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
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## Articles and Statements

### “Look, the British and the French”: a Little about the Don Literary Propaganda during the Crimean War

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#### Abstract

The article is devoted to literary propaganda among the Don Cossacks during the Crimean War. The author found several patriotic poems written by Don Cossacks during the reign of Nicholas I in the collection of the Don general, public figure and writer I.S. Ulyanov (State archive of the Rostov region). One of them, “The Eagle and Two Dogs” by F. Bykov, was a reaction to the entry of Great Britain and France into the Crimean War and was accompanied by an explanatory letter (in the article both of these documents are given in full). After analyzing these texts, as well as other poems, the author came to the conclusion that before the Crimean War on Don there existed patriotic literature, but it was distributed in manuscripts. The appointment of a patriotic M.Kh. Senyutkin to the post of editor of the Don Oblast Gazette and the beginning of the Crimean War led to the fact that patriotic artistic texts began to be actively printed. However, the authors of most of these texts were amateur writers, and because of the low quality of their poems and short stories, the propaganda of the “Don military statements was ineffective.

**Keywords:** Don Cossack Host, the Crimean War, military propaganda, Don Oblast Gazette, I.S. Ulyanov, F. Bykov, M.Kh. Senyutkin.

#### 1. Introduction

In 1854, I.S. Ulyanov, one of the few Don Cossack writers at the time, received a letter that read as follows:

“Your Excellency, dear sir Ivan Samoilovich!

A few days ago, I sent the fable attached here to without alterations and corrections; now, it seems to be given a proper modern form. I think that its very essence feels the premonition about the attitude England and France have towards us. If you take the effort and employ your characteristic view of literature to correct this fable, it will do.

However, even if it does not, I still send you my thanks and gratitude for the excellent poems published in the Don Oblast Gazette. With deep reverence and absolute devotion. I have the honor to be a humble servant of Your Excellency.

F. Bykov<sup>1</sup>” (GARO. F. 243. Op 1. D. 31. L. 34-34ob).

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We had an impression that both the letter and the text of the fable enclosed in it were unique and typical all the way. The Crimean War gave rise to a wave of patriotism on the Don, and Cossacks showed it not only by joining the army (a contemporary of the events, well-known statistician N.I. Krasnov, wrote on the matter that the government succeeded in “enlisting the support of the entire Don Host, depriving it of workers” (RGVIA. F. 330. Op. 10. D. 290. L. 146), but also by venturing to follow literary pursuits. A student at the Kharkov University, and a renown Don regional specialist and journalist in the future, A.A. Karasev “composed a patriotic play in verse, which even received the honor of becoming a stage production at the Kharkov Theater” (Dancy, 2003: 191). A teacher at the Novocherkassk high school, F.I. Anisimov, responded to the hostilities with the poem “Did rouse and surge, the Christian quiet Don”, which later became the text for the anthem of the Don Cossacks and the Rostov region (Skorik, Tikidzh'yan, 1995: 68). Speaking of other, quite numerous patriotic works, we will highlight them below. Such literary dynamism was rather an unexpected activity for a region which had almost no periodic or non-periodic press (only the official mouthpiece “Donskiye voiskovye vedomosti” (Don Oblast Gazette) came out on the territory of the Don Host Oblast in the middle of the 19th century). It is all the more difficult to explain the phenomenon, as few explanatory texts, which accompanied the then Don poems, stories and plays, survived to the day – and all this emphasizes the particular importance of the fable by F. Bykov, a poem typical of that time, but at the same time it is unique because the information of its creation reached as from the author himself. And this information brought up a number of legitimate questions. The letter by F. Bykov makes it clear that he was an amateur writer who hoped that his text would be published not so much due its literary merits, but because of its political relevance. How characteristic was this situation to the Don Host Oblast in the Crimean War era? What inspired F. Bykov and other people who had never before engaged in literature to react to the war through the creation of literary texts? And finally, was writing the texts their personal initiative or was it supported from above, within the framework of some kind of war propaganda carried out by the Russian authorities?

## 2. Materials and methods

Unfortunately, the limitation and scarcity of the source base complicated the process of obtaining answers to these questions (as well as to any questions related to the history of the Don literature in the first half of the 19th century). Scholars have very incomplete knowledge of the Don literary life in the period, with the primary reason being the absence of printed media in the Don Host Oblast. However, the State Archive of the Rostov Region preserved the fund of the above I.S. Ulyanov, which contains handwritten materials of Don authors of the time in our focus. In addition, the materials of the only Don newspaper in the 1850s, the Don Oblast Gazette, were structured as far back as in the 19th century by I.I. Strukov (Strukov, 1878), and already in the 21st century, his index was extended by L.A. Shtavdaker (Штавдакер, 2012). Although the available material cannot offer a sufficient basis for a complete and detailed picture of how the literary war propaganda was conducted on the Don in the Crimean War, but the historical and comparative, historical and systematic methods can help identify at least the most essential features of the propaganda.

## 3. Discussion

F. Bykov's fable saw us not in print, but as a manuscript, and this is by no means accidental. The Don in the era of Nicholas I was characterized by the existence of peculiar “samizdat of the 19th century”, i.e. texts delivered written by hand. The most famous example of such a “samizdat” can be historical and statistical descriptions of the Don Host Oblast, made by V.D. Sukhorukov, a man from the Decembrist group. The history of the creation of these works is well explored by Don historians, above all by N.S. Korshikov (Korshikov, 1994; Korshikov, Korolev, 2001). However, this cannot be said of the history of the manuscripts by V.D. Sukhorukov in the circles of educated Don Cossacks. The thing is that, although the manuscripts were officially banned, and even the permission to copy them for the local statistical committee had to be personally requested in 1839 by ataman M.G. Vlasov from the Minister of War (GARO. F. 353. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 1-10b), in practice, the authorities did not strictly enforce this prohibition. For example, the first edition of the

<sup>1</sup> The writing of the name was illegible, and perhaps it should read “Belov”.

Statistical Description of the Don Host Oblast in 1891 was produced based on the copy handed over to the Don Museum by the son of one of V.D. Sukhorukov's employees, rather than using materials stored in the statistical committee (Sukhorukov, 1891: III). On the other hand, the above-mentioned N.I. Krasnov wrote in the early 1860s about the "small number of copies" made from V.D. Sukhorukov's manuscript, but not about the only copy obtained by law (Krasnov, 1863: 3). And a distinguished Don historian, V.N. Korolev cites another statement by N.I. Krasnov, which argued that the intelligent Don society "respected Sukhorukov" even in his lifetime (Korolev, 1991: 242), when the historian's texts were officially banned. Thus, we can speak with confidence that the first copies of the prohibited works by V.D. Sukhorukov were made no later than in the 1850s, or, possibly, between 1830 and 1840, probably from copies of the text, which were retained by the historian's personnel.

V.D. Sukhorukov was a talented Don author of the first half of the 19th century, and therefore it is not by accident that modern researchers developed a deeper knowledge of the existence of his texts in handwritten copies. However, we discovered in our archival research that the "Don samizdat" was not limited to several manuscripts by V.D. Sukhorukov. In the above-mentioned fund of I.S. Ulyanov, we found numerous copies of poems, prose works and critical articles. And even a cursory look opened enough to make sure that many of these manuscripts were not written by I.S. Ulyanov, but only kept them for posterity, as they are either signed by other people or contain critical notes added by of the fund creator.

From the view of our research, it is particularly meaningful that already the first poem, opening the personal archive of I.S. Ulyanov, features patriotic ideas. It is interesting that it was written in a military camp, after a battle with the enemy – perhaps this fact alone can clearly explain why the patriotic theme played a prominent role in the "Don samizdat". For Cossacks, a military estate, whose members were liable for universal conscription, turning to such a theme and its glorification were quite natural as not simply did the poet "write from the camp of Russian soldiers", but he himself was a Russian soldier. Although we cannot exactly identify the author of this poem, not signed in the manuscript, we cannot rule out that it was I.I. Krasnov – the future general, the hero of the defense of Taganrog in the Crimean War. The point is that he was not only a poet and a friend of I.S. Ulyanov (Korolev, 1991: 231), but also wrote letters in verse from the theater of military operations with Turkey in the war of 1828–1829 (Doney, 2003: 239). The text we are interested in is very large so that we can even call it a small poem, and for this reason, we only give here a poetic introduction to it despite the interest that it holds.

Bivouacking at Aydos  
 Day 29 of June, 1829  
 Perchance, my friend, you've heard,  
 The chain of Balkan mountains and rocks  
 Is left behind us already;  
 That in the face of Russian eagles,  
 Aydos and Karnabat tumbled down  
 Together with three coastal fortresses,  
 And that inevitable Perouns  
 Make proud Tzargrad tremble.  
 Terrifying pictures are likely  
 To be drawn by this glorious feat  
 In your vivid imagination;  
 It draws abysses, rapids,  
 Mountain peaks in the clouds,  
 Covered with eternal snows,  
 Narrow paths in rocks  
 Overgrown with prickly bushes;  
 It draws how a Russian soldier,  
 Leaning on a steel bayonet,  
 Struggles to climb a steep cliff,  
 Stumbling over sharp stones,  
 Meanwhile, the dense leafage  
 Hides half-savage inhabitants,

Frequent bullets rip with whistle  
 Towards the brave;  
 And, in a word, it imagines all  
 The stories that we've heard  
 From our grandfathers that fought  
 In the Alps and on Elbrus.  
 But restrain your ambition,  
 Don't stretch your imagination!  
 Rumors go of the terrible Balkan,  
 But it yielded to dust seeing the heroism,  
 And the giant was dumbfounded  
 By the qualities of invincible Russians,  
 And with his arrogant head adroop  
 He faltered from fearful anxiety,  
 And sent broad roads,  
 Cleared, cut through, erected  
 Bridges over fast-flowing swamps  
 And convinced its inhabitants,  
 When the formidable forces are on the march,  
 Not to burst into needless atrocities,  
 But meet Russians as friends,  
 With holy water and icons,  
 And offer bread and salt to us  
 From their sincere heart.  
 The magnificent Balkans have already  
 Sounded a bulge more than once  
 To hail the swift eagle's glory,  
 That flew wherever the formation  
 Victoriously turned up,  
 Wherever it charged onto the enemy;  
 I<sup>1</sup> hope to properly tell you  
 About this memorable feat,  
 The deeds performed by heroes will thunder  
 Resounding in distant descendants.  
 It will suffice, if in simple words  
 I will narrate about fellow countrymen.  
 Of children of the warlike Don  
 I will recount celebrated deeds (GARO. F. 243. Op. 1. D. 28. L. 1-20b).

Regardless of the literary merits pertaining to the poem – very modest though they are, in our opinion – it represents another unique document confirming that the emergence of the “Don samizdat” was not only brought about by the conservative censorship policies pursued in the time of Nicholas I. Given the talent of V.D. Sukhorukov and specific nature of the Soviet historiography, which studied works by authors opposing the tsarist government as it was safer and more convenient for the researchers themselves, scholars almost exclusively reviewed manuscripts of the above Don historian, initially prohibited to print, picking them out from the entire array of Don Samizdat texts. However, we can see that I.S. Ulyanov's fund also contains patriotic texts by V.D. Sukhorukov, which circulated in the Don region in handwritten copies but remained unpublished.

The reasons explaining this will become clear if we turn to the biography of the author who possibly created the poem “Bivouacking at Aydos”, I.I. Krasnov. A well-educated person, a contemporary of A.S. Pushkin, the future general engaged himself in poetry in the late 1810s, when he served in St. Petersburg, one of Russia's literary centers. His biographer, V.N. Korolev traces the start of the Don author's poetic activity back to 1817 and cites the following pages from the diary of

<sup>1</sup> The illegible brief word, perhaps decrypted incorrectly.

the young poet: “I wrote until dinner, and after dinner translated from French at Kurnakov’s place”; “I started my “The death of enemy” (Korolev, 1991: 222). Fifteen years following the suppression of the Polish uprising of 1830-1831, I.I. Krasnov returned to the Don, where he founded a “circle of the most intelligent people in his homeland” (Istoriya, 1876: 418). The only problem was that members of this circle had no place to print their works: the first local newspaper, the Don Oblast Gazette, started to operate only in 1839. Moreover, it had no informal section in it until 1852 (Strukov, 1878: 1). Meanwhile, I.I. Krasnov emerged as quite popular a poet – his poems were much appreciated by the local educated public, and his admirer had no other choice but to make hand-written copies from them. Even four decades later, the general's obituary in “The Russian Invalid” (Russkiy invalid) mentioned “his poetic compositions that went around the Don in the thirties”, underlining that some of them were “particularly well known” (Korolev, 1991: 222).

So, we can conclude that since at least the 1830s hand-written “samizdat” practices started evolving on the Don, and hand-written copies of V.D. Sukhorukov's, I.I. Krasnov's and I.S. Ulyanov's works and those of other authors with many names lost in the course of history were distributed among the local educated public. Unfortunately, apparently, the modest literary and scholarly qualities of the most of the works explains why they, except for V.D. Sukhorukov and certain excerpts from other texts, had never had chances to be printed. The two turbulent centuries that had passed since the time almost completely erased this plane of the Don culture, only leaving out the fund of I.S. Ulyanov, which, first, was not analyzed as a literary monument, and second, it may inadequately represent the “Don samizdat” in general and mainly reflect personal preferences of its creator. Nevertheless, even in this fund one of the largest and chronologically earliest poems is devoted to patriotic themes. Consequently, the birth of numerous patriotic works by Don Cossacks in the Crimean War was engendered not without reason but prepared by the regional literary tradition. These works include the fable by F. Bykov, sent to I.S. Ulyanov. We believe we should give the whole text of the fable here.

The Eagle and Two Dogs  
The Eagle went down from heavenly heights  
To closely contemplate earthly beauty!  
Here is the regal Eagle, flying over the earth,  
Hurries to see his beloved family;  
Hurries with passion to embosom  
His dear eagless and young eaglets.  
The Eagle was noticed by two malicious Dogs,  
And then Bulldog says to Barbos:  
“If only we could as friends, without a fight,  
Catch the Eagle,  
And quickly drag  
In teeth to our dog court  
(The dog court is tough in the doglike fashion)  
Then all the prey, collected over centuries  
By victorious Eagles,  
Would be left with us”.  
And rushed Bulldog with Barbos  
With barks to dig the ground with noses!  
Here Barbos hit dung with his muzzle,  
Here Bulldog falls down into a dirty pit,  
But God does not indulge the evil!  
Ill luck tipped down their noses,  
The Dogs barked a little and yelped,  
But failed to prevent the Eagle from soaring  
To the height of the royal cliff!  
Now the Eagle and the whole family of Eaglets  
Are looking with contempt at the Dogs.  
And wondering whether the Dogs will end  
Their comedy without a mutual fight,

And won't get tired to howl and grumble.  
 Not daring to bite the Eagle even from behind  
 They would be happy in excitement  
 To tear at each other's throats.

Look, the British and the French,  
 And you, their nephew dock-tailed Kurguz!  
 Don't cock too high your nose,  
 So as not to stick in the manure;  
 And not choke with Islamism<sup>1</sup> themselves,  
 And the world won't be surprised  
 If your malice, envy, anger,  
 To set an example to godless scoundrels,  
 To you, hypocrites and villains,  
 Will turn into a dog bone.  
 Don Cossack, veteran of 1812 (GARO. F. 243. Op. 1. D. 31. L. 35-36).

As the above anonymous poem, the fable by F. Bykov can hardly be called a literary masterpiece. However, it is even more interesting and noteworthy as a document, as a reaction of a veteran of wars with Napoleon to the military involvement of Great Britain and France into the Crimean War. The letter attached to the fable, which we cited at the beginning of our paper, clearly suggests that the author himself had no illusions about the quality of his text, and hoped for I.S. Ulyanov to correct it. Hence, we would consider the final version of this poem not so much as a literary move, but as a civil act. The letter we quoted reveals that after Turkey's Western allies had declared war on Russia, F. Bykov added to the already written fable its last part that compared these allies with vicious dogs, and now sought the publication of the fable only in this form. We believe major significance for understanding the key idea of the author should be given to the signature to this poem: F. Bykov did not identify himself but he made a reference to his past, to his participation in the war of 1812. Obviously, this signature was intended for readers and was to create a certain spirit for the fable: rather than being perceived as a work of a professional writer, the poem was to be viewed as expressing the thoughts of a retired soldier who was forced to take up the pen by the treacherous actions of Britain and France. In addition, such a signature gave special weight to the author's ideas in the eyes of Don Cossacks for whom the war of 1812 remained one of the most glorious pages of the past. Thus, as contrasted with the poem "Bivouacking at Aydos" written to a friend and not intended for print, the fable "The Eagle and Two Dogs" by F. Bykov in its final version was estimated not only as a literary work, but as a propagandist tool targeted against the Russian enemies, and the author altered it in such a way as to achieve the greatest success in this area. And it was not accidental: the Crimean War witnessed the entire Don patriotic literature shifting to a new stage in its development, at which patriotic texts transformed from the private hobby of their authors and their friends, who distributed the texts in hand-written copies, into a weapon of official patriotic propaganda that it wielded on the pages of the only newspaper in the region.

Of course, this shift was directly related to the introduction of an unofficial part in the Don Oblast Gazette, which happened, as we wrote above, in 1852. The program of the state-run edition was expanded following changes in the position of editor, and the monument of the Don regional lore of the early 20th century, the collection of articles "Dony XIX veka" (Don Cossacks of the nineteenth century) wrote the following: "On January 29, 1851, Mikhail Khristoforovich <Senyutkin> was appointed to the post of translator of foreign languages in the Host administration and acting editor of the Don Oblast Gazette. Mikhail Khristoforovich, approved for the latter post on October 1, 1851, held it for more than seven years and was, so to speak, the founder of the unofficial department of the then only local (government) newspaper, distinguished by a serious focus" (Dony, 2003: 440). Importantly, M.Kh. Senyutkin was more than an ordinary official and a journalist, he was also an amateur historian, and it was typical for his works to

<sup>1</sup> This word seems somewhat unusual to us, but it is written quite legibly in the manuscript. It is obvious that the author of the fable used it as a neologism to refer to the Ottoman Empire.



demonstrate his patriotism that went beyond the academic nature. Unfortunately, no special studies into his creative work have been carried out so far, however, we think one fact is sufficient to understand the social and ideological stand of the Don Oblast Gazette's editor. When in the early 20th century the Ministry of War made an attempt to compose an official history of Cossacks, the author of the program for the project, N.A. Maslakovets, proposed to use the words of M.Kh. Senyutkin to define the role of Cossacks for Russia. "These people are made of iron, whom, according to Frederick the Great, you can kill, but you can never defeat! Turks, Crimeans, Nogais and Circassians wanted to stop them. All in vain. Not only did Don Cossacks defeat them, but they wiped them out of their land. They are conquering vast expanses of Siberia, and eventually everything – and their victories, and glory, and life – bring to the Tsar of Russia, saying: "We are your serfs, ready to serve, ready for the Orthodox faith and you, Sire!" (OR RNB. F. 1055. D. 4. L. 30).

