

It was the middle of 1915 when a German was depicted on the pages of the Don newspapers and magazines as a different image, as a soulless beast and a militarist. It was a striking contrast compared with the prewar situation. Thus, the famous Don cartoonist A. Voronetsky in his caricature "The Kaiser's Head" portrayed Germany as a terrible enemy, a monster instilling hatred and contempt.



**Fig. 2.** Caricature "The Kaiser's Head" by A. Voronetsky ([Priazovsky krai. Illustrated supplement to the newspaper. January 1, 1915](#)).


The negative "image of the enemy" was not immediately implemented in a political cartoon. Germany and its allies gradually appeared as cruel and insidious aggressors, who held the entire responsibility for the war outbreak. It was demonstrated (using religious and quasi-religious images and symbols) that Russia is fighting for the "truth", unlike Germany and its allies. In general, in our opinion, the dehumanization of the enemy during the World War I did not reach the extreme. In 1914-1917 the visual assessments of the Germans were, although negative, but "less emotionally colored, more neutral, often even without malice and simply ironic" ([Senyavskaya, 2006: 105](#)). Thus, the visual satire traces the features of visualization of the "enemy image" at all stages of its formation – "different" – "foe" – "enemy."

The art concept of a caricature, a satirical depiction of certain "assigned" characteristics of the enemy also included the representation of one's own (positive) side. In relation to oneself, the author often established a humorous distance. It is curious that such colorful and holistic images of hostile nations were not accompanied by the same holistic image of Russia itself: "the Russians had a fairly clear idea of who they were fighting against, but not about who, or what they were fighting for" ([Jahn, 1995: 173](#)).

The visual "image of the enemy" became an effective means of mobilizing people. As a rule, the Don caricature involved two main characters - "friend" (national hero) and "foe" (Germans, Austrians or Turkish). In caricatures, the Germans (especially Kaiser Wilhelm II) were credited with such qualities as "cowardice", "stupidity", "arrogance" and "mindlessness"; the Russians had flattering qualities, such as power, courage and strength. Old stereotypes are noticeable in the definitions that were given to the Germans: the repetition of the word "sausage eaters", commitment to money, callousness, impudence, and an ineradicable habit of drinking beer. V. Rozanov wrote: "The Germans' symbol ... is beer. It's not grape wine, not the precious phial of

fragrant moisture, but barrels of beer..." (Rozanov, 1915: 142-148). The main target of local cartoonists was Kaiser Wilhelm II – all possible negative stereotypes were transferred to his image. His image also included traditional Russian clichés about the pedantry of the Germans, their pettiness and narrow-mindedness.


Wilhelm was considered the main culprit of the conflict in the Entente countries. In many local cartoons, the Kaiser is portrayed as a miserable and ridiculous man or even dreaming, to take over the world, like Napoleon.



**Fig. 3.** Caricature "Declaring mobilization in Germany. It will not be difficult to conquer Europe with you, dear children". (Yuzhny Telegraf. Weekly addition to the newspaper. August 10, 1914).

The Wilhelm-Napoleon image was extremely popular in the Don regional press. In our opinion, the authorities tried to substitute the commemorative memory of World War I with the cultural memory of the war of 1812 through propaganda. The Don caricature of 1914–1917 followed similar works of visual culture in 1812: it appealed to the struggle for world domination, portrayed the German military troops as miserable, crippled or children and appealed to the flight of Napoleon and the retreat of his army.

Such simple and rather crude methods of propaganda were suitable only for common people, but other motives were intended for a sufficiently sophisticated audience. Germany was turned into a bulwark of militarism. With the pace of war, a German soldier took the foreground. Stories typical only for World War I appeared in the visual satire – those were the caricatures depicting battles with use of the new technology – airplanes, zeppelins and submarines. The image of Germany also changed and the image of a German soldier evolved from "foe" to an "enemy."



**Fig. 4.** A caricature "Playing the world globe and its consequences."  
 (Priazovsky krai. Illustrated supplement to the newspaper. October 25, 1915)

The body of a hero in the caricature is the antithesis of "alienation" and at the same time it serves as a key for revealing his inner world. The caricature did not claim documentary truthfulness, and it was not tied by the bond of "likelihood". The only thing guiding its creators was a contract with the audience, that is, a requirement for recognition. In this regard, the artists created the "image of the enemy" not in accordance with anatomical atlases, but relying on contemporary ethnic stereotypes and visual agreements. The cartoonists depicted the Germans implausibly thin, stooping, falling or stumbling, often with feminine traits. Russian cartoonists used the existing Europe conventions regarding masculine and feminine physical traits. The femininity of the German soldiers was exaggerated in the caricatures due to their "female lifestyle": Wilhelm II is often portrayed as a woman who sits on a barrel while his soldiers, along with their wives, are plundering Russian villages or sit in a hut surrounded by children and the elderly. The visual manifestations of femininity were perceived as a sign of the incapacity of the enemy, as well as his lack of honor and human dignity.


But not only stereotypes served as the basis for visual alienation and ridiculing of the enemies. Physiognomic skills were useful to Don caricaturists for the depiction of basic feelings that distorted the faces of enemies. In addition, they skillfully used the form of the nose as a universal means of personality recognizing. Enemies, like in 1812 caricatures, were portrayed with

open mouths (a sign of stupidity) and long "Gallic" noses (according to I.K. Lafater, it is a sign of selfishness, dishonesty, propensity to steal and corruption of a character) (Vishlenkova, 2011: 186). The effectiveness of such identification in the national caricature is associated with the traditions of the peasant humour. Visual satire of pre-revolutionary Russia gives an example of how comedy element in different epochs took into account the social order, reflected the image of the enemy and fit into the rigid demands of wartime censorship. Playing on the historical allusions, cartoonists portrayed Germans and Turkish with huge frostbitten noses.

Probably, in this case we are dealing not only with the preservation of plots and the reproduction of scenes in visual metaphors, but also with the spectators' readiness for laughter.

Don caricaturists often used zoomorphism to create an image of the enemy. The opponents were depicted possessing "bestial" instincts and emotions, and "national heroes" demonstrated reasonable, that is, "human", restraint and control of their feelings. Thus, the local cartoonists of the "Priazovsky krai" used zoomorphism to provide a set of expressive means for attributing the enemy with low cultural and psychological properties. A typical example is a drawing titled: "Before a trap", where enemies are depicted in a form of ravens with human faces. The "image of the enemy" served as an anti-image of the Russian hero. The Don caricature was characterized by a dichotomous structure of the plot. The image of the Germans is accompanied by such connotations as "vanity", "arrogance", "robbery" and "inhumanity". It was clear to the public that all these properties represent the complete opposite of a compatriot's moral qualities, for "our man" is humble, kind, peaceful and humane.

The allies of Germany-Austria-Hungary and Turkey were perceived as secondary opponents. The Austrians as an enemy at first were treated with a certain respect, but later the attitude towards them became more rigid, for they, like the Germans, used chemical weapons, and there were also crimes against civilians in the territories occupied by the Austrian troops. The Don caricature was one of the first to create "an image of a Turk". First and foremost, he is a representative of the Ottoman Empire, which is obsolete. The Turk is depicted as a hostile, but senilely weak and feeble old man.



**Fig. 5.** Caricature "The situation when the Turks look scary."  
(Priazovsky krai. December 13, 1916).

The image of a "sick European" corresponded to the cliché existing at that time in Russian journalism, referred to Turkey in the world community. The cartoons "Sire of Sultan", "About the war with Turkey", "In Mesopotamia" depict old senile Turkey, purposefully set against Russia by Germany. The well-known Don artist Voronetsky in his caricature "Turkey is preparing for the war with Russia" draws an "assembly" of a Turkish soldier in the Austro-Hungarian orthopedic workshop. "Yuzhny telegraf" portrayed a Turk as a deceived puppet, which can be juggled with. Reading the visual message, the viewer understood that Germany uses Turkey for his own purposes against Russia and the Slavs and with the help of the "East" the crafty "West" seeks to weaken Russia. A Turk is an obedient tool in the hands of enemies from the West in a generalized visual image. Thus the arch enemy is not the East. We agree with T.A. Filippova, who talks in her works about the theme of "west-eastern" provocation of phobia. She states that the visual satire was intended to show that the East was only a "tool" of geopolitics, used by the experienced, cunning and enlightened pragmatist - the enemy who was in the West (Filippova, 2012).



**Fig. 6.** Caricature "Turkey is preparing for war with Russia. (In the Austro-Hungarian orthopedic workshop) by A. Voronetsky. (Priazovsky krai. August 10, 1914)

Age difference "game" was characteristic for the Don visual satire. Different traits of the "foe" were shown through the age difference depiction: a German was often depicted as an overgrown child and a Turk – as an old Sultan. We should note that the depiction of a German was very

controversial: it could be an overgrown child, an ugly woman, a beer barrel and etc. Here we can see both the conflict between "male" and "female" and the age categories.

It is impossible not to agree with the Russian researcher D. E. Tsykalov, who noted the absence of the "cult of the bear" in Russia during World War I (Tsykalov, 2013: 75-76). However, after the advance of the Russian army in Galicia in May 1916, the bear again became the protagonist in the cartoon, – but not in the Don region. Caricatures with "Russia the bear" are very rare in the Don newspapers. We found only one single caricature with the image of a bear in the local press, but it turned out to be borrowed from the capital newspaper "Birzhevye Vedomosti" (Novaya illyustratsiya, 1916).

"Priazovsky Krai" and "Birzhevye Vedomosti" commented on the victories in Galicia with the caricature under the title "What did they think about the Russian bear in Austria and what came out of it": Emperor Franz Joseph, performing in the circus, puts his left hand in the mouth of a huge bear. "Now the bear is harmless, it is dormant," - he tells the invisible public. However, the bear only waits for an opportunity to bite off the "trainer's" hand, and so it does. It is very risky to train bears, and such an experienced "trainer" as Franz Joseph had to know this...



**Fig. 7.** Caricature "What they thought about the Russian bear in Austria and what came out of it". (Priazovsky krai. June 20, 1916).

The specifics of the Don regional press was in the mass replicating of the image of the Cossack. The external threat created conditions with a need for dialogue between the elites and social "low classes". Under these circumstances the visual language became a means of communication of the individual with the others, allowing them to act together, to share common emotions and to accept general behavior standards. The war gave rise to the social activity of the Don society groups who were not previously involved in the public sphere activities, it also influenced the social need for heroes. One of those heroes was a Cossack. In many pictures, one can see a brave Cossack, ready to fight the enemy despite its superior forces as well as the confrontation of the Cossack spirit and new German military equipment. In the caricatures, the German was usually portrayed as well-armed and equipped, but his technical superiority was opposed to the Cossack bravery and wit. The cowardice of the enemy was emphasized by the presence of a Cossack in the caricatures, and in order to enhance this effect his figure was often drawn in the background. The close-up was assigned to the fleeing enemy.



**Fig. 8.** Caricature "The Prussian sees the Cossack from afar!"  
([Yuzhny telegraf. Weekly addition to the newspaper. October 14, 1914](#)).

Another method was mentioning the Cossacks, and this was enough to make the enemy ready to surrender. There were many patriotic drawings that ridiculed the Germans opposed to the Cossacks' valor. For example, in the caricature "In East Prussia", the plans of the Emperor Wilhelm, (who was exaggeratedly portrayed as a dwarf) could not resist the Cossack wit. And Germany's allies were ready to betray each other under the torrent of Cossack power. The Germans were "educated" by the Cossacks, with their lances. The essence of the metaphor was that the Cossack acted as a "parent" in relation to a "misbehaving child", and punishment was interpreted as the only way to achieve "obedience", to restore peace and prosperity. On most of the drawings, the enemy was portrayed cowardly and weak, ridiculous or insignificant. The Cossack, on the other hand, was given such qualities as strength, good nature, wit and nobility. Often a large-scale diminution of the enemy's figures was used to achieve this effect, the enemy was drawn against the backdrop of a Cossack who was portrayed as a good-natured giant.

On the pages of Don newspapers we found caricatures of the French artist Emmanuel Poiret, known in the XIX century under the pseudonym Caran d'Ache. An outstanding caricaturist, a recognized chronicler of the French army, he portrayed the Cossacks-participants in the war of 1812 good-natured, strong and witty. Such images of the Cossacks were in demand at the beginning of the XX century.



**Fig. 9.** Caricature "Cossack patrols on the border of Austria-Hungary". Caran d'Ache ([Rostovsky-na-Donu listok July 15, 1915](#)).

In the period of World War I, the most acute international military and political crisis, the political caricature became quite important, demanded and very effective visual and purposeful element of mass propaganda.

The Don political cartoon is a linguistic-visual phenomenon and is a genre variety of a creolized text, the texture of which consists of two non-homogeneous parts: verbal (language and speech) and non-verbal (belonging to systems different to the natural language) ([Sorokin, Tarasov, 1990: 6](#)).



**Fig. 10.** Caricature "Cossacks play cards in peacetime". Caran d'Ache (Rostovsky-na-Donu listok. July 15, 1915).

In the Don political caricature of the early XX century, the word and the image were two equal types of signs. Cartoonists believed that the visual image needs a verbal support, and verbal communication needs some visual mediation. Analyzing the political caricature in the Don newspapers, one can observe a hybrid form of interaction between the verbal and the visual, which forms multidirectional vectors of identification.

### 5. Conclusion

The visual sources analysis suggests the artistic primitiveness of the "image of the enemy".

The cartoonists intentionally made the "image of the enemy" artistically unattractive. The worse it was, the greater effect it achieved and the more revealing was the absurdity and vulgarity of the enemy. Thus, it weakened the physical and moral strength of the enemy. The image of a German as an enemy was not canonically fixed in the national visual culture. The Russian artists literally created a traced image for the visual "enemizing" of a German. In revealing the orientation of the hostility rhetoric, it becomes clear that behind these processes, on the one hand, there was an intentional construction of phobias and on the other the cartoonists were reproducing historical stereotypes. Stereotypes influenced the "image of the enemy", captured by the means of satire.

The political caricature demonstrated a sufficiently high level of mobilization capabilities of the "enemy image" in the life of the Don region, and in Russian society in general. The study of the caricature makes it possible to reveal the characteristics of the military propaganda, its ways of constructing the "image of the foe" and the function of the "image of the enemy".

At the same time, considering the positive visualization of "friends" and the negative visualization of "foes" during World War I in the satirical graphic of the Don region periodical press, one can see the important role of the political caricatures, their great socio-political significance and a rather successful propaganda effect on the society during World War I.

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
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## Anti-Soviet Advocacy, Agitation and Defeatism Activities in Leningrad and Leningrad Region, June – August 1941 (based on the NKGB (People's Commissariat for State Security) Situation Reports)

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### Abstract

This article reveals one of the most thoroughly hidden aspects of the everyday life in Leningrad and Leningrad region during the first months of the Great Patriotic war. Recently declassified NKGB situation reports on Leningrad and Leningrad region from the Central archive of the Ministry of Defense were used as the information source for this article. The article deals with anti-government manifestations such as spreading panic rumors, anti-Soviet advocacy, listening to enemy radio broadcasts, distributing anti-Soviet leaflets and planning riots against local party and State authorities. Both urban and rural anti-Soviet manifestations' specifics are revealed in the article, as well as repressive activities of the state security service, due to the restructuring of the Soviet society during the first months of the war. We considered certain features of moral and psychological state of Soviet citizens at the initial stage of the German aggression against the USSR.

**Keywords:** situation reports, spread of panic rumors, defeatism, Anti-Soviet advocacy, propaganda, repressive activities, NKGB.

### 1. Introduction

The past seven decades after the end of Great Patriotic war were marked by the creation of the tremendous research works of historians devoted to this historic landmark not only to develop the Soviet society, but also the whole civilization in the XX century. The unleashing of World War II by the Nazi Germany meant a challenge for the entire world order, which had to be totally destructed or submitted to the Third Reich leader plans. At the same time a significant number of research questions and scientific problems of the history of 1941–1945 still requires a more in-depth analysis.

For a long period of time the propaganda cliché of universal unity of the party and the people was implemented in the mass consciousness of the Soviet society and grew incredibly strong during the Great Patriotic war time. It was a very successful myth that was steadily reproduced by all media and repeated in the works of the Soviet sociologists continuously all the postwar period year upon year (Yazov, 1988; Natolochnaya, 2005). This approach totally rejected any attempt to cast a doubt on this postulate. However, the proclamation of the “glasnost” in the Soviet Union and the permission to cover the events of national history from a “pluralist” point of view led to the appearance of unreliable information in press, sometimes separate facts were taken out of the

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context and adjusted to fit the new concept. In general, the established methodological approaches were taken down and replaced with the new unclear ones, adapted to the new conditions. One could get the impression that people were trying to avenge their country's past for their own unsettled present (Semiryaga, 2000; Mertsalov, Mertsalova, 1998).

One of such periods from the country's latest history was the Great Patriotic War. The total list of issues that demanded a critical rethinking of Soviet historians, was as follows: not all the military operations of the Red Army were carried out successfully, the feasibility of extremely harsh measures against the Soviet troops was questioned and collaborators gained increasingly more defenders, whose status was changed from traitors to "enemies of Stalin's tyranny" and "fighters against totalitarianism" etc. The siege of Leningrad, one of the most tragic events of the Great Patriotic War, was questioned as well.

Over time, the emotional fever of the Perestroika began to decline, which resulted in a more balanced and objective research. Therefore, the author puts objectivity (independence from a particular concept and fondness) as a fundamental scientific principle of the article in considering the studied subject, as well as versatility (a consideration of the variety of trends and processes) in the mass consciousness of citizens of Leningrad and Leningrad region in June – August 1941, where the patriotic sentiments coexisted with decadent moods, expectations of a speedy victory of the Red Army were close to defeatist rumors, faith in Stalin was close to the mistrust towards the authorities of the city, government and party of a town, district, village council or an enterprise.

## 2. Materials and methods

Declassified materials of the People's Commissariat of State Security in the city of Leningrad and Leningrad region (Situation and intelligence reports from late June to late August 1941), taken from the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence were used as a source of information for this article. In this study we differentiated various manifestations of anti-Soviet activity and revealed some individuals' features who were placed under the surveillance of the state security service of Leningrad and Leningrad region during the analyzed period of time.

Introduction of operational dispatches of the State Security service gives a fairly mixed picture of all sorts of anti-Soviet manifestations, of which the city authorities and interregional authorities of NKGB informed their supervisors. Only at first glance the entire set of the events may be perceived as a random conglomeration of disconnected facts. In fact, certain patterns can be traced in the expansion of the Soviet repressive machine. Of course, the beginning of the war had a profound impact on both spiritual state of the Soviet society and on the activities of the whole repressive machine. Let us dwell on this in greater detail.

The object of study in this article is the borderline of events and the phenomena of everyday life in the Soviet society, which was traditionally a sphere of competence of the USSR State Security service, and, therefore, was forbidden common citizens.

## 3. Results

Manifestations of anti-Soviet activities that Soviet legislation established as anti-Soviet, were very different: listening to foreign broadcasts, reading, storing, distributing anti-Soviet leaflets and other campaign materials, spreading panic rumors, etc. The number of cases of banditry, sabotage, infiltration of enemy reconnaissance groups, appearance of individuals with a particular interest in military equipment, defense facilities, communications and troop movements routes dramatically increased during the military invasion of the German troops into the territory of the Soviet Union, especially in the areas that were in close proximity to the war zone.

According to Segezorsky NKVD district office, on July 5, 1941 at 9 AM 14 armed Finns arrived at the village of Pelkula in Leningrad region. They gathered the villagers and urged them to revolt against the Soviet government (TsAMO. F. 217. Op. 1221. D. 192. L. 83).

The first few months (June – August 1941) after the beginning of the Great Patriotic War proved to be extremely difficult for the government and party authorities of the country, as well as for every Soviet citizen, who had to change their entire way of life in accordance with the wartime. Despite the official propaganda cliché about uniting all they Soviet society beyond the Party and Government authority, high spirits and patriotism of the Soviet citizens, however, State Security service noted confusion and signs of defeatism in many settlements on the territory of the Leningrad Military District.

The intelligence service bulletin number 12 of the NKVD headquarters of the Leningrad border from June 26, 1941 reported that an employee of the Enso City Council Tsarenko was spreading panic among the people. On June 23, 1941 the accountant of the collective farm named after Chapaev, N. V. Shabashev, a non-party member, created panic among the farmers by spreading defeatism. This fact was confirmed by questioning of witnesses. The material of the case was transferred to the Yaskinskoe NKGB district office for a further investigation (TsAMO. F. 217. Op. 1221. D. 192. L. 30).

The operational intelligence service bulletin number 42 of the Northern Front rear Guard headquarters, in the period from 6 to 10 July 1941 received information about the officials spreading false panic rumors about the enemy. Leningrad Militiaman Tumanov was reported to be twice spreading false rumors about the landing of paratroopers and commandos of the enemy in the outskirts of the city. The materials of his case were handed over to the Chief of the Office of the Workers' and Peasants' militia of Leningrad (TsAMO. F. 217. Op. 1221. D. 192. L. 147).

The imbalance in the government activity led to following facts. According to Slutskoe NKGB district office, on 2<sup>nd</sup> of August of 1941 an anti-Soviet broadcast was transmitted for a few minutes in Russian from a German radio station through the radio unit of the farm named after Bdaev in Slutsk district. At the time of transmitting the employee responsible for the broadcasting center was absent. Security service started the investigation (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 15).

State security recorded all cases of anti-Soviet manifestations very carefully, starting from the conversations of Leningrad bars visitors to the statements of employees of preschools. Thus, on 29<sup>th</sup> of July 1941 Dzerzhinskoe district office of NKGB arrested V.P. Firsov, a mechanic of the plant named after Marti, who led an anti-Soviet agitation in the bar. State Security service started an investigation on the detained person. According to the Primorsky district department of NKGB, the accountant of the Institute for blind children Michelson and a nanny of 48th kindergarten Pochka led anti-Soviet agitations and praised the German invaders. An unofficial investigation was conducted on this fact (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 7, 3).

State security service careful attention to the working class was recorded long before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The monthly reports of the Information Department (INFO) of OGPU-NKVD from the beginning of 1922 contained the most diverse information about the situation and the mood of the industrial proletariat of various professional groups. Already in those years the top party and state leadership of the country was repeatedly informed on the acute reactions of the representatives of the working class on delays in wages, tariff rates, overstuffed factory managements, the inability of the authorities to cope with the continued growth of unemployment, street crime, etc.

During the outbreak of war, the tension among the working class began to "spill over" and took the form of anti-Soviet feelings, words and actions. Below there are some of the facts from the reports of district State Security service on the daily anti-Soviet actions manifestations in the city of Leningrad and Leningrad region.

Akulov, a mechanic of the 52<sup>nd</sup> repair brigade 5<sup>th</sup> military base who was, expelled from the Party, led an anti-Soviet agitation. Akulov's case was unofficially investigated (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 4).

According to the Primorsky district department of NKGB, Baranov, a janitor from the 14, Lakhtinskaya Street was praising the Nazi Germany. G.N. Nekrasov, a worker of the 5<sup>th</sup> construction office held anti-Soviet agitation among the workers who joined for the partisan group. The Head of the local Anti-aircraft warfare of Primorsk region, Petrova was spreading provocative rumors regarding the results of Moscow bombing by the Nazi Air Force (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 10).

According to the Leninsky NKGB district department, Vasilyev, a mechanic of the 1<sup>st</sup> rubber shoe factory, N.V. Azonchevsky, a mechanic of the "Metallometer" plant, V. Fedorov, a repairman of the factory named after P. Anisimova and V. Kozalevsky, a worker from the "Krasnii treugolnik" shoe factory conducted anti-Soviet agitations. The unofficial investigation was initiated against all these people as well as preparations for Azonchevsky's arrest. A worker from the "Rabochii Khimik" farm, Petushkov, evading the defense work, said: "This war doesn't concern me and I'm not going to work for more than 8 hours". The employees of the NKGB district department began investigations on Petushkov's case (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 11).

N.V. Tatarov, unemployed, conducted anti-Soviet defeatist agitation. His arrest was being prepared (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 3).

According to Moscow NKGB district department, E.M. Mikhailova, a worker of the “Lengaz” plant, was conducting “corrupting” work among the workers, who joined the partisan units, urging them to surrender to the Germans. Her arrest was being prepared (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 11).

Leningrad State Security service authority paid particular attention to the representatives of the former privileged classes, especially if they were German by nationality.

Here are the facts noted in the operational reports of the Leningrad NKGB Control unit during the first war months of 1941: A.A. Gessen, a former landlord and a tradeswoman, German by nationality, who lived at 12, Blokhina street, conducted anti-Soviet agitation. Her case was investigated. According to Otyabrsky NKGB district department, A.D. Gering, a former plant owner, German by nationality, who was working for «Intrudoobsluzhivanie» company and Sakharova, an accountant of the household at 11, Soyuz Sviazi street were conducting anti-Soviet agitations. The facts were verified (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 3, 4, 11).