It is not surprising that a person holding such views decided to leverage the "Don Oblast Gazette" as a patriotic propaganda platform during the Crimean War. It is worth noting here that before the outbreak of military operations and in their first phase, in 1852-1853, even the unofficial part of the "Don Oblast Gazette" featured very few literary works, namely only one story by some Ye. Mikulin, which described everyday life (Shtavdaker, 2012; Strukov, 1878: 53). At this time, M.Kh. Senyutkin published materials mainly on local history, statistics and economy, for example, from the works of I.S. Ulyanov. Pages of the Don Oblast Gazette displayed not poetry or prose, but only agricultural articles in these years (Shtavdaker, 2012). It is our opinion that both the editor and the authors believed the format itself of the official Host newspaper was not suitable for fiction. It is characteristic that the "Doncy XIX veka" credited M.Kh. Senyutkin for publishing "a lot of fundamental articles and materials on the history of the Don" in the unofficial part of the Don Military Gazette and did not mention literary works at all (Doncy, 2003: 440). At the time, the newspaper published almost no materials on current combat events as well (Shtavdaker, 2012). However, the situation in the newspaper changed dramatically in early 1854. Already the 2nd issue for this year introduced a story by I.S. Ulyanov "Military resourcefulness" (Strukov, 1878: 53). Soon, Issue 4 printed the first patriotic article highlighting latest war events – "On the military exploits of Don Cossacks in the Caucasus under the command of Baklanov (combat news from the Caucasus)" (Strukov, 1878: 24). Further on, the number of such historical and literary patriotic materials rapidly grew. We will write more about published poems and stories below and note here that, for example, there were more than ten articles on current war events in 1855 in the newspaper concerned (Shtavdaker, 2012).

Therefore, the patriotic ideas for the first time became one of the central themes in 1854 on the pages of the Don Oblast Gazette, and the "first herald" of the change in the editorial policy was not the publication of news from the army but the appearance of work by one of the most distinguished Don writers. In turn, the increasing portion of patriotic texts in the Don Oblast Gazette clearly demonstrated the interest of the editorial staff in the materials, and we can assume that F. Bykov was not the only one who offered his patriotic opuses to the press in this context. On the other hand, we did not find his fable in any of the indexes to the Don Oblast Gazette, and this means that it was never published. We can only make assumptions on how many other similar materials, rejected as having no literary merit, were received in the editorial office of the analyzed newspaper and to the writers connected with the office, whose archives, unlike the archive of I.S. Ulyanov, did not survive?

And yet, even despite the selection, the number of literary works with a patriotic accent quickly grew in the Don Oblast Gazette. In 1854, the only Don newspaper published nine fiction texts, of which more than half reflected patriotic attitudes. In addition to the story by I.S. Ulyanov, these were a story by a certain Petrov "The feat of Don Cossacks", connected works "An excerpt from a Cossack's notes while on march" and the poem "The thought" by N. Posnov, as well as "Azov letters" by N.V. Kukolnik (Strukov, 1878: 53). And in the next year, in 1855, patriotic poems generally ousted all other fiction texts from the unofficial part of the Don Oblast Gazette. Their complete list is as follows: I. S-v "Feelings of a Don Cossack. When reading the Manifesto of December 14. 1854", V. Myznikov "Ruined churches. A poem about the death of Don Cossacks in battle", P. Grigoriev "A hymn for the demise of the great emperor Nicholas I", A. Leonov "The song of the militia of the 1st military district" and "To the Russian soldier", Captain N. N. "On the death of the brave Don commander of regiment No. 11 colonel I. A. Kharitonov, killed in the battle of Cholok on June 4, 1854", M. Molchanov "To Russia" and "To the Monument of Platov", F.T.

“The song. Do not grieve, our dear Don...” (Shtavdaker, 2012). Even after the end of the Crimean War, patriotic themes continued to dominate the literary part of the Don Oblast Gazette for some time. In 1856, when a peace treaty was concluded, the newspaper featured the stories “Uryadnik Yefremov and his military exploits against Turks” by I.Ch., “A love for the Motherland” by A. Leonov and “Return of the Don horse artillery battery number 7 from the service to the Don” by V. Popov, as well as the poem “Return of the Warrior” again by A. Leonov (Strukov, 1878: 53). Only two non-patriotic fiction works were published that year (Strukov, 1878: 53). And it was not until 1857 that the patriotic themes receded into the background in the edition under review, and at the same time, its publishing activities related to literary texts drops dramatically. Only three such works came out in 1857 and six in 1858, but two of them (“An episode from the Crimean campaign. The heroic deed of Uryadnik Pismenskov” and “Old hunter in the war” by M.Kh. Senyutkin himself) again turned to patriotic ideas (Strukov, 1878: 53-54). And in 1859, the publication of fiction works was completely stopped in the Don Oblast Gazette for several years (Strukov, 1878: 54).

It remains for us to acknowledge that the start of regular literary publications in the unofficial section of the Don Oblast Gazette was triggered by the Crimean War. In total, the newspaper printed twenty four literary texts between 1854 and 1856 (only one in the previous two years), of them eighteen addressed patriotic themes. It was the war-time years of 1854 and 1855 that marked the peak in the number of published works: there were nine of them in these years, then there was a decline to six in 1856 and in 1857 to three. Perhaps the imbalance was brought about by the fact that a considerable part of literary works, featured in the Don Oblast Gazette” paid attention to specific war and near-war events. In particular, the theme of the death of Nicholas I, before it was covered in the literary work, was raised in the news items “The last moments of late Emperor Nikolay Pavlovich falling asleep in the Lord” and “The last hours of the life of Emperor Nicholas I” (Shtavdaker, 2012). And, finally, an interesting fact is that of all the authors published by the Don Oblast Gazette in its the literary section in the peak of 1855, only A.A. Leonov, a fairly popular Don poet and public figure, could be called a professional writer (Volvenko, 2015b: 196). We could not find the remaining three full names either in the archival documents or in the literature on the Don history of the 19th century. Similarly, in 1854 and in 1856, the range of authors creating patriotic fiction works, published in the Don Oblast Gazette, was dominated by random individuals. A Taganrog researcher, A.A. Volvenko made a list of key authors featured in the Don Oblast Gazette from 1852 to 1860, and it includes neither N. Posnov, Petrov, V. Myznikov, P. Grigoriev, M. Molchanov, nor V. Popov (Volvenko, 2015a: 97). Thus, all these people, just as F. Bykov, were amateur writers who sent their texts for print expecting to receive not so much literary fame but to evoke public response.

Summing up the discussion above, we cannot but say a few words on the efficiency of patriotic propaganda facilitated by the Don Oblast Gazette during the Crimean War. Strange as it may seem the fact that at the time, as we wrote above, virtually the entire Don Host was mobilized, does not confirm the efficiency of the propaganda. On the contrary, the Don Oblast Gazette remained a very short-run newspaper until the 1860s, totally unpopular in the Cossack circles: Cossacks chose to subscribe to metropolitan editions, and the only local print mouthpiece had... 40 private and 167 mandatory subscribers (Volvenko, 2015a: 96). Therefore, the patriotic program, proposed by M.Kh. Senyutkin, was of little interest to Cossack readers in the war time. We would link this situation with the inferior writing skills of the people involved in patriotic propaganda, as most of them were non-professional authors. Hence, the conventional logic of propaganda was turned around in this case, and not the Don Oblast Gazette provoked a rise in patriotic sentiments in the Cossack society, rather the rise and the social position of M.Kh. Senyutkin led to changes in the newspaper's policy, increased number of patriotic publications in its issues, and, eventually, its transformation into a tool of military propaganda.

#### 4. Conclusion

The small letter written by F. Bykov to I.S. Ulyanov provided us with a kind of key to the problem of patriotic propaganda among the Don Cossacks in the Crimean War. Certainly, we wrote above, it is impossible to form a deep understanding of the history and all features of the propaganda having at hand only this small text and few other sources on the subject, available for researchers. However, we have progressed far enough to offer the reader answers to the questions set at the beginning of the paper.

1) The Don literature of the period that became the focus of our attention can be compared with an iceberg when only a relatively insignificant part of the mass is accessible for today's researcher. The major portion of this "iceberg" consists of the "Don samizdat", the works by Don authors, which were distributed in hand-written copies and have never been explored by scholars. On the other hand, a close look at the copies that have survived until our days from I.S. Ulyanov's fund in the GARO archive, suggests that the "Don samizdat" was also represented by patriotic texts. The narrow source base makes it difficult to evaluate how typical they were of this epoch but even I.S. Ulyanov retained a voluminous poem "Bivouacking at Aydos", dedicated to the Russian-Turkish war of 1827-1828 and portraying the exploits of the Cossacks who participated in it.

2) The appearance of numerous patriotic poems and stories was not accidental in 1853-1856 and had no connections to the Don folklore, but their authors were familiar with the Don Samizdat works that have been lost by now. Accordingly, one of the forms the reaction to the events of the Crimean War took was the literary response – the creation of works glorifying Russian weapons or openly attacking the enemies of the Russian Empire. Such "vituperative" works can be illustrated by the fable of F. Bykov "The Eagle and Two Dogs". However, while in previous decades such texts were destined to circulate in hand-written manuscripts, and their authors did not count on public appreciation, now the situation changed, and Don patriotic literature obtained more and more sheer agitation qualities designed to provoke readers into a certain reaction. In particular, with a view to producing this reaction, F. Bykov added to his fable a characteristic ending, comparing Turkey's western allies with vicious dogs, as well as a signature emphasizing his part in the Patriotic War of 1812.

3) This shift from essentially literary to essentially social goals was empowered by the opportunity to be published, which became available for Don author. Beginning in 1852, the only Don newspaper, Don Oblast Gazette, introduced an unofficial section. While almost no literary works were printed there till 1854, the increasingly larger scale of the Crimean War made the editor of the newspaper under review, M.Kh. Senyutkin, respond with a change in policy: since 1854, the Don Oblast Gazette started regularly highlighting relevant texts that were expressly patriotic and propagandist in nature, and the first work in the array of the materials was the story by I.S. Ulyanov "Military resourcefulness", rather than news or features from the theater of war operations. Thus, the only Don newspaper began to publish fiction works with a focus on military and patriotic themes.

4) However, M.Kh. Senyutkin was unable to engage the best Don authors of the time in the patriotic propaganda. Perhaps, the fact that the publications in the Don Oblast Gazette had less literary importance but brought a greater social impact explains why most of the authors, like F. Bykov, were random people who sent the editor their literary responses to specific events and the war in general. I.S. Ulyanov limited himself to one patriotic story, "Azov letters" by N.V. Kukolnik were not the exclusive material of the Don Oblast Gazette and were soon reprinted in the Severnaya Pchela (Northern Bee) (*Kukol'nik, 1854*), and of the rest authors of the patriotic texts, only A.A. Leonov was a professional writer. As a result, the patriotic propaganda in the only Don newspaper was inefficient as the newspaper continued to have a microscopic circulation, and none of the printed texts won popularity.

5) Nevertheless, as we wrote above, the Don literature of the time was a peculiar "iceberg", and, for example, the famous poem by F.I. Anisimov "Did rouse and surge, the Christian quiet Don" was never published in the war years. Therefore, we can suggest that the oral and handwritten literary propaganda, rather than the printed one, as well the dissemination of patriotic texts by traditional ways of the Don literature in the period had more profound significance. Alas, it is difficult to say whether any sources of such propaganda have survived, but further archival research can help to discover them.

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
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## “The Image of the Enemy” in the Russian Empire during the Great War

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### Abstract

The article analyzes the formation of “the image of the enemy” in the Russian society in 1914–1916 on the basis of periodical and non-periodical publications. The author focuses on the relationship of information policy and its part in the military-political events in the world. It displays the impact of media on mass consciousness. It is also noted that the formation of the image of the enemy was productive in the army and among the population, but only during the early years of the war.

In addition to newspapers and illustrated periodicals (“Lyetopis’ voyny”, “Velikaya voyna v obrazakh i kartinkhakh”, “Ogonyok”, “Iskry”, “Neva”), brochures and books, published for “propagandizing” the reader during the Great War were also used as materials for the article.

**Keywords:** propaganda, periodicals, “the image of the enemy”, prisoners of war, occupation, the Great War, public opinion.

### 1. Introduction

The Great War (1914–1918) became the symbol of a new total warfare, massive ideological confrontation, violation of international humanitarian law. All this required the governments of the warring states to have a total influence on the mass consciousness of the population, to form patriotic sentiments, and to create a negative image of the enemy, to mobilize all material and spiritual efforts to continue the protracted war. Consideration of these phenomena became the goal of this publication.

### 2. Materials and methods

During the war, a significant amount of propaganda literature was published, with a purpose to form an image of a cruel, inhuman enemy that should be defeated without any doubts. It is noteworthy that in the pre-war period the Russian society traditionally highly valued the cultural heritage of Germany. Now, German culture was viewed as barbaric propaganda, which threatened the whole European civilization.

In addition to newspapers and illustrated periodicals (“Lyetopis’ voyny”, “Velikaya voyna v obrazakh i kartinkhakh”, “Ogonyok”, “Iskry”, “Neva”), brochures and books, published for “propagandizing” the reader during the Great War were also used as a source base for the article.

In this article the author used a number of general historical research methods. Thus, when analyzing the mood in Russian society during the war years and the influence of propaganda on it, the retrospective method was of great importance. It allowed to show how military events in the world resonated with the propaganda campaign.

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The comparative historical method was used to study the propaganda literature directly; it allowed the author to trace the general trends and peculiarities in the information policy of the state during 1914-1916.

The sociological method of sampling material was used during the database processing. Given the significant number of both periodical and non-periodical publications, the author, in his subjective view, chose the most popular illustrated magazines, as well as brochures and books reflecting the formation of “the image of the enemy” during World War I.

### 3. Discussion and results

The outbreak of hostilities triggered a massive propaganda campaign in the warring countries. Thus, in the first days of the war, thousands of Russians located in Germany found themselves interned. Some of them could soon return back home. Their unfortunate experiences were promptly reported in 1915 by the publications of: E. Mogilensky “The hostage diary: 7 months of captivity in Carlsbad” ([Mogilenskiy, 1915](#)), N. Sergievsky “Notes of a captive: Two and a half months in captivity by the Germans” ([Sergievskiy, 1915](#)), M. Yakubovskiy “In the Devil's Tower: Impressions of the experiences of the captured Russian official in Vienna” ([Yakubovskiy, 1915](#)).

In 1914-1917 numerous publications appeared and spread in the army, telling about the abuse of Austro-German troops towards the prisoners of war in order to raise morale among the troops and prevent mass surrenders. For example, individual booklets: I. Kurmoyarov “A terrible story: (Stories of the Russian soldiers who fled from the German captivity)” ([Kurmoyarov, 1915](#)), V. Markozov “Heavy recent past” ([Markozov, 1915](#)), B. Radonich “Diary of a sister of mercy, who lived in German captivity for nearly 4 months” ([Radonich, 1915](#)), V. Fomin “Among cultural barbarians: 14 months in German captivity” ([Fomin V. 1915](#)).

The book “War of the fourteenth year. According to the stories of participants and eyewitnesses” was published in 1915 in Kiev. Its author, priest and publicist S. Broyakovskiy, summarized the periodicals in addition to the “nationwide patriotic upsurge and monarchical moods” in the country and spoke about the atrocities of the German-Austrian troops during the first months of the war in the occupied territories of the Russian Empire ([Broyakovskiy, 1915](#)).

In 1915-1916 three volumes of the official history of the war were released, in which the authors tried to convince readers of the misanthropic theory of Pan-Germanism, the need to endure all hardships for the sake of victory over the cruel enemy. “Witnesses of the wars that have been so far do not believe their eyes, seeing the unprecedented atrocities practiced by the Teutons on the battlefields and at sea ... It seems that the “ humane ” twentieth century will require satisfaction and response for the entire robbery practiced nowadays by Wilhelm”. ([Velikaya voyna v obrazah i kartinah, 1915: 4](#)). Thus, Professor A. Pilenko pointed out the widespread brutality of German troops and tried to give an explanation. He stressed that over the past century, German propaganda prepared the population to accept the ideas of militarism and Pan-Germanism, the main slogan of which was “Germany is above all” ([Pilenko, 1915: 274](#)).

The authors of books and articles tried to present Russia as a Christian, civilized country, a defender of truth and justice, opposed to the barbaric “Teutons”. “In this war there are two worlds: the world of modern culture and the world of the distant past, from the legends of the Tevtoburg forests” ([Kiev, 1914](#)).

It is noteworthy that the Russian pacifist organizations declared the need to wage war until the complete defeat of Prussian militarism. For example, the Moscow Peace Society, pointing to the cruelty of the enemy, noted: “There may be an exaggeration in some messages, but there is already enough factual evidence... Russia with its allies must finally defeat the enemy, unclench its armored fist and crush the hydra of militarism” ([Semenov, 1915: 146](#)). The Petrograd branch of the Society of Peace, justifying the war that had begun, emphasized that “the slogan “for the right, culture and civilization united our beliefs and our reason” ([Semenov, 1915: 146](#)). Some authors argued that the post-war, defeated Germany should represent fragmented principalities, as it was before the beginning of the Chancery of O. Bismarck. ([Velikaya voyna v obrazah i kartinah, 1915: 8](#)).

With the beginning of the war, the press actively forms the image of Germany and Austria-Hungary as a cruel enemy. “The system of Bismarck and Wilhelm II gave its fruits, and the ideals of the fist became the soul of a German” ([Denisyuk, 1914: 652](#)). The Russian magazine “Niva” began publishing material on German atrocities during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–71, drawing an analogy with the actions of Wilhelm’s troops in the occupied areas of Poland, Belgium and France.

In the first weeks of the war, in the newspapers, the German emperor was portrayed in a rather caricature form: a small Belgian boy in wooden shoes was blocking his path, or he ran away in panic from the Cossacks. At first he was funny and not scary. A month after the German invasion of Belgium, France and Poland, the image of the Kaiser is being shaped by the press in demonic, ominous tones. Famous psychiatrist, academician V. Bekhterev prepared an essay “Wilhelm is a degenerate of the Neron type” in which, describing the German emperor, he pointed to his “messianism” (the Kaiser often emphasized that God himself spoke through his mouth), cruelty and signs of mental disorder. The scientist came to the conclusion that the Kaiser, with his delusional ideas, a penchant for abnormal psychological manifestations, was a “typical degenerate” on the throne (Behterevev, 1915: 252-253).

“Letopis voyny” promptly acquainted the readers with Wilhelm's war plans: “I will take Brussels on August the 3<sup>rd</sup>, I will have dinner on the 11<sup>th</sup> in Paris, on the 19<sup>th</sup> I will land near St. Petersburg” (Letopis voynyi, 1914: 29).

The population was warned of a possible invasion of the enemy in the European provinces of Russia. Thus, the propaganda prepared the society for the need to conduct a partisan war to assist the army. For example, “Niva” published a report “Captured by women”: on the forced landing of a German aircraft and the capture of its 2 pilots by the peasant women working in the fields (Niva, 1914. № 37: 722).

The opinion that the subjects of the Empire of all nationalities, social groups and religions were united around the idea of protecting “the throne and the Motherland” was actively formed in the minds of the public

The outstanding philosopher F.A. Stepun, who served as an ensign in the 12<sup>th</sup> Siberian Infantry and Artillery Brigade, in September 1914, assessing the propaganda campaign that had begun in the warring countries, wrote: “All the most evil, sinful and foul, forbidden by the elementary conscience in relation to one person to another, is now truth and heroism” (Stepun, 2000: 5).

The devastated city Louvain is considered to be a symbol of cruelty of the German army in Belgium. The entire world press wrote about it in August 1914. Polish provincial town of Kalisz, located four miles from the border became a place of bloody events in the Russian-German front from the first days of the war. The press, covering the enemy's presence, published a photograph of the “first victim of German atrocities” – the provincial treasurer, P. I. Sokolov, shot by the Germans for refusing to give money. Reporters published evidence of B. Bukovinsky (the mayor of Kalisz) on the atrocities of the German troops (Breshko-Breshkovskiy, 1914: 776). According to press reports, before leaving, the Germans fired artillery on Kalisz, resulting in death of dozens of civilians. A total of 420 houses were burned down during the occupation, according to incomplete data, losses amounted to 50 million rubles. It is noteworthy that German citizens who lived in Kalisz also reported losses of 2 million rubles. (Niva, 1914. № 38: 3).

Polish Częstochowa, where the Catholic Yasnogorsk monastery was plundered and desecrated, was subjected to the same fate, the population was subject to indemnification and 18 inhabitants were shot (Broyakovskiy, 1915: 101). According to eyewitnesses, Austrians executed 17 people in Kielce (Broyakovskiy, 1915: 121). This information, presented in the collection and borrowed from newspapers, was written for propaganda purposes in order to expose the policies of the enemy in the occupied territories, and, accordingly, requires further study and comparison with other sources.

The information about the presence of the enemy directly on the Ukrainian territory, then owned by the Russian Empire, is also interesting. In the first weeks of the war, Austro-Hungarian troops invaded Volyn and Podolsk provinces. For example, on August 3, 1914, the Austrian cavalry began advancing towards Vladimir-Volynsky (Volyn Province). However, six attacks of enemy cavalry were successfully repelled on the outskirts of the city, which suffered from enemy shelling. On August 7, the remnants of the Austrian troops withdrew to the border. According to eyewitnesses, the presence of the enemy in the Vladimir-Volyn district was remembered by the robbery of the population. But the Austrians did not hurt the civilians, declaring that they were then Austrian nationals; that Kovel and Warsaw had already been taken, and that Kiev would soon fall (Broyakovskiy, 1915: 135).

On August 4, Austrian troops approached the town of Gorodok (Podolsk Province), located 30 versts from the border, and shelled it with shrapnel. The city led a fierce battle for 8 hours.

The press later claimed that the Austrians finished off the wounded on the battlefield. The battle ended with the victory of the Russian troops: more than a hundred soldiers and 4 guns were captured. For several days, the Austrians occupied Satanov. The population was robbed, 5 people were killed; 80 inhabitants (among which was a priest) were taken as hostages by the Austrians (Broyakovskiy, 1915: 147).

Kamenetz-Podolsk was also subjected to the enemy invasion. On August 4, on their approaching the city, the Austrians shelled it: three citizens were killed on Pochtovaya Street. The local tailor M. Gorbman, who did not stop at the request of the Austrian patrol was shot. The city's population was lined up with a 200-thousand contribution, in addition, 800 poods of baked bread and 200 horse carriages were demanded from it. The townspeople managed to collect only 25 thousand rubles" (Broyakovskiy, 1915: 149). However, during the retreat from the city the money was returned. The commander of the 8th Russian army, General A. Brusilov, mentioned this in his memoirs: "The Austrians ... hastily left Kamenetz-Podolsk and completely returned the indemnity, which they collected from the residents of the city. It was completely natural, because they understood that if they took money from the residents of Kamenetz-Podolsk, then I would not spare Tarnopol, Trembovl and Chertkov" (Brusilov, 2003: 97).

However, due to the power of prayers, as pointed out by S. Broyakovsky, the Pochaev monastery was saved from desecration. On July 26, 1914, the first patrols of the Austrian cavalry appeared at Pochaev. "The Austrians robbed all around them and were going to move to Pochaev". For 11 days, the monastery was expecting to be captured by the enemy, who stopped only 3 miles from them. The monks were able to observe the Austrian cavalymen. But on August 6, as the Russian troops approached, the Austrians hurried back to the border (Broyakovskiy, 1915: 127).

According to the publications of 1914-1916, the enemy treated the wounded and prisoners of war the same as the civilian population in the occupied lands. From the first weeks of the outbreak of hostilities, it was reported that the Germans slaughtered the wounded, shelled ambulance trains and infirmaries. In August 1914, A. I. Guchkov (a member of the Main Directorate of the Russian Red Cross Society) informed the International Red Cross organization in Geneva about the systematic violation of international conventions by Austro-German troops against the wounded and prisoners of war. According to the military historian N.N. Golovin, about 2 million 417 thousand Russian soldiers and officers fell into enemy captivity. More than 200 thousand people died from epidemics, forced labor, hunger and bullying in captivity. (Golovin, 2001: 135).

Since the beginning of 1915, newspapers and magazines increasingly began to receive information from those who had been in captivity about the cruelties of the enemy towards the prisoners. As a result, on January 29, 1915, the State Duma decided to set up a commission to investigate violations of international conventions of warfare by Germany and Austria-Hungary. (Letopis voynyi, 1915. № 26: 421).

In April, the Emergency Investigation Commission was established under the chairmanship of Senator A. N. Krivtsov, and a year later documentary evidence of the atrocities of the Austro-German troops was published. The "first martyrs" were considered to be non-commissioned officer P. Panasyuk, corporal V. Water and telephone operator A. Makukha. With the description of their sufferings in captivity (during interrogations their noses, ears and tongues were cut, they were beaten), the press began to widely report on the enemy's abuse over the prisoners.

Thus, according to the testimony of the non-commissioned officer of the 1<sup>st</sup> Siberian Rifle Regiment N. Mishchenko, the prisoners refused to fulfill defense orders at a plant in Budapest. For this they were hanged by their hands to the post for 18 days. Then twenty people stabbed with bayonets, eight of them died. (Chrezvyichaynaya sledstvennaya komissiya, 1917: 14). A private soldier of the 18th Siberian Regiment N. Bokovets told about the situation of prisoners at the Witten factory in Germany. For refusing to make shells, people were forced to stand at the factory furnaces until the iron pads they were wearing turned red by the heat. The most stubborn prisoners were blindfolded and were intimidated by the execution. "The prisoners were waiting for the inevitable death and were crossing themselves while listening to the command, but there was no shooting, and morally exhausted people returned to the barracks until the next test" (Chrezvyichaynaya sledstvennaya komissiya, 1917: 17). On June 1, 1915, four prisoners were shot after refusing to build fortifications on the Italian front after being tortured by Austrians in the Brennerbad camp (Chrezvyichaynaya sledstvennaya komissiya, 1917: 48).



The local press called for assistance to those who were languishing in captivity, collecting food, clothing, and medicines for them. The Nikolaev committee of the Russian city union published the letter of prisoners with “a prayer to send them something edible, at least some crackers”. The letter was signed by I. Grundewald, J. Panchenko and Veremenko, privates of the 254<sup>th</sup> Nikolaev Infantry Regiment who were prisoners in the camp of Zerbst ([Nikolaevskaya gazeta, 1916](#)).

The beginning of the 1915 campaign made it possible for the Russian propaganda to accuse Germany of new crimes against humanity. In the spring, the Germans first used chemical weapons. Soon the press was full of photos of victims of German gas asphyxiation and the various gas masks that soon became widespread.

In 1915, after being defeated, the Russian troops left Poland, Lithuania, part of Latvia, western Belarus and Volyn. Columns of refugees were moving to the east, were shelled by the German artillery and airplanes at Brest, Kobrin, Slonim (Grodno Province). The press regularly reported on German air raids on peaceful cities. For example, it was noted that the cathedral of the city of Lomza was the object of constant enemy bombardment in March-April 1915 ([Iskryi, 1915. №20: 158](#)). The weekly newspaper “Zarya”, noting the goals of the war for the Entente, prophetically wrote: “Prussian militarism must not only be crushed. It is necessary to prevent its revival, to make this revival impossible” ([Zarya, 1915. № 21: 16](#)).

#### 4. Conclusion

Thus, the key task of propaganda in 1914-1916 was the formation of a negative image of hostile states, support of the official ideology, dissemination of patriotic ideas to enhance morale, both in the army and among the civilian population. This was facilitated by the violation of international conventions of warfare by the troops of Germany and Austria-Hungary. It was proved by numerous facts (although some of them were created or exaggerated by propaganda): repressions against the civilian population, taking hostages, harassment of the wounded and prisoners of war – these methods were really used by the enemy on the Eastern Front. Throughout the war, the warring powers understood perfectly the role and significance of the propaganda factor in influencing compatriots and neutral countries. But the formation of the image of a cruel, inhuman enemy, who was actively created by the propaganda apparatus of the Russian Empire during 1914-1916, did not achieve the expected results: stories about real and imaginary atrocities of the enemy could no longer inspire the army tired of sitting in the trenches. This was vividly illustrated by the revolutionary events of 1917: “fraternization” with the enemy and the spread of anti-war sentiment among the broad masses of soldiers.

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
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## Propaganda as a Tool of “Non-Lethal Warfare” (on the Example of British and German Propaganda during the Period of World War I)

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### Abstract

The article analyzes some propaganda models, in particular, the Herman-Chomsky model, the Ellul model and the Hall model and their practical application as theoretical foundations for the analysis of British and German propaganda during World War I. The article shows that knowing the target audience is one of the most important principles of propaganda and it guarantees its effective work on shaping the picture of the world. At the same time, the specificity of the dominant subjective and group picture of the world determines both the research methodology and the applicable propaganda model. Supposedly the object of propaganda functions in three realities: empirical (defined in terms of the correspondence of the physical world and our senses); imaginary (corresponding to the virtual space of culture) and spectator reality (the intersection of the first two). The article considers propaganda to be a consistent, long-term way of creating or shaping events, with the aim of influencing the attitude of the masses to an idea. It is proved that the effect on the group is more effective than the same effect on the individual. The article researches the artificiality and intensity of propaganda campaigns with an obvious predominance of the emotional component, using factoids, i.e. facts that do not exist before their appearance, objectification in the media space. The author shows that both the German and British propaganda of World War I can be characterized to a greater extent as Propaganda 1.0, with its conceptualization.

**Keywords:** propaganda 1.0, propaganda 2.0, dominant code, informational and semantic war.

### 1. Introduction

The fact that propaganda today is an integral part of the media space is indisputable. Moreover, it takes place at any time in any society. We all live in a world of propaganda, without even noticing it. And only in the times of the collision of contradictory circumstances and their polar interpretation propaganda is objectified in our consciousness. Substantially, propaganda is a multifaceted phenomenon: from the promotion of any idea (gender, tolerance, healthy lifestyle, etc.) to political propaganda and the imposition of hateful ideas. Propaganda quite often, “coexists” with religion and ideology and acts as a strategic management option, creating new rules applicable to facts.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The paradox is that by creating new rules, propaganda thereby creates new facts, while the creation of new facts does not determine the creation of new rules. This is an obvious strategic function of propaganda in the virtual space, different from the tactical management options and means of physical influence in the physical

Propaganda primarily reacts to the physical space, sometimes distorting the reality with fake messages, and in this context it is ahead of counterpropaganda, which reacts to the informational space and acts as a response to propaganda.<sup>1</sup> Modern man is most susceptible to the influence of propaganda, which is explainable in terms of information expansion, manipulation, information and semantic wars, influential operations and other things. For the state, propaganda is a natural communication tool: it is an institutional flow that is different from interpersonal communication, since institutions are not peculiar to commissioners, but directives. Thus, propaganda is a form of communication with the masses, unambiguously containing an ideological component.

## 2. Materials and methods

During the preparation of the article, the author used open Internet sources devoted to the subject of World War I and containing a large amount of documentary materials, photos, card files, rare works and so on. We should mention the following:

1. Multimedia history of WWI: <https://www.firstworldwar.com/posters/index.htm>
2. Archive of WWI documents: [wwi.lib.byu.edu](http://wwi.lib.byu.edu)
3. Unique footage of the WWI events: [www.britishpathe.com/workspaces/page/ww1-the-definitive-collection](http://www.britishpathe.com/workspaces/page/ww1-the-definitive-collection)
4. Diaries, photos, postcards and relics: [www.europeana1914-1918.eu/en](http://www.europeana1914-1918.eu/en)
5. The site dedicated to the history of propaganda during WWI: <http://www.ww1propaganda.com/world-war-1-posters>
6. The Internet Encyclopedia of WWI: <https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/home/> and many more.

The theoretical foundations of the historical-comparative method and analysis of German-British propaganda of the time of WWI were research works representing the propaganda models of Herman, Chomsky, Ellul and Hall, extrapolated to the processes and events of European history of the first quarter of the XX century.

## 3. Discussion

Encyclopedia "Britannica" gives the following definition of propaganda: "Propaganda is the dissemination of information – facts, arguments, rumors, half-truths and lies, defining public opinion" (Smith, 2018).

N. Snow understands propaganda as a mass conviction with a clear advantage for its creator. (Snow, 2003). Such a definition, as it seems, is quite wide and widespread both on advertising and public relations, which once again confirms the relation of these sciences to the communicative cycle.

A. Edelstein distinguishes between propaganda and non-propaganda along the line of the emotio-ratio, emphasizing the fact that propaganda is based on deliberate lies and falsification. (Edelstein, 1997).

T. Clark analyzes the art and propaganda of the 20th century, describing the propaganda nature of socialist realism and modern art, whose exhibitions were heavily funded by the special services as a promotion of democratic values and freedoms (Clark, 1997).

V. Lippmann (Lippmann, 1998) associates propaganda with stereotypes, through which he explains the "enemy" function in the mass consciousness.

I. Levy (Levy, 2004) distinguishes between rhetoric and propaganda: the main difference is that rhetoric is possible as an individual communicative practice, while propaganda is always institutional and directed at persuasion, acting at the same time as rhetoric; whereas rhetoric cannot be propaganda.

Laswell (Lasswell, 1927) is one of the first who clearly outlined the scheme of propaganda influence: WHO – WHAT – TO WHOM – CHANNEL – EFFECT.

The understanding of the new propaganda, or Propaganda 2.0, is to a greater extent associated with the research of E. Bernays (Bernays, 1925), N. Chomsky and E. Herman (Herman, Chomsky, 1988), J. Ellul (Ellul, 1973) and S. Hall (Hall, 1973). The basic idea of the Herman-

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space. Propaganda generally works successfully with a non-existent reality, manifesting itself both at the level of non-existent reality, and at the level of its incorrect, not true interpretation.

<sup>1</sup> A "fake" comes from the person, misinformation comes from the state.

Chomsky propaganda model is that they highlight five news filters that create consistent content.<sup>1</sup> These include the amount of information, advertising, media support, “flak” and “anti-communism” (Herman, Chomsky, 1988: 2). The last two filters are interesting in this context, as they are potentially misleading, as it turns out, perform exclusively restrictive and controlling functions. Thus, “flak” is nothing but a means of controlling the media so that they strictly follow the official version of the information provided. “Anti-communism”, in turn, also performs a controlling function and is positioned as a national religion.<sup>2</sup> To some extent, these filters can be regarded as a means of censorship, but at a slightly different level: not the state, but the business elite one, since the primary control over the media and the output information belongs to their beneficiaries.

Modern times dictate new conditions, actualizing the change of priorities, and therefore, the Herman-Chomsky model can be revised in the light of recent changes. In particular, due to the fall of the USSR and the end of the “cold war”, “anti-communism” becomes a rudiment and can no longer perform a consolidating, and in fact controlling, function at the level of values and worldviews. The new discourse comes to replace it, the discourse of the struggle against terror, when the “Other” clearly acquires the features of a representative of the Arab-Muslim world. In its essence, the ideology of the model remained the same, only the content was changed with a lurch in conservatism and right-wing interpretation.

It is important to note the fact that the mass media perform the function of social management, veiling messages of an ideological, propaganda nature with entertainment content, sometimes forming feelings of political apathy, shifting the vector of social attention and tension towards apolitization and blind consumerism.

The Herman-Chomsky propaganda model seems to be successful only in the context of traditional media. The Internet has significantly transformed not only the reality itself, but also updated the proofreading of its interpretations and perceptions (Rampton, 2007).

<b>MODEL</b>	<b>POST-MODEL</b>
<i>Ownership concentration</i>	<i>The Internet is a space of freedom and everyone can create their own website</i>
<i>Advertising → information</i>	<i>Information → advertising</i>
<i>Official sources</i>	<i>Blogging, People's Journalism</i>
<i>The “Other”</i>	<i>The other “Other”</i>

The Herman-Chomsky propaganda model describes the mechanisms for constructing (media) reality, consensus and the dominant picture of the world. It is noteworthy that the Western media demonstrate the “democratism” of opinions to some extent, when media resources are used in parallel by both government and business, whereas in many post-Soviet countries a state monopoly on information is obvious, but it does not interfere with both types of the states and their social engineering.

J. Ellul’s model of propaganda is interesting, as he sees a scientometric function in it: propaganda must take into account the data of psychology and sociology, since the difference between the types of media and individuals implies the difference between the types of propaganda. It is important to note that propaganda is more effective in democratic societies, since totalitarian regimes have different means of social management and control that are more effective than propaganda. The “democratic” propaganda is hidden, horizontal<sup>3</sup>, it is more complex and refined, and therefore it is easier to fight against simple, open, vertical, political “totalitarian” (communist, Nazi) propaganda (Ellul, 1973: 79-84).

<sup>1</sup> In this case, propaganda takes place only when it correlates with the interests of those who control the “filters”.

<sup>2</sup> In this connection, it is appropriate to recall such a phenomenon as “McCarthyism”.

<sup>3</sup> Horizontal or sociological propaganda is contextual, when it is not ideology that determines the structure and laws of the social, but vice versa. In this case, it constitutes the unconscious impulses of individuals to submission and very often appears as propaganda without words, since it actively enough performs informational interventions in the field of art, education, science, technology.

Propaganda in the theory of J. Ellul is total: it is difficult to form an opinion in the mind of an isolated individual, and therefore, various means and forms of propaganda should be used simultaneously. Modern propaganda is targeted at the mass and the individual, since their separation is impossible; it ends where the dialogue begins.