According to the Starorussky NKGB district department, N.V. Kaidalova, the wife of the ex-bailiff and an active church woman, as well as Andreev, a worker of the fire-brigade guard of the plywood plant were conducting defeatist agitations. Kaidalova’s and Andreev’s arrests were being prepared (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 16).

According to the authorities, the social groups of those who were “overthrown” during the October armed uprising of 1917 and the short "entrepreneurial renaissance" period of NEP (former owners of property, businesses, shops and other facilities) were joined by former members of the Menshevik, Socialist-Revolutionary groups, supporters of various opposition factions and trends that were “related” in their anti-Soviet essence and excluded from the Party.

One of the typical examples is the following excerpt from the situation report of Leningrad and Leningrad region NKGB department.

According to Malovishersky NKGB district department, the former active Trotskist, P.V. Ivnitsky, who was living in the city of Chudovo and was a Head of the Lenzagotplodovoshtorg office, the former Tzar army officer Bobrov and Parfenov M. V., a worker from the “Proletarskoe znamya” factory conducted anti-Soviet agitations and spread provocative rumors. State Security service began their investigation on these facts (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 11).

On 26<sup>th</sup> of July 1941 Starorusskoe NKGB district department arrested I.F. Povarov, an accountant of Satrorussky Union of Osoaviakhim and an active Trotskist for conducting defeatism propaganda and agitation activities. A search in his apartment revealed an unauthorized gun (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 17).

Pushkinsky NKVD district department registered several cases of close relatives of people repressed by the NKVD expressing the intention to avenge the Communists for their loved ones in case of the arrival of the Germans.

So, the wife of a convicted to capital punishment Podlessky, leading defeatist agitation among the residents of the house where she lived, said: "The Germans will come, and we, along with my husband will avenge the Communists, and we will strike them as the Germans do”. Polesskaya’s arrest was being prepared.

Anti-Soviet sentiments were mostly spurred by the disappointing reports from the front. The refugees from the Baltic states made their additions to that information. According to the Borovichsky interdistrict department of NKGB the following people were arrested for the anti-Soviet agitation activities: N.Y. Golikov, an employee of the “Red ceramic” factory, Ruzi, a librarian of the 12<sup>th</sup> engineering factory, A.P. Vasilyeva, a member of the “Krasnaya gorka” collective farm, I. Ivanov, a member of the Moshensky region “2<sup>nd</sup> bolshevistsky sev” collective farm, I.F. Frolov, a member of the Moshensky region “1<sup>st</sup> of May” collective farm, and a member of the Lyubitkinsky region “Parizhskaya kommuna” collective farm. All those people were suspected in spreading anti-Soviet defeatist rumors and were under the investigation of the Borovichsky interdistrict department of NKGB (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 5).

According to the Borovichsky interdistrict department of NKGB, a deputy of the Bykovskiy village council of the Borovichsky district Galakhova conducted the anti-Soviet agitation activity and proposed to share the collective farm lands and to “live separately” (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 12).

Being related to the kulaks clearly put a person under the category of the potentially dangerous and unreliable people, who could, according to the State authorities and the State Security service, at any time, go to the side of the enemy of the Soviet power. The following reports contain a reference to the kulak origin of those involved in anti-Soviet activities. A.M. Mikhailova, a teacher of the Ustyinsk school who came from a kulak family, conducted anti-Soviet agitation (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 12; F. 217. Op. 1221. D. 192. L. 73).

According to Starorussky district department of NKVD, Smirnov I. V., a former kulak, who lived in the city of Staraya Russa and was unemployed at that time, conducted the anti-Soviet agitation activities. His arrest was being processed (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 5).

Even a short-term occupation by German troops of certain areas in the Leningrad region showed that there were a certain number of citizens who were forced to carefully mask their hatred to the Soviet regime. As soon as they got an opportunity, they were willing to support Germany immediately.

Considering the peculiarities of the struggle of the State Security service with the anti-Soviet agitation, it is necessary to note that under the conditions of formation and consolidation of a totalitarian political regime, the term "anti-Soviet" was extremely broad. This could be attributed to the townsfolk disputes in a communal kitchen or to conversations during breaks in the "smoking rooms" at work or to a retelling of news and rumors heard from a colleague, and even to a person's point of view on some events of internal and foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which might not coincide with the official ideology.

During the wartime, the State Security service stepped up significantly in their agent work, and the agents were directed to identify all manifestations of anti-Soviet activities and people involved in them.

A former Chairman of the Pestovsky region village council, M.I. Belyakov, was conducting anti-Soviet agitation activities and organized broadcasting of the anti-Soviet foreign radio stations. Belyakov was said to be arrested (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 17).

The intelligence bulletin number 12 of the NKVD Headquarters of the Leningrad border region on June 26, 1941 reported that according to the information received from the agents of the 5th border unit, on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of June of 1941, in the city of Enso, in the apartment of L.A. Gryaznov, a viscose factory Chief Engineer, his "SI-235" radio received an unknown German radio station's "Hitler's declaration in Russian" broadcast. His wife, also a party member, was listening to the broadcast, as well as the three executives of the same factory, two of whom were also party members. It was reported that the fact of receiving the above-mentioned broadcast was confirmed by the unofficial interrogation. For further investigation the material of this case was handed over to the Enso NKVD district department (TsAMO. F. 217. Op. 1221. D. 192. L. 30).

Apparently, they were listening to the address of the chancellor of the Nazi Germany Adolf Hitler to the German people in connection with the attack on the USSR translated into Russian (*Der Führer...*, 1942: 51-61). This Führer's speech that justified the beginning of the invasion of the Wehrmacht in the USSR was not significantly different from his previous appeals to the nation: on the Anschluss of Austria (12-13, August 1938), on the annexation of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia (1-10, October 1938), announcements on Bohemia and Moravia becoming a protectorate of Germany (15, March 1939) and on Wehrmacht invading the territory of Poland (1, September 1939).

The beginning of each military campaign of the Nazi Germany was followed by Hitler's speech to the Germans to justify the lawfulness of the German army invasion on the territory of a sovereign state. But this time, Hitler brought up two arguments in his speech: German preemptive strike against 160 Soviet divisions that were supposedly preparing to invade the borders of Germany and the need to halt the worldwide Jewish conspiracy, which stretched its thread to Moscow and London.

The indisputable fact is that the German propaganda reached Leningrad and found a fertile ground in the minds of certain individuals. For example, Lyubomirskaya, an employee at the mechanical manufacture was distributing a provocative insinuation that the war with Germany started was the fault of the Soviet Union. State Security service started the unofficial investigation (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 14).

It should be noted that, for a Soviet citizen individual, who was not enlightened in the Third Reich's foreign politics the conclusions of the leader of the Nazi Germany didn't seem absolutely

baseless, especially when it came to the prevalence of Jews in leader positions in the Soviet State at the end of 1930s – early 1940s.

There is no coincidence that in a number of NKVD situation reports in Leningrad region it was noted that the local population were frequently giving negative remarks towards the Soviet leaders and the Soviet system as a whole.

The most notable cases of anti-Soviet manifestations during the first war months were the hostile leaflets spread in different places, as noted in NKVD situation reports. As the Germans advanced towards Leningrad, the frequency of appearance of the anti-Soviet leaflets in many parts of the city greatly increased.

Let us form a timeline of the frequency of appearance of the messages of this type of the Nazi Germany propaganda against the Red Army and the civilian population of Leningrad and Leningrad region in the State Security service reports during the period of late June – late August of 1941.

From the first days of the Great Patriotic War Soviet citizens, residents of the city of Leningrad and Leningrad region proved to be objects of the German propaganda war against the Soviet Union. According to the Petrogradsky NKGB district department, on the 29<sup>th</sup> of July, 1941 Z.K. Abramova, a teacher of the Primorsky region school № 52, found 7 anti-Soviet leaflets (written in ink and colored pencil) in the tram number 12, en route to the Kirov Islands, on the floor of the carriage.

A capital letter “S!” was drawn on the leaflets in colored pencil. The text, calling to spread everywhere the letter «S» was aside as well as the decryption of this letter, urging for terror against the Party and the Soviet government (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 3).

According to the Ocityabrsky NKGB district department, on 1<sup>st</sup> of August of 1941, a handwritten anti-Soviet leaflet was found during the cleaning of the mailbox number 180 of the postal department of the city of Leningrad. The author called for an active struggle against the Soviet power and to the termination of the party leaders. The leaflet was signed: "A member of the Org. Committee". State security service informed about the beginning of the search of the anonymous author (TsAMO. F. 249. Op. 1544. D. 29. L. 10).

According to the report of the OVT HQ, on the 17<sup>th</sup> of August 1941, 3500 anti-Soviet leaflets were found in the Manduselg region (TsAMO. F. 217. Op. 1221. D. 192. L. 406).

On the 20<sup>th</sup> of August, 1941, Operational Division Headquarters of the Leningrad Military Region received a situation report number 122 from the “UKLON” HQ, which stated the following. According to the report of the commander of the 56th Fighter Battalion Lieutenant Chechurin, on the 17<sup>th</sup> of August 1941 at 22.55 his troop fighters Daleneko and Landa found 30 anti-Soviet leaflets in Russian in the 3<sup>rd</sup> paddock of the tram №9. The leaflets were packed on the front area, two of them were found on the floor in the middle of the carriage. It was noted that the carriage was full of people before the incident. All the leaflets were immediately seized and handed over to the chief of the NKVD district department to identify their source (TsAMO. F. 217. Op. 1221. D. 192. L. 403).

Possession of an enemy leaflet was a serious case for a Red Army soldier, consequencing to an investigation. For example, a Leningrad Front situation report stated that: “P.A. Safronov, a Red Army soldier from the first company of the 14th Infantry Regiment left looking for a lamp for his dugout. Wandering through the empty houses and dugouts, he came in the dugout of the 119 Infantry Regiment, where he was arrested. During the search, in his inventory he had 119<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment soldiers’ possessions, 2 German leaflets and passes for the 119<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment”. The detainee was handed over to the Red Army for further State Security investigations (TsAMO. F. 217. Op. 1221. D. 110. L. 112).

The operational, intelligence and operational intelligence reports of the NKVD border troops headquarters, rear Guard troops of the Northern Front and NKVD divisions since the beginning of July 1941 were marked by the intensification of German command advocacy against the Red Army soldiers and local civilians, often involving aviation.

According to the rear guard troop headquarters of the Northern Front operative intelligence reports, on the 5<sup>th</sup> of July 1941, an anti-revolution leaflet was found by the Group on the "VCH" protection line under the command of Lieutenant Gran (14th Motorized Rifle NKVD regiment in the Khaniil region). It was passed to the Vyborg city NKVD department. Apparently, the leaflet was thrown from a plane (TsAMO. F. 217. Op. 1221. D. 192. L. 127).

For example, according to the 7<sup>th</sup> army OVT headquarters report, on the 17<sup>th</sup> of August 1941 on the Loukhi-Kestenga railway line Red Army soldiers found several anti-Soviet leaflets that were thrown from a German plane. The leaflets were destroyed (TsAMO. F. 217. Op. 1221. D. 192. L. 403).

#### 4. Conclusion

By all means, it is hardly possible to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the designated problem in one article. We can make some interim conclusions that can lay the foundation for further studies of such an understudied problem as anti-Soviet propaganda during the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War.

The beginning of the military operations stirred up the public consciousness of the Soviet society and it was clearly demonstrated on the example of Leningrad and Leningrad region citizens. End of June – end of August 1941 was a relatively short period; however, it clearly highlighted metamorphoses in social consciousness intricately connected to the everyday life of Leningrad citizens. Due to the fact that the State Security service had to contend with the various manifestations of anti-state activities, various negative phenomena primarily fell in the scope of their interests.

General rule was that with the strengthening of the totalitarian state limit, everything that fell under the term “hostile”, whether it was action or a verbal expression of a personal attitude, was steadily expanding. Therefore, nobody was immune to repressions in the Soviet society in the second half of 1930 – the beginning of the 1940s. The article includes specific facts regarding people that were caught by the city and regional departments of Leningrad and Leningrad region of NKGB during the last two months. The facts indicate that both a housewife and an industrial worker fell under secret surveillance, both party members and non-party members could be arrested.

At the same time, the Party authorities set up a certain gradation of the enemies of the Soviet power for the law enforcement. The list of criteria that drew the attention of the security service included being from a property-owning origin, service in the Police during the monarchy, serving in the White Guard army, being an “active churchman”, being involved in the former opposition groups and movements membership within the ruling party. All of the listed above almost automatically turned the citizen into a politically unreliable person according to NKGB.

In general, the political leadership of the country, following its theory of a steady increase of the class struggle as they moved to the construction of socialism in the USSR, contributed to the split of the society instead of its consolidation. This was clearly seen on the occupied territory by German troops and their allies, when a certain part of the population expressed a voluntary desire to enter the service of the Nazi Germany to the detriment of their own homeland. The collaboration of 1941–1944 was not accidental, but a natural consequence of the socio-economic, political, legal and ethical deformations that took place during the preceding decades.

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
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## Propaganda Raids of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Slovakia (Czechoslovakia) in 1945–1946: Structure and Forms of Czechoslovak Resistance

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### Abstract

The Ukrainian insurgent army, which operated in western Ukraine and south-eastern Poland during the World War II – from 1942 onwards, continued in its actions during the post-war years but it slightly altered its mission. The leaders of the Ukrainian underground movement expected that a political conflict would start between the actors of the anti-Hitler coalition and that a new armed conflict would start between the West and the Soviet Union. This, they thought, would mark the end of the Soviet regime in Eastern Europe. In this situation the Ukrainian underground encouraged the Soviet Union republics and countries of middle and south-eastern Europe, to a united armed conflict against bolshevism. This was to be done in the so called: Front of Enslaved and Endangered Nations of Middle and Eastern Europe. To practically realize these aims the Ukrainian insurgent units undertook several propaganda raids during 1945–1950 into Belarus, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and into the Baltic states (Lithuania). These raids were a new form of anti-Soviet activities and struggle of the Ukrainian insurgent army during the post-war years. Czechoslovakia was one of the main targets for these raids, which took place in three phases: August – September 1945, April 1946 (both in eastern Slovakia) and the so called: Great raid through the republic into the American zone in Germany during June – October/November 1947, which also had a profound international response. This paper focuses on first two raids of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Slovakia in 1945 – 1946, analyzes them from the viewpoint of forms and methods of the struggle and analyzes the structure and forms of the elimination by the Czechoslovak security forces.

**Keywords:** Ukrainian Insurgent Army, propaganda raids, anti-communist activities, anti-Soviet resistance, Czechoslovak army, Czechoslovak security organs, Czechoslovakia, Slovakia.

### 1. Introduction

According to newly formed (post-war) anti-Soviet conception of active resistance of the “Front of Enslaved and Endangered Nations”, formulated by the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (*Ukrains’ka Holovna Vyzvol’na Rada – UHVR*)<sup>1</sup> – which framed the struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukrains’ka Povstans’ka Armia – UPA*) and the civilian network the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (*Orhanizatsia Ukrainiiskykh Natsionalistiv – OUN*) in the Ukrainian ethnographic lands – the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe who had fallen under the “Bolshevik yoke of the USSR” were supposed to become strategic partners in the Ukrainian insurgents’ struggle to restore Ukrainian statehood. Specifically with regard to the liberation

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movements of these nations, the existing Bolshevik “imperialist state of affairs” was supposed to be destroyed, and a new international legal system based on the principle of national self-determination was to be established. Thus, during the course of the struggle against the Soviet system in the region, from 1945 the leaders of the Ukrainian liberation movement adopted the tactic of so-called propaganda raids. They dispatched specially trained UPA units into neighbouring countries, whose task was to organize various forms of political-propagandistic work among the local population (Szczęśniak – Szota, 1973: 320).

As Osyp Diakiv, one of the eminent ideologues of the Ukrainian liberation movement, writes, “In this way the UPA is providing information about the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people and life in the USSR (mainly those nations that have not yet experienced the harshness of the Bolshevik regime), activating the revolutionary anti-Bolshevik forces of these nations, and lifting the anti-Bolshevik moods of the popular masses, creating the practical prerequisites for the concrete cooperation of these nations in a single anti-Bolshevik front” (Viatrovych, 2003: 144).

The practical steps of the above-mentioned goals took the form of raids carried out by Ukrainian insurgent detachments into Belarus, Poland, Romania, the Baltic states (Lithuania) and Slovakia (Czechoslovakia) between 1945 and 1950.

## 2. Materials and methods

The primary source base for the study of the activities of UPA detachments on the territory of Czechoslovakia (Czechoslovak Republic; CSR) in 1945–1947/48 is mostly concentrated in military and central (national) archives and the archival funds of the security organs of both republics.

A special place in the research on UPA activity in Slovakia is occupied by the documents stored in the collections of the Military Historical Archive in Bratislava, mainly in the collection called “Operation ‘Banderites’: Military Units Operating against the Banderites in 1945–1948”. This collection contains documents that were drawn up by anti-UPA military units in Slovakia, but there is no documentation by the army, which hunted down UPA members in Moravia in 1947. This material is thus incomplete and includes documents drawn up by only sixty army units that were deployed against the UPA in 1945–1947. Documents originating from other units either did not survive or were not archived. In addition, those documents that are extant are of a diverse nature. Some are comprehensive—minutes, series of orders, military diaries, agentura reports, etc.—while others exist only in the form of fragments. The historical value of this collection is unquestionably high, as it contains situational and intelligence reports that expose the strategy and activities of the UPA detachments in Slovakia. As well, they reveal not only yesterday’s perceptions of the UPA raids into Slovakia but also relations both in north-eastern Slovakia and south-eastern Poland, the situation of the Lemko population and its flight to Czechoslovak territory, and many other issues. From the large number of existing operational orders it is possible to make a detailed reconstruction of the progress of the combat actions that were aimed at eliminating UPA activity in the country, i.e., to trace the tactic of launching Czechoslovak military units into battle and their movements, as well as the reorganization of combat groups and their results.

Various collections in the Czech Archive of the State Security Service in Prague, above all fond 307 entitled “Banderites”, play a key role in the study of UPA activities in the CSR. The materials contained in this fond include mostly documents on the actions targeting UPA detachments on Czechoslovak territory from 1945 to 1948, which were undertaken by the organs of National Security (*Národní bezpečnost* – NB), the Corps of National Security (*Zbor národnej bezpečnosti* – ZNB) and State Security (*Štátna bezpečnosť* – ŠtB). The documents in this collection comprise a comparatively broad base of materials (a total of 111 archival cartons) consisting of a large number of reports on the presence of UPA units and their activities, as well as situational reports prepared by individual NB stations, part of the materials of the Regional Commands of the NB based in nearly every corner of Slovakia (only some from Moravia; documentary materials on the transit of some insurgents and smaller groups of the UPA through Moravia in 1947 are located in a branch of the Archive of the State Security Organs in Kanice, near Brno, specifically in fonds A–14 and A–15). In addition, the fond contains various types of documents that reveal the measures undertaken against the UPA: directives, orders, circulars, agentura announcements, teletype messages, statements of Czechoslovak citizens who had links with UPA members, personnel files, and minutes of interrogations of captured UPA soldiers and members of the OUN civilian network in Poland. The collection also contains organizational matters, administrative

(office) notes, photographs (of captured and killed UPA members) and graphic materials (maps, plans, and sketches), particularly with regard to the deployment of individual NB and ZNB units, border protection, etc. There are also documents issued by military commands and the Commission of Internal Affairs of the Slovak National Council (*Slovenská národná rada* – SNR) in the form of teletype announcements and situational reports about the location and movement of the UPA detachments, military intelligence, orders issued by the General Staff of the Ministry of National Defense in connection with the anti-UPA actions (copies of these documents are located in some archival collections stored at the central archives). In terms of quantity and quality, this is arguably the best developed collection on this topic.

Some documents of the state security and intelligence services connected to the UPA's activity on the territory of the CSR are housed in several other fonds of the Archive of the State Security Service, specifically in the "Fond of the Scholarly Institute", which contains materials on the activities of the Czechoslovak state security and intelligence services after 1945, as well as in the collections entitled "Main Directorate of Military Counterintelligence" (fond 302) and "Various Security Materials from 1945" (fond 304). These collections include materials on the activities of the intelligence services, documents concerning the investigations of individuals who crossed the border illegally, reports on the situation in the border area and on the actions that were launched against UPA units (agentura and daily reports, etc.).

In addition to documents from the archives of the army and the state security service, materials on the UPA's activity on the territory of postwar Czechoslovakia are also stored in the collections of the Slovak National Archives in Bratislava, especially in the fond "Commission of Internal Affairs of the SNR 1945–1948 (secretariat, security, circulars)", which contain mostly wide-ranging material in the form of situational reports and files. Similar documentation is housed in the National Archives in Prague, the collections of some central state bodies, especially "The Klement Gottwald Collection" and the fond entitled "Ministry of Internal Affairs—Secret".

An important part of the research on the heuristic base of the set of problems relating to the UPA's activities in the CSR is the regional archives of eastern Slovakia, particular those in Humenné, Svidník, Prešov, Vranov nad Topľou, et al. Since the issue here is the UPA's intense activity, these documents supplement the general picture in this region and often contain information that is missing in documents stored at the central archives.

In the process of solving of the researched problem have been used general scientific methods (analysis and synthesis, concretization, generalization) together with traditional methods of historical analysis and specific historical methods (direct/indirect method, structural analysis, typological method). We have mainly used the principle of historicism that supposes viewing of historical circumstances of researched period, relations and interconnection of events, understanding causes, phenomena and the whole context.

### 3. Discussion

Within the framework of the newly formed (post-war) anti-Soviet conception and active resistance of the "Front of Enslaved and Endangered Nations", the Ukrainian nationalist movement devoted special attention to the Czechoslovak Republic out of all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; in particular, to the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia, which bordered on southeastern Poland and western Ukraine, and where the UPA was most active during the first years after the Second World War. From the Ukrainian standpoint, there were several reasons for this. First, the process of "Bolshevization", or "Sovietization", was being introduced at a comparatively slower pace in Slovakia. During the first post-war years (1945–1946) Slovakia was only loosely dependent on the Kremlin, and the Czechoslovak communists were still weak. Second, there was a tradition of cooperation between the Ukrainian nationalist movement and the CSR: during the interwar period émigré nationalist organizations were active here, newspapers were published, and Ukrainian educational and cultural-educational organizations, etc., were founded. Third, special attention was focused on the CSR, mainly Slovakia, because the leadership of the Ukrainian nationalists viewed the Slovaks as potential allies in the anti-Bolshevik resistance. This may be explained by the fact that Ukrainian-Slovak relations had never resulted in any harsh antagonism or acute misunderstandings, as may be seen in Ukrainian-Polish relations and, to a lesser degree, in Ukrainian-Romanian or Ukrainian-Hungarian relations. An important role was also played by the domestic political development of Slovakia, where a significant proportion of

Slovak society was distressed by the abolition of the independent Slovak state (1939–1945) and the restoration of the Czechoslovakia in 1945 year (Viatrovych, 2006: 167).

#### 4. Results

The military and political conditions in the second half of 1945 were difficult for the UPA, yet comparatively encouraging because the insurgents were able to gain control over a large swath of territory in south-eastern Poland—the so-called Zakerzonnia region<sup>2</sup>—which comprised a nearly 500-kilometer-long segment of the Polish-Soviet border. Thus, the OUN and the UPA (UHVR) considered it crucial to organize propaganda raids into Slovakia, both in terms of their political and military-strategic interests. The Slovak historian Miroslav Kmet' writes: "The leadership of the [Ukrainian] resistance was interested in disseminating its views, concepts, and programs in the neighbouring country, to which part of the Ukrainian ethnic population was moving; at the same time, a real need for strategic rear line services was emerging for logistical reasons, especially for the purpose of acquiring allies and sympathizers" (Kmet', 2005: 163). Without a doubt, the main purpose behind the UPA operations on the territory of Slovakia in 1945–1946 was to gather intelligence, promote its movement, and explain its intentions—and especially to disseminate anti-Soviet and anti-communist propaganda. Another important consideration was the need for external self-promotion: to demonstrate the struggle of the UPA through the Czechoslovak and Western press, whose reactions were anticipated.