In the dyad “orthodoxy” – “orthopraxy” J. Ellul prefers the latter, representing the “hard” British<sup>1</sup>, not the “soft” American<sup>2</sup> information operations model. In this context, J. Ellul’s distinction of propaganda-agitation and integration propaganda is obvious (Ellul, 1973: 70-79). Propaganda-agitation is more pronounced and effective in the environment of poorly educated individuals, it can take both destructive (change of the constitutional system) and constructive (mobilization of the population in the face of general danger) forms. It is obvious that propaganda-agitation is appropriate to consider in the context of the British model of information operations.

Unlike propaganda-agitation, integration propaganda is the propaganda of consent, aimed at adopting postulated principles, values, attitudes, and not simple actions. In fact, this kind of propaganda transforms a person, a model of his thinking and perception, with a subsequent change in his pattern of behavior. Propaganda-integration, therefore, is a representation of the American model of information operations.

The conditions for the effectiveness of integration propaganda are the living and cultural level of the individual. It will not be implemented in relation to the poor, because they are burdened with the efforts of simple survival. It will not be effective in relation to the illiterate and uncultured, as they are not burdened with the ability of critical thinking, analysis and understanding of information.

In this regard, it is appropriate to cite another example of propaganda in the model of J. Ellul, namely “rational and irrational propaganda” (Ellul, 1973: 84-87). The formation of the subject’s reaction to rational factual propaganda, which is essentially irrational in essence, is problematic in this respect. Propaganda cannot be invented, it is contextual and lined up on real, factual grounds. And in this sense it is appropriate to identify (as J. Ellul does) propaganda and information.

There is no doubt that propaganda acts as an interdisciplinary phenomenon, for which the process of communication is fundamental. In the context of the analysis of propaganda models, communication can be conceived as a process of trans-coding information: verbal to non-verbal and vice versa; as a transmission of information, a symbolic suggestion, interaction and exchange.


In this context, the communicative process can be represented as a semiotic process (semiosphere), a process of conflict of cultural codes as a mechanism for constructing meanings. In the broad sense, the semiosphere is equal in its essence to culture and is a prerequisite for communication, since each of the subjects of communication must have a semiotic cultural experience. Thus, the language of propaganda is an element of semiotic space with fuzzy boundaries of semiotic reality, because what is a message for one may be different for the other, in particular, in the absence of understanding, the difference between cultural codes, etc.

Such a (semiotic) model of propaganda was proposed by S. Hall, the key for which is the process of decoding a message according to its subjectivity, determined by culture, language, mentality, education, etc. <sup>3</sup> (Hall, 1973).

<sup>1</sup> Behavior change model.

<sup>2</sup> Relationship change model.

<sup>3</sup> But at the same time, the asymmetry of encoding and decoding is obvious. S. Hall, explored television messages and talked about the complexity of television signs that combines visual and audible discourses. Thus, the visual discourse transforms the three-dimensional world into two-dimensional images (as S. Hall puts it: “A dog can bark from the TV screen, but cannot bite”).



**Fig. 1.** S. Hall's coding-decoding model

Following S. Hall, several decoding schemes can be distinguished:

- conformist scheme: the recipient (interpreter) takes the original meaning of the message laid down by the sender, without reflecting on it
- negativist scheme: the recipient (interpreter) denies the original meaning of the message, relying on the oppositional submitted code;
- conventional, or synthesizing scheme: the recipient (interpreter) forms its message value as a result of partial acceptance of the original and its partial denial.

In this regard, it should be noted that S. Hall's propaganda theory is not a manipulative theory, since the "reader" of its messages and codes takes a rather active position, creating new meanings, rethinking propaganda as a Text, i.e. information with unset poly-functional values.

In various informational and virtual streams (literature, art, cinema, culture in general) a certain ideological matrix, model of the world, gestalt is laid, setting the state that we consider as correct. Such a dominant model of a particular sociological system will be primarily retained by the dominant systems – education (which sets this model for the younger generation) and television (which keeps the transformations of this model from the adult generation).

The theory of S. Hall is consonant with the Herman-Chomsky theory in terms of accepting the fact of existence of the dominant code, in the context of which the professional code functions. Media space is a complexly structured system, which implies a significant variety of discourses. At the same time, the recipient (interpreter) of the message has different semantic structures from the proposed media, occupying completely different social spaces, respectively, and differentially perceiving them.

The consumption of content and context is given by typical recurring semantic frames for the consumer coding, encoded, in particular, in the form of well-established genre codes as guides for interpreting: "sport", "weather", "news", "emergency", etc. Propaganda messages, as well as messages from other spheres of the communicative cycle (advertising, public relations), often mimic the news to reduce the audience's resistance.

Frames operate in a structure of political cascades (Oana et al., 2016) and are actively blocking alternative forms of understanding and interpretation. This phenomenon is explained by the psychological characteristics of perception and evaluation of information: the primary information is difficult to deduce from the content, its denial only enhances the effect of its impact; not negation becomes effective, but thematic or episodic building of a new frame and new information (Iyengar, 1991).

Thus, S. Hall's propaganda model indicates that the decoded meaning is not always and does not necessarily coincide with the encoded meaning. Decoding can take completely different directions, taking into account the intentions of the sender (author), the intentions of the recipient (interpreter) and, as it seems, the intentions of the Text (message), programmed for a specific, necessary reading. In this regard, it would be appropriate to mark S. Hall's propaganda model as semiotic, since in his view the language plays the role of media and is represented in semiotic<sup>1</sup> and discursive<sup>2</sup> practices.

Important in this context is the change in the message received from the dominant to the opposition, when both political and negativistic values are important in political propaganda (as most effective for/in democratic regimes). This can be explained from the point of view of the subjectivity of political processes, since any person, being a supporter of this or that political ideology: "bi-conceptualism" in the terminology of J. Lakoff (Lakoff, 2008), subjectively evaluates individual problems and issues. And it is precisely on these wavering grounds that propaganda is aimed in order to transfer to its side those who have not yet made up their mind.

<b>PROPAGANDA 1.0</b>	<b>PROPAGANDA 2.0</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- state propaganda;</li> <li>- meaningful;</li> <li>- "transparent": does not hide the authorship and purpose;</li> <li>- implies both positive and negative goal setting;</li> <li>- "Black and white": is built on binary oppositions (ours and others);</li> <li>- construction of the binary world;</li> <li>- aggressive, and therefore causes open protests;</li> <li>- uses "hard" force of influence;</li> <li>- enemy-centered.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- propaganda of professionals;</li> <li>- formal;</li> <li>- "Illusory": represents its ideology as someone else's, without revealing the purpose and source;</li> <li>- Generates positive emotional reactions;</li> <li>- retention of the picture of the world;</li> <li>- dependent on the consumer of propaganda, and not on its source;</li> <li>- uses "soft" power of influence, including aesthetically attractive form of presentation (books, TV series)</li> <li>- population-centered.</li> </ul>

#### 4. Results

Denoting the basic aspects of propaganda, let's analyze its functionality using the example of British and German propaganda on the eve of World War I. The primary task of the British government was to encourage the local population to support and participate in hostilities. To this end, the Bureau of Military Propaganda was created, headed by Charles Masterman. He managed to unite well-known writers (R. Kipling, A. Conan-Doyle, G. Wells) to develop effective tools for the ideological struggle against the Triple Alliance and Germany, in particular. Thus, the "inhuman cruelty" of German soldiers against civilians of the occupied territories or the soldiers of the allied forces was shown, thereby creating an alternative reality.

<sup>1</sup> How language "produces" meanings: poetics.

<sup>2</sup> How values are represented in communication: politics.





**Fig. 2.** Crucified soldier of the Entente



**Fig. 3.** Wounded soldier, begging the German “nurse” to give him water

Also, these well-known authors were asked to sign full-text advertisements in newspapers, condemning Germany and appealing to the United States for support. On September 11, 1914, C. Masterman met with the editors of leading newspapers and formed the Neutral Press Committee, whose main task was to ensure that all British newspapers supported the dominant government line, spreading British propaganda abroad.

In May 1915, the Bureau issued a special brochure “Report on alleged German crimes”. It was stated that this report there was an independent and objective official review edited by the former British Ambassador to the United States, V. Bryce. In fact, the report was a product of “black” propaganda, containing manipulative facts and outright lies.



**Fig. 4.** British anti-German propaganda poster

The response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany was the creation of the Central Directorate of Foreign Affairs under the leadership of Matias Ertsberger, who, in particular, was engaged in the collection and analysis of foreign printed publications, as well as the publication and distribution of the German press abroad. Sometimes they published articles with the “necessary” content in the foreign press, with subsequent replication and reference not to German, but foreign sources.



Fig. 5. German propaganda press

German propaganda widely used photography, because the visual image accurately conveyed emotions and did not need a commentary translation, although very often it was accompanied by annotations in several languages, including English.



Fig. 6. German propaganda photo

Later, along with the propaganda photography, cinema was also widely used to promote the values and image of the German Reich; representatives of the German creative elite were encouraged to idealize, praise the courage, sacrifices and military skill of German soldiers, exposing the treachery, cowardice and failure of the British.



**Fig. 7.** German propaganda photo

### 5. Conclusion

It should be noted that both British and German propaganda of World War I were a classic example of Propaganda 1.0, with its characteristic methods:

- 1) ignoring the historical context;
- 2) the use of selective stories that are most suitable for a set goal;
- 3) the use of a limited number of “lap experts”, lobbying for the general line and the dominant code;
- 4) demonization of the enemy, sometimes in a fictitious perspective;
- 5) since propaganda produces an emotionally rich text, conceptualization is built on the basis of the traumatic events of the past;
- 6) artificial focusing on an object, driving it under the point of view, rather than expanding the spectrum of the vision of the problem.

Although even at that time some of the techniques used in the framework of the “soft” model of Propaganda 2.0 were obvious, in particular, the use of literature, cinema and art for propaganda purposes. Propaganda is one of the tools for waging “non-military” wars, in this case informational, along with migrational (Steger, 2017), legal,<sup>1</sup> diplomatic, trade, etc. wars. Propaganda is a tool for creating false narratives, historical (constructed history) with its heroic and alternative reality, functioning according to the laws of framing. Propaganda clearly undermines the ability of people to think rationally and critically, when simplified, emotional appeals undermine their logic and reason. The propagandist does not need to refer to the truth, but should strive to design it, to develop mechanisms for its effective production.

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
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## Military Propaganda in the Baltic Fleet during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939–1940

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### Abstract

The article deals with the organization of the military propaganda in the Baltic fleet during the Soviet-Finnish war 1939–1940. The author analyzed the propaganda spread in the Navy along with the objective difficulties related to the clarification of the goals and objectives of the war with Finland.

The author of the article used materials from the funds of the Russian State Archive of the Navy (RSA Navy), the city of St. Petersburg. Publications and rare editions of the political department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were used.

In this work, traditional and general scientific methods were used with the historical-situational method in respect to the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and its political management.

In conclusion, the author notes the reasons for the effectiveness of military propaganda among officers and sailors of the Baltic fleet. At the same time little-known questions of the Soviet – Finnish war of 1939–1940 are investigated.

**Keywords:** Baltic fleet, propaganda, political governance, the USSR, Finland, sailors, officers.

### 1. Introduction

During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 - 1940, the political administration of the Baltic Fleet was to set to the personnel of the naval units the goals and objectives of military operations (RGA VMF. F. 92. Op. 2. D. 496. L. 4). During the conversations with officers and sailors, political leaders emphasized in every possible way that the outbreak of the war was “just, non-predatory and liberating” (Just war, 1939). They constantly called the Finns “bold provocateurs” and brought the following arguments:

1) From the very beginning of coming to power, the Finnish reactionary bourgeoisie was closely connected with the British militarists.

2) In 1920, the Finnish government wanted to support General N.N. Yudenich in his march to Petrograd

3) Before the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, the Finnish side committed numerous provocations at the border (Ataka istrebiteley, 1939).

At the same time, a thesis on the USSR’s peace-loving policy towards Finland was widely spread.

1) The Soviet government offered the Finnish rulers to move the border several tens of kilometers to the north of Leningrad, since Leningrad was the largest and most important political,

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industrial and cultural center of the Soviet Union. It was located at a distance of a modern artillery gun shot from the border.

2) The Soviet government offered to lease a small area at the northern mouth to the Gulf of Finland for the construction of a naval base. It would be in the interests of both states, since the entrances to Leningrad as well as to the Gulf of Finland would be closed for any aggressive neighbors.

3) The Soviet government was ready to give Finland in return two times more territory than Finland demanded in Karelia.

4) The transfer of the named Soviet territory united the Finnish and Karelian peoples ([Just war, 1939](#)).

Further political leaders said that the Finnish government, at the suggestion of British friends, hadn't revealed the lucrative offers of the USSR from its own people. At the same time, the Finnish ruling circles in every way aroused hatred of the Soviet people. On November 26, 1939, their artillery shelled the territory of the neighboring state. After which V.I. Molotov made a strong protest on behalf of all Soviet people. As a result, on November 30, 1939, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, together with other armed forces, entered war with Finland ([Finnish provocateurs, 1939](#)). ([Figure 1](#))



**Fig. 1.** Soviet propaganda poster "Beaten on the Mannerheim Line"

## 2. Materials and methods

The author of the article used materials from the funds of the Russian State Archive of the Navy (RSA Navy), the city of St. Petersburg. Publications and rare editions of the political department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were used.

In this work, traditional and general scientific methods were used with the historical-situational method in respect to the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and its political management.

## 3. Discussion and results

The main task set before the political management of the Baltic Fleet was to prove the justice of the new war from the Soviets. Political leaders said that in the war imposed by the USSR, the struggle was not for the seizure of foreign territories and peoples, but for the security of the Motherland and for the freedom and happiness of the Finnish people. It was well known that according to the plan of the Soviet leadership, after a quick and victorious war, Finland was to

become the next republic of the USSR. Hence, the happiness of the Finnish people became an indispensable component of military propaganda in the Baltic Fleet. (Figure 2)



**Fig. 2.** Soviet poster “A White Finn lurking in the woods”

It was emphasized that the Red Army did not come to Finland as a conqueror, but as the liberator of the Finnish working people from the oppression and exploitation of landowners and capitalists (Just war, 1939).

At the same time, they paid attention to the fact that the Finnish ruling circles were threatening to expand their borders even to the Ural Mountains. The war against Finland was not fighting against the Finnish people, but directed against class enemies, i.e. capitalists and militarists. The Finnish people did not need a war against their class brothers, i.e. Soviet workers (Finnish provocateurs, 1939).

The political administration of the Baltic Fleet accused the following government officials of the Finnish government in fomenting anti-Soviet propaganda:

- 1) Chairman of the State Council (Government) of Finland Kayander Andrio Carlo.
  - 2) Finnish Foreign Minister Erkkko Juho Elyas.
  - 3) Finnish Finance Minister Tanner Väino Alfred.
  - 4) Ambassador of Finland to Sweden Paasikivi Juho Kusti.
  - 5) Commander of the Suojeluskunta (Finnish military militia – auth.), Lieutenant General Carlo Lauri Torvald.
  - 6) Commander of the Finnish army, Lieutenant-General Osterman Hugo Victor.
  - 7) Commander of the Finnish naval forces, Major General Valve Väine (Just war, 1939)
- (Figure 3).



**Fig. 3.** Finnish leaflet “Tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers”

All the above-mentioned persons, according to Soviet military propaganda, were industrialists and capitalists and were closely connected with the business and political circles of England. Moreover, the Finnish government set a course for the destruction of workers' organizations from the first days of its existence. (RGA VMF. F. 92. Op. 1. D. 287. L. 15). Propaganda of the Finnish counterrevolutionaries against the leaders of the labor movement was especially notable for propagandists: “The executioners committed horrible acts. With four-inch nails, they nailed membership books of the working society to the foreheads of the Red Guards. They gouged out their eyes, drove rifle cartridges into the eyes of the Red Guards, cut off their ears and noses” (Finnish provocateurs, 1939). It was impossible to ignore the active participation of the White Finns in the events of the Civil War. When in 1919 their detachments attempted to cut the railway in the Leningrad-Petrozavodsk area and capture Petrozavodsk, they could hardly be defeated by the Red Army detachments.

The political officers of the Baltic Fleet told officers and sailors about the difficult internal situation in Finland. Since 1928, the main branches of the Finnish economy were on decline. The standard of living of the working class was constantly declining. Unemployment rates were growing along with the ruining of peasantry. The sharp fall in government revenues forced the Finnish government to cut their spending on all budget needs, but military. Finland spent huge sums on military needs. The Finnish army had about 300 thousand people and cost the state budget 50 million marks a day. It necessary to add the organization of a mass enlisting into the army together with the industry fully transferred to military needs. (RGA VMF. F. 902. Op. 4. D. 76. L. 18). That gave the impression that the Finnish government was consistently preparing for war with the USSR.

The separate idea that the USSR would not interfere with the choice of the political regime of the Finnish people after the war was highlighted. The peoples of the Soviet country were always ready to help the Finns on their choice of an independent path of development. Actually, the last thesis implied that the new independence in any case passed through the creation of a Soviet republic. By the way, a genuine historical fact was mentioned: on December 31, 1917, the Council of



People's Commissars adopted the decree on the independence of Finland, personally presented to the representatives of the Finnish side by V. I. Lenin. That is why the USSR never interfered in the internal affairs of a neighboring state. (RGA VMF. F. 1598. Op. 4. D. 44. L. 107).

However, despite the Soviet peace-loving, naval propagandists introduced the personnel to the goals and objectives of the "People's Government of Finland" created in Moscow. This government was proclaimed in the first claimed city of Finnish territory, Terioki, on December 1, 1939. (RGA VMF. F. 1598. Op. 6. D. 51. L. 79).

The People's Government of Finland published its political program:

- 1) The overthrow of the bankrupt government of the "Finnish political gamblers" and the defeat of its armed forces.
- 2) Sign of the Mutual Aid and Friendship Pact between Finland and the Soviet Union. By the way, a similar document was signed with the "People's Government" on December 2, 1939.
- 3) The reunification of the Finnish and Karelian peoples within the Finnish Democratic Republic.
- 4) Settlement of border issues with the USSR, especially with regard to the security of Leningrad.
- 5) The creation of the people's Finnish army.
- 6) Establishment of state control over large private banks and industrial enterprises.
- 7) Introduction of a mandatory 8-hour working day.
- 8) Confiscation of landed estates and their transfer to the peasants. State aid to low-power farms.
- 9) With the consensus of the Finnish people, the establishment of the Soviet power (Just war, 1939). (Figure 4)



Fig. 4. Finnish poster "Political instructor is worse than the enemy"

Practically we have a program of “Sovietization” of Finland. As the political administration of the Baltic Fleet stated: “There is no doubt that the Finnish people, with the help of our heroic Red Army and Navy, will in the near future completely destroy the White Finnish hirelings and live a happy life, relying on the bonds of close friendship with the Great Soviet Union” (Finnish provocateurs, 1939).

The Baltic Fleet seafarers were informed that the Finnish navy consisted of 2 coastal defense battleships, 5 submarines, 6 patrol ships, 6 minelayers, 7 torpedo boats, 18 motor boats, 15 patrol boats, 6 icebreakers and 7 gunboats, and light motor Suojeluskunta fleet of about 300 units. (RGA VMF. F. 92. Op. 1. D. 938. L. 28).