The first Slovak raid was organized by the UHVR and the leaders of Zakerzonnia: Vasyl' Halasa ("Orlan"), deputy krai leader and OUN krai responsible leader for propaganda, and Iaroslav-Dmytro Vitovs'kyi ("Andriienko"), commander of the 24<sup>th</sup> UPA Tactical Group (TH) "Makivka", who was concurrently appointed commander of the Slovak raid. Under their leadership, the UPA riflemen and OUN members who were selected to take part in the raid into eastern Slovakia received special training and political instruction on the territory of Ukrainian Galicia (Sambir area), starting in July 1945. It was decided that the following military units would take part in the actions in Slovakia: detachments of TH UPA "Chornyi lis" from the "Pidkarpats'kyi" Battalion (led by Pavlo Vatsyk—"Prut") within the companies "Zmii" (Company Commander Mykola Korzh—"Sokil") and "Zavedii" (Company Commander "Buria"; real name unknown), as well as Bulava Company under the command of Volodymyr Hoshko ("Myron") from TH UPA "Makivka". In addition, a women's UPA platoon, "Krylati", was to be seconded to the raiding group (Viatrovych, 2001: 62).

In early August 1945 the newly trained detachments were deployed to the forests near the village of Lopinka in the Lemko region<sup>3</sup>, located in south-eastern Poland. Before the raid, the UPA detachments based in the vicinity of Lopinka completed another two-week round of training, obtained their final instructions, and were issued weapons and ammunition as well as a supply of propaganda material for dissemination in Slovakia. After a brief rest, on the evening of 22 August 1945 the UPA raiders began to move into the territory of Slovakia. During the night of 22–23 August three reinforced UPA companies, consisting of approximately 450–500 soldiers and members of the civilian OUN network, crossed the border. This was the start of the first raid of UPA detachments into Slovakia (23 August–24 September 1945).

After reaching the northeastern districts of Slovakia, the UPA detachments began maneuvering practically out in the open. With the intention of covering the largest chunk of territory as possible, they divided into smaller groups and initially moved around the districts of Medzilaborce, Stropkov, and Giraltovce, where they visited individual villages. Later, they expanded their activities to the more outlying districts of eastern Slovakia. As a rule, they operated in keeping with a set plan. Toward evening, they would approach individual villages, which earlier had been surrounded by armed guards. They would first take over the local police station, if the village had one, detain its personnel, and assure them that the Ukrainian detachment would not use force because it was under strict orders not to harm the local population. At the police station they would hold a propaganda lecture describing the goals and reasons why they were fighting. Later, an assembly of the village's inhabitants would be announced or convened by a drummer, during which an UPA or OUN political worker would describe the activities of the Ukrainian insurgents. Meanwhile, other members of the detachment would be going from house to house holding conversations with the residents. At the same time, the raiders searched for lodgings for the night, where a hot meal could be prepared and more food supplies acquired. Late at night or at

dawn, the UPA detachment would leave the village, and after a brief trek, visit other (often outlying) villages, which led the population and the security organs to believe that there were huge numbers of Ukrainian insurgents operating in the region (see: Šmigel, 2007(a): 85-106; Viatrovych, 2001: 62-78).

The first official news about the penetration of UPA detachments into north-eastern Slovakia was disorganized and vague. Despite the fact that before the raid some information from the districts had warned that UPA detachments were becoming more active near the borders of Slovakia, it was underestimated by the Czechoslovak security agencies. This may be explained by their unfamiliarity with the real situation in south-eastern Poland and the fact that information about the UPA's activities as such in the Polish borderlands was practically non-existent. Thus, in the early days of the first UPA raid, local national committees, border agencies, and auxiliary army subunits in this region were poorly informed, which was reflected in their reports and orders. At first the UPA detachments were regarded, absurdly enough, as units of Vlasovites—who could not possibly have been in the area at this time—or members of smashed German detachments or armed bands. Misconceptions were also rife in regard to the numerical strength of the UPA detachments operating in the area: according to data gathered by the Slovak security forces, the army, and local inhabitants, there were between 1,200 and 2,000 Ukrainian insurgents, although certain reports assessed their numerical strength at around five or six thousand, and even more. (A report prepared for Edvard Beneš, the president of the Czechoslovak Republic, stated that 10,000 armed UPA soldiers had penetrated into the territory of Slovakia.) As the historian B. Chňoupek writes, “The assorted mixture of reports that were arriving about the first influx of the Banderites was inaccurate, contradictory, sometimes exaggerated, at other times intentionally diminished, and often completely chaotic. [...] In a word, the situation was unclear, and matters were contradictory. The only clear thing was that well armed bands had penetrated deep into our territory, and the weak security organs and financial guard were helpless against them” (Chňoupek, 1989: 285-286). The local Slovak and Rusyn population in the region was frightened and taken aback—a state of affairs that was documented by the commanders of the UPA raiding detachments in Slovakia (ABS-1).

It is very likely that the Czechoslovak authorities also knew nothing about the goal of the UPA's appearance in eastern Slovakia. At first, they believed that the UPA units in Poland had suffered a defeat and were therefore crossing over into Slovakia; or their goal was to secure supplies or strengthen their ranks by enlisting local residents. At the same time, it was suspected that the UPA was seeking to free German POWs from the camp in Kysak. It was only later—after a reassessment and analysis of the course of the UPA raid into Slovakia—that the Czechoslovak military and political structures clearly grasped the focused UPA action. Nevertheless, this new knowledge was deliberately distorted and misused for propagandistic, anti-Banderite goals.

The Slovak security organs' lack of preparedness in the border region and inability to confront the penetration of a foreign armed group, which was caused by the disbandment of the old police and gendarme structures of the First Slovak Republic of 1939–1946 and the formation of a new security structure for the CSR, unquestionably benefited the UPA, and this advantageous situation was generally reflected throughout the course of the first Slovak raid. The numerically weak and poorly organized borderland stations of the National Security (*Národná bezpečnosť* – NB)<sup>4</sup> and the Financial Police (*Finančná stráž* – FS)<sup>5</sup> both of which protected the border, mainly from contraband, were simply powerless against the UPA units (stations in border villages were staffed by a maximum of two or three people). For that reason they did not go up against the UPA raiding detachments and, logically, did not resist them. They focused their activities only on grouping and transmitting often unverified and contradictory information to their command or army organs, for which they were unjustifiably censured. This situation changed somewhat after the arrival of military reinforcements to the region during a later period. The inability to deal with the situation was also manifested in the structures of the Committee of Defense Security Information (*Obranné spravodajstvo* – OBZ), which was only being created and developed at this time.<sup>6</sup>

The only force that could have stopped the activity of the Ukrainian insurgents was the newly created Czechoslovak army. However, at this very time the army was grappling with post-war personnel and material shortcomings. Its formations, stationed in Slovakia, comprised the 4<sup>th</sup> Military District; its command was based in Bratislava,<sup>7</sup> and its units were manned by Slovak soldiers and commanders.<sup>8</sup> The stationing of the Czechoslovak army in 1945 primarily satisfied the

security needs of the republic's western and southern borders shared with the countries with which the CSR was in military conflict at the time (Germany, Austria, and Hungary) and from where it was possible to expect eventual threats to the country. At the time when the army was being organized, nothing was known about the UPA and its activities, and no threat from southeastern Poland was anticipated.

The southern borders of eastern Slovakia, from Turňa nad Bodvou to points farther east, were secured by the 10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division with its command in Košice (commander: Artillery Colonel Emil Perko) with infantry troops from the 14<sup>th</sup>, 20<sup>th</sup>, and 32<sup>nd</sup> Regiments stationed in Prešov, Michalovce, and Košice. On the north-eastern sector of the Slovak border the 10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division only had smaller border guard units (i.e., auxiliary stations assisting the NB and the FS) based in garrisons in the district cities of Humenné, Medzilaborce, Snina, Stropkov, et al.<sup>9</sup> Initially pitted against the relatively numerous UPA detachments, which were extraordinarily mobile and experienced, masters at taking advantage of the forested and mountainous terrain of northeastern Slovakia, and highly skilled in the art of insurgent warfare, was the weak Combined "Samo" Battalion (commander: Infantry Captain Tibor Samo from the Michalovce Garrison), which consisted of two companies (the 14<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> companies from the Infantry Regiment, numbering 120 soldiers and officers).


Following the penetration of the UPA into the country, on 26 August 1945 the battalion created the command of the 10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division on its own initiative. Later, the auxiliary "Samo" Battalion was reinforced by soldiers from the guard detachments (of the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment) in Snina and Medzilaborce (the garrison in Humenné was a reserve force), numbering approximately 110 men. Reinforcements from individual NB stations in the districts, which were subordinated to the army, could also be relied on to offer assistance. At first, these troops limited their operations to gathering accurate information about the movement of the UPA units, and patrolling and blockading important routes to prevent the deeper penetration of the UPA into the territory.

In early September 1945, in addition to the "Samo" Battalion, the 10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division created the auxiliary "Bajús" Battalion (commander: Infantry Captain Michal Bajús) by merging the Guard detachments of the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment. Also put into operation was a platoon from the Intelligence Company of the 10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division: the "Vojtech" Group, which was activated on 6 September 1945. The reserve of this military formation was comprised of one company from the 37<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment (10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division). Also in early September the Main Command of the NB at the Regional Command of the NB in Humenné issued an order creating the Concentrated Detachment of the NB as reinforcement for the army units.

On orders from the Ministry of National Defense of the CSR, the command of the 4<sup>th</sup> Military District deployed additional military reinforcements to eastern Slovakia: the "Ján" Group, a battalion of the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment; and the "Ondrej" Group, a battalion of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Regiment, 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division from Trnava, both of which were pressed into action against the UPA on 8 September 1945. By this time, cooperation had already been established with Soviet border subunits in Uzhhorod, and Lieutenant-Colonel Cherevinsky, a Red Army liaison officer, began to work in the command of the 10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division.

The concrete engagement of Soviet troops in the operations to liquidate UPA activity in Slovakia has been mostly neglected by contemporary scholars, despite the fact that this is a key question. According to the Polish historian G. Motyka, information about the penetration of UPA detachments into Slovakia sparked alarm in Moscow, in none other than Lavrentii Beria himself. The Soviets' nervous reaction stemmed from lack of knowledge of the Ukrainian insurgents' plans and forces. The possibility was not excluded that the UPA detachments were seeking to break through to Zakarpattia (Transcarpathia) (Motyka, 2006: 592). For this reason, a motorized regiment from the 4<sup>th</sup> Armored Army (including 30 Armored Personnel Carriers/APCs/ and tanks) was deployed from Uzhhorod to Kapusany, near Prešov, together with a special-forces unit from the 9<sup>th</sup> Guards Army (possibly a raiding detachment of the Soviet army; in documents it is called the "Group of the Red Army Lieutenant-Colonel Rudzik", which arrived in Slovakia from Szombathely, Hungary, on 4 September 1945). Also enlisted in the struggle to eliminate UPA activity in Slovakia was a special group of Soviet NKVD officials, who monitored the situation with the aid of several of its units in eastern Slovakia. Additional Soviet reinforcements were consulted through the Soviet liaison officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Cherevinsky, and the participation of two more machine gun companies from the armies led by General Andrei Vedenin from Uzhhorod was also considered.

**The Structure of Military Units Deployed against the UPA**  
(August–September 1945)



The Czechoslovak army's military operation, in concert with Soviet troops, to clear the area of north-eastern Slovakia of UPA detachments began only after the completion of military preparations on 11 September 1945. The start of the operation was delayed because at this time (10–11 September) two out of the three UPA raiding companies, including the commander of the "Andriienko" action, had already left the territory of Slovakia. On 28 August 1945 "Andriienko", the commander of the raid, received a dispatch from Ukraine ordering him to divide the raiding group into three sections. The first one, headed by him, departed for Galicia via Zakarpattia. The second section, commanded by "Prut", left for Zakerzonnia on 10 September 1945. The third group, "Myron's" Company, remained behind to continue the operation until 24 September 1945 (Viatrovych, 2001: 69). As of 11 September the concentrated Czechoslovak army units (to which Red Army officers were attached as liaisons and observers), in cooperation with Soviet subunits and reinforced detachments of the NB, were finally able to fight against only the third UPA company, led by V. Hoshko ("Myron").

Since the Czechoslovak organs also had at their disposal information about the departure of the two UPA companies to Zakarpattia and Poland, the command of the 10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division began to regroup its forces. After the disbandment of the "Samo" Group on 15 September 1945, the task of combing through the terrain of the UPA's active operations, liquidating them, and pushing them across the border into the USSR was carried out by Soviet detachments concentrated in the group led by the Red Army Lieutenant-Colonel Rudzik, together with the "Bajús" Battalion and "Vojtech" Company, which were subordinated to the Soviet command. The arrival in Prešov of two machine gun companies from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Military District (in Moravia) on 14 September led to a further regrouping of forces and the creation of a new combat unit (commander: Infantry Major Jaroslav Fuks) under the joint name of the "Fuks Group" (comprising the two machine gun companies from Moravia and the "Bajús", "Ján" and "Ondrej" units), which joined the final stage of the anti-UPA operations on 20 September 1945.

The engagement of the Czechoslovak and Soviet forces did not impede the relatively peaceful departure on 24 September 1945 of "Myron's" Company to Poland, which concluded the UPA's first raid into Slovakia. From the UPA's point of view, the raid was totally successful: the political mission had been completed in full. It was also a victory from the military standpoint, as it had taken place in a favourable atmosphere, without clear-cut combat engagements or human losses (apart from a few desertions). The insurgents' return to their base territories was determined exclusively by the circumstance that their assignment in eastern Slovakia was completed. Thus, there is every reason to agree with B. Chňoupek, who states: "...Our operations influenced the withdrawal of the Banderites like last year's snow on the winter before last. If they had wanted to, they would have remained. They did not want to, so they left" (Chňoupek, 1989: 292).

According to the Main Department of Military Intelligence at the Ministry of National Defense of the CSR, the reason behind the feeble round of anti-Banderite actions was, first and foremost, "the insufficient willingness of the NB organs to put up an energetic stand; their stations supplied delayed information about the enemy, and the whole responsibility was dumped on the army units" (Fiala, 1994: 97). Another reason was the lack of preparation and weak organization of the army subunits (lack of ammunition, transport, and communications, etc.) – problems that were manifested in their vague actions and exclusively defensive strategy for carrying out what should have been a simple operation to push the UPA detachments back across the border (Syrný, 2005: 155-156).

Although earlier Czechoslovakian historiography states that during the first raid "ordinary criminal attacks and robberies, together with violence against the population did occur", an analysis of daily documents refutes this. During their campaign in eastern Slovakia in August–September 1945, the UPA raiding detachments conducted themselves in a disciplined fashion, and the only argument that can be used against them is that they obtained their food supplies at the expense of the local population, which was itself experiencing shortages. With regard to the murder of Michal Potoma from Breznica, Stropkov district, on 30 August 1945, in no way can the UPA be blamed for it because murder absolutely did not fit the purpose of the raid. Although one of the documents concerning the murder blames the Ukrainian insurgents, its objectivity is weakened by the subjectivity of the explanation that was given at the time (based on the testimony of only one witness). This event adds a minimal, at first glance, dimension to this set of questions; at the same time, it is an important issue.

The designation as “Banderite” (sometimes spelled “Benderite”) of every suspect individual (armed and/or in uniform) found in the forests and mountain massifs of Slovakia was a phenomenon that was instantly accepted by the post-war Slovak society, and it became prevalent during and after the UPA’s first raid. At the same time, a typical feature of the Slovak population during the first post-war years was the wearing of various uniforms and the illegal possession of firearms—the result of partisan warfare, border crossings, and battles that took place here—and many untrustworthy elements were hanging about in the forests.<sup>10</sup> Poverty and hunger among the nationally-mixed inhabitants was felt most keenly in eastern Slovakia, which had suffered the greatest losses because of the war. Complex relations marked all spheres of public life, and favourable conditions for the formation of groups of smugglers and criminals were emerging here. These elements quickly understood that they could capitalize on the term “Banderite” for their own nefarious schemes or to mask their actions and misdeeds (not excluding criminal acts). The lack of reliable NB and FS personnel, inadequate military protection of the borders, organizational shortcomings of local national committees, corruption, and clientelism only exacerbated the situation. There is no question that, in addition to the UPA detachments on the territory of northeastern Slovakia, various armed, criminal, and even terrorist groups (SNA-1), both those from the nearby Polish and Transcarpathian border areas and domestically-based ones, were active here at this time. This activity worsened the situation and compromised the UPA.

Therefore, a much more complex aspect of the perception of the UPA’s activity in Slovakia is the period between the first and second UPA raids (October 1945–March 1946). At issue here, unquestionably, is the key later period because everything that took place then determined not only the anti-Banderite opposition, which was propagandistically directed and misused, but also formed—in the eyes of the top ranks of the government and security organs in Slovakia—the basis for the normalization of relations in the north-eastern border area and mobilized more diligent protection of the state borders, leading to more radical action against the UPA.

After the end of the first UPA raid into eastern Slovakia, the military units from the 9th Infantry Division and the 3rd Military District gradually began to withdraw from the region and return to their bases. During October 1945 Soviet units also returned to the USSR (by the end of that year all Soviet troops had been withdrawn from the CSR). Thus, from fall 1945 the protection of Slovakia’s borders was once again being maintained by FS units and border stations of the NB. Units of the 10th Infantry Division were discharged from the direct task of protecting the borders and in the future served as auxiliary detachments, carrying out the new tasks that had been formulated by the “Borderland Protection Service” (Zabezpečenia pohraničného územia – ZPÚ) (VHA-1): organizational measures aimed not at directly protecting the state borders but maintaining law and order in the borderland.<sup>11</sup> From Bardejov all the way to the borders of the USSR military assistance was provided by units from the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment, placed at the disposal of the command of the 10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. They consisted of the “Bajús” Group and the “Group of the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment”, as well as one battalion of the 20<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment.

After the military forces were scaled back in north-eastern Slovakia, domestic and foreign armed criminal groups began appearing, as well as soldiers of the Polish regular army and various Polish nationalistic elements, all of whom took advantage of the continuing weak border protection provided by the FS and the NB. From the end of 1945 these groups regularly staged attacks and robberies in Slovak border villages. Such attacks took place not only in northeastern Slovakia but all along the Polish border. In late October/early November 1945 robberies and attacks against the Slovak population spread to the districts of **Svidník**, Medzilaborce, and especially Snina.

The security situation was becoming exacerbated in the Medzilaborce districts, where, beginning in October 1945, smaller groups of refugees began arriving in the wake of the tragic events in south-eastern Poland, which were compounded by the forcible resettlement of the Lemko population to the USSR. Shortly afterwards unidentified armed groups began appearing in the area. It is impossible to determine exactly who they were because, for the most part, all the above-listed misdeeds were of a criminal nature; yet they were perceived as Banderite activities. An especially critical situation emerged in November–December 1945 in the Snina district, where attacks and robberies took place as well as several acts of violence and murders that claimed the lives of eighteen people, mostly Jews and communists, in the villages of Nová Sedlica, Ulič, and Kolbasov.<sup>12</sup> Once again, these crimes were attributed to UPA soldiers (see Šmigel, 2007c).

It is known that the UPA command in Zakerzonnia distanced itself from these murders. According to the Ukrainian historian V. Viatrovych, Czechoslovak historians deliberately ignored the fact “that these murders took place in December, i.e., at the time when there were simply no UPA units left on the territory of Slovakia”. Viatrovych emphasizes that Czechoslovak historians unjustly blamed the killings in the Snina district on the Ukrainian insurgents, knowingly alluding to them as an example of “Banderite terror” and clear-cut proof of the UPA’s anti-Semitism. Citing the US-based Ukrainian historian Lew Shankovsky, Viatrovych writes that in the fall of 1945 a special detachment designed along the lines of an NKVD agentura-provocateur special unit was organized in the Snina district. This pseudo-Banderite detachment, pretending to be the UPA, later carried out a number of attacks on the civilian population in the Snina district (Viatrovych, 2001: 75-76). This alternative theory is entirely plausible because the presence of Soviet army units and NKVD officials at this time and in this area has been confirmed. It is an established fact that in its struggle against the UPA the NKVD apparatus frequently resorted to false-flag, pseudo-Banderite detachments (using them regularly on the territory of western Ukraine and southeastern Poland) with the goal of terrorizing the civilian population by groups masquerading as the UPA. The use of such special units in northeastern Slovakia would have been viable and logical: at the outset of their operations, they would deprive the UPA not only of sympathy on the part of the local population but also of its rear line services in Slovakia, which the Ukrainian insurgents were seeking to establish.<sup>13</sup>

Out of all the possible explanations that have been discussed in Slovakia in recent years, the most plausible explanation is that the murders of the Jews were carried out in a targeted fashion, probably to order, with the goal of liquidating certain undesirable individuals in the region. Neither should one discount the possibility that the killers were members of a purely criminal Polish-Slovak group. A clear indication of this is the fact that the members of this group had knowledge of local relations and had exact information about the situation in the region, obviously obtained as a result of their cooperation with some local residents. The motives behind the killings were neither racial nor political, as they have been interpreted to this day, but economic; or it was a case of settling accounts. On the basis of facts concerning the situation that existed at the time in the Snina district, the web of suspicion surrounding those who ordered the murders of the Snina Jews may be expanded to include several officials of the local self-administration and members of the NB stations in the district.<sup>14</sup>

A document from the Prešov State Security, dated 1952, openly accuses an official from the District National Committee (Okresný národný výbor – ONV) in Snina, who was allegedly behind the 1945 murders of the Jews, and who had a special interest in liquidating the Jews of Kolbasov, above all (AMVSR). This is corroborated in particular by a document drawn up by the Commission of Internal Affairs in Bratislava, dated 20 March 1946, which confirms that in late 1945 there were no UPA detachments in the region. Nevertheless, “various groups of robbers and smugglers...masquerading as ‘Banderites’, terrorized, robbed, and also killed the inhabitants of the north-eastern corner of Slovakia. In certain cases, they were joined by criminal elements from the Snina district, especially because the local population here lives in very impoverished conditions and has no possibility to earn a living” (ABS-2).

The above statement of the Slovak Commission of Internal Affairs confirms the current theory that domestic criminal elements may have been behind the killings in the Snina district. *For example, several other documents (dated 1946) from the Commission of Internal Affairs in Bratislava confirmed the escalation of “various attacks, especially in the northern border area, where our people, pretending to be Banderites, are engaged in thefts” (SNA-2).* Later, in November 1947, during a joint session of a commission formed of representatives of the army and security service of the CSR, Division General B. Boček, the head of the General Staff of the Ministry of National Defense, summarized the anti-Banderite measures, declaring that “in many cases it was ascertained that units consisting of Czechoslovak citizens (poachers, smugglers, speculators, and various criminal elements) committed their crimes precisely masked as Banderites” (Demokraticeskii golos).

The difficult situation in the districts of Snina and Medzilaborce in November–December 1945 once again mobilized the Czechoslovak army and the NB in the northeastern corner of Slovakia. Thus, on 29 November 1945 the command of the 10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division ordered the immediate deployment to Medzilaborce and Snina of the I/14<sup>th</sup> Battalion from Poprad (14<sup>th</sup> Infantry

Regiment), which was tasked with securing the north-eastern region, liquidating illegal groups, and preventing them from penetrating into Slovak territory. Its units arrived in the villages of the Snina district on 7 December 1945, i.e., shortly after the murders of the Jews in Ulič and Kolbasov.

The NB in eastern Slovakia once again became the target of criticism. In keeping with an order issued by the Main Command of the NB in Bratislava, on 11 December 1945 the regional commander of the NB Košice-II, Staff Captain Emil Krokavec, was dispatched to Humenné. Until his recall, his assignment was to take charge of all measures pertaining to the safety of the population and its property in the north-eastern districts and to establish contact with the highest command of the army units that were deployed by the headquarters of the 4th Military District. All the NB stations in the region were placed at his disposal, and NB units in Bardejov, Snina, and Michalovce were also mobilized (SNA-3). At the same time, the Main Command of the NB transferred to this area some of the NB personnel from the regional commands in Michalovce, Prešov and Košice. In addition, personnel changes were made at some unreliable NB stations (SNA-4).

On 14 December 1945 the situation in eastern Slovakia was discussed at a session of the Ruling Presidium of the Czechoslovak Republic in Prague, which ordered the Ministry of Defense to shore up the army units in the districts of Snina and Medzilaborce (VHA-2). In agreement with the General Staff of the Ministry of National Defense, Division General Michal Širica, the commander of the 4th Military District, issued an order on 13 December 1945 (one day before the Presidium's order) to create a special ZPÚ group for northeastern Slovakia (SNA-5). According to this order, the ZPÚ group, consisting of four battalions (the 4th Rapid-Response Division was the group's reserve), was tasked with securing the borders with Poland and the USSR from the village of Čertizné (Medzilaborce district) to the village of Ruský Hrabovec (Snina district) and, with the assistance of an agentura network consisting of reliable local residents, to obtain more accurate information about the UPA. Subordinate to the group's command were NB organs in the territory (the Regional Command of the NB in Košice was supposed to direct their activities) (Mičko, 2006: 203-204) and an FS liaison officer was assigned to the ZPÚ headquarters. Initially, the commander of the ZPÚ was Lieutenant Colonel Jaroslav Kmicikievič, commander of the Infantry Brigade of the 4th Rapid-Response Division (his command began using the codename "Jaroslav"). In mid-January 1946 he was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff Ján Stanek, commander of the 4th Rapid-Response Division (the ZPÚ command used the codename "Jánošík").


As ordered by the command of ZPÚ Group "Jánošík", three battalions directly assisted units of the NB and the FS in guarding the border, with one or two platoons or a company deployed to individual borderland settlements. The task of these army units was to seal the main border crossings, guard important routes, and maintain control over the population. On the initiative of the commander of ZPÚ "Jánošík", on 18 January 1946 an agreement of mutual cooperation on the search for and liquidation of UPA detachments was concluded with Colonel Kantorov, the commander of Soviet NKVD borderland units of Zakarpattia oblast (VHA-3). In addition to the establishment of communications and information exchange, the agreement opened up the possibility for mutual border crossings during anti-UPA actions in the borderland area, which, in the final result, never came to pass because in the first months of 1946 no UPA units crossed the Slovak border.

In January 1946 the OBZ structures in the north-eastern border area were reinforced. The Regional Security Department (*Oblasťný bezpečnostný referát* – OBR) in Humenné began to operate more energetically, and units of military intelligence were created at the command and in individual battalion groups of ZPÚ Group "Jánošík", where approximately forty members of the OBR began working (VHA-4). Once an agentura network of informers recruited from the local population was created, the process of obtaining data on the political situation, public security in the area bordering on Poland, and information on the UPA's activity in the region—so-called offensive (external) intelligence—was improved.


For a time, the security situation in north-eastern Slovakia seemed to stabilize. Everything stemmed from the situation in neighbouring south-eastern Poland, where in the early months of 1946 the Polish army launched an offensive, and the UPA detachments there put up strong resistance. At the same time, border crossings by the Lemko population were considered dangerous from the standpoint of the Czechoslovak organs. As a result of the worsening situation in southeastern Poland, beginning in early 1946 Lemkos began fleeing, at first individually and then en masse, to the territory of Slovakia (especially to the Medzilaborce district), where they were

detained by NB units and deported across the border. Since it was expected that UPA detachments would be moving into Slovak territory, the command of the 4<sup>th</sup> Military District reinforced the ZPÚ group with additional reserves from the 4<sup>th</sup> Rapid-Response Division; the entire formation now numbered 2,500 soldiers (Fiala, 1994: 67).

**The Structure of ZPÚ Group “Jánošík”**  
(January–March 1946)




***Reserve:***



As a result of intelligence information that was obtained about the situation in southeastern Poland, and on the demand of the commander of ZPÚ “Jánošík”, in early February 1946 the Commission of Internal Affairs in Bratislava promulgated a series of extraordinary measures in the districts of eastern Slovakia (a proposal to declare a state of emergency was rejected) (SNA-6) and temporarily appointed Lieutenant Colonel J. Stanek commander of the NB, a post that he retained until 15 March 1946 (VHA-5).

Eventually, the military intelligence services reported that the UPA had purportedly suffered a number of defeats in Poland (this intelligence was inaccurate). Therefore, it was expected that the ultimate liquidation of the Ukrainian nationalist movement would be carried out by the Polish organs within a short period of time. For that reason, a number of Czechoslovak soldiers, who were concentrated in the northeastern region of Slovakia in anticipation of a possible conflict with the UPA, were transferred to the reserve. The numerical strength of ZPÚ Group “Jánošík” was thus reduced by half to 1,250 soldiers. On the proposal of the group’s commander, J. Stanek, the reorganization was carried out in the belief that the Banderite danger had now been reduced to a minimum. Therefore, the maintenance of security in the northeastern sector of the Slovak border once again became the responsibility of only part of the 10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, and the rest of the troops returned to their garrisons (VHA-6).

**The Structure of ZPÚ Group “Otto”**  
(April 1946)



In late March 1946 the command of the 10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division created “Otto”, a new ZPÚ army group in north-eastern Slovakia (commander: Lieutenant Colonel Otto Wágner of the 20<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment), whose three infantry battalions and reserve motorized units stationed in Michalovce replaced the recently deployed army units. They were tasked with guarding a 200-kilometer-long stretch of the border from the Poprad River all the way to the village of Ubl’a in the Snina district (VHA-7). This flawed military directive was issued on the eve of the second UPA raid into Slovakia.

The success of the UPA’s first Slovak raid in 1945 encouraged the UHVR and the OUN and UPA leadership in Zakerzonnia to organize a second raid into Slovakia. However, several factors had an impact on its realization. At the beginning of 1946 a number of changes had occurred in the international arena. Relations had now cooled between the USSR and its erstwhile allies in the anti-Nazi coalition, and the world was now divided into two hostile camps. This polarization sparked the hope that the West would provide effective assistance and support to the anti-Soviet and anti-communist resistance movements, and this hope led them to become more active. At the same time, an important domestic political event in Czechoslovakia was on the horizon: the May 1946 elections to the Legislative National Assemblies, which were supposed to define the political future of the country. Thus, through its operations in north-eastern Slovakia in the spring of 1946 the UPA entered the pre-election campaign fray between the communist and the democratic forces that would determine the future course of post-war Slovakia.

The preparations for the UPA’s second raid into the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic—specifically Slovakia—began in the winter of 1945–46. Just like the first raid, the second one was organized by Vasyl’ Halasa (“Orlan”) (Halasa, 2005: 84-85). Besides Halasa, other leading figures of the UPA and the OUN in Zakerzonnia took part in the preparations. Iaroslav Petsiv (“Vadym”) was responsible for political-propagandistic activity. Battalion commander Vasyl’ Mizernyi (“Ren”) was in charge of forming the detachments that would enter Slovakia. The okruha leader of the OUN, Myroslav Huk (“Hryhor”), was in charge of preparing propagandistic literature and leaflets in the Czech and Slovak languages. The leader of OUN nadraion “Beskyd”, Stepan Golash (“Mar”), was tasked with securing food supplies. The entire Slovak operation was placed under the command of V. Hoshko (“Myron”), a participant and the commander of one of the units that took part in the first UPA raid. Besides his company, companies led by Vasyl’ Shyshkanynets’ (“Bir”) and “Didyk” (real name unknown) were also preparing to leave for Slovakia; during the raid the command of the latter company was taken over by Commander “Karmeliuk” (real name unknown). At the same time, the companies were reinforced by propagandists from the civilian OUN network of Zakerzonnia (Viatrovych, 2001: 79-80). Approximately a thousand Ukrainian insurgents and members of the civilian OUN network worked on the preparation of the approaching operation. A set of “Brief Instructions for Those Who Are Going on the Raid into Slovakia”, prepared by “Orlan” for the insurgents assigned to the propaganda raid and which were to be used during the campaign, outlined the main conception and tactical assignments of the second UPA raid into eastern Slovakia (Viatrovych, 2001: 158-162, 169-173). Vasyl’ Halasa (“Orlan”) writes: “In keeping with the tactical instructions, the insurgents were to cover the largest chunk of territory possible without remaining long in one place; to avoid battles with Czechoslovak army units; immediately after their arrival, to distribute our leaflets among the villagers, explain that we are not going to be fighting against them; to provide information about the goals of our struggle, and to find sympathizers among the intelligentsia” (Halasa, 2005: 85).

The UPA detachments received their final instructions on 4–5 April 1946 in the village of Wola Wyzna, near the northeastern border of Slovakia. All three companies, numbering 400 insurgents, crossed the border without any difficulty on the evening of 6 April at the appointed time (after 21:00 hours) in the Medzilaborce segment of the border (near the village of Habura). Over the next few days the members of the three UPA detachments launched their propagandistic activities. They resorted to the tactic that had been tested during the first raid: once again they divided into smaller groups, thereby creating the impression of a large number of Ukrainian insurgents maneuvering throughout the region, and they sought to expand their activities in as large an area as possible (see: Viatrovych, 2001: 79-95; Šmigel’, 2007a: 128-157). Furthermore, they were well supplied with propaganda materials in the form of leaflets.

Despite its numerical strength, ZPÚ Group “Otto” was once again unable to protect the border in the north-eastern sector. Just like during the first raid, this situation acted in the Ukrainian insurgents’ favor. Even though the OBZ structures had improved their offensive

intelligence gathering, no UPA activity was noticed, and military intelligence did not have any information about the preparation of the raid, which again attests to the utmost conspiracy surrounding the plans of the Ukrainian insurgents.


In agreement with the General Staff of the Czechoslovak army, on 14 April 1946 the command of the 4<sup>th</sup> Military District began shoring up its reinforcements and formed a special new group called “Ocel,” whose command was assigned to Colonel of the General Staff, Jan Heřman, deputy commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> Military District. Two days later, on 16 April, the Czechoslovak government discussed the situation in eastern Slovakia at its 51<sup>st</sup> session. It passed a resolution urging that anti-UPA actions be carried out with all available forces and that the defense and interior ministries of the CSR issue speedy directives—within two weeks—to ensure that the area was cleansed of the UPA and to normalize relations in the region. With this goal in mind, the government subordinated all the NB and FS units to the army command in Slovakia (SNA-7).

By 18 April 1946 the command of the 4<sup>th</sup> Military District and the General Staff of the Czechoslovak army quickly deployed to the area of UPA operations additional combat-ready army units (of the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup>, and 10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Divisions and the 4<sup>th</sup> Rapid-Response Division), which were supplemented by two machine gun battalions of Czech tank brigades. By 21 April the following army formations were concentrated in eastern Slovakia: fourteen infantry, motorized, and machine gun battalions; one tank battalion; two artillery units; one APC company; a squadron of fighter planes; and several smaller units (companies) that were divided into the subgroups “Železo” (Iron), “Hliník” (Aluminum) and “Zlato” (Gold), with ZPÚ Group “Otto” subordinated to the latter subgroup. At the same time, all stations and regular NB units and FS sections were subordinated to the military formation “Ocel.” An additional three battalions were on alert in the Czech part of the country for possible use in north-eastern Slovakia. The Slovak Commission of Internal Affairs also issued an order proclaiming a state of emergency in the districts of eastern Slovakia (ABS-3).

Thus, approximately 7,000 soldiers supported by tanks, artillery, aviation, and auxiliary units of the NB and the FS were arrayed against three UPA companies. By 18 April 1946 army units had already occupied the valleys of the Cirocha, Topľa, and Sekčov rivers. They were deployed along the line of Brekov–Humenné–Sol’–Hanušovce–Bardejov, thus creating a position from which to launch the cleansing operation, later called “Wide Rakes” (Mičko, 2006: 203-204). Its essence lay in encircling the region where the UPA detachments operated and pushing them across the state border; afterwards it was to be reinforced and its inviolability secured. Nevertheless, the task of these army units was a difficult one. “Numerical strength alone was not sufficient to liquidate the UPA detachments that evaded direct clashes, moved constantly from one place to another, and which were scattered throughout mountainous and forested locales that provided hiding places and concealed movement”, writes J. Fiala (Fiala, 1994: 79-84).


Once again, the commitment of Czechoslovak army and NB units came too late. The military operation launched on 21 April 1946 took place when the UPA detachments had already left Slovakia or were in the process of departing for their bases – because the raid was coming to an end (“Karmeliuk’s” Company crossed the Slovak-Polish border during the night of 18–19 April; “Bir’s” Company crossed on 22 April; and “Myron’s” Company, on 24 April). The “Ocel” Group continued combing the area, and by 29 April it had reached the Polish border, which it occupied and reinforced in the sector between Čertižné and Nová Sedlica.

**The Structure of “Ocel” Group**  
(Up to 21 April 1946)



<p><b>“Pavol”</b> 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 20<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment (10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division Košice)</p>	<p><b><i>Reserve:</i></b></p>
<p><b>“Michal”</b> 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the 14<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment (10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division Košice)</p>	<p><b>“Filip”</b> Tank Battalion of the 14<sup>th</sup> Tank Brigade (4<sup>th</sup> Rapid-Response Division Žilina)</p>
<p><b>“Milan”</b> Machine Gun Battalion of the 14<sup>th</sup> Tank Brigade (4<sup>th</sup> Rapid-Response Division Žilina)</p>	<p><b>“Dušan”</b> Combined Artillery Unit (2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division Banská Bystrica)</p>
<p><b>“Dávid”</b> APC Company (4<sup>th</sup> Rapid-Response Division Žilina)</p>	<p><b>“Čechy”</b> Machine Gun Battalion (1<sup>st</sup> Military District)</p>
	<p><b>“Morava”</b> Machine Gun Battalion (3<sup>rd</sup> Military District)</p>
	<p><b>Squadron of fighter planes</b> (Košice)</p>

*The Structure of “Ocel” Group  
(22–29 April 1946)*



<b>Subgroup “RUKA”</b> from 10-13 May 1946 (SV Prešov)	<b>“Pavol”</b> Infantry Battalion (SV Zboj)
<b>Reserve of “Ocel” Group:</b>	
<b>“Čechy”</b> Machine Gun Battalion (Zbudské Dlhé)	<b>Reserve:</b>  <b>“Václav”</b> Combined Artillery Unit (Hostovice)
<b>“Morava”</b> Machine Gun Battalion (Podčičva- Tovarné)	<b>“Michal”</b> Infantry Battalion (Snina)
<b>“Filip II”</b> Tank Company (Humenné)	<b>“Oldřich”</b> APC Platoon (Snina)
<b>“Milan”</b> (Half) Machine Gun Battalion (Humenné)	
<b>“Oldřich”</b> APC Platoon (Humenné)	


During the raid all three UPA companies maneuvered throughout Slovakia in keeping with a set plan. “Bir’s” Company moved along the Medzilaborce–Humenné–Vranov nad Topľou–Giraltovce–Stropkov Highway. The company spent sixteen days in north-eastern Slovakia, visiting thirty-one villages without encountering any major difficulties or military clashes. “Myron’s” Company moved along the Medzilaborce–Stropkov–Giraltovce–Bardejov–Prešov–Sabinov line, reaching the vicinity of Košice. It covered a total of 311 km and visited 49 villages. The third company, under “Karmeliuk’s” command, moved along the Medzilaborce–Giraltovce–Stropkov–Bardejov–Prešov–Vranov nad Topľou–Humenné–Michalovce Highway, visiting twenty-six villages in eastern Slovakia ([Litopys, 2001: 592-627](#)). Altogether, the members of the UPA detachments visited 106 villages in 10 districts, where they carried out their planned activities. They completed the tasks assigned by their leadership (the plan was to spend ten days in Slovakia, to a maximum of fourteen, only if the Czechoslovak units did not obstruct them). The second Slovak raid actually lasted until 24 April 1946, i.e., a total of

eighteen days (Viatrovych, 2001: 82). During this operation the UPA detachments did not encounter any resistance from the Czechoslovak armed forces and security organs (with the exception of two or three clashes). The Ukrainian insurgents suffered only minimal human losses – a few soldiers were wounded or disappeared without a trace (two wounded) – and they returned unmolested to their base field of operations in Poland. This time, too, the propaganda raid was a resounding success.

After occupying the north-eastern sector of the Slovak-Polish border, in May 1946 the army units of “Ocel” Group began carrying out ZPÚ functions. When the situation became exacerbated again in the adjacent Polish territory, the command of the 4<sup>th</sup> Military District deployed new reinforcements: a unit of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Rapid-Response Division from Moravia and one battalion of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division. Together with the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the 20<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment, these units were included in the newly created subgroup “Ruka” (commander: Colonel Jan Kolařík). It secured the state border west of the “Ocel” Group’s position—from Čertižné all the way to the Poprad River (with three battalions right on the border and two held in reserve). The subgroup “Ruka” occupied a special position within “Ocel” Group and operated in a more independent fashion (VHA-8).

### The Structure of Subgroup “Ruka”

(From 10-13 May 1946)



As a result of the experience amassed by the Czechoslovak army and security services during the UPA's previous penetrations into Slovakia, cooperation with the Polish side was established for the first time.<sup>15</sup> After joint talks involving government officials and the highest-ranking military representatives of both countries were held, on 26 April 1946 representatives of "Ocel" Group met at Dukla Pass with the Polish DGO operational group "Rzeszów", which had begun its anti-UPA operations in Poland earlier that month. Both sides exchanged information about their past and future operations against the UPA, and about the state of security maintenance on their borders. They came to an agreement about holding further meetings and establishing cooperation in the field of information exchange and coordination of their operations (Fiala, 1994: 85-86).


At the same time, both sides appointed liaison officers, who began to work in the commands of both groups as of 12 May 1946 ("Ocel" Group: Major of the General Staff Jan Konieczny; DGO "Rzeszów" Command: Staff Captain of the General Staff Jozef Musil). In addition, the Czechoslovak military command and the headquarters of Lieutenant Colonel J. Heřman renewed cooperation with the Soviet military command in Uzhhorod (during the second /April/ UPA raid some units of "Ocel" Group were already cooperating with NKVD border units, exchanging intelligence) (VHA-9). A Soviet liaison officer also began working in this group (AUPN). Several more rounds of joint talks between the military representatives of the CSR, Poland, and the USSR took place in the summer of 1946, in order to coordinate the anti-UPA operations of the three countries' armed forces.

With the exception of several skirmishes, during May–June 1946 a period of relative calm descended on the border. "Ocel" Group (approximate strength in June 1946: 11,000 soldiers) primarily ensured that the ZPÚ's tasks were being carried out in northeastern Slovakia. On the basis of information supplied by "Rzeszów", the group command periodically reinforced the border guard (the group's composition occasionally changed, depending on the situation) and, after the completion of the Polish operations, the army units of this group combed the state border area and its own borderland. Together with NB units, the group hunted down and deported Lemko refugees from Poland, who were fleeing the Polish operations and seeking refuge in Slovak territory (see Šmigel, 2007b). Thus, in late May 1946, more than 4,000 Lemko refugees were forcibly deported to Poland; later, other Lemko refugees were sent to a refugee camp located in Strážske. The search for and detention of suspect civilians were carried out by OBZ units and the so-called Special Group commanded by First Lieutenant Hugo Reisman (ABS-4), which was subordinated to the 6<sup>th</sup> Branch of the OBZ of the "Ocel" command (by 26 May 1946, 290 individuals were detained for collaborating with the UPA or other types of illegal activities) (Fiala, 1994: 90). At the same time, military intelligence continued to gather offensive intelligence with the help of an agentura network (VHA-10), to which border units of the NB were gradually enlisted to collect information about political-civic relations and UPA actions in the adjacent Polish territory.<sup>16</sup> However, the intelligence that was obtained in this manner was often shoddy.

In July 1946 the composition of the forces that were assigned to protect the border, including the ZPÚ, was partially altered (the ZPÚ's method of operations had worked well, but it required a large number of forces and means). On the basis of an agreement concluded by the defense, interior and finance ministries of the CSR, the existing four-tiered state border security system (in keeping with an order issued by the Ministry of Defense on 31 August 1945) was changed to a three-tiered system (by combining the third and four tiers)<sup>17</sup>. At the same time, army garrisons and units deployed near the borders were assigned to "Border Security" during a period of real threat to the country's external security (Štaigl, 2000: 59).

The calm situation in the border areas facilitated the gradual reduction of forces needed to defend the border of north-eastern Slovakia and to reorganize ZPÚ Group "Ocel", which on 22 July 1946 changed its codename to "Teplice". The group command assessed the combined experience of defending the border and reviewed the anti-UPA operations. It proposed new ZPÚ methods based on methodical agentura border protection and the maneuvering of powerful, operational reserves. From mid-August 1946 some army units began returning to their garrisons (along with some Czech units), as a result of which the ZPÚ "Teplice" Group was scaled back to five infantry battalions and one machine gun company in the so-called informational tier, and two motorized battalions and two machine gun battalions, with machine gun companies and APCs in reserve. On 10 September 1946 the liaison officers were recalled from the headquarters of the "Teplice" and "Rzeszów" groups. At the end of that month the command of "Teplice" Group was taken over by Colonel Jozef Tlach, and Colonel J. Heřman returned to his previous post, the command of the 4<sup>th</sup> Military District (Fiala, 1994: 108-109).

**The Structure of ZPÚ Group “Teplice”**  
(10 August–18 September 1946)



Between the end of the second April raid and late 1946/spring 1947 large UPA detachments practically did not appear on the territory of north-eastern Slovakia (with the exception of small groups, as a rule those that were crossing into Slovak territory in order to escape encirclement by the Poles and which then immediately returned to Poland). Units of the “Teplice” Group’s informational tier monitored the border area, changing the areas of their activities and border guard duties. Reserves of battalions and groups primarily engaged in training. Minor incidents occurred on the border only in late 1946. In the majority of cases, UPA detachments tried their utmost to avoid encountering units of the Czechoslovak army and had no interest in engaging in any military confrontations. As a result of the continuing calm, “Teplice” Group continued its reorganization and simultaneous reduction (as of 30 November 1946 the group numbered only 3,920 people).

## 5. Conclusion

In the first years after the end of the Second World War units of the UPA carried out a series of propaganda raids on the territory of Slovakia (Czechoslovakia). These raids, which had immense political and social significance, triggered the Czechoslovak army’s largest military operation in the postwar period. In certain aspects, these raids overwhelmed the security measures that were implemented in connection with the liquidation of the UPA’s operations in the CSR. The UPA’s penetration into Slovakia between spring 1945 and spring 1946 had an explicitly political goal and took the form of propaganda raids. Although the third round of UPA raids into the CSR in 1947 had a political subtext, it was primarily a military question, and the potential political impact on the domestic political development of Czechoslovakia gradually accrued to it. Because of mentioned reasons the analysis of the UPA activities in Czechoslovakia has a considerable historical value and is a valuable contribution to understanding several important aspects of the issue, mainly the aspects regarding forms and methods of the national liberation struggle led by the UPA, OUN, respectively UHVR on Ukrainian ethnic territories, especially in its military and political dimension.

The raids that were organized from southeastern Poland into the CSR by UPA detachments, whose goals were to conduct anti-Soviet and anti-communist propaganda, draw attention to the Ukrainian armed resistance movement and, later, cross the territory of Czechoslovakia to the American Zone of Occupation in Germany in 1947, are reflected in Czech and Slovak army and security service documents. Knowledge of the UPA raids in Slovakia in 1945 – 1946 fills the information gap essential for a complex reconstruction of the UPA activities in Eastern and Central Europe and related topics as well.

## 6. Acknowledgements

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup>The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (*Ukrains’ka Holovna Vyzvol’na Rada* – UHVR) was founded on a broad political base in July 1944 on the initiative of the UPA. This was an underground government whose task was to represent the Ukrainian nation, lead the liberation movement, and conduct a political and propagandistic-informational struggle against the Soviet regime in Ukraine. The Presidium of the UHVR consisted of the president, Kyrylo Os’mak; vice-presidents Vasyly’ Mudryi, Rev.- Dr. Ivan Hryniokh, and Ivan Vovchuk; general secretary Roman Shukhevych (the de facto head of the UHVR); a judge-general; and a general controller. Toward the end of 1944 some of the UHVR leaders immigrated to the West, where they established the External Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (ZCh UHVR), headed by Rev.-Dr. I. Hryniokh. The General Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the UHVR, Mykola Lebed’, was responsible for foreign policy (UHVR).

<sup>2</sup>The Zakerzonnia region (*Zakerzons’kyi krai*) was the territory that lay west of the so-called Curzon Line in southeastern Poland, populated by Ukrainians and Rusyns, where an underground administrative network of the OUN(B) was created. This territory was divided into three OUN administrative okrugas: Okruha no. 1, comprising the Lemko and Peremyshl’ regions; Okruha no.

2, comprising the Iaroslav and Hrubeshiv areas; and Okruha no. 3, comprising the Kholm and Pidliashshia regions. Each okruha was subdivided into nadraions, raions, and kushches. The leadership of OUN in Zakerzonnia consisted of: krai leader Iaroslav Starukh (“Stiah”); responsible leader of the OUN Security Service and first deputy of the krai leader Petro Fedoriv (“Dal’nych”); responsible propaganda leader and second deputy of the krai leader Vasyl’ Halasa (“Orlan”); and responsible military leader and commander of the 6<sup>th</sup> UPA Military Okruha “Sian” Major Myroslav Onyshkevych (“Orest”). The OUN network functioned as a civilian administration and created the UPA’s rear line services.

<sup>3</sup> The Lemko region (Lemkivshchyna) is located in southeastern Poland, near the Polish-Slovak border, parallel to northeastern Slovakia, whose eastern part borders on Ukraine. Until 1947 this territory was inhabited by Lemkos. Their neighbors in the west and north were Poles, and in the south—Slovaks, Slovak Ukrainians, and Rusyns, with whom they shared close ethnocultural ties. The people living in this region did not consider themselves members of a single ethnic group. In contrast to the western Lemkos, who considered themselves Rusyns, the eastern Lemkos considered themselves Ukrainians. The western and eastern parts of the Lemko region are divided by Dukla Pass.