Possible bases of deployment of the Finnish fleet were Koivusaari, Viipuri, Hamina, Kotka, Helsinki and Hanko. Coastal Finnish batteries were located in the Helsinki, Viipuri, Kotka and Hanko areas (Pietarin, 1931). (Figure 5).



**Fig. 5.** Poster “Sea approaches to the USSR can only be protected by the Red Fleet”

This was followed by the assertion that the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, like all the Soviet armed forces, would do everything necessary to defeat Finland. To raise the morale of the officers and sailors of the Baltic Fleet, the political instructors told them about a number of examples of heroism and courage during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940.

Thus, a link of Soviet aircraft, under the command of Comrade Baranov, skillfully shot down a column of white Finns on a low flight, and put them to flight (Ataka istrebiteley, 1939). The bomber navigator Zhdanov made an exact bombing at the Finnish lighthouse and completely destroyed the enemy strategic object (Bombili vrazheskiye obyekty, 1939). During the combat mission, Captain Dolsky’s aircraft received 97 holes, but an experienced pilot was able to bring it to the airfield and successfully land it (Boyevyye epizody, 1939). The junior lieutenant Pruntsov during his combat mission fell under heavy anti-aircraft and artillery fire. The plane refused steering control. The aforementioned pilot was able to bring the combat vehicle to the airfield (Boyevyye epizody, 1939). Junior Lieutenant Knyazev was swooping down on a white Finnish battery. Seeing the pilot’s maneuver, the enemies fled, part of them was killed. Together with the battery, the machine-gun nest was also eliminated. However, the plane got a hole in the gas tank,

but the brave pilot was able to land the plane on the last drops of fuel. ([Boyevyye epizody, 1939](#)). Finally, the electrician Sergeyev having high temperature escaped from the infirmary to the battle post. When the political officer began to persuade him to return to treatment, he gave him an application to join the Communist party ([Samootverzhennyiy boets, 1939](#)).

#### 4. Conclusion

Covering military propaganda on the Baltic Fleet during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–1940, it is necessary to note its competent construction by the political administration. Political leaders talked about the hostile intentions of the Finnish bourgeoisie against the USSR, stressing Finland's economic and political ties with the British capitalists and militarists. They called the names of Finnish politicians responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. At the same time, the peace-loving Soviet policy towards the Finns was explained and the fact of the creation of an independent Finland by the Council of People's Commissars on December 31, 1917 was pointed out. Information was given on the plight of the workers and peasants in Finland and the details of the atrocities committed by Finnish counterrevolutionaries against the leaders of the labor movement. Separately praised the activities of the Finnish "People's Government" and its political program, which was to lead to the "Sovietization" of the state. At the same time, officers and sailors of the Baltic Fleet received objective information about the naval forces of the enemy. For them, examples of the heroism and courage of Soviet soldiers during the war were specifically cited.

All of the above measures helped the political management of the Baltic Fleet to create among the personnel a sense of justice in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–1940 and its necessity for the continued happy and free life of the working people of Finland.

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
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## Formation and Combat Use of Russian Anti-Soviet Military Units as an Integral Part of German Propaganda during World War II

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### Abstract

The article considers the formation and combat use of Russian collaborationist units in the German army during the Second World War on the basis of a significant number of historiography sources.

The author pays attention to the use of collaborationist units in both front-line combat operations and as reconnaissance and sabotage units.

In conclusion the author notes that the Russian units that were on the side of the Third Reich during World War II performed a variety of functions: they were engaged in anti-partisan activities, in front-line combat operations, and also in reconnaissance and sabotage work behind the front line. Most of these units were distinguished by their reliability and existed until the fall of Germany.

**Keywords:** Russian anti-Soviet military units, World War II, Third Reich, German propaganda.

### 1. Introduction

The participation of collaborators on the side of Germany during World War II is poorly studied. The reason for this phenomenon is that this topic was prohibited during the Soviet era, since the official Soviet propaganda did not recognize the fact of a significant number of Soviet citizens siding with the enemy.

### 2. Materials and methods

Recent Russian and foreign materials published on the topic were used as materials for the research, as well as sources of personal origin, such as memoirs and diaries.

The methodological basis of the study was formed by the principles of objectivity and historicism, implying an unbiased approach to analyzing the problems of formation and combat use of collaborationist units, a critical attitude to sources, making conclusions only after analyzing the facts and revealing concrete historical situation in certain development and context.

### 3. Discussion and results

**3.1. Russian squadron.** In early 1942, the German counter-intelligence agency created an agent-political organization, the “Combat Union of Russian Nationalists” (CURN). From its name it is clear what this organization was, an agent-political structure, a reconnaissance and sabotage unit, intended to send saboteurs to the USSR. Soviet prisoner of war, lieutenant colonel

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I.G. Radionov was considered the nominal leader and creator of the CURN (V.V. Gil). Former commander of the 48<sup>th</sup> rifle division, Major General Pavel Bogdanov, who had surrendered on July 17, 1941, also took an active part in the creation of this organization. In September 1941, Bogdanov appealed to the German command with a request to allow him to form a detachment to fight the Red Army. After that, he was transferred to a propagandist school in Vulgide, where he was recruited in the CURN. Soon, in one of his appeals to prisoners of war, Bogdanov declared that he renounced his Soviet citizenship as well as his rank of a Red Army General.

In June 1942 the German command started the formation of military units from the members of the CURN. "Militia number 1" numbering up to 500 people was created in the city of Parczew (Poland) and Radionov was appointed the squadron leader. Later in the "SS - Sonderlager of the Guides" near Lublin a "Squadron No. 2" was established, numbering about 300 people. Both of these units were used in Belarus in anti-partisan operations.

In March 1943, the German counterintelligence decided to merge the detachments into the 1<sup>st</sup> Russian National SS Regiment, and the Special SS Detachment stationed in Breslau was attached to the squadrons as reinforcement. The commander of the formed regiment was Radionov. Bogdanov was promoted to Major and appointed Head of the counterintelligence regiment. A month later Bogdanov was promoted to Major General of the Russian Liberation Army and remained in his previous position.

Despite the seemingly small number (only 1.2 thousand people), the division had powerful strike weapons, which included 60 guns of various calibers, 18 mortars, 95 machine guns and rifles (Okorokov, 2000: 81).

In April 1943, when reinforcements from prisoners of war were "poured" into the regiment, it was reformed into the 1<sup>st</sup> Russian SS National Brigade, consisting of up to 3 thousand people. Bogdanov became the Head of the brigade's counterintelligence and Radionov became its Commander (Reshin, 1994: 171). Along with the active use of the division in anti-partisan operations, the formation process continued, and by June 1943 there were about 8 thousand soldiers and officers in the brigade, which caused the re-formation of the division. The battalions were turned into regiments, and were reinforced by the tank and artillery divisions (Okorokov, 2000: 83).

On August 14, 1943, returning from the "cleaning" of the Belarusian village, a part of the brigade along with its commander (2.2 thousand people) joined the partisan unit of Zheleznyakov. On the eve of this event, Radionov arrested Bogdanov and handed over to the partisans who brought the chief counterintelligence to the Mainland (On April 24, 1950, Bogdanov was sentenced to death by execution – auth.). The German "core" of the brigade (an average of 8-10 people per company) was shot. The German command hastily took measures to apprehend and terminate the rebellious unit, but without any significant results.

The remnants of the brigade that did not join the partisans were subsequently transferred to one of the German counterintelligence units for use as a punitive detachment and recruiting agents.

**3.2. 1<sup>st</sup> Russian National Army.** The creation of this army is connected with the activities of its commander Boris Alekseevich Holmston-Smyslovsky (the former captain of the Imperial Guards regiment, during civil war he fought on the side of the Tzar) who immigrated to Poland and then moved to Germany to study at the Military Academy. Considering that Russia can be liberated only with foreign aid, he worked solely for this purpose. When the war with the USSR began, Smyslovsky entered the Eastern Front and in July 1941, with the approval of the command of the 16<sup>th</sup> German Army, he was appointed the Head of the 1<sup>st</sup> Russian Foreign Training Battalion. Gradually, he created 12 combat battalions in the city of Pskov (Drobyazko, 2000: 21). Besides these battalions there were also large groups of partisans reaching almost 20 thousand people in the Soviet rear. The "Russia" special division was formed by the High Command of the Wehrmacht from these troops at the beginning of 1943. Several sources refer to the "Russia" special division as the "R." division. And thus, Smyslovsky became the first Russian to become the Commander of an anti-Bolshevik division, which remained a regular part of the Wehrmacht until the end of the war (Tolstoi, 1991: 116). It was engaged in reconnaissance and sabotage work in the rear of the Soviet troops and partisan areas, and this explains the large number of soldiers of the division in the rear of the enemy.

On January 23, 1945, due to the threat of the approach of the Red Army, the headquarters of the "R" division was hastily evacuated from Breslau to Bad Elster, near Dresden. Here, on February

12, an order was received to reorganize the division into a “Special Green Army”. Cadets of reconnaissance and sabotage schools as well as volunteers from prisoner camps were additionally introduced into the “Green Army”.

On March 10, 1945, Himmler gave Smyslovsky’s division the status of the 1<sup>st</sup> Russian National Army, and Smyslovsky was promoted to Major General. There were about 6 thousand soldiers and officers, organized in two regiments as part of the newly formed army (Andreev, 1997). Colonel Ryasnyansky was appointed Chief of Staff of the 1<sup>st</sup> RNA, Lieutenant Colonel Tarasov-Sobolev was appointed Commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Regiment and Lieutenant Colonel Bobrikov was appointed Commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment.

Having lost most of his forces in battles, Smyslovsky moved with the rest to the west, intending to unite with the emigre Russian Corps from Belgrade and the 3<sup>rd</sup> division of the Armed Forces Committee of the Liberation of the Russian People under the command of Shapovalov. But these plans failed, since the defense of the entire Eastern Front of Germany was rapidly deteriorating. In April 1945, personnel of the Warsaw reconnaissance and sabotage school were added to the 1<sup>st</sup> Russian National Army. With the remnants of these troops, Smyslovsky moved to Feldkirch, the most western city of Austria. On May 2, 1945, the unit entered the land of Liechtenstein, with 494 members: 462 men, 30 women and 2 children. It must be added that not a single soldier of General Smyslovsky was forcibly extradited to the Soviet Union (Tolstoi, 1991), despite the pressure from the USSR on this small European state.

**3.3. Russian Corps.** Former Russian citizens - white emigres took an active part in the development of Soviet collaborationism. In the course of the revolution and the Civil War, more than 2 million Russians went abroad, more than 70 % of whom were men in their majority at the most able age (Bocharova, 1998).

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the desire to liberate the Fatherland intensified among white emigres, and a significant part of them joined the various volunteer legions of the SS and the army. However, there were also purely Russian formations, such as the Russian Corps in Yugoslavia, a military unit that comprised 80 % of the ranks of the Russian All-Military Union (RAMU).

In 1941, 30 thousand Russian emigrants lived in Yugoslavia, where the 4<sup>th</sup> Division of the RAMU was located. They came up with the idea to recreate a white military unit with the help of the Germans and continue the armed struggle against Bolshevism. This initiative was headed by General M. F. Skorodumov. Being an implacable enemy of the Soviet regime, he, like many other emigrants, knew about the huge crimes of the Bolsheviks, whose victims in the USSR were estimated to be up to 45 million people (Nazarov, 1993: 74). General Skorodumov considered all foreigners to be the enemies of Russia, so it did not matter to him from which state to get weapons and which country to use for the liberation of the Motherland. But there was one more reason pushing Russian emigres in Serbia to take up arms.

In August 1941, a partisan war began in Yugoslavia, led by communist I. Tito. The victims of the partisan raids were not only German soldiers, but also Serbian citizens who did not share Tito’s Bolshevik views. These were, first of all, priests, wealthy peasants, intellectuals, Russian immigrants living throughout the Kingdom and all the others who fell into the hands of the red partisans. According to the Bureau for the Protection of Russian Emigration in Serbia, about 250 Russian people were killed. General Skorodumov appealed to the German command with a request to protect emigration from the Communists by forming the Russian Corps. For this, Skorodumov formulated and advanced his own conditions, among which were: 1) the ranks of the Corps were to be subordinate only to their commanders, and the Corps commander himself was subordinate to the German command; 2) the Corps should not be broken up into smaller parts in order to second them to the German regiments; 3) they should wear only Russian uniforms; 4) – when the Corps finished formation, and communism in Serbia was suppressed, the German command should transfer it to the Eastern front, in order to fight the Red Army (Russkii Obshche-Voinskii Soyuz: 11).

To this, the Germans offered the Russian volunteers to join the nearest German regiments. However, Skorodumov replied that the Russians were ready to fight only against the Communists, and the German regiments could be deployed on other fronts. Meanwhile, the rebel communists in the city of Sabac attacked the civilian Russian Cossacks and killed five families. Then the Cossacks under the command of the centurion Ikonnikov, obtained some weapons from the Serbs and

Germans, formed two hundred people detachments and fought off the partisans. In this situation, it was necessary to take urgent measures, and on September 12, General Skorodumov issued an order No. 1 on the formation of the Separate Russian Corps. This order began with the following words: *“Today, on the day of the Holy Blessed Prince Alexander Nevsky, patron of the long-suffering Russian Land, the cherished desires of the Russian people to begin serving their Homeland in the Russian Army were fulfilled.*

*On September 12, I received the order of the German Command with the consent of the Serbian authorities on the call of the Russian emigration in Serbia for the formation of the Separate Russian Corps. I was appointed the Commander of the Russian Corps.*

*1). Based on the above, I declare the recruitment in the military of all persons between the ages of 18 and 55” (Russkii Korpus na Balkanakh: 47).* According to this order, within the next 10 days, volunteers should be recruited for infantry, cavalry, artillery, Cossacks, technical and air troops. General Skorodumov organized all those capable of serving Russian emigres, but as soon as he began this work ... he was arrested by the Germans. The Corps command was automatically taken over by the chief of staff of the Corps, another Russian general, Lieutenant-General Boris Alexandrovich Steifon.

The reason for the arrest of Skorodumov, most likely, was the Germans’ distrust to the White Guards. The words of Hitler at a meeting in July 1943 are significant in this regard: *“... They do not see our national goals, in perspective they see their own goals. Every nation thinks only about themselves and about nothing else. All these emigrants and advisers only want to prepare their own positions for the future” (Russkii Korpus na Balkanakh: 47).*

So, Hitler understood that after the victory over the Bolsheviks, the Russian national interests (they were always expressed by the White Guards) and the interests of Germany would enter into an insoluble contradiction. Therefore, at the initial stage, the Germans restricted the “flow” of volunteers into the Russian Corps. The German authorities allowed the replenishment of the Corps only from the countries of southern Europe and Russian emigration (even from Germany itself) was not allowed to replenish their ranks. Later, volunteers began to be called in from the countries of Eastern Europe: Poland, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, and finally, from Russia, where Soviet prisoners of war became main volunteer forces.

However, let us return to the process of forming the Corps, which happened very quickly. On the first day, a Russian platoon emerged from the guard barracks<sup>1</sup>, on the second it was already a company and on the third – a battalion. During the formation some oddities took place, for example, at first, without understanding what was happening, the Serbian communists came to the Corps. It is not difficult to imagine their surprise when they found out that this was a white Russian Corps, and not a Soviet one from Moscow, which they were impatiently waiting for.

The personnel of the Corps were outfitted in the form of the Imperial Army, and a white militia cross on a helmet was their distinction sign. By October, about 2,000 soldiers and officers were in the Corps, and this newly created 1<sup>st</sup> regiment was immediately thrown against the Yugoslav partisans in Serbia.

On January 30, 1942, an order was issued by the Office of the Affairs of the Russian Emigration (OARE) in the Protectorate, which concerned the increase of the number of the volunteers in the Security Corps. In this order it was noted that the Russian Security Corps, organized for the struggle against the Bolsheviks, under the command of Lieutenant-General Steifon was part of the German armed forces. Enlisting of volunteers was carried out on the instructions of the Corps commander, by Colonel N. A. Bigaev, and he should have been contacted for reference information. In the case of actions against the recruiting campaign, the leaders of the Russian military organizations were warned that it would be regarded as sabotage, with all the consequences of the war-time (Getmanenko, 1989: 47).

Initially, the Russian Security Corps was formed only as a security unit for the guard service, and therefore it was subordinate to the administrative and economic service of the German army. However, for the Security Corps or the Security Group it was necessary to perform purely combat functions, for example, counter-partisan operations. In this regard, on November 30, 1942, the Security Corps was transferred to the status of an army Russian Corps, as it joined the armed forces

<sup>1</sup> The Corps was formed in the Topchider Guards Barracks.

of Germany - Wehrmacht, and was outfitted in a German uniform. The armament of the Corps was also replaced by more modern types, including anti-tank weapons.

The fact that during the period from 1941 to 1943 not a single person was taken captive from the Corps indicated the high fighting qualities of the Russian Guard Corps, despite all the difficult situations it was in ([Russkii Korpus na Balkanakh: 52](#)).

In 1942, the Corps included four rifle regiments located in Belgrade, Loznica, Krupno, Kraljevo and other places. Each regiment had three rifle battalions, each of which, in addition to small arms, consisted of four 81-mm mortars. In the regiments there was one platoon of three 37-mm guns, a weak howitzer platoon with two 75-mm field guns, a cavalry squadron, and a bomb squad ([Mun'ova, 1999: 26](#)). The Corps also had auxiliary units: two field hospitals, a supply company, a reinforced communications company, a guard of honor company, a veterinary and a spare company. The main task entrusted to the guard Corps by the German Command was the protection of mines and railways. There is evidence that Cossack hundreds were included in the Corps to be sent to the Don region during the battles near Stalingrad. In December 1942, the Corps was officially incorporated into the Wehrmacht by a decision of the OKW.

At the beginning of 1943, the 5<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment was formed from the White emigres of Bulgaria, which was able to break up a large partisan unit on August, 7. After this, the 5<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment received the name "shock regiment".

In September 1943, the Corps listed 4.8 thousand people, and within a year - 11 thousand ([Drobyazko, 2000: 19](#)).