<sup>4</sup> On 23 February 1945 the Presidium of the Slovak National Council issued resolutions disbanding all existing formations of gendarmes and the police (of the First Slovak Republic), and an agency organized along military lines and called National Security (*Národná bezpečnosť* – NB) was created as part of the newly created Commission for Internal Affairs (renamed in January 1946 as the Commission of Internal Affairs) of the CSR. After some limited changes were made to the organizational structure of the NB in early May 1945, the new security agency consisted of: the Main Command of National Security (*Hlavné veliteľstvo Národnej bezpečnosti* – HVNB) in Bratislava; twenty Regional Commands; and local and borderland stations. General questions were dealt with by the 1<sup>st</sup> Section, while questions relating to the activities of the borderland control stations were dealt with by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Section of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division (Security) of the Commission for Internal Affairs. Essentially, the national security service in Slovakia developed and carried out tasks independently of the security organs in the Czech-Moravian part of the CSR, where the Committee of National Security (*Zbor národnej bezpečnosti* – ZNB) was created by a resolution of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the CSR on 30 June 1945 and headed by the Main Command in Prague (ZNB 9600). The activities of both sections of the state security service were coordinated through negotiations between officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Commission for Internal Affairs, the ZNB, and the NB, the dispatching of liaison officers, etc. The Slovak NB became part of the ZNB only in the second half of 1947, following the passage of the Law on National Security, No. 149/1947, Collection of Laws (Štaigl, 2000: 56, 60).

<sup>5</sup> The Financial Police (*Finančná stráž* – FS) – armed organs of the state financial administration (customs formations) whose task was to oversee and maintain state border crossings. From the summer of 1945 the leadership and implementation of day-to-day operations were provided by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Section of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division of the Commission of Finances of the Slovak National Council in Bratislava. The main organizational structure of the Financial Police was comprised of the main inspectorates, inspectors, and branches of the FS (Štaigl, 2000: 56).

<sup>6</sup> The Committee of Defense Security Information (*Obranné zpravodajstvo* – OBZ) was founded in General Ludvik Svoboda’s 1<sup>st</sup> Czechoslovak Army Corps in the USSR as a military-defense intelligence service (on the direct orders of the Soviet NKVD and without the agreement of the Czechoslovak Ministry of National Defense). From the beginning of its existence, the OBZ operated both as an intelligence service and a security force (political police) and was the “long hand” of the NKVD in the country. During the period when the country was in a state of mobilization (until the end of 1945) and the army (Ministry of National Defense) acquired extraordinary rights, the OBZ became permanently entrenched in the military structures. It was tasked with maintaining internal security in the army (surveillance, control, and vetting of army personnel and officers (a priority task at the time) and external defense (liquidation of enemy agents, spies, and saboteurs; intelligence monitoring of the civilian population; the creation of agentura networks, etc.). During the postwar build-up of the Czechoslovak defense system, by early July 1945 the OBZ structure was being developed within individual army units and military districts. The OBZ was divided into the Main Directorate based at the General Staff of the Ministry of National Defense, regional OBZ directorates at district army commands, OBZ sections (within

the commands of army corps, divisions, and brigades, and in large garrisons and key locations), and OBZ officers (in regiments, battalions, garrison commands of medium-sized cities, district commands of reservists and other military units and institutions). The OBZ's operations were also partly channeled outside the army and intruded on the competence of other secret services, in particular the Department of Political Intelligence and the Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the CSR; it also cooperated with the Soviet secret services. An order issued on 1 May 1946 by Division General Bohumil Boček, the head of the General Staff of the Ministry of National Defense, made the OBZ part of the structure of the General Staff as its 5<sup>th</sup> Division (Hanzlík, 2003: 20-28).

<sup>7</sup> The so-called Provisional Peacetime Organization of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces began to function on 25 May 1945. The territory of the CSR was divided into four organizational and territorial parts—military districts—with an organizational structure similar to the army. The 4<sup>th</sup> Military District was created in Slovakia, with its command based in Bratislava (commander: Brigadier General **Mikuláš Markus**; on 20 October 1945 the command was handed over to Division General Michal Širica). The main organizational structure and composition of the stationed troops that were subordinated to the 4<sup>th</sup> Military District were comprised of two Army Corps (*Armádný zbor – AZ*), auxiliary units in the form of a tank brigade (Liptovský Mikuláš), four artillery brigades, one anti-aircraft artillery regiment, one aircraft division (command based in Trenčín), and military supply units. The organizational nucleus of the various corps consisted of infantry regiments. The command of the VII AZ in Trenčín (commander: Brigadier General M. Širica; from 20 October 1945 led by Brigadier General M. Markus) was subordinated to the 4<sup>th</sup> Division with its command headquarters based in Ružomberk (as of 10 October 1945 it was reorganized as the 4<sup>th</sup> Rapid-Response Division, with its command based in Žilina) and the 9<sup>th</sup> Division based in Nitra (later in Trnava). The 2<sup>nd</sup> Division, with its command in Banská Bystrica, and the 10<sup>th</sup> Division with its command in Košice, were subordinated to the command of the VIII AZ in Banská Bystrica (commander: Brigadier General Ján Imro; from October 1945, led by Colonel Pavol Kuna). The Enhanced Organization of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces began to function from 1 October 1945, and it significantly altered the organizational structure and deployment of troops in Slovakia (Štaigl, 2007: 136-137).

<sup>8</sup> The agreement with the Košice government program (5 April 1945) called for the preservation of the national character of army units. Thus, army units deployed on the territory of Slovakia were comprised of soldiers and junior and senior officers mainly of Slovak nationality. The language of the command and the administration was Slovak.

<sup>9</sup> Their task was to carry out intelligence and patrolling operations, prevent attempts at illegal crossings of the state borders and the movement of contraband, and provide armed assistance to state administrative bodies, above all to sections of the FS and the NB while carrying out various security tasks.

<sup>10</sup> For example, persecuted and resettled Germans, former Hungarian soldiers, and people of other nationalities, who were returning from captivity, concentration camps, and other types of camps; motley groups of deserters, supporters of former military regimes, refugees, criminal elements, including smugglers, poachers, and others. Even some military reports from this period distinguished “Banderites” (it was assumed they were bandits, members of bands) from “UPA groups”—Ukrainian insurgents.

<sup>11</sup> As part of the new peacetime border protection system (according to the pre-war model) the Ministry of National Defense of the CSR resolved, after concluding an agreement with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Finances of the CSR, to create a four-tiered border protection system (31 August 1945). The first tier consisted of the FS, which primarily controlled border crossings; the second tier consisted of NB (ZNB) border stations; the third tier consisted of auxiliary military units that were deployed to border areas; and the fourth tier consisted of rapid-response divisions from various military districts, to be used as reserves (Štaigl, 2000: 58).

<sup>12</sup> Some older writers claim that these events, which took place between October and December 1945, were the second UPA raid into eastern Slovakia. This claim is uncorroborated, as it is based on assumptions and inventions. This claim appears, e.g., in the works of Pavel Drška, who writes about the penetration into the Snina district of the “Brovko”, “Karmeliuk”, “Myron”, “Perih” and “Sokil” companies and “Horbovyi’s” platoon, numbering 500 men. This is utter nonsense. Equally ludicrous are the names of the companies: they did not exist in the UPA structure in

Zakerzonnia, with the exception of “Karmeliuk’s” Company, which was located far north of the Slovak border; “Myron” was briefly the commander of another company to which he was assigned (Drška, 1989: 100-101).

<sup>13</sup> As the researcher of Banderite-related topics, B. Chňoupek, writes, “Although no one has ever uncovered any proof, I suspected that the killings in Nová Sedlica, Ulič, and Kolbasov were committed by” the UPA unit led by Commander “Bir.” He explains that “Bir’s” company was in the Polish border region closest to the Snina district (Chňoupek, 1989: 313). In its concluding report issued in February 1948, the commission that was formed to investigate the Banderite groups on the territory of Czechoslovakia confirmed the complete opposite. The report states that the killings in the Snina district were carried out by armed groups that arrived in the district from Transcarpathian Ukraine, to which they later returned (ABS-5). This report significantly bolsters the theory of the use of the pseudo-Banderite group that was created by the Soviet NKVD in Zakarpattia.

<sup>14</sup> The murders of Jews and communists in the Snina district in November–December 1945 are being investigated by a group of Slovak historians, who have been studying this question since 2006. Some of the results of this research have already been published (Šmigel, 2007c; Šmigel, 2008). Research on this tragic episode is complicated by the fact that, with the exception of a few documents that have been uncovered (published in the second part of this volume), scholars working on this topic have not been able to uncover any comprehensive documentation on the investigation into these murders. The possibility cannot be excluded that if such documentation ever existed, it has not survived or was at some point deliberately destroyed.

<sup>15</sup> In the first postwar years, Czechoslovak-Polish relations were quite strained. This was caused, among other things, by border disputes and both sides’ claims to certain territories that had belonged to pre-war Germany after the Polish-German border along the Oder-Neisse line was moved (primarily the Tesin (Teschen) region), as well as by the tense situation around Upper Orava and Northern Spiš (Štaigl, 2000: 55; Majeriková-Molitoris 2013).

<sup>16</sup> After the restructuring of the Slovak Commission of Internal Affairs in 1946, the task of organizing the NB Directorate (including border stations) became part of the responsibility of the 1<sup>st</sup> Section of the 5<sup>th</sup> Division (state security and administrative police). In relation to their activities, other sections of the Commission of Internal Affairs, particularly the 6<sup>th</sup> Division (Information), which was renamed in the fall of 1946 as Department “Z” (state security and political information) also had certain responsibilities. In keeping with a decision handed down on 10 August 1946 by its head, Major R. Viktorín, the tasks of the NB border stations were expanded to offensive intelligence, i.e., the gathering of news from the border area as well as from inside those neighboring countries on whose borders their command posts were stationed (except for the USSR, against which all intelligence gathering was forbidden). This intelligence activity was supposed to be organized at a distance of 30 km beyond the Czechoslovak border, and its goal was to obtain information on the economic, political, social, and military issues of neighboring states (Štaigl, 2000: 59-60).

<sup>17</sup> See notes No 11.

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
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## 'Cinema Art' as part of a typical model of the Soviet humanitarian journals in the Cold War times

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### Abstract

The analysis of the journal *Cinema Art* – 1977 revealed the following main film criticism trends:

- the magazine was unable to preserve the "thawing" tendencies, which were still strong even in the late 1960s, and in many ways proved to be in the ideological line of the peak of the L. Brezhnev's epoch;
- At the same time, the journal tried to analyze the most notable works of Soviet cinema, while, alas, not allowing even in minimal doses a criticism of the shortcomings in the works of the most "principally" influential at that time the screen masters;
- giving a weighty tribute to the Soviet propaganda pathos, the magazine could afford to publish the substantive discussions "on certain narrow bridgeheads".

In general, the *Cinema Art* in 1977 was part of a typical model of the Soviet humanitarian journal, which, with significant censorship concessions and powers, tried to retain at least 50 % of the total text for art analysis of the film process.

**Keywords:** film criticism, USSR, Soviet, film, social and cultural context, politics, magazine, Cinema Art.

### 1. Introduction

1977 year was jubilee in the USSR: the 60th anniversary of the Soviet power was fulfilled. It is clear that as in 1967, the Soviet press (and the magazine *Cinema Art* was no exception) should have joyfully reported about all the victories and accomplishments.

*Cinema Art* was published monthly: from 50 to 54 thousand copies in 1977, against 30–35 thousand in 1967. In each issue included several articles about the Soviet cinema, materials of directors, screenwriters and other filmmakers, scripts and filmographies. A whole series of ideological materials were added to the traditional headings (*New Movies, Theory and History, Interview between Films, Abroad, Script, Published on the Cinema*, etc.). For example, quotation from the speeches of the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee L. Brezhnev, *Towards the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution, Modernity and the Screen...*

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The editorial board of the magazine *Cinema Art* – 1977 consisted of 21 persons. As before, many of them were well-known directors (S. Gerasimov, A. Zguridi, R. Carmen, S. Yutkevich) and film functionaries. However, compared to the 1960s, film critics and film experts became approximately twice as large (almost 50 %) in the editorial board: E. Surkov (editor in chief) (1915–1988), N. Ignatieva (deputy editor-in-chief), A. Medvedev (deputy editor-in-chief), V. Baskakov (1921–1999), I. Weissfeld (1909–2003), A. Karaganov (1915–2007), K. Paramonova (1916–2005), N. Savitsky (born 1939), N. Sumenov (1938–2014) and R. Yurenev (1912–2002).

Of course, the spectrum of the authors of the journal was wider, but in comparison with the previous jubilee year (1967), it largely lost its representativeness. Yes, the list of authors still included: A. Vartanov (born 1931), Y. Warsawsky (1911–2000), M. Zak (1929–2011), N. Ignatieva (born 1923), G. Kapralov (1921–2010), A. Svobodin (1922–1999), Y. Khanyutin (1929–1978), R. Yurenev (1912–2002), etc. In addition, *Cinema Art* – 1977 also published such well-known film critics as L. Anninsky, E. Bauman (1932–2017), L. Donets (1935–2016), K. Rudnitsky (1920–1988), E. Stishova, V. Turovsky (1949–1998), but on his pages there were no articles by Y. Bogomolov (born 1937), V. Demin (1937–1993), L. Kozlov (1933–2006), L. Pogozeva (1913–1989), L. Rybak (1923–1988), I. Solovieva (born 1927), T. Khloplyankina (1937–1993), V. Shitova (1927–2002) and many other well-known film critics (among the most insulting ones, for example, are the absence of N. Zorkaya and M. Turovskaya).

*Cinema Art* – 1977 wrote about such notable Soviet films a *Ascension* by L. Shepitko, *Atybaty, the Soldiers Were Walking* by L. Bykov, *I ask for Words* by G. Panfilov, *Leg-pull* by V. Menshov, *Mimino* by G. Danelia, *The Eldest Son* by V. Melnikov, *The Key Without the Right to Transfer* by D. Asanova, *The Steppe* by S. Bondarchuk, *The Tale of how Tsar Peter Married the Arap* by A. Mitta, *The Wreath of Sonnets* by V. Rubinchik, *Twenty Days Without War* by A. German, *Unfinished play for the mechanical piano* and *Slave of Love* by N. Mikhalkov, *Wounded* by N. Gubenko. Were published talented scenarios *Moscow does not believe in words* by V. Chernykh and *Reserve* by A. Bitov. But, alas, in the same year the magazine also published a servile script of a documentary about L. Brezhnev's *Story of a Communist*, and uncontrollably complimentary reviews of the very weak military drama *Thought on Koupak* by T. Levchuk, about mediocre melodramas *Love of the Earth* and *Destiny* by E. Matveev...

## 2. Materials and methods

The main material for the study were 12 issues of the *Cinema Art* – 1977. At the same time, we analyzed only how the film criticism reflected on magazine's pages the Soviet feature film (although, of course, *Cinema Art* also wrote about documentary and foreign films, animation, published articles by prominent filmmakers, writers, actors, full texts of scenarios, etc.). We used the method of hermeneutic analysis.

## 3. Results

### *Anniversary texts*

The jubilee articles of 1977 were often anonymous: apparently, not every film critic, even the "boss", could afford to put his signature under such, for example, articles as "*The Inspirational Care of the Party*" (*Cinema Art*, 1977: 3-8) or *The Fading Light of October* (*Cinema Art*, 1977: 1-5). Here is just one quote from such anonymous opuses, saturated with references to L. Brezhnev's speeches: *It is great and honorable duty of the masters of the Soviet screen, called to recreate the epoch-making picture of the life and accomplishments of the great Soviet people. Soviet cinema art was, is and will always be the military assistant of the party* (*Inspiring ...*, 1977: 8). In issues 10 and 11 of *Cinema Art* – 1977, such ideological texts occupied more than 50 % of the total volume of the journal.

Of course, among these articles there were also "author's" works. For example, a long & boring article of V. Dmitriev *The Humanism of the Socialist Revolution and Cinematography* (*Dmitriev*, 1977), exerting on references from the L. Brezhnev's "works", where it was enthusiastically asserted that *the cinematographic art of the Soviet land became communist party. The socialist primogeniture was determined by the choice initially made-together with the communist party, with the revolution, with the people!* (*Dmitriev*, 1977: 8).

Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Cinema Committee B. Pavlenok (1923–2012) in his party-politicized article about the current film process approved the outstanding film *Ascension* by L. Shepitko, but does not stint on the praise of long-deservedly forgotten films on the historical-revolutionary topic: *Carriage from the South, Siege, Red Black Earth, Red Diplomatic Couriers* (Pavlenok, 1977: 6-14).

The indefatigable fighter of the ideological front V. Baskakov, in his article *The Cinema of Socialist Realism and the Falsification of Sovietologists*, as always (although without any convincing arguments), refuted the opinions of the bourgeois film criticism: "Whatever our ideological opponents say, no matter what "models" of the history of Soviet cinema they are, no matter how hard they try to confuse the question of the continuity of the progressive development of Soviet cinema, they will not be able to substitute the truth for falsehood, will not be able to cover up their "true" intentions and plans" (Baskakov, 1977: 52).

#### Film Reviews

Editor-in-chief of *Cinema Art* E. Surkov was famous for his ability to balance between the "communist party line" and the line of truly artistic. That is why, in addition to the above-mentioned ideological materials, *Cinema Art* of the 1970s was active supporter of many outstanding screen works, the publication of an interview with A. Tarkovsky and his script.

So in 1977 the magazine published two articles about the masterpiece of L. Shepitko – the military drama *Ascension* (1976). Boldly noting the biblical motifs of the film, E. Stishova rightly argued that "L. Shepitko, judging by her former films, always attracted crisis situations for the individual, the model of this situation was repeatedly tested by the director. And in "Warmth" and "Wings" characters are captured at the moment of the greatest aggravation of mutual relations with the world and with themselves. Such a sequence in the choice of characters suggests that others are uninteresting to this artist: the personality is interesting in the moment of the maximum of its human luminescence" (Stishova, 1977: 31). And Z. Kutorga stressed that the authors "conduct a social and moral investigation of the greatest heroism and self-sacrifice... In parallel, they mercilessly and consistently show the moves of self-deflection and self-justification, which naturally turn Rybak into a traitor" (Kutorga, 1977: 56).

Full support for the magazine received another masterpiece on the military theme – *Twenty Days Without War* (1976) by A. German. Y. Khanyutin noted in his brilliant article: "It is profoundly significant that an eyewitness, front-line correspondent and writer Konstantin Simonov and young director Alexei German, who did not see this war, severely, documented the desire to tell about the war honestly, harshly. Hence, in different generations there is a need to see the era of the war as it was – in high and terrible, in tragic and ridiculous, in the greatest accomplishments and in the smallest detail" (Khanyutin, 1977: 96-97).

In general, a positive review of another notable film on the military theme – *Aty-baty, the Soldiers Were Walking ...* (1976) by L. Bykov – wrote A. Medvedev.

The film critic reasonably noted that the level of "Bykov's directorial mastery did not rise to the skill level of Bykov-actor" (Medvedev, 1977: 51), but at the same time, he asserted in a positive context, that "Leonid Bykov is building a film on colorful and juicy details that have always worked in textures... He forces our feelings, forcing emotions, and now we laugh, loudly laughing, and then immediately, without transition, we are compressed from pain" (Medvedev, 1977: 48).

V. Turovsky also gave ambivalently evaluation of the poetic film about the military childhood *The Wreath of Sonnets* (1976) by V. Rubinchik: "The director doubted, hesitated, whether his own poetic gift would be enough for the film. He decided to back up himself with the poetry of Bella Akhmadulina, two poems and six sonnets of her live in the film with own life... These sonnets heavier and complicate the film action. ... The music of Bella Akhmadulina's verse, superimposed on the poetic nature of the film" (Turovsky, 1977: 114).

I believe that if the military drama *Thought on Kovpak* (1976) by T. Levchuk was on screens in 1960s, the "thawing" editorial office of *Cinema Art* would give this film a negative evaluation. But by the mid–1970s the People's Artist of the USSR, the first secretary of the Union of Cinematographers of Ukraine, candidate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine T. Levchuk (1912–1998) joined

the cohort of "untouchable" directors, and *Cinema Art*, despite the low artistic level of this film, it only remained to write that "Thought on Koupak" "impresses with its scale and depth, causes a sense of pride in Soviet people, helps to better understand the revolutionary transforming power that the people, having defended freedom, applied to peaceful affairs. Undoubtedly, the Thought on Koupak is one of the best works in our cinema on a military theme in recent years" (Zemlyak, 1977: 36).

The same opinion it was possible to print in 1977 about the director's work of People's Artist of the USSR, Secretary of the Board of the Union of Cinematographers of the USSR E. Matveev (1922–2003), who played L. Brezhnev in the film *Soldiers of Freedom*. N. Tolchenova wrote the unconditionally positive review about E. Matveev's films *Earth Love* (1974) and *Fate* (1977) with not forgotten quotes from the report of L. Brezhnev (Tolchenova, 1977: 34-40).

Needless to say, in the jubilee year *Cinema Art* was simply obliged to respond to current films on the so-called historical-revolutionary topic. The drama *Trust* (1976) by V. Tregubovich was in the category of "Leniniana" of this year. V. Ishimov's very positive review of *Trust* had a lot of politics, a retelling of the plot and dialogues, but did not have the serious analysis of the movie's professional qualities.

Much more interesting was the review of E. Stishova for the melodrama *Slave of Love* (1975) by N. Mikhalkov. Of course, the article did not say a word about the fact that first this film (under the title *Unexpected Joys*) was shot by R. Khamdamov, but this shooting was banned by censorship. E. Stishova did not dispense with the stereotyped ideological phrase relating to the plot of the picture (Stishova, 1977: 98). On the one hand, E. Stishova admitted: "I see N. Mikhalkov as the artist endowed with creative courage and an innate sense of form, which provided him with such a vivid start" (Stishova, 1977: 102). But on the other hand she criticized the director, noting that film is too refined and stylish (Stishova, 1977: 101). Although the *Slave of Love*, I think, is real good melodramatic nostalgia for the departing beauty of the intelligent world on the eve of its death under a communist sickle and hammer...

Further E. Stishova remembered the previous work of N. Mikhalkov, arguing that "the plot of *Your own among strangers..*" is ethically untenable already because the Communist special service officer, in order to rehabilitate himself, must act "strangers", that is, bandit methods" (Stishova, 1977: 103). Here it is necessary to think, the author of the article tried seriously (albeit very recklessly) to convince the readers that the "crystal clean" Communist special service officers never used "gangster methods", anywhere in their life...

As a result E. Stishova concluded that N. Mikhalkov "does not notice how flirting. It happens because, in my opinion, that the primary impulse of creativity is just another formal experiment. The task how to say is put on the first place, is absolutized, all outstanding forces are thrown at its decision. The downside is indifference to the material, bordering on neglecting its historically specific moral essence. Stylization turns into an aesthetic" (Stishova, 1977: 103).

If you dismiss the pathos about "indifference" and "historically specific moral essence," the *Slave of Love*, I think, in fact, a brilliant stylization, refined and aesthetic.

It is curious that *Cinema Art* – 1977 wrote about another film by N. Mikhalkov: *Unfinished play for a mechanical piano* (1977), perhaps the best movie of this director. A. Svobodin detail and kindly analyzed the *Unfinished Play ...*, and noted that "the authors of the film freely and uninhibitedly continue the confusion of genres, acting in the spirit of the current understanding of Chekhov's dramaturgy" (Svobodin, 1977: 135).

Contemporary topics were presented in the journal with a number of outstanding works. A. Lipkov (1936–2007) in a review of the drama *I Ask for Words* (1976) by G. Panfilov accurately noticed that here "the director's attitude is as if impartial: he only objectively expounds the facts. But from the viewer he demands activity – activity of thinking, analysis, evaluation" (Lipkov, 1977: 56).

Another drama, *The Word for Legal Protection* (1976) by V. Abdrashitov was demanded no less activity of the audience. M. Zak generally praised this work, since "such films, probably, should encourage not only empathy, but also "co-creation" (Zak, 1977: 94). But he immediately drew the readers' attention to the fact that "there is a motive for a programmed discussion, well hidden in the characters and circumstances, but ready to come to the surface after" (Zak, 1977: 94).

N. Ignatieva wrote very warm review of the drama *Elder Son* (1976) by V. Melnikov: *"The connection, the penetration of genres for this director is associated primarily with this or that psychological mood, the state of the heroes. Therefore, genre joints, genre transitions are natural and organic in this film"* (Ignatieva, 1977: 53). And they generally work on the important thought of the film: *"kindness is associated with insecurity. She is always not ready for spiritual hardness"* (Ignatieva, 1977: 57).

I agree with T. Mamaladze's opinion about the melodrama *Sweet Woman* (1976) by V. Fetin: *"Restoring ... the genre of the morality sketch, it takes a concrete drama beyond the limits of one fate, correlates it, this drama, with the antisocial essence of philistine spirituality"* (Mamaladze, 1977: 26).

Dignity was appreciated and one of the best comedies of G. Danelia – *Mimino* (1977) (Troshin, 1977: 22-23).

A significant place in *Cinema Art* – 1977 was devoted to the analysis of films about childhood and adolescence.

In detail revealing the positive aspects of the drama *Wounded* (1977) by N. Gubenko, T. Jensen noted with regret that *"the scenes before and after the children's home – draws, in no uniqueness, they are all from common places. ... Actually, the lessons that childhood gives us ... a poetic and sincere in its main part..., and alas, straying to the scheme, when the action is being transferred to our days"* (Jensen, 1977: 84-86).

T. Mamaladze preceded reflections on the films of the 1970s on the school theme in the article of D. Asanova's drama *The Key Without the Right to Transfer* (1976): *"The school film" was established in the vocabulary of criticism and in the viewer's consciousness as a persistent concept. In other cases, alas, – as a persistent stereotype. It happens that our cinema "writes" on the topics of the modern school, using a set of ready-made tools, solutions and techniques. However, there are a lot of good works, although the inertia of the stamp all strives to improve the innovative reading of the topic – and sometimes leads to the course laid by the flow of the average "school film"*.

*True, the scheme itself is also of considerable interest. First, one way or another, it fixes certain objective life-patterns: the emergence of "nonstandard" teachers, their opposition to the routine. The assertion in the school environment of an equally "non-standard" student, an intelligent clever man: often he conflicts with a class and a doctrinaire teacher and does not always find a way to an intelligent mentor or peer. Secondly, the study of the scheme reveals a common tendency for many school films: the school in them is not part of the mainland, not a peninsula, but an island in an endless but serene sea. Of course, the island is inhabited, inhabited by actors, but what their connections with the mainland, with the "outside world" and how this world is refracted in their characters, actions, actions – we do not know. In other words, the desire to study the life of the school in depth with all its conflicts and conflicts leads to its screen isolation from the life of the general. The article with a hard-coded name "school" is attached to everything – even to moral conflicts not of local, local origin. The island remains an island, leaving it and laying a course to the mainland, linking them with a single, unstable connection, our cinema is rarely solved. The traditional two-unit formula "school and life" breaks off at the link..."* (Mamaladze, 1977:75-76).

Based on these reflections, T. Mamaladze claimed that the authors of the film *The Key Without the Right to Transfer* *"do not assess their characters, they seem to endure the action beyond the movie, take it to the mainstream of life. And life, as you know, breaks any scheme, even the most convenient and beautifully built. In the movie, there is usually no nostalgia for the school years, which is laid down in the "school film" scheme, which provides the lyric sound, which is kind to the spectator's heart. Here lyricism is achieved due to a special knowledge of the truth that the school is an institution largely lyrical, that is, based on feelings. That school is not just part of the continent, but its beginning"* (Mamaladze, 1977: 83-84).

V. Kichin approached more strictly to another film on the school topic – *Leg-pull* (1976) by V. Menshov, – arguing that *"this film reveals an unexpected ambivalence instead of the expected purposefulness. The director arranges with the viewer that there will be a debate film, a reflection film – in a word, a serious conversation. But the same, followed, clearly sound the call-sign of the film-games, film-spectacles"* (Kichin, 1977: 47).

And finally, *Cinema Art* gave deserved negative evaluation of V. Rogovoy's film *Minors* (1976) (Zhavoronkov, 1977: 42-46) and drama *Always with me ...* (1976) by S. Schuster (Mariamov, 1977: 36), and *Ivan and Kolombina* (1975) by V. Chechunov, where many shortcomings "deprives the film of the main features of the debut – the lack of young audacity, maximalism and independence of creative thinking. ... If the debut film replenishes the gallery of works of overtly gray, faceless ones, this should alarm" (Bauman, 1977: 61).

Alas, V. Chirkov wrote only about the political aspects of the *Night over Chile* (1977) by S. Alacorn (this film dedicated to the tragic events of the military coup of September 11, 1973), bypassing any artistic analysis in an article (Chirkov, 1977: 69-75).

As before, *Cinema Art* did not forget to review the movies from the national republics. Very critical, clearly argued article of A. Vartanov (Vartanov, 1977: 65-77) was about the state of affairs in Turkmen cinema.

V. Silunas wrote an article about Lithuanian cinema also in the critical way. He gave a positive opinions about the films *No One Wanted to Die*, *Stairway to Heaven*, *Hercus Mantas* and *Cleaved Sky* (Silunas, 1977: 15-40), but wrote about weakness of *Saduto-tuto* (Silunas, 1977: 29).

Reviewing the drama *The White Steamer* (1976) by B. Shamshiyev, film critic A. Medvedev noticed minor shortcomings, but on the whole gave a positive assessment (Medvedev, 1977: 54).

#### *Film History*

1977 year was, apparently, not rich in the thoughts of Soviet film theorists. In any case, the separate heading *Film Theory* did not become in the journal, and in the available heading *Theory and History*, there was no theory either.

But there were a lot of articles on the film history. In this way a large article, filled with many details, was published by R. Yurenev. It was the text about foreign creative business trip of S. Eisenstein (Yurenev, 1977). A few years later the material of this article organically entered into R. Yurenev's monograph on S. Eisenstein.

R. Yurenev's article about the creative path of the Soviet director I. Savchenko (1906–1950) in general was written in a positive way. I. Savchenko appeared on the pages of this boring article "the leading, universally recognized, revered Master & Teacher" (Yurenev, 1977: 102).

V. Shklovsky's article about the Soviet director A. Roome (1894-1976) was written much more vividly. In it, there was even a reference to the film *Strict Youth* forbidden by the Soviet censorship: "A good movie, but it has not yet appeared on screens" (Shklovsky, 1977: 156).

L. Anninsky wrote the interesting article on the topic of Leo Tolstoy and the cinema (Anninsky, 1977: 131-139): this is a kind of fragment from the future book of L. Anninsky about Tolstoy and cinematography.

The most unfortunate and trivial article of *Cinema Art* – 1977 on a historical theme is probably the text by I. Dubrovina *Moral Potential of ordinary character* (Dubrovina, 1977: 118-134), where a lively thought is practically not seen behind the succession of timid, censored arguments about the film characters of the 1930s-1950s ...

#### *Cinema Sociology*

Sociology in the *Cinema Art* – 1977 was presented by the article of D. Dondurei, where it was correctly noted that "there is no ideal spectator community that can always adequately perceive "true art", and, as sociological studies show, there is a clear, constant and constantly repeating division of the audience into groups. Some, with some degree of approximation, read the program of the work, given by its creators, decode the artistic "code" of its understanding. Others demonstrate this type of perception, which experts qualify as inadequate to the author's design. ... What does a viewer see in this or that film? How to understand the origins, motives and results of such "unprofessional" perception of art and how to properly assess them? Is such a perception, despite all its differences from the "true", "prepared", be nevertheless self-valuable – and in its own way artistic? Or are we still another, negative, second-rate pole of the same "true", "adequate" perception? These are questions that require special reflection, research" (Dondurei, 1977: 79).

Questions, I agree, are difficult and now...

Another Dondurei's thesis was as follows: "At the present time, the creation of a film that would be crowded by viewers of all cultural backgrounds, all social groups, when the most

*delicate connoisseurs of art will gather in one room, and those who just do not have anything to do have jumped into the cinema. The creation of such a film is associated with so many difficulties. The audience of the cinema was stratified, differentiated into different "sub-audience" according to their attitudes. Is a great art to please all at once" (Dondurei, 1977: 60).*

Here, however, the words "at the present time" are somewhat embarrassing. That such a bundle was not it earlier (for example, in the 1950s - 1960s)? But in general, D. Dondurei is right that *"there must be such a way. For example, the production of multi-layered, multi-oriented films, like mille feuille cake, which can be read by different social groups in such a way that some will see a deep comprehension of reality in them, others will be an interesting story from life, and others – lyrical digressions of the authors. Hence the special structures of the plot collisions, the inclusion of special themes of "spectator interest", "double bookkeeping" of the artistic structure of the film, and the like. Such a compact, albeit extremely complex, path will ensure in modern conditions the social functioning of the picture of its box-office and, at the same time, artistic prestige" (Dondurei, 1977: 60).*

Agree, as if it was written about the melodrama (and Academy Award winner) *Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears* (1979) by V. Menshov...

#### 4. Discussion

The editorial board of the *Cinema Art* – 1977 decided to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the Resolution of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee *On Literary and Art Criticism* (1972). The editorial article (without any reference to the publication of concrete film specific critics) wrote: *"Many reviews are published (including in the "Cinema Art"), ... articles that are not correlated with the tasks put forward before our time and Communist" (Criticism ..., 1977: 7).*

Further *Cinema Art* published a discussion about the role of film criticism in modern society. The answers of some film critics (V. Baskakov, V. Zhdan, A. Karaganov) were filled with standard phrases about socialist realism, ideological struggle, etc. The film critic A. Krasinsky noted that *"you can find many reviews and articles in which a high rating of a particular film is made only on the basis of the importance and relevance of the topic. In such cases, the very low artistic level of the film is not taken into account " (Searches ..., 1977: 17).* A fair statement, as exemplified by some of the above-quoted reviews in the *Cinema Art* – 1977.

The most daring text about Soviet film criticism was written by Y. Khanyutin, reasonably asserting that *"our criticism is rather toothless. Rather, critical courage is manifested, but more and more for some reason in secondary scenes of secondary directors, or, better, foreign ones. ... and if you do not like the movie of the leading director, then it's best to bypass the side, keep silent - and then, as it were, you cannot make trouble!" (Searches ..., 1977: 25).*

Yes, Soviet film criticism for discussions (both in 1967 and in 1977) had to carefully select the material and personalities. Of course, it was impossible even to imagine that in the 1970s a principal discussion could unfold on the *Cinema Art* pages, for example, about the films *"A Story of a Communist"* (1976) or *Thoughts on Kovpak* ...

But the *Cinema Art* could afford long discussions about the films not influential directors, but about, for example, fairy tales films. In 1967, such a discussion film of the year was *Aibolit-66* by R. Bykov, in 1977 – *The Tale of how Tsar Peter Married the Arap* (1976) by A. Mitta.

True, there could be no discussion about *The Tale* ... if the well-known writer, Nobel prize laureate M. Sholokhov watched this film in the year of its creation, and not two years later... An ardent opponent of the film S. Semanov wrote about: *"In August 1977, the author of this book brought this Russophobic film to Sholokhov in Veshenskaya, the writer became very interested in them" (Semanov, 2006).* M. Sholokhov did not like this film, however, he was not in a hurry to express his opinion in writing, and sent his angry letter to L. Brezhnev only in March 1978, when the discussion about the film *The Tale of how Tsar Peter Married the Arap* in *Cinema Art*, fortunately, has already ended.

Here is a key extract from M. Sholokhov letter addressed to General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev (March 14, 1978): *"World Zionism, both foreign and Soviet, is aggressively attacking the Russian culture. It is widely practiced to drag through the cinema, television and the press of anti-Russian ideas, discrediting our history and culture, opposing the Russian socialist. The appearance of "The Tale of how Tsar Peter Married*

the Arap" by A. Mitta is the symptomatic in this sense. The dignity of the Russian nation is openly humiliated in this film. Tsar Peter's progressive undertakings are spoiled, Russian history and our people are ridiculed" (Sholokhov, 1978).

A tangible reaction of the authorities to this letter did not follow. The main reason for this, apparently, is that by the time of this letter the film *The Tale of how Tsar Peter Married the Arap* already widely passed across all Soviet screens, and the post factum prohibition of this movie no longer made any sense, since such actions would be a clear indication that the authorities "missed" the appearance of an "ideologically harmful" work ...

But back to the discussion about *The Tale* ... in the pages of the *Cinema Art*.

I. Zolotusky reproaching this film for the difference and genre blurring (Zolotusky, 1977: 62). Considering *The Tale*... as an unsuccessful stylization, I. Zolotusky stressed that talented "stylization requires not only loyalty to a parodied source, but also a shine of a fake – a brilliance that would eclipse the original and create the illusion of complete triumph over it. The charm of stylization in its ambiguity, in unintentional balancing on the verge of seriousness and ridicule" (Zolotusky, 1977: 63).

I. Rosenfeld, on the contrary, thought that "in the sequence, in the sense of the genre, A. Mitta, you will not refuse. Moreover, in my opinion, he managed to solve the most complicated task by introducing into the conditional "action" of Tsar Peter without violating the fabric of narration, the integrity of the film and, at the same time, not turning the sovereign into a puppet" (Rosenfeld, 1977: 48). In a similar vein also written by A. Lipkov, who insisted that "it is not the business of tale to give a comprehensive, psychologically and historically profound analysis" (Lipkov, 1977: 67).

But L. Onyshko was even more categorical than I. Zolotusky: "Despite the talent and efforts of the authors, you soon notice that the image of Tsar Peter does not fit into the chosen stylistics of the movie. He does not need this character here, not this movie. There are, after all, concepts, images, which do not joke" (Onyshko, 1977: 49).

Y. Seleznev, who considered that "despite the author's attitude to gaiety, the film as a whole is still boring, because it is monotonous. ... The main reason for the artistic disobedience of the film is, in my opinion, the artificiality of its internal idea, acting in the form of a scheme" (Seleznev, 1977: 91).

As a result, as in the case of *Aibolit-66*, the *Cinema Art* enabled critics to express different points of view, thus proving that one can always find a springboard for discussion, even in the "stagnant" times...

#### Book reviews

The bibliographic section of the journal was devoted to the analysis of current cinema books. I. Eventov wrote a review of the monograph by D. Moldavsky *With Mayakovsky in the theater and cinema. The book about Sergei Yutkevich* (1975). He marked controversial moments, but in general considered "it is necessary to appreciate the observations contained in it and analysis, as well as the core thoughts of the researcher" (Eventov, 1977: 138).

A. Vartanov gave the positive evaluation of A. Macheret's book *Feature film* (1975). The monograph *The Golden Section of the Screen* (1976) by S. Freilich also had the positive reaction (Dmitriev, 1977: 114-122).

#### Other rubrics

The rubric *Creative Portraits* has a qualified analysis of director's and actor's works of V. Shukshin (Rudnitsky, 1977: 96-125), the creative path of the actors L. Sverdlin (Varshavsky, 1977; 172-187) and T. Makarova (Yagunkova, 1977: 119-136) and the film critic N. Lebedev (Vlasov, 1977: 171-172). The column *On the set* included the reports about the filming of *Steppe* (1977) by S. Bondarchuk (Tolchenova, 1977: 101-115) and *Fate* (1977) by E. Matveev (Donets, 1977).

## 5. Conclusion

So, the analysis of the *Cinema Art* – 1977 revealed the following main film criticism trends:

- the magazine was unable to preserve the "thawing" tendencies, which were still strong even in the late 1960s, and in many ways proved to be in the ideological line of the peak of the L. Brezhnev's epoch;

- At the same time, the journal tried to analyze the most notable works of Soviet cinema, while, alas, not allowing even in minimal doses a criticism of the shortcomings in the works of the most "principally" influential at that time the screen masters;

- giving a weighty tribute to the Soviet propaganda pathos, the magazine could afford to publish the substantive discussions "on certain narrow bridgeheads".

In general, the *Cinema Art* in 1977, as in 1967, was part of a typical model of the Soviet humanitarian journal, which, with significant censorship concessions and powers, tried to retain at least 50 % of the total text for art analysis of the film process.

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
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## Securitizing Culture in Post-Deng China: An Evolving National Strategic Paradigm, 1994–2014

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### Abstract

This article examines the emergence and impact of the threat image of U.S.-led globalization on national strategic paradigms in the People’s Republic of China. It finds that, beginning in the mid-1990s, internal discussions focusing on national cultural security (NCS) became increasingly influential within elite policymaking circles and directly impacted assessments of comprehensive national security and sovereignty—specifically, how these concepts were to be defined. Other results demonstrate the importance of NCS to institutions and policy frameworks emblematic of the “cultural turn” in politics under Xi Jinping. Finally, the article draws parallels between NCS and, within the People’s Liberation Army, the evolving doctrine of psychological warfare, hypothesizing that these developments are connected by a shared paradigm uniting strategists within the party-state-army. It concludes that strong consensus concerning cultural security exists at the national level and that, viewed from a historical perspective, “Xiism” as an approach to politics and information flow management is grounded in an intellectual and institutional transformation—cultural securitization—which first emerged during the mid-1990s.

**Keywords:** propaganda, security paradigm, securitization, national cultural security, psychological warfare, globalization, informationization, People’s Republic of China, Chinese Communist Party, People’s Liberation Army.

### 1. Introduction

Propaganda concerns the large-scale dissemination of ideas and information intended to induce recipients to act in a certain way. Within recent decades, discussions concerning issues of value change and resulting challenges to social and international order have, within The People’s Republic of China (PRC), mainly focused on issues of culture and, in the military realm, psychology. Under current president and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary Xi Jinping, “ideological security” (*yishixingtai anquan*) has become a watchword for active national defense against what is frequently portrayed as U.S.-led efforts to maintain global hegemony and undermine CCP authority through education, networks, NGOs, and the media. The PRC’s draft National Security Law focuses on defending “advanced socialist culture” against “negative cultural infiltration” from abroad. Likewise, China’s new National Security Council, organized after 2012 in part to counter “extremist forces and ideological challenges to culture posed by Western nations,” also shares in the broader task of investigating links between the media and internet, and anti-government sentiment and protests.

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Xi's concern with culture, and further attempts to defend and strengthen national cultural unity through "revival" (*fluxing*), is significant, but it is not new (Rao, 2014; Lam, 2016). This article narrates the history of cultural securitization—that is, the elevation of culture, as a policy issue, to the status of a vital element of national security—starting in the mid-1990s, when vivid concerns over the likely impact of globalization, Westernization, and U.S. economic, military, and technological dominance on CCP regime legitimacy and PRC national interests first reemerged with renewed vigor following Dengist reforms (Reilly, 2011; Zhu, 2012; Lynch, 2013; Stockmann, 2013). The article further assesses the impact of this emerging NCS paradigm, as defined by the centrality of value change to PRC leaders' overall strategic concerns, on party-state-army institutional change, doctrine, and relationship to the media. Its overall argument is that a threat image based on externally imposed value change and domestic fragmentation have produced two main outcomes: institutionalization of cultural and ideological security as central, if not primary, elements within broader definitions of comprehensive national security, and both defensive and offensive responses to this threat which seek to neutralize it through complementary securitization of information, public opinion, and individual and mass psychology.

## 2. Discussion

The topic of securitization has not been widely addressed in studies of PRC cultural policy and military science. This article uses the term in two ways: first, to describe the process by which the paradigm of NCS emerged within PRC policymaking circles after 1994, and, second, to refer to manifestations of NCS in national security policy from a military perspective, focusing on psychological warfare (PW).

As described by noted security studies theorist Barry Buzan (1997), the concept of "security" expanded widely following the Cold War, focusing on non-military issues (e.g. the economy, the environment) and moving beyond the state, and issues of state survival, to look at how other aspects of society have been securitized by states or other international, transnational, and subnational actors. This transformation of the meaning of security was due in part to the range of significant threats to state security having increased, in relative terms, as the possibility of military conflict seemingly receded from primacy. Securitized referents were tantamount to issues identified as constituting *existential* threats; from this perspective, the process of securitization is legitimized through the construction of a corresponding threat image which justifies disproportionate attention and mobilization of extraordinary measures and resources. Within discussions of PRC cultural policy, however, and particularly those touching upon the overarching policy framework of propaganda, analysis using the prism of securitization has been largely absent. Rather, scholars have tended to focus on mid-level activities related to persuasion and popular legitimacy, assessing how these have, or have not, bolstered the legitimacy of the PRC's post-Mao CCP leadership (Brady, 2006; Shambaugh, 2007). Some acknowledgment has been made of the role in internal security forces, such as local public security bureaus and the Ministry of Public Security, in ensuring media compliance with Central Propaganda Department directives and monitoring the overall state of public opinion, but there have been few attempts to draw connections at the policymaking level between propaganda and security as interdependent concerns. At the same time, academics and analysts writing prior to 2007 have also noted the more pronounced significance ascribed to discourse and media in PRC foreign policy, but did not often draw clear connections between these developments and internal changes in national security paradigms and policies (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007; Shirk, 2007; Swaine, 2014; Blackwill and Campbell, 2016).

Researchers of the Chinese internet, by contrast, have been among the most insightful and innovative analysts of securitization; their work follows a trend among media scholars, evident since the 1990s, of looking at how the CCP has attempted to balance forces of media marketization with "public opinion guidance" (*yulun daoxiang*, *yulun yindao*) and media control (Zhao, 1998). One contribution has been the observation that, under Hu Jintao, CCP internet policies have attempted to address how technology change affects linked issues of socialist culture, information security, and state stability. Institutionally, guidance and supervision of internet public opinion, and the monitoring and filtering of sensitive information in cyberspace, have become matters directly dealt with by the Public Information Internet Security Supervision Bureau (*Gonggong xinxi wangluo anquan jianchaju*) of the Ministry of Public Security (*Gong'an bu*) ("President Hu

*Asks Officials*,” *Xinhua News Agency*, 2007; Chin, 2010). In times of social crisis, both propaganda (“publicity”) and security departments are expected to provide information, on a rapid, continuous, rapid, and repeated basis. As Hu summarized in 2008, the role of the journalistic media and CCP propaganda offices was to spread ideology, do thought work, and assure the long-term stability and security of the nation. Under Xi Jinping the securitization of socialist culture and cultural development has intensified, with elite speeches, CCP documents, and the state press repeatedly calling for greater “cybersovereignty”—echoing calls for cultural sovereignty nearly a decade earlier—and the development of technological systems capable of resisting foreign interference (“foreign hostile forces,” *waiguo didui shili*) in China’s internal affairs through ideological infiltration (Hu, 2011; Creemers, 2015a). More recently, scholars of the PRC political system have begun to acknowledge the “pluralization” of security to include a wider range of policy areas, including addressing of citizen grievances, ideology, and the media (Wang and Minzner, 2015; Ohlberg, 2016).

Viewed from a military perspective, cultural dimensions of national security policy have been noted only infrequently. Here the main point of focus has been information warfare (IW) operations and doctrine. These scholars also note that 1980–1990s were, roughly speaking, a period of transformation during which new security conditions—represented most visibly by the display of U.S. power during the 1991 Gulf War—triggered a shift toward increased concern with protecting the nation militarily against foreign psychological and ideological threats (Mulvenon, 1999; Perry, 2007; Kamphausen et al., 2010). Like party-state propaganda work, IW represented a potentially continuous, even preemptive, activity, though one which remained primarily military in nature. Such activity was often classified abroad as propaganda and “influence” operations; its relationship to national security strategy was, by contrast, less widely discussed as the strategies themselves were only vaguely understood (*China’s Propaganda and Influence Operations*, 2009). However, observers around the world had begun to take note that the PLA had begun to move toward a doctrine of “unrestricted warfare,” or “warfare without rules,” which emphasized struggle and information dominance even during peacetime, and the importance of capability to paralyze system and create social effects (e.g. mass panic and confusion) under conditions of networked conflict (Chansoria, 2010; Ball, 2011). Subsequent analysts of China’s cyber strategy also noted both government and military concern over social media platforms, where “Chinese citizens are able to rapidly gain access and exchange information as the primary source of “misinformation, dissemination of rumors, popular discontent, chaos, political destabilization, and terror that can cause panic, lead to social crisis and turmoil, and overthrow the regime” (Cooper III, 2012: 8-9). In response, and in order to enhance and protect China’s “core interests,” particularly within Asia, PLA leaders and strategists began developing both offensive and defensive capabilities in order to counter U.S. dominance in cyberspace.

Research on party-state-army security strategy thus suggested, but did not directly address, parallels between CCP securitization of culture in the civilian realm, and the evolution of PLA doctrine concerning information as both a threat and a weapon. In more recent years, while the literature on China’s cultural security published outside of China has gradually, if fitfully, increased, its authors largely exclude military affairs from their analysis (Pang, 2012; Keane, 2013; Lin, 2014; Gao et al., 2015; Hu, 2015).

### 3. Materials and methods

This article draws primarily from policy-relevant academic journal articles openly available in the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database (<http://oversea.cnki.net/kns55/default.aspx>). Much of the material was gathered between 2009 and 2010, when writing about cultural security and NCS began to appear in a small number of English-language publications (Xie, 2007; Renwick and Cao, 2008; Bandurski, 2009). Results analyzed were limited to those journals which were primarily national and policy-oriented in scope. Additional sources were downloaded in early 2017 from the PRC’s National Center for Philosophy and Social Sciences Documentation (<http://www.ncpssd.org/>). Between this research’s inception and completion, publication on issues related to PRC soft power, external propaganda, ideological security, informationization, psychological warfare, and related topics has been steady across academic, journalistic, military, and public affairs publications. Some of those perspectives are incorporated as well, with emphasis on empirical discoveries related to institutions, policies, and doctrine.