Later, during the retreat, part of the Corps took their place in the rear guard of the 1<sup>st</sup> Mountain-Jaeger Division and covered it during their retreat. The role of the rearguard was performed by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Regiment under the command of General Petrovsky. For their very short period of being in the rearguard, the General was awarded two Iron Crosses for counterattacks. One of such attacks is remembered by V. P. Albrecht: *"...Near the village of Yakubovats they collided with parts of the 169<sup>th</sup> Guards Regiment of the Red Army. Numerical advantage as always was on the side of the enemy. Here, once again, General Petrovsky showed his brilliant military abilities. Using the element of surprise, he hit first, not giving the enemy an opportunity to look around. This, he said, was the shortest way to victory.*

*Automatic weapons have proven to be particularly valuable in melee attacks. The Corps opened heavy fire on the Soviet Guard. The impression was that the Corps was twice as numerous as the Red Army. There was complete confusion in the 169<sup>th</sup> Red Guard regiment. And then from nowhere, there was a powerful Russian "Hurray!", "Hurray, for National Russia!"*

*The battlefield, against all military laws, remained behind a handful of Corps soldiers. It is truthful to say that, in previous days, in numerous clashes with regular units of the Red Army, the battalion was victorious; but those were ordinary or penalty units... The spirit was so elevated that the Germans perceived the Corps members as suicidal. They were not far from the truth - the Corps adhered to a popular saying: "Company in distress makes trouble less" ([Russkii Korpus na Balkanakh: 309-311](#)). After these battles, at the time of leaving the entourage, the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion was reduced from 882 to 21 people (including 7 wounded), and was able to make its way to Belgrade, where the Corps was situated. General Petrovsky was killed.*

On September 26, 1944 The Russian Corps, along with units of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Brandenburg Regiment and battalion of the 1<sup>st</sup> Mountain Division clashed with Soviet troops near Belgrade. The desperate two-day assault on Belgrade (September 26-27) did not bring success to the Red Army units. Belgrade fell only on October 19, and in that battle several hundred soldiers and Corps officers were killed. Speaking about the further fate of the Russian Corps, we note that during the entire war it remained in the Balkans, participating in battles against the Yugoslav partisans. The German Command never sent it to the Eastern Front, and on May 12, 1945, the Corps crossed the border of Austria and handed over their weapons to the British troops. During the war, 17,090 people passed through the Corps, the majority of being RAMU officials. It should be noted that many soldiers who fought in the Russian Corps died in heavy defensive battles of 1944 (including Generals Zborovsky and Zinkevich) ([Kazantsev, 1992](#)).

**3.4. SS Special regiment "Varyag".** The formation of a "Special Group K" on the basis of the volunteer White emigre battalion began in Yugoslavia in March 1942. It was intended for a landing operation in Novorossiysk. The formation of the unit was entrusted to the White emigre officer of the Imperial Army, M. A. Semenov, and the Breitenmark military camp was specially



allocated for their training, in which the deployment of the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion under the leadership of senior sergeant Major A. Orlov began. Initially, the unit was intended for military operations on the Eastern Front, but due to the exacerbation of the situation in Yugoslavia, a special group was involved in providing protection for strategic sites and anti-partisan struggle.

At the end of 1944, in Slovenia the battalion was deployed to the regiment and received a new name “Special SS regiment “Varyag”. By the beginning of 1945, it consisted of 3 battalions of three companies, a mortar, a guard, a reconnaissance company, an artillery battery, a commandant platoon, a platoon of guns, an engineer platoon, and economic and medical services (Okorokov, 2000: 55). Private personnel were almost completely recruited from prison camps, and former Soviet officers occupied 60 % of all officer positions in the command post.

After the capitulation of Germany, on May 8, 1945, the regiment fought its way to the state border of Yugoslavia-Austria, where it surrendered to the British.

**3.5. Russian National People's Army.** In 1942-1943 attempts were made to create large semi-autonomous formations under the Russian command. One of such units was the Russian National People's Army (RNPA), which began to form in March 1942 in the village of Osintorf near Orsha on the initiative of emigrant officers S. N. Ivanov, I. K. Sakharov, K. G. Kromiadi and others. It was assumed that by the end of the summer the RNPA this military unit, would be brought to a division, starting with a platoon, and then, it should cause a massive transfer of its soldiers and commanders to its side after their attack on the Red Army. Soon the RNPA leadership changed, introducing the former prisoners of war, the former Commander of the 41<sup>st</sup> rifle division of the Red Army, Colonel Boyarsky, and the former member of the Military Council of the 32<sup>nd</sup> Army, Brigadier Commissar Zhilenkov (who had received the rank of Lieutenant General of RLA from the Germans by that time).

The basis of the RNPA was a small, up to 200 people, reconnaissance and sabotage group, called the “Gray Head”<sup>1</sup> and was a part of the German counterintelligence. Consisting from Soviet prisoners of war and people from the occupied territories, this group, commanded by the former major of the Red Army, Bocharov, in May 1942 received its baptism of fire. It happened in the area of Vyazma and Dorogobuzh where the RNPA clashed with parts of the 1<sup>st</sup> Guards Cavalry Corps, led by Lieutenant General P. A. Belov. The RNPA detachments were disguised in the Soviet uniform and tried to penetrate the Corps location and capture its headquarters. As a result of the operation, about 100 fighters from 300 joined the Soviet side, up to 70 were killed and only 120 came back along with a small number of Red Army soldiers who joined them.

In the middle of summer, by the permission of Army Field Marshal von Kluge's commander of the “Center” Group, four infantry battalions, an artillery division and an engineer battalion joined the RNPA. These units were the so-called 1<sup>st</sup> RNPA brigade, and were widely engaged in punitive operations against partisans in the Orsha region, and later along the Mogilyov-Minsk highway (Reshin, 1994: 162).

In September 1942, there were 8 thousand soldiers and officers in the RNPA (Levin, 1995: 136), armed with 8 76-mm guns, the same amount of 45-mm anti-tank guns, 9 82-mm mortars, 20-25 50-mm company mortars, Mosin rifles and SVT <sup>2</sup> and 2 armored vehicles (BA-10(r) and BA-20(r)) (Drobyazko, 2000: 16). The personnel of the RNPA wore a Red Army uniform with Russian three-colored cockades and German shoulder straps with Red Army insignia.

On October 16, 1942, Field Marshal von Kluge, commander of the Army Group “Center”, visited the RNPA, and after his review of the Russian volunteer forces, declared that the Russians had made a positive impression on him. After the inspection, Kluge decided to check out the RNPA units in battle and gives the order to transfer two battalions to the Berezino area in order to suppress the partisan movement. Despite the fact that this operation was a failure, three fully equipped battalions were ordered to advance to the Velikiye Luki region and aid the surrounded German group. When they tried to break through the front line to the surrounded garrison, they were scattered and almost completely exterminated.

It is also worth noting that the number of volunteers willing to join the RNPA was twenty times higher than the number of available positions there. Eyewitnesses recalled that when the

<sup>1</sup> Abvergroup – 203.

<sup>2</sup> SVT – Soviet semi-automatic rifle.

RNPA battalions marched through the surrounding villages, the population warmly greeted them (Kvitsinskii, 1999: 95).

In January 1943, the RNPA was reformed into the 721<sup>st</sup> Eastern Special Regiment under the command of German Colonel Coretti. The 721<sup>st</sup> regiment continued punitive operations against the partisans of Belarus, deploying east of the city of Borisov, until October 1943. Then it was transferred to France to be disbanded in the area of Marseille. The battalions that were part of it received new numbers and were assigned to German divisions stationed on the Breton Peninsula.

**3.6. Separate units.** In addition to the above-mentioned units, in 1942, the prisoners of war separate regiments were formed as part of the German armed forces. For example, the 1<sup>st</sup> Eastern Reserve Regiment was formed on June 1 in Bobruisk, in the Army Group Center, with the active assistance of white emigres and it consisted of the “Dnepr” and “Berezina” battalions. In September, these battalions were assigned serial numbers of the 601<sup>th</sup> and 602<sup>nd</sup>. At this stage they enlisted 1 thousand soldiers and officers, led by the White emigre lieutenant colonel N. G. Yanenko. By June 20, the 603<sup>rd</sup> reserve battalion was formed in Bobruisk, which was in charge of back up training, and by the end of the year, this battalion was deployed in combat and the regiment received a three-battalion detachment. In addition to these units, the Eastern Battalion “Pripyat” (604<sup>th</sup>), a cavalry squadron, and several artillery batteries were also formed there. There was even an officer school within the reserve battalion. Another distinctive touch was the fact that the commanding staff of all parts of the regiment was from the former officers of the Red Army, and the German personnel were represented only by communication officers and instructors.

Such autonomy soon showed positive results. At the beginning of 1942, the battalions “Dnepr” and “Berezina” fought against partisans and despite the leaflets distributed by air they did not surrender to the partisans. One company of “Berezina” battalion was surrounded by partisans for 28 hours, and was repeatedly told to surrender, but despite all the proposals and significant losses, not a single person followed this call.

In the same year, in April, the command of the rear area of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Tank Army, in Bryansk, formed a volunteer regiment “Desna” consisting of HQ, three rifle battalions (615<sup>th</sup>, 616<sup>th</sup> and 617<sup>th</sup>), 621<sup>st</sup> artillery battalion, a mounted reconnaissance platoon, a combat training department and an economic company. In addition, another battalion was in formation at Trubchevsk - the 618<sup>th</sup> Infantry battalion. Thus, the regiment had 2.7 thousand people, and in their service they had 2 howitzers of 122-mm caliber, 6 76-mm caliber guns, 6 anti-tank guns - 45-mm, 9 battalion and 24 company mortars, 46 machine guns and rifles (Okorokov, 2000: 73).

Some of the other eastern battalions were also combined into regiments. For example, the 709<sup>th</sup> special regiment (“Titien” group) operating in the summer of 1943 on the eastern outskirts of the Bryansk forests had in its composition the 628<sup>th</sup>, 629<sup>th</sup> and 630<sup>th</sup> eastern battalions, an artillery division and a tank platoon with 7 tanks. The other regiment of the 45<sup>th</sup> Eastern Yegersky consisted of the 666<sup>th</sup>, 667<sup>th</sup> and 668<sup>th</sup> battalions and provided security for the lines of communication in the rear of Army Group North (Drobyazko, 1994: 16).

**3.7. Russian People's Militia.** The creation of the Militia was associated with the activities of two associates of the Russian Imperial Union-Order (RIU-O) by brothers N. I. and P. I. Sakhnovsky. Together with 20 Russian volunteers, they entered the Belgian Valonsky Legion, which first acted as part of the Wehrmacht, then as part of the Waffen SS, then, in 1943, as part of the 5<sup>th</sup> Panzer SS “Viking” division. During the fight in the Valon Legion, a special volunteer detachment was created from Soviet prisoners of war, but this unit was not prepared ideologically. In this regard, N. I. Sakhnovsky with the sanction of the German Command in 1943 began the formation of a military unit in the area of Korsun, in Ukraine, in which the first place was given to Imperial propaganda. Sakhnovsky addressed the neighboring peasants with a speech that said: *“You all know perfectly well the difference between the Bolsheviks, the Germans and our Valon unit. It is not for me, the Russian white emigrant, to explain to you, who are living here this year, what Bolshevism is and what the collective farms are. It is also not for me, wearing a German uniform, to explain to you what the Germans are - you have been seeing them here for two years now. You should not have expected that ... they will save us from the Bolsheviks. It is time to understand that the Germans are not serving Russia, but Germany. But we Russians, above all, are concerned and interested in the fate of our Motherland, our people. So in order to our Motherland to be happy and powerful... we need a **Russian national government**, strong enough to protect the Truth ... what our Orthodox Church teaches us.*

... Our Valon unit will not remain staying here indefinitely. We will be replaced by either the Germans or the Bolsheviks. Therefore, I invite everyone to join the new volunteer detachment. We will take part in battles against the Bolsheviks, first in this uniform, but at the first opportunity we will fight on our own”.

Soon, about 200 people were enrolled in the unit (*Rossiiskii Imperskii Soyuz-Orden*). As a distinctive sign, an emblem was developed and adopted: an Orthodox cross with the inscription “In this sign thou shalt conquer!”. The emblem was located on the left side of the uniform, opposite the heart. The unit also had regular worship services. According to N. Sakhnovsky, this group was decided to be called the Russian People’s Militia. However, their intention to create a powerful liberation movement failed. The German group, which also included a company of the militia, was surrounded (Korsun-Shevchenko's operation of the Red Army). On January 4, 1944, in difficult climatic conditions, armed only with small arms and hand grenades, the militia collided with the Red Army on the march. Only a small group of fighters was able to break through the Soviet surroundings when entering hand-to-hand combat. This ended the activities of the Russian Militia at the front of World War II.

**3.8. Guards brigade of the Russian Liberation Army.** At the beginning of 1943, at the initiative of White emigre officers Ivanov and Sakharov and Major General of RLA Zhilenkov, a detachment of 500 Soviet prisoners of war was formed in the village of Kryshov, seventeen kilometers from Pskov. They agreed to serve in the RLA Guards brigade and participate in front-line activities. The brigade was to consist of two regiments: small for punitive operations and a special one for undercover and sabotage work. The special regiment, according to the concept of General Zhilenkov, was to ensure the landing of assault forces to Moscow, Leningrad, Kuibyshev, Sverdlovsk, Gorky, Ivanovo and Yaroslavl in order to organize the anti-Soviet underground, introduce agents into the Red Army, conduct propaganda among the population and organize terrorist acts. The groups were planned to be small-numbered, 3-8 people each, in order to minimize losses in case of being captured or disclosed. However, it was believed that the number of such groups should be on maximum. Only in the area of Moscow in two months it was planned to land up to 75 assault forces. General Zhilenkov made a proposal to try to carry out several noisy terrorist acts and the Soviet government leaders were chosen as targets: Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Beria, Zhukov and Rokossovsky. They also planned to send the assault forces to the area of concentration camps and exile settlements in the hope of organizing a partisan movement in the deep Soviet rear.

In November 1943, after 150 brigade soldiers joined the partisans, the unit was disbanded, and its personnel were transferred to the formation of the Russian air group.

#### 4. Conclusion

Summing up, it is important to note that the Russian units that were on the side of the Third Reich during World War II performed a variety of functions: they were used in anti-partisan activities, in front-line combat operations, and in reconnaissance and sabotage work behind the front line. Most of these units were distinguished by their reliability and existed until the fall of Germany.

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
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## The Manifestations of Soviet Propaganda and Separatism in North-Eastern Slovakia at the turn of 1944–1945 in the Context of the Annexation of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Transcarpathian Ukraine) to the USSR

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### Abstract

The development of a solution to the question of Subcarpathian Ruthenia in 1944–1945 which ultimately led to the withdrawal of this territory from the Soviet Union (initially called the Transcarpathian Ukraine), had a certain significance in the territory of Slovakia too. In the broader meaning, it had affected the situation around the so-called Ukrainian question in Slovakia. It emerged through the so-called Movement for annexation of northeastern Slovakia to Transcarpathian Ukraine (Soviet Ukraine) and the establishment of the Ukrainian National Council of Prjaševščina (at the turn of 1944–1945 or at the beginning of 1945), evidently being carried out with the support of the Communist authorities in Transcarpathia, the Red Army headquarters and Soviet State Security Departments. The events in Transcarpathia have obviously influenced developments in northeastern Slovakia and had a major impact on the political activation of some local representatives of the Ukrainian population (as it was in the case in the Marmaros-Sighet region of Romania) who, at the time of the liberation of Eastern Slovakia, had not any clear idea of the further orientation. At the beginning of their activities, they attempted to imitate the variant of the Transcarpathian sovietisation and were supported by Soviet military and security structures. Clearly, this was a local initiative developed and coordinated by Uzhhorod which the Soviet leadership in Moscow had tolerated for some time (as a means of pressure on the Czechoslovak government and president Beneš to give up Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the Soviet Union as soon as possible) and then halted regarding the willingness of Czechoslovak government officials not to complicate relations with Kremlin and carry out the handover of Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the USSR in 1945.

**Keywords:** Subcarpathian Ruthenia, sovietisation of Transcarpathian Ukraine, Movement for annexation of north-eastern Slovakia to the USSR, Ukrainian National Council of Prjaševščina, Soviet propaganda and agitation, Slovakia in Czechoslovakia in 1944–1945.

### 1. Introduction

The development of a solution to the issue of Subcarpathian Ruthenia between 1944 and 1945, which eventually led to the surrender of this territory to Soviet Union, also had, in a sense, some sort of response in Slovakia and, in a broader sense, influenced the situation concerning the so-called Ukrainian question in Slovakia. Let me remind you, that at the turn of 1944 and 1945, ideas on annexation of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (according to the Soviet term – Transcarpathian Ukraine) to the Soviet Ukraine began to spread in Subcarpathian Ruthenia. These ideas arose from

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the Red Army (further ČA) Headquarters, Soviet security forces and local communists. These efforts were given a specific form during the first congress of the National Committees in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, which took place in Mukachevo on 26<sup>th</sup> November 1944 attended by 663 delegates from the Subcarpathian Ruthenia as a manifesto “to reunite the Subcarpathian Ruthenia with its great mother, Soviet Ukraine, and to separate from Czechoslovakia” (Vanat, 2001: 13-15). The subsequent events escalated quickly.

The local communists formed an independent Communist Party of Transcarpathian Ukraine and separated from the KSČ (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia). The National Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine ceased to cooperate with the government delegate (sent to this territory by the Czechoslovak government) František Němec and thus deprived the government of the ČSR (Czechoslovakia) of the ability to intervene and exercise its power in this territory. At the same time, a campaign was launched in Transcarpathia in which citizens expressed their consent by signing the Manifesto of 26<sup>th</sup> November (Švorc, 1996: 105-106). By the end of 1944, nearly a quarter of a million citizens had signed this declaration. It looked as if almost 90 % of the adult population of Transcarpathia, as Klement Gottwald claimed at the end of December 1944, expressed their wish to be annexed to the Soviet Union. However, it was not so unambiguous. The incoming news informed that the signatures were obtained under pressure, as was confirmed by the government delegate F. Němec. Under the influence of communists, such a situation was created in Transcarpathia that “anyone who would oppose the annexation to USSR would be exposed to severe attacks” (Kaplan, 1990: 30-31; see: Vidňanskyi – Gajdoš, 1995: 80-87). As historian M. Gajdoš stated, it is understandable that in this situation only few had the courage to oppose, especially of these efforts were apparently supported by the Red Army and the NKVD authorities (Gajdoš, 1994: 105).

## 2. Materials and methods

Material basis of the research includes documents from central archives (the Slovak National Archives, the Military History Archives) and regional archives of Slovak republic and Slovak periodicals. Other sources are represented by Slovak and foreign scientific publications to issues published in recent years.

Methodological basis of the research consists of principles of objectivism and historicism. These principles enable impartial and objective approach to analysis of researched problems, critical evaluation of sources and summarization of knowledge (through analytical, progressive and comparative method, direct and indirect method) as a result of analysis of reality and depiction of phenomena in the course and context of historical situation.

## 3. Discussion

Even today, it is difficult to pinpoint precisely how important was the role played by Moscow in the *first phase* (!) of the separation of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Transcarpathian Ukraine) from Czechoslovakia. Was it an initiative of local communists, the high-ranking intelligence officers in the Red Army, an operation of the Ukraine government, or a double game of the Kremlin after all? Either way, this act was convenient for the Soviet leadership in Moscow, because it was interested in this, in their view, strategically important territory which made a military entry to the west and the control of Central Europe easier.