Chinese-language reference sites, including Baidu.com and CCP-created information portals, were also used. Many of these sources have not been previously analyzed, as NCS remains relatively unexplored as a policy framework even during the period of Xi Jinping's leadership (2012-present), during which ideological and cultural security issues supposedly rose to the fore.

The methodological approach taken is primarily inductive: the sections below are intended to 1) narrate and analyze the emergence of an NCS paradigm within elite PRC policymaking circles, 2) and assess the impact of NCS thinking and strategy on the PLA. Sources have been read with the understanding that they mainly consist of open assessments pitched at midlevel cadres and officers, and that they may serve political interests, and domestic and international propaganda agendas, as well as disclosing key elements of strategy, doctrine, and elite thinking (Chase et al., 2015: 7-8). Where possible, the analysis focuses on drawing clear connections between NCS paradigm emergence and definitions, and changes in party-state-military institutions and behavior. Overall, the perspective taken is one of contemporary history, and the emphasis is less on expected future patterns than on the origins and effects of NCS as a feature of national policymaking discourse. With respect to propaganda studies, the article emphasizes frameworks and institutions over media, dissemination, symbols, and audience.

## 4. Results

### 4.1. Cultural securitization and national cultural security strategy

Concern with NCS in PRC policymaking circles goes back at least as far as 1994. Today Wang Huning is a leading political theorist and advisor to current president Xi Jinping; in 1994 Wang was a rising political theorist in Shanghai who would go on to become head of the political research team of the Central Policy Research Office (*Zhong gong zhongyang zhengce yanjiu shi*), based on the support of central figures Wu Bangguo and Zeng Qinghong. Wang's article on "Cultural Expansion and Cultural Sovereignty: A Challenge to the Concept of Sovereignty" (*Wenhua kuozhang yu wenhua zhuquan: dui zhuquan guannian de tiaozhan*), published in the social science edition of the *Fudan Journal*, explored the "increasingly sensitive nature of the 'cultural question'" within a changing international system in which national sovereignty collided with globalization (Wang, 1994). The nature of international relations and international society, Wang argued, had fundamentally changed after the Cold War: "culture" now played an increasingly important role in both. This was seen in the phenomenon of cultural expansionism, or cultural hegemony, and the related phenomenon of cultural struggle—struggle to maintain national cultural sovereignty within a globalizing international system. Though Wang did not mention NCS directly, he laid out many of the basic threat images in response to which securitization of culture would become conceivable as a policy framework: the threat of "powerful" (or coercive, *qiangshi*) cultural expansion and hegemony; the "smashing" of cultural order; and "disequilibrium" in the cultural ecology. The result between relatively stronger and weaker cultures, he predicted, would be "cultural clash." Forces of globalization, under the pretext of "humanism," would impede the sovereignty of developing nations, leading to cultural "invasion" and the "conquest" of value systems. Fundamental to Wang's outlook was that in addition to military and economic security, *cultural security* would need to be made part of one single national security system.

Wang would go on to become head of Central Policy Research Office in 2002; from 2007 to 2012 he served as secretary of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee. In November 2012 he was elected to the Politburo of the Eighteenth CCP Central Committee. Popularly he is known as theoretical architect of Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents"; Hu Jintao's "Scientific Development Concept"; and Xi Jinping's "China Dream" ("[Wang Huning](#)," *Wikipedia*). Some might consider him the PRC's principal living theorist of both Marxist and comparative, or Western, politics. If this is true, then it is noteworthy that central to Wang's understanding of security is its cultural component: national cultural sovereignty, and cultural order, is rendered insecure by globalization. Under Jiang Zemin, cultural competition was described in CCP ideology as a fundamental feature of the international order, and culture was tied to both national development ("scientific culture") and security (Yao, 2008). "Culture" referred primarily to unified national ideology. By 1999, an outpouring of scholarship on cultural security began appearing in academic journals, and in August the *National Security Bulletin* (*Guojia anquan tongxun*) published a substantial article by Lin Hongyu titled "Cultural Security: A Fundamental Topic in National Security" (*Wenhua anquan: guojia anquan de shenceng zhuti*); this was followed by another article in the *Jiangnan Academy*

of *Social Study Journal* by Zhu Chuanrong titled “Facing China’s Cultural Security Strategy in the Twenty-First Century (*Shilun mianxiang 21 shiji de Zhongguo wenhua anquan zhanlve*).

(“Wenhua anquan,” *Baike baidu*). The Lin Hongyu article was significant for its effort to embed cultural security within definitions of national security which, according to Lin, already included sovereignty, territory, politics, economics, military affairs, diplomacy, science and technology, and the environment as frequently encountered topics. Cultural security was important because of the “influence” of culture on a state (*guojia*) and on a national people (*minzu*) (Lin, 1999). “Cultural infiltration” was therefore an powerful method by which hegemonic countries control and threaten the security of other countries: as examples, Lin listed the Roman empire, British empire, and United States of America. To guarantee cultural security was both to propagate the “good cultural traditions” of a national people while, at the same time, “resolutely opposing total Westernization and resisting the decay and influence caused by unhealthy Western culture.” Lin’s solutions were not military: the proposed solution was for “forcefully extolling patriotic traditions and strengthening patriotic education among youth.”

Leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin had always stressed ideological and political work as matters important to continued CCP rule. Jiang, in particular, advocated “socialist spiritual civilization” and construction of cultural-civilizational infrastructure (e.g. cultural industries, continued teaching of state ideology in schools) during his 1997-2002 tenure as CCP General Secretary. The further linking of cultural security to national security also took place under Jiang, ultimately producing the concept of NCS. This development appears to have occurred primarily within research on international politics, which by 2000 was concerned with issues of cultural security and ideological security as necessary responses to the threat image of U.S.-dominated globalization. “Cultural interests” (*wenhua liyi*) and “cultural sovereignty” (*wenhua zhuquan*) became linked to issues of strategy and China’s post-Cold War security concept; globalization itself was identified as a “cultural issue,” and an important aspect of international relations was “securing China’s cultural position within world culture” (Fu, 2000). These academic discussions had multiple topical variants, including “scientific national revival strategy,” “anti-hegemonic cultural strategy,” and building a “socialist new cultural movement.” Conceptually, cultural security thus ranked alongside other national strategic goals, birthing the idea of NCS, which was also sometimes expressed as “cultural national strategy” (*wenhua guojia zhanlve*).

Cultural strategy existed as a complement to the better-known policy of spiritual civilization construction (*jingshen wenming jianshe*), which was announced with the 1996 CCP Central Committee “Resolution on Several Issues Relating to the Strengthening of Socialist Spiritual Civilization Construction” (*Zhong gong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming jianshe ruogan wenti de jueyi*). A clear requirement of building Chinese socialist spiritual civilization, both within and without, was cultural security, including cultural “balancing” and increasing international discourse power. Within this new strategic context, NCS discourse centered on: 1) concern with “clashes” between civilizations as a result of rapid acceleration of economic globalization following Cold War; 2) Western advantages in military, technology, and the economy creating new issues related to protection of national cultural sovereignty and the defense of non-Western “nationality” (*minzu*) culture; 3) the spread of Western value systems along with Western economic aid; 4) and the global propagation of political ideologies, leading to “struggle” on the new cultural battlefield (Hu, 2000). In stricter terms, what NCS stood for was the effective safeguarding (*weihu*) of national cultural interests and security. Its urgency was further embellished by the perceived severity of the Western, or U.S., threat: the superiority of economic-technological-military “hard power,” control and leadership with respect to international norms, the appeal of consumerism, and the pursuit of economic, cultural, and information hegemony (Hu, 2000).

Contrast between a decadent and challenging global consumerism, controlled by the West, and a non-Western nationality culture supported by state policy, constituted the fundamental duality on which NCS policies were based. Western culture was to be resisted, national culture propagated and extolled. By 2003, high-level publications like *Journal of the Party School of the Central Committee of the C.P.C.* (*Zhong gong zhongyang dangxiao xuebao*) associated NCS with national survival (*minzu shengcun*) (Yu and Hao, 2003). American cultural imperialism was “the ... monstrous offspring, and pitfall of, globalization, and the contemporary form of capitalist expropriation, [which] directly threatens the cultural security of China and other developing

countries.” The range of contemplated responses grew wider, and more specific: building a cultural security “system” (*xitong*), raising public consciousness of the threat posed by cultural imperialism, using the Internet and media to more widely disseminate nationality culture, establishing an NCS “warning system,” creating a Chinese cultural industry system, digitizing China’s cultural heritage, and educating a creative “new force” for reviving Chinese national culture (*Zhonghua minzu wenhua*) in the new globalization era (*Ibid*). Within other publications, the definition itself expanded with cultural security used to refer to the securitization of “intellectual trends in society” (*shehui sichao*) (*Wu et al., 2004*). Arguably, the concept of NCS was also becoming more hardline and aggressive, with suggestions that successful NCS strategy required greater national cultural “dignity” (*zunyan*), and that socialist cultural industries, supported by state investment and policy, be used to engage in “active outward attack of international cultural markets.” Culture was to be supported by “hard” economic development, while cultural industries were to be protected, as much as possible, from competition and cross-border movement promoted by the World Trade Organization, to which China acceded in 2001.

Under Hu Jintao’s leadership (2002–2012), NCS became both a strategic paradigm and a policy framework. A shift had occurred in national security discourse, with cultural security and discussion of NCS included in the authoritative 2004 *National Security Studies* (*Guojia anquan xue*) reference series published by the China University of Political Science and Law (*Zhongguo zhengfa daxue*) (“Wenhua anquan, *Baike baidu*; “Guojia wenhua anquan,” *Baike baidu*). As a framework, NCS issues were often discussed as part of broader policy-related analysis related to international politics and relations and, particularly in the pages of authoritative CCP theoretical journal *Qiushi*, spiritual civilization construction. At the same time, within the CCP Central Committee Politburo the topic of cultural security was addressed directly by Hu Jintao as relevant to the development of PRC cultural enterprises and industries, and as of critical importance to the preservation of socialism, ideological change within the CCP and wider society, and the preservation of social stability (“Hu Jintao emphasizes,” *Xinhua wang*, 26 Oct 2012). This significant pronouncement took place at the Politburo’s seventh collective study (*jiti xuexi*) session on August 12, 2003, which addressed the topic of “the condition of global cultural industry development and our cultural industries’ development strategy” (“Di shiliu jie,” *Zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju jiti xuexi*). Of central importance to this discussion was perceived “inequality” in international cultural flows, U.S. policies of ideological expansion, the “pressure” put on developing countries and their governments by U.S. consumerism and popular culture, and the necessity of “opening space” for other cultures globally.

As before, securitization of culture at the most elite levels was accompanied by a narrative of overwhelming American economic and technological strength, attempts to undermine other nations’ cultural security through policies of “hegemony,” and growing strength as a result of the demise of communism across the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Thus, from 2003 onward there was greater strategic importance attached to the idea of safeguarding cultural sovereignty and security as a matter of national policy. NCS became a national priority just as the forces of U.S.-led globalization appeared to be gaining strength. As during the period of Jiang Zemin’s leadership, during which socialist spiritual civilization construction through cultural industry development was a key point of emphasis, during Hu Jintao’s tenure as CCP general secretary, and particularly following the 2007 Seventeenth Party Congress, there was a corresponding emphasis on productive cultural activity as well: revival of socialism and Neo-Confucianism, popular moral education the “Eight Honors and Eight Shames”, and attempted reversal of moral decay within the CCP and society (*Heath, 2015*; “*Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi*,” *Weiji Baike*; *Chin and Johnson, 2010*).

Under Hu’s leadership, cultural securitization moved beyond broad discussions of international relations and national strategy toward more specific topics such as media, education, and internal security: a strong indication that the paradigm was gaining adherents. Public security academic-policy journals described national cultural security as an “urgent and applicable topic” for the public security curriculum and broader political reform (*Ma, 2004*). Other discussions addressed the importance of addressing links between globalization and cultural security through education (*Zhou, 2004*). One key focal point was media. Arguments proliferated for greater “discursive control” and use of cultural industries, coupled with external media strategy, to combat the perceived Western threat to China’s cultural sovereignty (*Liu, 2005*). (Within CCP journals, NCS debates were still often treated as a subset of policy related to [socialist] spiritual civilization

construction.) By 2005–2006, these discussions spilled out into the mainstream of cultural policy agenda-setting, and were addressed on a nearly industry-by-industry basis as NCS became a byword for maintaining political-ideological content within publishing, broadcasting, and other mass media, including the Internet (Wang, 2007; Su, 2008; Kong 2008).

Blurring the lines between international relations, domestic security, political education, media, and, ultimately, the Dengist-Jiangist agenda of maintaining a “plurality” of civilizations amidst globalization, the NCS paradigm under Hu Jintao revived importance which Deng Xiaoping had placed on thought-political education work (*sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu gongzuo*) as central to the CCP’s historical mission (Guangdong sheng Deng Xiaoping lilun he “Sange daibiao” zhongyao sixiang yanjiu zhongxin, 2007; Yu, 2009). However, the threat image behind the new emphasis was not “bourgeois liberalization,” but civilizational clash between China’s “peaceful world” and the U.S.-led Western “new world order” of globalization. From an academic perspective, one of the most definitive statements concerning NCS appeared in 2008, with the publication of Han Yuan’s “Preface Concerning National Cultural Security” (*Guojia wenhua anquan yinlun*), published in leading ideological journal *The Contemporary World and Socialism*, and based on research supported by the National Social Science Fund’s program for “Research on National Cultural Security Strategy in the Context of Globalization.” According to this essay, cultural security was defined as a “manifestation of national interest in the cultural domain”; was a prerequisite to national survival and development; and represented the means by which individuals were united through by nationality (*minzu*), the state, and social systems. As “protection of cultural interests and defense of cultural sovereignty against invasion,” NCS came to stand for all efforts, whether domestic or international, to (tacitly) consolidate CCP power within China and maintain an independent international position within the cultural-ideological sphere. The dangers of not maintaining a robust NCS strategy, Han warned, were that China would face cultural invasion and spiritual enslavement by a U.S. that “looked down on the world,” and which was already emboldened by the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. Political and culture security were thus inseparable and, as international competition using “soft power” strategies increased, the creation of a new, safer, and more legitimate international order was an urgent necessity.

Against this background, the period 2008–2009 can be seen as a kind of turning point during which NCS-related discussions reached their peak, before splintering into a less coherent grouping of public and academic discussions concerning related themes of soft power, cultural industries, traditional national culture, spiritual civilization, and “harmonious society”—the latter an emblem of Hu’s efforts to confront rising internal tensions (Tan, 2009; Meng et al., 2009). At the same time, the NCS policy paradigm was becoming embedded, internally, in internal security and international relations policy frameworks. Combatting cultural “splittism” in Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet required attention to NCS, as did the management of plural value systems and English-language content on the global Internet (Li, 2008; Jia, 2008; Xiao, 2009). By late 2010, leading propaganda official Li Changchun had inaugurated a further shift toward “ideological security” (*yishixingtai anquan*): a seemingly new securitization paradigm, but one which replicated the emphasis of NCS on Western cultural infiltration and globalization as threatening forces, and demanded appropriate domestic and international responses needed to revive CCP cultural power. In a December 17, 2010 speech, Li urged Communication University of China students to “promote national achievements, expand battle for public opinion, protect national and ideological security, and create first-class international media” (“Wei jiaqiang guojia chuanbo nengli,” *Qiushi*, 2011).

#### 4.2. NCS, National rejuvenation, and ideological security

During Hu Jintao’s second term as president of the PRC, culture became defined as both a key strategic theme and a “core resource” of party-state power (Glaser and Murphy, 2009). The outcome was not only a shift not only toward securitization, but also toward centralization of control over media institutions, as well as specific policy approaches intended to minimize foreign influence and ideological multipolarity within the national cultural sphere. On May 4, 2009, top CCP leaders including Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, He Guoqiang, and Zhou Yongkang convened a meeting held in the Great Hall of the People to commemorate the ninetieth anniversary of the 1919 May Fourth Movement. During this anniversary event, Li Changchun commented on the necessity of “inspir[ing] the Chinese people to be united and hardworking in rejuvenating the Chinese nation” (“China Marks 90th Anniversary,

*Xinhuanet*, 2009). The phrase “national rejuvenation” echoed earlier statements, such as the October 2006 Communiqué of the Sixteenth CCP Central Committee Sixth Plenum, which advocated rejuvenation, along with national prosperity and the “people’s happiness,” as one of the three main goals associated with building a “harmonious socialist society”—and which made governance of citizens’ ideology and moral qualities, as well as national culture generally, part of a broader set of means of fostering national participation in support of CCP economic and political agendas (*Xinhua News Agency*, 2006).

For analysts, a significant consequence of the Sixth Plenum was its long resolution promising to address tensions in PRC society as viewed from the CCP’s perspective, including loss of control over the media (*Miller*, 2006). By the time of the May 4, 2009, Great Hall of the People meeting, a new leadership group including both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping was already beginning to articulate connections between national rejuvenation, propaganda, and cultural policy, with notable emphasis placed on “cultural public service”—reconstruction of state cultural and media infrastructure on a national basis—and “cultural citizenship” in national development policy (*Chin*, 2010: 1-2). Arguably, CCP emphasis on political management of culture during much of the 2000s viewed ideology and, by extension, culture, as part of a wider effort to reverse the relative loss of position stemming from marketization of the media. The October 2006 Sixteenth CCP Central Committee Sixth Plenum “Resolution on Several Important Questions Concerning the Construction of Socialism and a Harmonious Society,” for example, directed that renewed attention should be paid in official PRC media to dissemination of Marxism, socialism with Chinese characteristics, and a spirit of popular nationalism; in addition, the CCP sought to expand public cultural service (PCS) networks and governance more widely throughout society as part of protecting “public knowledge” against forces of “commercialization” (*Chin and Johnson*, 2010; “*Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi*,” *Weiji baike*). While leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin had always stressed ideological and political work as important matters affecting CCP leadership, starting from the 2007 Seventeenth Party Congress the Hu Jintao government began to devote significant attention to reviving both socialism and traditional Chinese culture (“New Confucianism”) as a means of strengthening a society that Hu and other CCP Politburo elites appear to have believed was suffering from advanced moral decay. (Here again the break was not absolute: Jiang Zemin advocated “socialist spiritual civilization” and infrastructural construction during his tenure as CCP general secretary, and in 2006 Hu had already begun to advocate for renewed popular moral education under the mantra of the “Eight Honors and Eight Shames” [*Heath*, 2015]). The 2008 Olympic Games (Beijing) and 2010 World Expo (Shanghai) brought additional surges in party-state attention to issues of social norms and behavior. Moreover, Hu’s “Harmonious Society” (*Hexie shehui*) vision, with its emphasis on social stability, soon became synonymous with internet censorship, indicating that the degree of state tolerance for independent public opinion and media in a broad sense had, in fact, begun to narrow. (For satirical internet users, to “be harmonized” [*bei hexiele*] was to be censored online through mechanisms such as page and post deletion by state internet authorities [*Xiao*, 2007]).

A notable rhetorical shift from internal stability to national security in the ideological realm took place during the years 2010–2011, when street protests and “color revolutions” emerged as visible challenges to state authority in settings ranging from North Africa to Eastern Europe. In February 2011, PRC politics were stirred by a prodemocracy Jasmine Revolution (*Molihua geming*) characterized by public gatherings and rhetorical demands for better economic conditions, fairness, individual freedoms, and an end to one-party rule. CCP elites had long been aware of the lessons of Soviet collapse and Eastern European political instability for the importance of “initiative” in ideological work, as evidenced by a 2011 summary of CCP historical experience in the ideological realm originally published in *Qiushi*, the theoretical journal of the CCP Central Party School (“*Zhongguo Gongchandang 90 nian*,” *Guangming ribao*, 2011). However, color revolutions both inside and outside of China both stirred and coincided with a new range of reactions affecting cultural policy, including:

- National People’s Congress Standing Committee chair Wu Bangguo’s March 10, 2011, work report emphasizing the “Five Will-Nots” (*wu bugao*), which were widely covered in the official media as indications that no significant changes in the political system would be forthcoming (*Wu*, 2011; *Yihan*, 2011; “*Wu bu gao*,” *Weiji baike*).

- Theoretical analysis within the CCP indicating that consolidation of the security of the PRC's political system, and particularly in the ideological sphere, would be necessary to combat Western-sponsored "peaceful evolution" regime-change strategies ("[Zhongguo Gongchandang 90 nian](#)," *Guangming ribao*, 2011). (Specific examples included domestic non-Marxist and anti-Marxist ideologies, Western spread of capitalist ideological concepts and "denigration" of CCP ideology, and attempts by imperialist countries to overturn systems of socialism globally.)

- Securing of the "basis" for socialist ideological construction through "spiritual civilization construction." One of the clearest signals of this commitment was the October 2011 Seventeenth CCP Central Committee Sixth Plenum, which emphasized cultural construction and national identity as part of the "backbone of the country's economic and social development" ("[The Sixth Plenary Session](#)," *CCTV.com*, 2013).

Constructing "socialist cultural power" both domestically and abroad (the latter via a renewed policy emphasis on developing international cultural industries and soft power) was thus explicitly linked to the modernization and "rejuvenation" (*fixing*) of the Chinese nation, as well as to the goal of building "national cohesion" ("[Cultural Development Concerns](#)," *CCTV.com English*, 2011).

At the time, links between NCS and a cultural policy of national cohesion had not yet been clearly drawn by observers outside of the CCP. Whereas the latter attracted attention primarily by virtue of being the main focus of the 2011 Sixth Plenum and subsequent February 2012 cultural policy outline issued by the CPC Central Committee Propaganda Department, the former reflected what was then still an internal CCP discussion concerning the nature and extent of the threat to PRC political stability and one-party rule posed by Western cultural-ideological forces. Intensifying CCP focus on structural aspects of ideology—in other words, institutions and media—accompanied the shift toward securitization of culture within the PRC's borders, with significant consequences for independent voices and media production located beyond officially sanctioned networks of supervision and control. At the central level, in 2012 the Cultural Reform Leading Small Group was renamed the Cultural Structural Reform and Development Work Leading Small Group (*Zhongyang wenhua tizhi gaige he fazhan gongzuo lingdao xiaozu*), indicating a shift in emphasis toward comprehensive centralization of control over cultural production and dissemination ("[Zhongyang wenhua tizhi gaige](#)," *Baike baidu*; "[Quanguo wenhua tizhi gaige gongzuo huiyi](#)," *Baike baidu*). (In 2013–2014, this group was incorporated into the Comprehensively Deepening Reform Leading Small Group, an institution closely associated with the personal power of Xi Jinping, who succeeded Hu in late 2012). Another major theoretical statement, "Six Major Challenges Faced during Our Country's Present Ideological Construction," published in July 2012 in *Party Building (Dang jian)*, the journal of the CCP Central Committee Organization Department, identified Western cultural "penetration" and "threat" as leading challenges to national "ideological security" (*yishixingtai anquan*), along with the negative effects of "social influence" on mainstream CCP ideology; crises in confidence [in socialism] posed by the disarray of post-Soviet Europe; the weakening of ideological control by other forces of modernization; cultural "multipolarity" and incompatibility with CCP ideology and control; and the control challenges posed by internet technology ([Ren, 2012](#)).

By the time of Xi Jinping's public rise to power within the CCP by late 2012, then, a coherent internal threat image concerning media institutions, ideological plurality, and the cultural sphere had already been institutionalized both theoretically and organizationally. Securitizing CCP-sanctioned ideology and, by extension, national cohesion and rejuvenation, required centralization and, with respect to Western culture particularly, sanitization of meaning-producing structures—labeled, variously, "ideological," "cultural," "spiritual," "socialist," "media," or "internet"—impacting social values and ties between party and populace. This threat image and related internal CCP discussions constituted the largely invisible backdrop against which successive, more spectacular revelations, such as the "leaked" April 22, 2013, CCP Central Committee General Office "Document No. 9" (full title: "Circular Concerning Present Conditions in the Ideological Sphere" [[Guanyu dangqian yishixingtai yingyu de tongbao](#)]) first appeared ("[Guanyu dangqian yizhixingtai](#)," *Weiji baike*). Document No. 9 identified seven prominent issues affecting the strength of mainstream CCP ideology within PRC society, including the CCP itself, and consisting of the propagation of: Western constitutional democracy, universal values, civil society,

neoliberalism, Western media viewpoints, historical nihilism, and doubts concerning reform-and-opening policies. These issues overlapped considerably, and not coincidentally, with a less formalized list of “seven don’t discuss” (*qi bu jiang*) topics that were made off-limits for university instructors and, by extension, for those engaged in knowledge-producing professions, including artists and the media (“*Qi bu jiang*,” *Weiji baike*).

The longer 2006–2013 reverse course in policy from marketization back toward more rigid governmental strictures, which emphasized securitization while defending against the “plural” and the “Western,” has not been analyzed as a coherent episode in China’s contemporary politics. Rather, conventional accounts seeking to explain the increasingly restrictive turn in culture, media, education, and other areas linked directly to CCP discussions of ideological work focus primarily on speeches made by Xi Jinping, cybersecurity and internet policy official Lu Wei, and chief ideology and propaganda official Liu Yunshan when identifying the defining features of PRC cultural policy since Xi’s rise (Creemers, 2015b). At issue in such analysis is whether or not the CCP is increasing “control” over culture and the media as it promotes “socialist core values” (“Xi Jinping zai Wenyi gongzuo zuotanhui,” *Wenhua Zhongguo*, 2014). Starting with Xi’s August 19, 2013 speech to attendees at the National Conference on Propaganda and Thought Work (the “Eight-Nineteen Speech”), the CCP is seen as bringing all media closer to systems of political leadership and surveillance, while at the same time elevating the significance of “spiritual and civilization construction work” to a level equivalent with the economy (“Xi Jinping ‘8-19,’” *China Digital Times*). From 2014 to 2016, subsequent speeches by Xi, Lu, and Liu on topics such as cybersecurity, informationization, news, public opinion work, and literature and the arts have all consistently emphasized the leading role of the CCP; at the same time, new measures have been taken to further securitize media and culture through the strengthening of centrally guided, and infrastructure-focused, institutions that are the direct descendants of policy initiatives already in development under Hu Jintao. However, the Xi Jinping government is far more expansive than its predecessor concerning the culture–media–security connection amidst this ongoing political institutionalization effort, establishing and investing in think tanks devoted to “national cultural security and ideological construction,” and both institutionally and rhetorically emphasizing the significance of culture and information to national security policy (“China Issues First Blue Paper,” *China Military Online*, 2014; Ng, 2014). (For example, the National Cultural Security and Ideological Construction Research Center [*Guojia wenhua anquan yu yishixingtai jianshe yanjiu zhongxin*], Academy of Marxism, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences [<http://myy.cass.cn/cate/3902.htm>].) As a result, cultural security—along with ideological security and cybersecurity—has been shifted to the fore of a security-related policy framework labeled “unconventional security threats,” and implemented at the highest level by the recently formed National Security Commission (Tiezzi, 2014; d’Hooghe, 2015: 119–120).

Within the news media, contemporary observers have noted that the Xi Jinping government’s renewed emphasis on CCP dominance has led to an overturning of the notion of news media—even official news media—as means of establishing independent “supervision” of public opinion and local instances of official malfeasance. (The official policy phrase, *yulun jian du* or “supervision by public opinion,” has often been used to justify independent reporting on a range of topics [Bandurski, 2015]). In keeping with NCS frameworks, the media are now being remade into a tool of positive propaganda (*zhengmian xuanchuan*) and purged of Western notions of “freedom of the press” (Bandurski, 2015). Thus, media policy since 2012 continues to be made with two main priorities in mind. The first is the ongoing renovation of China’s media and information industries in the pursuit of goals related to building a strong country (*qianguo*) such as economic development, leadership over public opinion, security, and national cultural soft power (“Quanguo xuanchuan buzhang,” *Xinhua wang*, 2015). The second, overlapping somewhat with the first, is to achieve ideological security (*yishixingtai anquan*) through technological means, including the buttressing of key information architecture against foreign attack, control of discourse, and elimination of hostile rival discourses via censorship (“Baogao,” *Zhongguo xinwen wang*, 2014; Zhao and Xu, 2014). Along with the media, similar policy shifts are underway in higher education, mainstream television and film media, publishing, and across the internet.

While much of this work is managed by clearly designated propaganda organs, most notably the CCP Central Committee Propaganda Department and State Council Information Office, these organs are apparently directed by a powerful new institution—China’s Central State Security

Commission (CSSC, *Zhongyang guojia anquan weiyuanhui*), whose establishment was announced in November 2013. As conveyed by Xi Jinping, who serves as CSSC chairman, China's state security challenges were "more complex than at any time in history," and included internal corruption, challenges to centralized governance, and domestic threats with foreign connections (Hoffman and Mattis, 2016). This assessment, and the formation of the CSSC itself, further institutionalized definitions of state security as inclusive of cultural security, insofar as *information transmission* and *ideological infiltration* were viewed as two of the primary vectors by which both domestic and foreign security threats sought to unsettle CCP claims to legitimately govern China. Examples of color revolutions in Central Asia from the early 2000s, foreign-connected NGOs, and media attacks on CCP narratives were used continuously in the official press to further legitimate this assessment (Hoffman and Mattis, 2016). As a threat image supporting a broader policy framework, the NSC paradigm thus remained embedded within Xi's CSSC and, by extension, the PRC party-state security concept.

#### 4.3. Ambiguous parallels – NCS and PLA psychological warfare doctrine

The incorporation of NCS into China's national security concept both preceded and accompanied creation of a policy framework of securitization: specifically, the defense of China's cultural sovereignty and preservation of CCP dominance within the sphere of domestic national culture, and projection of cultural power ("soft power," "discourse power") beyond China's borders. To the extent that these aspects of NCS strategy are evident in military doctrine, strategy, and operations, it can be argued that, through the party-state-army political system, the NCS paradigm also informs the behavior of the PLA.

PLA political work and, more broadly, psychological warfare and operations are part of active measures intended to defend against perceived threats to state security and promote "rise" globally. Analysts use terms like political warfare, influence operations, liaison work, and perception management, often interchangeably, to describe military attempts to influence foreign governments, groups and individuals through psychological warfare (Mulvenon and Finkelstein, 2005; Stokes and Hsiao, 2013). In addition to serving as a force multiplier on the battlefield, psychological warfare (including propaganda) is intended to counter external political warfare: defined as Westernization, peaceful evolution, and the spread of universal values. Like cultural securitization, the informationization (*xinxihua*) of PLA warfare strategy is thus conceptually connected to a threat image of hostile foreign cultural forces, and has produced doctrinal frameworks that emphasize the strategic significance of military capability to project values and influence society through ideological-psychological means.

Psychological warfare, along with cyberwarfare, represents a principal site of this doctrinal and strategic revolution. As on the party-state side of the political system, during the early 2000s a shifting emphasis toward PW was observed in top-level publications like *China Military Science* (*Zhongguo junshi kexue*), with six articles on the topic published during the period 2001–2002 (Thomas, 2003: 1-4). Most of these articles were published by instructors in the Shijiazhuang Ground Forces Command Academy, and appeared to be based on course lectures. In content, they focused primarily on the value of intimidating demonstrations and shows of force as PW strategies applicable to deterring the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait; tactically, they recommended significant investment in PW as a means of offsetting enemy superiority. However, there were also strong indications that the scope of PW operations was not to be limited to cross-Strait issues. Articles contained numerous references to both ancient Chinese texts and Western PW principles from the 1990s, and incorporated observations of recent wars in the Persian Gulf and Kosovo (Thomas, 2005: 5). This latter, broader perspective took a different view of PW: as change in belief effected through propaganda, as a science of power and intimidation, and as study of the psychological character of the enemy.

In reality, the PLA's PW "awakening" had, according to internal accounts, begun during the mid-1980s, when a series of military psychological theory research conferences (*junshi xinli lilun yantaohui*) were convened in Benxi (1985), Shijiazhuang (1986), and Kunming (1987). During this same period, the China Military Psychology Research Collaborative Center (*Zhongguo junshi xinlixue yanjiu xiezuo zhongxin*) and China Social Psychology Academic Association Military Special Subjects Committee (*Zhongguo shehui xinli xuehui junshi zhuanke weiyuanhui*) were established in 1986; this emerging research network consisted of approximately 1,000 researchers,

and was active in the editing of publications such as *Military Psychology Bulletin* (*Junshi xinlixue tongxun*) and *Military Psychology Research Proceedings* (*Junshi xinlixue yanjiu zhuanji*) (Hao and Jiang, 2004). A flagship journal, *Military Psychology Research* (*Junshi xinlixue yanjiu*) began publication in 1988; military psychological study became a regular topic of study in military academies; and numerous new monographs on the topic appeared from 1986 onward. Significantly, a research conference devoted to psychological warfare and counter-psychological warfare (*xinzhhan yu fan-xinzhhan*) was convened in Xi'an in 1990; from 1994 to 1996, an experimental educational training site was active in Shenyang working to extract the “essence” of theories of psychological warfare from ancient texts.

The shift from research in military psychology to research on PW had thus effectively been completed. As a kind of capstone to this transition, and signal that military PW was now being discussed at the highest levels of party-state-army leadership, a “New Military [Affairs] Revolution and Psychological Warfare Research Conference” was convened in Beijing in 1997. The intensity of PW study further increased in 2003 through careful study of the operations of both sides during the Iraq War, with focus on both the offensive and public opinion effects of PW, and methods of resistance (*Ibid*). That same year, the national Military Affairs Commission directed that opinion warfare, PW, and legal warfare using modern media were to become “important methods of striving for political initiative and military victory in warfare.” (This directive, it should be observed, can be viewed as the first authoritative statement concerning the importance of the Three Warfares [public opinion, psychological, and legal] as one of two “sides”—the other being conventional military force—in PLA doctrine.) Further conferences, training, and the creation of new command systems followed. This new institutional and theoretical configuration became known, especially outside of China, as the “Three Warfares” (3W). In its essence, 3W moved beyond kinetic and tangible concepts of war and deterrence to achieve dominance through manipulation of the enemy’s cognitive processes (Halper et al., 2013: 5-15).

Nonetheless, much of the scholarship on 3W produced nearly a decade after the doctrine was endorsed in 2003 by the CCP Central Committee and Central Military Commission missed what was already obvious to observers writing at the time: namely, that PW itself was deemed important because, within China, planning for future scenarios of superpower conflict reflected the belief that armed force itself was primarily a means by which combatants sought to impose *value systems* on each other’s populations. According to Chinese strategists, within such a future (and present):

The highest strategic objective ... is achieved by changing a country’s fundamental social concepts and its society’s sense of values. In this regard, the West uses a system of values (democracy, freedom, human rights, etc.) in a long-term attack on socialist countries. The West used the ideas of democracy and human rights to undermine the communist party in the Soviet Union, and it intends to use the same rationale for interfering in China’s internal affairs. The U.S.’s strategy is to attack political, moral, social and cultural values in target countries” (Thomas, 2003: 5).

The alignment with NCS was further emphasized in military writing which emphasized that China was compelled to take the initiative in PW *defense*, “because psychological security is now an important aspect of national security ... Information and psychological factors are now political and diplomatic weapons, and their power cannot be ignored” (Thomas, 2003: 6-7).

Concern with the informationized conditions of modern warfare and, more generally, technology and media as increasingly powerful forces within society, led military thinkers toward a set of conclusions concerning PW which further echoed those of NCS. Information influence was the *determining* factor in shaping people’s spiritual and mental states (Ji et al., 2003). (As suggested by the bibliography for this article, PLA and national defense publications on PW were already commonplace by 2004). The “space” for use of PW had increased due to the growth of highly advanced information systems, including the Internet. Instead of culture, however, PLA strategists were more concerned with themes of psychology and information, though like writers and policy makers within the party-state their overarching concern was with *ideas, public opinion, and national consciousness*. Likewise, the prescriptions for action were similar as well: temper and inoculate minds against psychological change, sieve public opinion through media control, and resist Western hegemony and media superiority through network defense and recovery of network sovereignty (Thomas, 2003: 7-8). Through military external propaganda, and military soft power, China could become a “prime mover” in shaping the perception of international events (Zhao et al., 2009). More militarized uses of media for PW included intimidation (“soft PW”); in technological

battlespaces, networks served as potential conduits for sowing chaos at the level of social, political, and economic systems (“hard PW”). At the same time, throughout the development and discussion of PW doctrine from 2003 to 2009, definitions of the term returned consistently to sovereignty, information protection and psychological security, defense, and national security strategy.

Securitization of culture through NCS and securitization of psychology through PW thus moved together on parallel tracks, with national grand strategy based on defense against the hegemony-seeking and powerful U.S. led forces of globalization as the primary goal. In 2008, however, a military supreme command for direction of external propaganda, the All-Military External Propaganda Work Small Group (*Quanjun duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo lingdao xiaozu*), had convened its first meeting in Beijing on September 3, placing the timeline for a coherent military response somewhat ahead of the Hu-Xi consensus around ideological defense arising during 2010-2011, though it should be noted that internal civilian strengthening of cybersecurity and defense had already begun to take shape prior to this point (“Quanjun duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo lingdao xiaozu,” *Wikiwand*). (Meetings of this high-level organ were covered online by news sources Sohu and Xinhua, among other sources, from 2008 onward). Guidance and coordination for national-level PW action was intended to counter perceived U.S. efforts to accelerate peaceful evolution and trigger the collapse of socialist governments. Power projection, rather than defense and inoculation, was the primary outcome of psychological securitization within the military domain.

Manifestations of the new doctrine and overarching national strategy surfaced after 2008 in minor, but revealing, forms. The film *Silent Contest* (*Jiaoliang wusheng*, 2013), was produced by the People's Liberation Army's National Defense University Information Management Center, and was intended to awaken viewers both inside and outside of the military to the existence of a secret U.S. “strategy” to westernize China and topple its government (“Contest a silent” [sic], *Youtube*). The film’s main premise was that the U.S. plot to maintain hegemony depended not on military force, but on political and cultural infiltration, and “soft war” methods including use of NGOs, academic institutions, human rights discourse, and propaganda techniques intended to create internal division; as recommended by one of the many Chinese military figures interviewed for the film, president of National Defense University general Wang Xibin (also credited as one of the film’s producers), political and ideological defense were the principal means by which American infiltration was to be defeated. Other evidence of PLA response to the westernization threat image included increasing cooperation between the General Intelligence Department Shanghai Liaison Bureau and Shanghai branch of the Chinese Cultural Promotion Association, and a major internal propaganda “offensive” to reform ideology among the rank-and-file (Stokes, 2015: 23, n 47; Saunders and Wuthnow, 2016: 12).

## 5. Conclusions

From the 1990s onward, a strong national-level consensus has emerged within China’s party-state and party-army leadership that emphasizes the importance of securing culture and making mass opinion and psychology an important future battleground. While many traits of this post-1990s paradigm are widely associated with the figure of Xi Jinping, they should more accurately be seen as responses to a threat image of U.S.-led international hegemony, cultural westernization, and collapse of socialist rule which emerged against a backdrop of post-Deng globalization. China’s NCS-based strategic paradigm was thus itself a product of “reform and opening: cultural securitization and economic and information globalization have proceeded hand-in-hand. As this article has demonstrated, when viewed in both civil and military terms there are two important aspects of securitization which can be observed. First, and primarily with respect to the civil sphere, there has been a renewed emphasis on defending and controlling public opinion both within China and, to a certain extent, abroad. Second, within the military sphere, defensive cultural strategies have been superseded by a doctrine of psychological warfare which stresses the ongoing, conflictual, and existential nature of struggle for control over opinion, information, and, ultimately, consciousness. Whether the emergence of an entire party-state-army apparatus based on this culturally-oriented national strategic paradigm during the period 1994-2014 will be seen as a coherent episode by future historians, and whether this paradigm’s impact on both theories and operations related to propaganda in the Chinese and global contexts will stand out as particularly notable within the frameworks through which China’s longer history is studied, remains to be seen.

Nonetheless, what seems significant is that China's political and military thinkers seem to accept the proposition that human societies face new challenges under conditions of globalization and "informationization" which did not exist previously, and that such challenges require a wholesale transformation of the institutions, media, and weapons through which human thought is shaped and secured.

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
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## Technical Means of Propagandists

### Combat Auto-Printing Mobile Unit BPK-63MKL

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#### Abstract

Distribution of printed materials in the combat zone can be used both to raise the units' morale (publication of newspapers and military leaflets of military units) and to demoralize enemy units (publication of anti-military propaganda materials). Combat auto-printing mobile units are produced in the armies all over the world for these purposes. BPK-63MKL is one of the models of the combat auto-printing mobile units in the Russian army.

Open sources (auction data, technical information of the manufacturer, etc.) were used as materials in this work. General scientific traditional methods of analysis, synthesis, concretization and generalization were used in the research. The historical comparative method was used to reveal and characterize the general and the particular aspect in the selected materials. We also applied the method of generalization of the information on the studied subject.

The author comes to the conclusion that the combat auto-printing mobile unit BPK-63MKL is the new generation weapon of the Russian army and it fully meets the modern requirements for the weapon of the propagandists. Despite the lack of feedback on this product from the military conflicts zone, the combat auto-printing mobile unit proved itself during maneuvers and exercises.

**Keywords:** combat auto-printing mobile unit BPK-63MKL, weapon of the propagandists, Russian army.

#### 1. Introduction

There are numerous technical means in the arsenal of propagandists aimed at the sound impact (radio and megaphone devices)<sup>1</sup> as well as the printed materials impact. Distribution of printed materials in the zone of local or international conflict can be used both to raise the morale of their own units (publication of newspapers and military leaflets of military units) and to demoralize enemy units (publication of anti-military propaganda materials). Combat auto-printing mobile units are produced all over the world for these purposes. BPK-63MKL is one of the models of the combat auto-printing mobile units in the Russian army.

#### 2. Materials and methods

Open sources (auction data, technical information of the manufacturer, etc.) were used as materials in this work. General scientific traditional methods of analysis, synthesis, concretization

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<sup>1</sup> For example, the radio broadcast was actively used during the civil war in Spain (Ribeiro, 2014).

and generalization were used in the research. The historical comparative method was used to reveal and characterize the general and the particular in the selected materials. We also applied the method of generalization of the information on the studied subject.

### 3. Discussion and results

Due to the fact that the combat auto-printing mobile unit BPK-63MKL wasn't tested in the military zone it has no feedback in the press. Nevertheless, it proved itself during the military exercises. In 2010 BPK-63MKL was used in the military exercises "Vostok-2010" and was planned to be used during the strategic military exercises "Tsentr-2011" (Belousov, 2011). General V.M. Smyslov, commander deputy for personnel of the Central Military District in his review noted that "the technical capabilities of BPK-63MKL make it possible to ensure not only the preparation and publication of a full-fledged edition of the brigade newspaper, but also other small printed materials for the participants of the exercises. Moreover, the auto-printing mobile unit will become a material basis for the functioning of the editorial office of the district newspaper" (Belousov, 2011).

BPK-63MKL was designed in the early 2000's at the 106th Experimental Optical-Mechanical Plant in Moscow. It was created in the department of the Development of technical means of computer systems and industrial automation (Russian arms forum). In 2005 the combat auto-printing mobile unit BPK-63MKL was included in the inventory of the Russian army (Bashlakov, 2009). The main purpose of BPK-63MKL is to ensure the prompt publication of multi-colored printing products in A3 format. In addition, it is possible to publish printed materials using data obtained from artificial earth satellites using the set of satellite equipment installed in the mobile unit.



**Fig. 1.** Combat auto-printing mobile unit BPK-63MKL

BPK-63MKL is mounted in the K1.4320 van on the chassis of the URAL 43203-31 vehicle (Fig. 1). BPK-63MKL is powered by the ED16-T400-1VK diesel power station, installed on the PPU-4,5 van on the chassis of the 2-PN-4M biaxial trailer or from an external three-phase network with a voltage of 380 V, 50 Hz with isolated neutral connection.

The mobile printing unit is operated by the crew of four:

- Senior layout designer, operator of the "Granat-630" the mobile printing unit chief;
- Layout designer, satellite communications operator;
- Typographer;
- Driver-electrician-technician.

Combat auto-printing mobile unit BPK-63MKL set-up:

Typographical equipment is installed in a special van with two sections separated by a partition with a door:

- Editorial and publishing section (prepress area);
- Printing section (Fig. 2).

The editorial and publishing section has the following main equipment:

- Two workplaces for the printing layout on the basis of two industrial PCs of the KI-MP type with installed software (Fig. 3);
- An A3 laser printer and an A4 flatbed scanner with a slide module;
- A secure portable PC, a digital SLR camera with a TFT color monitor with a resolution of 8 million pixels for field operation;
- A workplace for the “Granat-630” laser form machine operator (106 [eksperimental'nyi...](#)).

Let us review the equipment more thoroughly. The basic version includes the industrial PCs KI-MP LKNV.466215.007 TU with the following characteristics: PIII-1133 processor, RAM – SDRAM 512 Mb, 40 Gb HDD, 3,5" drive; CD-RW drive; PCI Direct PC and PCI Pent@NET boards for the reception of the Russian technical information channel; IPC-6806 case, PS/2 keyboard and a PS/2 mouse.

In addition, the editorial and publishing section equipment :

- An HP LJ 5100DTN network printer with a duplex A3 unit;
- An HP ScanJet 5470C A4 flatbed scanner;
- A workplace for the editor with a portable Roverbook Discovery AT6 PC and a digital Olympus C-2020ZOOM camera;
- A workstation for the laser LFA-M laser form machine operator, used for the production of offset printing plates of A3 format and image scanning.

Each workstation as well as the LFA-M operator's workplace is equipped with an uninterruptible power supply that allows completing the printing in the event of an emergency power outage.

The printing site is equipped with a “Romayor” offset printing machine.

The climatic conditions inside the mobile unit are supported by the OVU-65 heating and ventilation unit and 1K38-1 industrial air conditioning unit.

The equipment is powered both by the industrial 3-phase network of an alternating current of 380V 50 Hz, and by a mobile power station DES16-T400-1VK on a biaxial trailer ([Russian arms forum](#)).

The printing site is equipped with an A3 offset printing machine.

The functions of the BPK-63MKL are the following. The technological equipment of the BPK-63MKL mobile printing unit allows editing and printing various types of multicolored materials.

The editorial and publishing section carries out the prepress process using the “computer-printed form” technology, namely:

- A set of satellite equipment ensures the reception and PC-processing the data transmitted from the satellite.
- Computing complex of the unit’s publishing section, consisting of two PCs of the KI-MP type and a protected industrial PC of the "Panasonic" type, provides preparation of the A3-format publication, including set, layout and photo processing.
- The unit’s publishing section is equipped with the "Granat-630" automatic laser printer that provides the output of an offset printing of 450x370 mm format, using special software.



**Fig. 2.** Editorial and publishing section



**Fig. 3.** Printing section

The printing section of the product provides printing of A3-format newspapers using an offset form made on a form-factor laser automatic machine in the publishing section.

**Table 1.** Tactical and technical characteristics of the BPK-63MKL auto-printing mobile unit (106 eksperimental'nyi...)

1	Maximum printing , prints per hour	7500
2	Minimum printing , prints per hour	2500
3	The size of the printing plates, mm	370x490x0,15
4	Continuous operation time, hours, not less than	8

5	Time of deployment of the unit by a trained crew (without taking into account the time for assembling, installing and tuning the satellite aerial), minutes, not longer than:	
	- in summer	35
	- in winter	40
6	Interval between failures, hours, not less than	500
7	Service life, years, not less than	12
8	Warranty period, years	5
9	Temperature in the printing unit at the ambient temperature in the range from minus 40 to plus 50 ° C, ° C:	
	- not less than	15
	- not more than	30
10	Overall dimensions of the unit (length width height), mm	13640x2820x3325
11	The full mass of the product when fully fueled and manned, with a crew of four (the weight of one crew member is considered to be equal to 100 kg), kg, not more than	18000±50

The cost of the unit. The unit's cost dynamics can be traced based on the government procurement data.

**Table 2.** The cost of the unit in 2007–2016, rubles. ([Gostorgi 2007](#); [Elektronnyi auktsion 2015](#); [Elektronnyi auktsion 2016](#))

Name	years		
	2007	2015	2016
Combat auto-printing mobile unit (BPK-63MKL) OKPD 34.10.54.910 Special motor vehicles	34 000 000,00	18 370 000,00	25 094 690,97

From the [Table 2](#) we can see that after 2007 the cost of the basic equipment was reduced. This significantly reduced the cost of the BPK-63MKL unit. Nevertheless, in 2015-2016 there was a tendency of increasing the cost of BPK-63MKL unit, which, in our opinion, may be due to inflation.

#### 4. Conclusion

In conclusion we would like to note that the combat auto-printing mobile unit BPK-63MKL is the new generation weapon of the Russian army and it fully meets the modern requirements for the weapon of the propagandists. Despite the lack of feedback on this

product from the military conflicts zone, the combat auto-printing mobile unit proved itself during maneuvers and exercises.

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