Despite all this, the situation in Transcarpathia caught the Czecho-Slovakian officials off guard for a moment and the KSČ leadership in Moscow, who did not expect such a development, even though the exile President E. Beneš considered the eventual surrender of this territory to the USSR in 1939, and he even promised it in 1943 to Joseph Stalin to create a common border with the Soviet Union for strategic reasons. There were also some concerns that this could be a precedent for the Slovak communists who, during the period of illegality, especially in 1939 – 1944, flirted with the dangerous idea of “Soviet Slovakia”, that means they wanted Slovakia to be attached to the Soviet Union.

The Czechoslovak communists adjusted their position according to Moscow’s instructions. Zdeněk Fierlinger, K. Gottwald, but also F. Němec and the representatives of the Slovak National Council (SNR), as a result of this development, recommended to President E. Beneš to rather carry out a “smooth annexation of the Transcarpathian Ukraine to the Soviet Union” (Kaplan, 1990: 34).

E. Beneš, however, took a wait-and-see position, still trusting J. Stalin and the Soviet leadership. He probably did not believe that the USSR would be able to deprive Czechoslovakia of its territory.

Vyacheslav Molotov, People's Commissar of the Foreign Affairs of the USSR, wrote a letter to E. Beneš, in which he apologized for the incident that occurred in Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Later even Stalin himself contacted E. Beneš in a similar fashion and informed him that "the Soviet government does not intend to harm the interests of the Czechoslovak Republic or its prestige in any way" (Švorc, 1996: 107). E. Beneš was satisfied for a while. In his response, he assured J. Stalin that the issue will not be a subject of discussion with other powers, nor of a dispute between the two states. He suggested that it should be resolved after the war, when he would be able to consult with domestic officials (Kaplan, 1990: 36). By that he basically, figuratively speaking, untied the hands of Moscow and provided time for further activities.

The issue of Subcarpathian Ruthenia re-emerged in March 1945 due to a discussion on the post-war first Czechoslovak government program. The Czechoslovak communists in Moscow had proposed resolving this issue as quickly as possible and to start the urgent talks with the Soviet government, in which way it would be possible to attach the territory to Soviet Ukraine. Similarly, the Soviet government soon changed its strategy and began to openly press upon the Czechoslovak side, especially E. Beneš. During his visit to Moscow, it was presented to him as a *fait accompli*, although the opinions coming from the London exile environment stated that Czechoslovakia as a winner state of the WW II. cannot give up its territory and remain territorially weakened. As P. Švorc said, "the Czechoslovak government, at the beginning of April 1945 having a hearing on its government program, did not have the possibility to interfere with the ongoing changes in Subcarpathian Ruthenia" and "did not even try to". "It accepted the new reality and its program statement only confirmed what had already happened in Subcarpathian Ruthenia. It declared that the Subcarpathian Ruthenia will decide its own faith" (Švorc, 1996: 108).

As a result of the new international and domestic political situation, the problem of the Subcarpathian Ruthenia had taken on new dimensions. The issue of the questionable Cieszyn Silesia appeared on the foreign policy scene. In the Czechoslovak-Polish disagreement, Moscow acted as a smart arbiter who linked the question of Cieszyn Silesia to the issue of a surrender of the Subcarpathian Ruthenia. At this point, under the pressure of the situation, the Prague government had decided to use the Subcarpathian Ruthenia to strengthen the Czechoslovak positions in solving the problem with the Poles. As Minister Václav Majer said, the Czechoslovak government can gain a lot in Moscow during the talks on the issue of Cieszyn Silesia "when we can point out that we, like the Poles, agreed with the adjustment on the East in favour of the Soviet Union" (Bobák, 1998: 12). Similarly, Václav Kopecký pointed out that the "de facto sovereignty over the Transcarpathian Ukraine no longer exists, and that it is actually only a legal implementation of this factual state" (Kaplan, 1990: 40). According to historian M. Barnovský, the final decision to close the case of Subcarpathian Ruthenia and thus to win Moscow's favour and a favourable position during the negotiations with the Polish government on the issue of Cieszyn Silesia was adopted at a government meeting on 18<sup>th</sup> June 1945. Deputy Prime Minister K. Gottwald justified it by saying that if Czechoslovakia clearly declares that it surrenders the Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the Soviet Union, it will get into "a similar situation as the Poles on the eastern border, which would be psychologically favourable" (Barnovský, 2002: 14).

Before that, on May 16, 1945, Prime Minister Z. Fierlinger announced for radio and press that an autonomous government of Transcarpathian Ukraine had been formed, which expressed the wish to incorporate the Transcarpathian Ukraine into the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Government also stated: "President E. Beneš and our government intends to resolve this issue with Moscow in the spirit of the most sincere friendship as the population of the Carpathian Ukraine wishes" (Pravda-1).

#### 4. Results

On the internal political discourse, a new impulse for the government of the restored Czechoslovakia to quickly proceed to address the Subcarpathian issue. Concerns of E. Beneš and some Czechoslovak politicians that the Transcarpathian variant of sovietisation may continue and end in an annexation of part of the Slovak territory were not, in fact, entirely unfounded. The events in Transcarpathia clearly influenced the development in north-eastern Slovakia, and had a naturally major impact on the political mobilization of some representatives of the Ruthenian

and Ukrainian population who, at the time of the liberation of Eastern Slovakia, had no clear idea of their further orientation and were facing dilemma - to follow the example of Transcarpathian Ukraine or build their own status in cooperation with the Czechs and Slovaks (Šutaj, 1988: 52). However, the slogans of sovietisation of the country began to re-emerge spontaneously and spread the idea of uniting the north-eastern Slovakia with Transcarpathian Ukraine, that is with the USSR (see Gajdoš et al., 2006: 6-9).

An initiative developed by the Temporary National Committee of the Prjaševian and Russian Ukrainians (Vanat, 2001: 19-21), which on its first meeting in Uzhhorod on 29<sup>th</sup> November 1944 adopted a resolution similar to that of the Mukachevo addressed to the National Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine, was nonnegligible in this respect. In the resolution, the Temporary Committee called for "...to attach the entire Prešovian Ukraine (i.e., north-eastern Slovakia – *M.Š.*) with the Galician Lemkivshchyna (Lemkovyna, south-eastern Poland – *M.Š.*) to the Free Mother of Transcarpathian Ukraine" (Gajdoš et al., 1999: 38-39). Certain uneasiness was also caused by the fact that, with the support of the Soviet security forces from Subcarpathian Ruthenia, a group of agitators began to enter the territory of Slovakia between 1944 and 1945, trying to instigate a movement for annexation of the Transcarpathian Ukraine (Soviet Ukraine) among the population of north-eastern Slovakia.

The overall situation in the border regions was also complicated by the fact that the Red Army occupied six Slovak municipalities in eastern Slovakia. Even the National Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine began to intervene in the border districts of north-eastern Slovakia (Bobák, 1998: 10).

"The fact that in Transcarpathia they also seriously counted on the annexation of the north-eastern districts of Slovakia inhabited by Ruthenian population – a so-called Prjaševščina (understand Prešovsko – *M. Š.*), is indirectly confirmed by a record from the discussion at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Transcarpathian Ukraine held on 27<sup>th</sup> November 1944, where it was criticized that the best cadres coming from Prjaševščina are not represented in the National Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine" (Gajdoš, 1994: 107).

Similar tendencies appeared among some members of KRASNO<sup>1</sup> organization, who initiated the formation and establishment of the Ukrainian National Council of Prjaševščina (UNRP) since late 1944. The founders of UNRP seemed to have been inspired by reports on the activities of the Slovak National Council (SNR), but above all by the creation of the National Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine. The official establishment of UNRP took place later – on 1<sup>st</sup> March 1945 at a convention of delegates from municipalities and districts of eastern Slovakia, although according to the original plan the meeting should already have taken place on 15<sup>th</sup> February 1945.

However, the original deadline was postponed probably because the members of the Preparatory Committee<sup>2</sup> were conducting an agitation in eastern Slovakia for uniting its territory with the Soviet Union (Šutaj, 1988: 53). An assumption, that in this regard they were engaged under the direct impulse coming from Uzhhorod and high military officials of ČA (Gajdoš et al., 1999: 39-41), is realistic. In principle – due to the similar (and parallel) ongoing events in north-western Romania (Movement for the annexation of the Marmara-Sighet region to Transcarpathian

<sup>1</sup> Karpatoruskij sovet nacionalnogo osloboždenija – KRASNO (in Engl. Carpatho-Russian Council for National Liberation) – a resistance organization in eastern Slovakia founded in September 1943 to help refugees from Nazi concentration camps and to support the development of the anti-fascist movement in the region. Members and co-workers of the organization also carried out intelligence activities and organized supplies for the partisan units operating in eastern Slovakia. However, the group's activity was more visible in the work of individuals than of the organisation. Among the founding members of KRASNO – P. Babej, P. Kapišovský, V. Karaman, I. Židovský, P. Židovský, D. Rojkovič, P. Jurečko, T. Seman, I. Nachaj etc. – were also the later founders of the Ukrainian National Council of Prjaševščina (Pažur, 1974: 84).

<sup>2</sup> The Preparatory Committee of the Ukrainians (Prjaševščina) was established at the regional conference of the KSS, which took place in Prešov on 13<sup>th</sup> February 1945 with the participation of 32 representatives from Stropkov, Svidník, Bardejov, Prešov, Sabinov and Giraltovece districts. That the Preparatory Committee played an important role in the formation of the UNRP is indirectly evidenced by the fact that the representatives of the Democratic Party later blamed the UNRP for not inviting the people to the establishing congress, but only the delegates of the Preparatory Committee, and demanded the reorganisation of the UNRP on a party basis (Šutaj, 1988: 53).



Ukraine), at about the same time (mid-January – the beginning of February 1945) – it is possible to speak of a coordinated action (see Gajdoš, 1998; Gajdoš, 2013).

Apparently, local Ukrainian activists proceeded according to the scenario developed outside Slovakia, i.e. as it was in Subcarpathian Ruthenia and then in Marmaroschine, and tried to develop a broad popular movement for Prjaševščina's annexation to the Soviet Union. The cooperation of the founders of UNRP with the Soviet armed forces is obvious also because its later President, Vasil Karaman<sup>1</sup>, asked General Lev Mechlis, a member of the Military Council of the 4<sup>th</sup> Ukrainian Front, for help, informed him about the situation in Prjaševščina (Barnovský, 2002: 13), and the officers of the ČA participated in the business meetings as well (AZR-USR-1).

The fact that at the beginning of 1945 there really was an agitation among the population in the north-eastern Slovakia and that there was also a signature collecting under some kind of a drafted memorandum, was confirmed by several reports. Signatory actions for joining the USSR took place in various places and in the municipalities of the region, from Stará Ľubovňa to Snina. However, they were obtained in a diverse, often fraudulent way, frequently not without a pressure or threats (Gajdoš, 1994: 111). That is, similarly as in Transcarpathia, when collecting signatures to support the Manifesto of Mukachevo of 26<sup>th</sup> November 1944.

Remarkable in this case is the report of the Regional Administration of Defence Information (OBZ) of the 4<sup>th</sup> District Headquarter in Bratislava, which, on the example of the Snina district, reveals relatively detailed backstage attempts to develop the movement for uniting the north-eastern Slovakia with Transcarpathia: "Since the liberation of the Snina district by the ČA, there has been deliberate and organized agitation to attach this district to the ZU (Transcarpathian Ukraine – M. Š.). (...) This action is carried out primarily by the chairman of ONV Hákoš, the political director of ONVB Pytel', also by Dr. Hoffmann and, besides those, by notary Šmiga in Papín and the forest warden Senko in Zvala. The Chairman of the ONV and his faithful assistants are unlimited masters in the district of Snina. For their personal safety, they have at their disposal a completely faithful and inclined NB and the so-called city militia or police. (...) The Chairman of the ONV and his assistants used to take and are still taking *very frequent trips to ZU, mainly to Uzhhorod*, and according to the chairman of ONV, they also receive petrol from Perečín. The exact purpose of the trip could not be ascertained; however, it is probable from the testimonies of our citizens and the legitimate assumptions that they are traveling there *in order to force the annexation of the entire Snina district to ZU* (previously and still talking about attaching the territory reaching Poprad). This assumption, or almost certainty, is supported by several statements of the leading personalities of Snina themselves. The aforementioned notary Šmiga from Papín told the financial guard in Telepovce that everything was ready and that everything, district by district, will be attached to Russia. It is clear that this is a deliberate propaganda in order to attach some districts to ZU from the fact that an inventory is being done in the villages, or rather a signing campaign for joining ZU. Thus, in the village of Vyšná Jablonka, MNV meetings are held, during which speeches on uniting with ZU are given and the signing campaign is organized there as well. People are forced to sign under threats that if they do not sign the Russians will punish them when this territory is annexed to ZU. As a result of these threats, people are afraid of possible consequences and are signing. However, there are cases like in the ZU, when people say they will sign it to receive a maintenance allowance, *but in fact, it is an event for joining the ZU*. (...) It is certain that the mentioned people, who are assisted by teachers in the villages, are *almost openly agitating for joining the ZU*. It is also very likely that some Russian border units have occupied some of our land as a result of their "begging" and pleading. It is further likely that *their agitation is probably inspired by Uzhhorod*" (SNA-1).

Initiatives in this respect went even further. Nikita Khrushchev, then the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine – KS(b)U and the Prime Minister of the Ukrainian Government, recounts in his memoirs that in early 1945 the representatives of some district of eastern Slovakia where the Ukrainians lived<sup>2</sup> had visited him in Kyiv and asked for their district to be annexed to the Ukrainian SSR. N. Khrushchev replied that

<sup>1</sup> According to J. Bobák, UNRP originated from the support of the Soviet security forces and describes its President, V. Karaman, as a co-worker of the Soviet NKVD (Bobák, 1998: 12).

<sup>2</sup> According to several indications it is possible to believe that the delegation which visited N. Khrushchev in early 1945, came from the district of Snina.

this is not possible, as it would offend the Czechs, but especially Slovaks. He recommended the delegation to build socialism in close cooperation with the KSČ. After their departure, however, he took the whole matter to J. Stalin (Vanat, 2001: 24-25).

Obviously – considering the further development of the situation – there was insufficient coordination between the ČA command operating in eastern Slovakia and the political leadership of the USSR, that is, it is also possible to anticipate a change of tactics as ČA commanders were finally asked to suspend their initiative in this direction. Moscow did not want to risk any loss of reputation in the eyes of the Allies and, in particular, the forming government of the Czechoslovakia, as this could compromise the partnership relations and, in addition, the issue of Subcarpathian Ruthenia – regarded as a bilateral issue between Czechoslovakia and the USSR – would take on other dimensions, including the activation of international public opinion. Apparently, we can state with a certainty, that as a result of this (as M. Gajdoš points out), several agitators were summoned to the Soviet military command in Prešov in mid-February 1945, and were ordered to stop their activities. At the same time, they were warned that their conduct was not in accordance with the Czechoslovak-Soviet Alliance and was “premature in the given conditions” (Gajdoš, 1994: 108-109).

However, these separatist tendencies culminated during the visit of a delegation of Ukrainian municipalities and districts that took place in the Russian House in Prešov on 1<sup>st</sup> March 1945, and which declared the establishment of the Ukrainian National Council of Prjaševščina<sup>1</sup> as a national-political body representing the “Ukrainian and Russian population” living in eastern Slovakia (Encyklopédia, 1982: 170). UNRP objective was to protect and enforce the rights and interests of that population (Gajdoš - Konečný, 1994: 14). It was very clearly formulated in the draft of the organisation order, which stated that “UNRP is the highest and only universal representative of the Ukrainian and Russian (understand Ruthenian – M. Š.) population in Slovakia” (Bajcura, 1967: 90).

At the inaugural congress in Prešov, UNRP adopted a resolution, in which it declared its support for the Manifesto of the first congress of National Committees of the Transcarpathian Ukraine in Mukachevo, expressing its gratitude to J. Stalin for the liberation and granting the right to freely express one’s national sentiment and – most importantly – it re-sketches the idea of attaching the north-eastern territories of Slovakia to the Ukrainian SSR (AZR-USR-2). The overall atmosphere of the founding congress and the adoption of such resolution in many ways resembled the congress of National Committees of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, which declared the unification of Transcarpathia with Soviet Ukraine. The council hall was predominantly decorated with the portraits of J. Stalin and local officials. In the telegrams sent from Prešov only to the Soviet statesmen (J. Stalin, N. Khrushchev), the commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, General I. Petrov, and to the National Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine, a hope that in the foreseeable future the entire Ukrainian nation would be united in one state and a request for a patronage were expressed.<sup>2</sup>

The fact that there was an attempt in the north-eastern corner of Slovakia to imitate the Transcarpathian variant of sovietising is evidenced by the UNRP’s call in its bulletin “Prjaševščina” for “the armed representatives of the Ukrainian people” to stay awake and to make sure that “our decisions are introduced to life and all deviations from our decisions are punished by law” (Prjaševščina). It was an obvious attempt to emulate the formation of people’s militia, as was the case in Transcarpathia (but also in Marmaroschine), in order to enforce its own intentions. Indeed, it is necessary to agree with the opinion that in north-eastern Slovakia there was a real danger of a dual governance during this period.

<sup>1</sup> The aforementioned Vasil Karaman was elected as a President of the UNRP, Peter Babej and Peter Židovský were elected Vice-Presidents, and Dr. Ivan Rohal’-Il’kiv became a General Secretary.

<sup>2</sup> The salutatory telegram addressed to J. Stalin expressed hope that “the day when the ancient injustice is eliminated and the whole great Ukrainian nation is united in one state, is not far away”. The telegram addressed to N. Khrushchev – a plea not to forget to resolve the issue of Transcarpathian Ukraine, that “there are Ukrainians living in Prjaševščina, who, by their way of life and culture, are brothers, bound by blood, to the Transcarpathian Ukrainians. Now, we have a unique opportunity to freely determine our nationality. *We cordially ask for your patronage*”. The UNRP asked the National Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine “not to forget us” when dealing with the fate of the Transcarpathian Ukraine (AZR-USR-2).

However, it should be stressed that among the initiators of the founding of UNRP were members of the communist party of Ukraine nationality (or rather Ukrainian national orientation), who even held a very significant position in it. And after all, the most ardent supporters of the platform of uniting some north-eastern districts of Slovakia to the USSR (even reaching river Poprad, which caused considerable political uncertainty among the Ruthenian population) were among the eastern Slovak communists, although the leadership of the KSČ in Moscow and the leaders of the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) clearly distanced themselves from them (Gajdoš et al., 1999: 39-40). Leaders of this policy had apparent connections in Transcarpathian Ukraine (Konečný, 2002: 33) and cooperated intensively with the Soviet security authorities.

In addition to the resolution, UNRP proclaimed a national unity of the Prjaševščina's population and the people of Transcarpathian Ukraine and Russian nation (Bajcura, 1967: 73). An important fact in this situation was that the Ruthenians – inhabitants of north-eastern Slovakia, were presented by the UNRP in a new light. It identified them as Ukrainians, or rather as a Ukrainian national minority. The UNRP representatives wanted to increase the authority of the institution, especially in connection with the development in Transcarpathia, by giving them this name, which did not match the tradition or the sentiment of the majority of the population.

According to M. Gajdoš, the declaration of this attitude was in fact addressed to the political elites in Czechoslovakia, who should have been convinced that the presentation of the population by UNRP represents a responsible and equal partner to be reckoned with. At the same time, it should assist in enforcing the requirements presented by the UNRP (Gajdoš, 2000: 1-2). However, on the other hand, they understood the overall political tendency in this matter. Using a foreign and, for the Slovak language, de facto untranslatable term *Prjaševščina*, they irritated the Slovak national authorities, who feared the autonomist and separatist ambitions in the eastern Slovakian region (Gajdoš - Konečný, 1994: 14).

Representatives of the Czechoslovak Government, the SNR and the KSČ were literally surprised by this turn of events<sup>1</sup>. Representatives of the Slovak communists informed about this matter the leadership of the KSČ in Moscow and K. Gottwald forwarded in a radiogram of 4<sup>th</sup> March 1945 to G. Husák the following instructions: “You have raised the Ukrainian question incomprehensibly for us, because we cannot respond only broadly. Because the annexation of the Slovaks districts populated by Ukrainians to the Transcarpathian Ukraine is not on the agenda of the day, this will be solved within Slovakia. It is clear that the Ukrainians are entitled to acquire national minority right within Slovakia. Whether this right should be done within the framework of territorial or cultural autonomy, or otherwise, will be addressed in the overall adjustment of the constitutional position of Slovakia”. In the next section of the radiogram, it was said that, as a temporary solution, it would be enough to create a certain national-representative body of Ukrainians, which would be recognized by the SNR and would also have some representatives in it. All the questions regarding the Ukrainian population would be dealt with in agreement with this body, but it would not have the nature of state administration itself. The final section warned: “We cannot, in any way, allow nationalist, anti-Soviet elements, who have now lost their foundation in western and Transcarpathian Ukraine and will try to settle themselves in eastern Slovakia, to infiltrate the National Committees in Ukrainian municipalities and districts, as well as the aforementioned “national-representative” body. Such elements must be detected and completely removed from public life of the Ukrainian minority. We also cannot allow the democrats to flirt with them. With regard to the so-called Ukrainian and Russian directions, the question now arises differently as it did during the pre-Munich Republic. The population as a whole is considered to be Ukrainian, who wants to, however, can declare himself to the Russian nation and the schools can be both Ukrainian and Russian, depending on what will the population want. However, we continue to oppose the so-called rusinism as a fabrication of Hungarianization” (Barnovský, 1996: 65-66).

<sup>1</sup> According to M. Gajdoš, the great ambitions of the UNRP officials are also evidenced by the fact that on 3rd March 1945, they asked the President E. Beneš through a letter given to him by the government delegate F. Němec, to allow the UNRP representatives to participate in the negotiations between the Czechoslovak political parties and SNR, which took place in Moscow in March 1945. Apparently, they wanted to take part in the Moscow negotiations (among other things) to present and, if necessary, enforce the surrender of Prjaševščina to the Soviet Ukraine (Gajdoš et al., 2006: 7).

This *expressis verbis* message became a directive for the leadership of the Slovak communists on how to proceed in the case of UNRP and its demands. From the quoted document, the possibility of granting a certain degree of autonomy to the “Ukrainian” minority is quite obvious, but the further undefined possibility expressed by K. Gottwald in the phrase “or otherwise” is also nonnegligible. At the same time, the KSČ leadership in Moscow warned and called attention to the “anti-Soviet element”, which, as we will see below, was really closely monitored in the post-war republic. In any case, the KSS strictly followed the instructions of K. Gottwald.

Czechoslovak state authorities and political organizations had begun to develop an initiative to calm the situation in eastern Slovakia. At the same time, they were determined to defend the “undermined” integrity of the restored republic at all costs. At a meeting of representatives of the KSS with the representatives of the KSČ leadership in Moscow, which took place on 8<sup>th</sup> April 1945 in Košice, G. Husák declared: “The Party clearly stated, it wishes to live in peace with the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian National Council has not come up with any proposal to this day, *but it makes actions that make the citizens nervous*”. P. Babej, a member of the UNRP chairmanship, opposed him by justifying its orientation on the USSR by a critical socio-economic situation of the population in north-eastern Slovakia and the lack of help from the Czechoslovak authorities. He stated: “Therefore, the Ukrainian people see no other salvation as the one from the East” (Šutaj, 1988: 56).

As far as Moscow is concerned, in the given situation it was not as much concerned about uniting a part of eastern Slovakia and USSR. The Soviet government had not expressed any interest in this territory, which may have more hurt its authority on an international scene than help it. It was the first attempt to blackmail or force E. Beneš and the Prague Government to surrender Subcarpathian Ruthenia as soon as possible to the Soviet Union. For Moscow’s leadership, it was not desirable to question its credibility and to risk conflicts with the allies when the spheres of influence were being decided. The Transcarpathian precedent could not repeat itself in north-western Romania, not to mention in north-eastern Slovakia. Much more pragmatic was to gain decisive influence over the entire country than to attach other relatively insignificant territory to the USSR (Gajdoš, 1998: 2).

Even the UNRP leaders gradually began to realise that attaching part of eastern Slovakia to USSR was unrealistic both from the international as well as domestic political point of view. UNRP’s intentions could not be realised due to the fact that the entire spectrum of the Czechoslovak political representation insisted on the territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic after the apparent loss of Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Not to mention that the annexation of a part of eastern Slovakia to USSR based on the ethnic principle was almost impossible, because the so-called Ukrainian, or rather Ruthenian population did not form a compact settlement. At the same time, a very dangerous precedent could be created for the Hungarian and Polish minorities in Czechoslovakia, what the Czechoslovak government and the Slovak National Council could not afford to allow.

Gradually, the UNRP-led movement for attaching the territory to the USSR began to weaken and eventually ceased to exist (although it did not gain a more massive support among the population, in some circles at home and in exile, however, it existed until 1947) (Konečný, 1997: 72). The situation calmed down and cleared only after 9<sup>th</sup> April 1945 when a meeting of the leading figures of UNRP V. Karaman, P. Babej and I. Rohal’-Il’kiv with the representatives of the Slovak National Council G. Husák and T. Tvarožka took place in Košice. UNRP had shown willingness to cooperate with the SNR in addressing political, economic and cultural issues and peculiarities of the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) population and actively engaging in the post-war reconstruction and restoration of the country. In this respect, they have been assured that the SNR will create the conditions for the requirements of the Ukrainian representation to be fulfilled. It was also agreed that UNRP will develop a memorandum in which it will formulate its views on the current problems of the population it represents and, which will be submitted to the Presidium of the SNR (Gajdoš, 1994: 110; Gajdoš et al., 2006: 9).

After the Moscow negotiations in March and the declaration of the Košice Government Programme – the government of the National Front of Czechs and Slovaks on 5<sup>th</sup> April 1945, and after the negotiations of the UNRP delegation with the representatives of political parties, the figures of UNRP began to shift their attention towards building the Czecho-Slovak platform of its further direction (Šutaj, 1988: 57).

On 22<sup>nd</sup> April 1945, UNRP drafted a memorandum (see Vanat, 2001: 56-59), which it handed over to the SNR representatives on 5<sup>th</sup> May 1945. The document contained a wide range of political and cultural requirements that the state authorities should implement in order to address the “Ukrainian” issue (Bajcura, 1967: 76). UNRP also expressed its full support to the Košice Government Programme, while demanding proportional representation of the Ukrainians in the SNR, the central governmental authorities at the Commissariats of the SNR and other institutions, state administration and judiciary authorities, especially in the districts with “Ukrainian” population. Particular attention was paid to the development of Ukrainian (Russian) national education and the establishment of a department managing these schools at the Commissariat for Education and Enlightenment of the SNR (Gajdoš, 1991: 7). In early May 1945, the Deputy Prime Minister of the National Front, K. Gottwald, expressed through the press that the Czechoslovak government considers the Ukrainians from Slovakia to be equal citizens of the republic, who should be treated as equals. He promised that the government will take all measures to meet the demands of the Ukrainian population (Hlas ľudu).

Meanwhile, the SNR discussed the memorandum and, by the end of May 1945, informed the UNRP that it accepts their demands: “...greet and welcomes the political, economic and cultural movement of the Ukrainian population living in Slovakia. With full understanding, it will monitor the efforts to consolidate the Ukrainian national consciousness within this part of the Slovak population, furthermore, the efforts to release and develop its hidden creative strengths and will support them by all means. (...) In the name of the Slovak people, we declare that it will always make sure that its relationship with the Ukrainians is as heartfelt as possible so that there is no room for bitterness for the crimes committed against Ukrainians in any Ukrainian heart” (Bajcura, 1967: 78). Soon, the SNR had taken specific measures to meet the requirements defined by the UNRP, which took steps to ensure the realisation of the demands in memorandum.

Although UNRP had distanced itself from separatist ideas and started to proclaim its support for the Košice Government Programme, its statements were not forgotten, but still remembered very vividly. It might be argued that the leaders of Czechoslovakia exercised the wait-and-see tactics for a while, but secretly sought an opportunity for the gradual liquidation of the UNRP (what indeed happened in early 1950s) as well as for the solution of the issue of the population supporting its advices – including the method of resettlement of the population into the USSR. The following recommendation of the Regional Administration of the 4<sup>th</sup> district’s OBZ Headquarters addressed to the Commissariat for Interior of the SNR in Bratislava confirms this idea: “It would be in a national and state interest to prevent these individuals (initiators of the movement – *M. Š.*) their further activities, because it could indeed happen that, on the basis of their request, this territory would end up annexed to the ZU (Transcarpathian Ukraine – *M. Š.*), what, however, is not something people really want. But, however, if these individuals wish to go to the ZU, assuming they will be better off there, let them be given the opportunity or force them to opt for the ZU. At the ZU itself, we have many Slovaks who want to opt for Slovakia, and in case we resolve the issue of option, a displacement (on both sides) on a larger scale could be considered” (SNA-1).

Equally important is the issue of the north-eastern Slovak district’s Ruthenian population’s attitude towards the tendencies of annexing their region to the USSR, or rather Ukrainian SSR. It is said that “UNRP’s initial efforts to resolve the issue of the Ruthenians (Ukrainians) by attaching north-eastern Slovakia to Transcarpathian Ukraine did not gain any support, even though they lived in some domestic and exile circles up until 1947” (Konečný, 1997: 72). In this regard, M. Gajdoš for example stated that in eastern Slovakia, especially in the Ruthenian environment, the idea of attaching part of this region to Transcarpathian Ukraine persisted for quite a while. This was reflected not only in the initial period of UNRP’s activities, but also later on other occasions. The relatively unpredictable situation was related to the demarcation of the Czechoslovak-Soviet border, there were various rumours circulating among the population about the possible annexation of a part of eastern Slovakia to Transcarpathia. Overall, the Ruthenian population was loyal to the Czechoslovakia, although some of them were interested in joining the USSR<sup>1</sup>. It was

<sup>1</sup> “The population of Ruthenian nationality living in eastern Slovakia is loyal to Czechoslovakia. Some proletarians of this ethnic group would like to join the USSR – rather to the Ukrainian SSR. This effort is strongly supported by the insufficient supplying of the eastern Slovakia in the Ruthenian provinces, which

mainly due to the poor supply situation in the region. Propaganda, that the corresponding commissariats are not interested in these regions because they will be surrendered to the USSR<sup>1</sup>, was spreading (Gajdoš, 1996: 209).

Reports that its eastern part to Poprad will fall under the USSR, or rather that the Ruthenian population will be displaced into the USSR, were spreading all over Slovakia. This caused turmoil and protests of some municipalities, as well as individuals. This is also evidenced by the letter of the Greek-Catholic parish priest from the village of Jarabina addressed to the District National Committee (ONV) in Stará Lubovňa on 4<sup>th</sup> October 1945. It characterizes the described events very accurately and is remarkable because it shows the view of the population itself on the aforementioned events:

“Most sincerely, please, tell the competent authorities that the people of Jarabina is outraged by the reports that the Russians demand from the ČSR to displace all the Ruthenians into Russia, more precisely Ukraine, because they say it is the will of the Ruthenian people. The Ruthenians absolutely do not wish to belong to the USSR, and if *some of them signed some sort of memoranda in January and February of this year (1945 – M. Š.) that they wish to belong to Russia, they did so unaware, tricked by teachers and pseudo-intellectuals similar to them, who scattered among Ruthenian villages and claimed to be collecting signatures in villages that wish to have Ruthenian schools, are need of spring seeds, etc.; and none of them ever talked about what was actually going on, otherwise no one would sign these foolish memoranda. My tricked believers are asking me to point out that all of the abovementioned little people, who rakishly collected the signatures on their own deserve to be declared treasonous and to be kicked out of the ČSR to the USSR so that they get what they deserve and try themselves what they wished for..., because all my believers, as well as the Ruthenians from the neighbouring villages, always felt like being Czechoslovaks, always fought for the integrity of the ČSR and wish to remain faithful citizens of their beloved homeland, the Czechoslovak Republic. When necessary, all the mentioned will sign certificates stating they are feeling to be Slovaks to be left in peace once and for all and not be bothered by this eternal fear that they are to be, or could be displaced at some point into Russia just because they were born Ruthenians. They say they have nothing against someone, who likes being in the USSR, voluntarily moving there, but that all of them can absolutely never be forced to move there. In addition, more than 70 boys already left or will leave in the next few days for the work in coal mines in the Czech lands just because they once heard they would be displaced to Russia*” (ŠALpSL).

We are of the opinion that the UNRP did not enjoy the mass support of the Ruthenian population even at the beginning of its separatist existence, nor after announcing its support of the Košice Government Programme. As resulting from the analysis of the contemporary documents, the inhabitants of eastern Slovakia were rather concerned with existential problems and the elimination of the consequences of the war in everyday life. The backstage political games and ambitions of the UNRP worried the population and brought uncertainty into their lives (ŠALpP).

The very crossing of the front and the direct contact with Soviet soldiers, as well as the circulating information on the situation in Transcarpathian Ukraine brought by the refugees, forced the ordinary people to think and consider their position in the ČSR, as evidenced by several contemporary reports and accounts of the Slovak security forces. “The population of the border area is 100 % behind the Czechoslovak Republic, because the refugees from the East and North are confirming them in their beliefs...” (VHA-1). “There is a certain degree of dissatisfaction, especially in the border regions, as the population is worried about the definitive solution of the state border between Czechoslovakia and the USSR. This population, which is mostly of the Ruthenian nationality, expresses openly its desire to be loyal to the ČSR and to stand by its current constitutional status” (SNA-4). And finally: “Our civilians in the Czechoslovak border is mainly of the Ruthenian nationality, sympathizes with the Ukrainians in Transcarpathian Ukraine, with the Ukrainians in Poland... Is 100 % of Czechoslovak thinking because it sees how badly the Ukrainians

then spread propaganda that the Commissariat for Food and Supply does not care for these regions, because they should be surrendered to the USSR” – as was observed by the Commissariat for Interior of the SNR (SNA-3).

<sup>1</sup> “According to the incoming reports from Košice, the citizens of Košice are worried because of the news that the East (understand eastern Slovakia – M. Š.) is going to be attached to the USSR, resulting in the refusal of the incoming officials to move to Košice” (SNA-2).

are treated in the neighbouring countries. *It is hostile towards those who were lobbying in the spring of 1945 and collecting signatures supporting the annexation to the USSR.* They see that its salvation, primarily from the material point of view, lies in the ČSR” (VHA-2).

## 5. Conclusion

Between 25<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> June 1945, negotiations between a Czechoslovak and Polish delegations on the issue of Cieszyn and Subcarpathian Ruthenia took place in Moscow. The delegation of the ČSR was led by Prime Minister Z. Fierlinger, its members were Jan Ursíny, Vladimír Clementis, Ludvík Svoboda, Hubert Ripka, Zdeňek Nejedlý, Adolf Procházka. One of the outcomes of the so-called Moscow Award on the Cieszyn issue was an agreement between the ČSR and USSR of 29<sup>th</sup> June 1945 on the surrender of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Transcarpathian Ukraine)<sup>1</sup> to the Soviet Union (Bobák, 1998: 12).

The treaty was concluded in Kremlin in the presence of the Premier of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, J. Stalin. The treaty was signed by an authorized representative of the President of the ČSR, the Prime Minister Z. Fierlinger, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, V. Clementis, on the Czechoslovak part, and by deputy of a Premier of the Council of People's Commissars and a People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V. Molotov, for the USSR. After signing the agreement, Z. Fierlinger and V. Molotov appeared with a ceremonial speech in front of the delegations of both countries. As the communist “Pravda” noted in the days following the meeting: “There is no doubt that the peaceful surrender of this territory to the Soviet Union morally strengthens the Czech territorial claims concerning the future of Cieszyn Silesia and a part of the German Silesian region that are being discussed in Moscow” (Pravda-2).

By signing the Agreement on the Surrender of the Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the USSR, the original idea from the Slovak National Uprising period according to which he restored Czechoslovakia would become a federal state of three Slavic nations: Czechs, Slovaks and Subcarpathian Ruthenians – ceased to be relevant (see Vanat, 1968: 367). It meant, among other things, that the national individuality of the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) population of Slovakia could only be accepted in the form of recognition of the status of a national minority (Gajdoš - Konečný, 1994: 14). And for the minorities, the post-war Czechoslovak political representation had a special (negative) attitude that in the case of the Ruthenians and Ukrainians from Slovakia had manifested itself in the Czechoslovak-Soviet mutual relocations of the population in 1946 – 1947 (see Šmigel', 2004). However, it is another subject of wider contexts of the problem.

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<sup>1</sup> The day before the signing of this agreement (28<sup>th</sup> June 1945), during the negotiations between Z. Fierlinger and V. Clementis with V. Molotov and J. Stalin, the latter asked the Czechoslovak representatives whether “it is appropriate for the government of ČSR to signed the given Agreement right now” and also pointed out that: “We are not pressuring you. Act as you see fit in this matter”. Z. Fierlinger, however, replied that “the Czechoslovak government considers this moment to be appropriate for the conclusion of the agreement and, therefore, comes with the proposal to sign the treaty itself” (Vostočnaja Evropa, 1997: 230).

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
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## Weapons of Propagandists

### Sound Broadcasting as a Source of Military Propaganda

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#### Abstract

The article deals with sound broadcasting equipment that is at the disposal of various countries of the world. Attention is paid to lightweight, portable, vehicle and helicopter sound stations.

Open Internet sources as well as specialized literature were used as materials. In terms of methodology, comparative and typological methods were used in the article, which made it possible to compare such weapons of propaganda as sound stations from the standpoint of typology.

In conclusion, the author notes that there is an almost full range of sound equipment in the arsenal of the Armed Forces today, and it allows broadcasting at various distances from several hundred meters (portable complexes) up to 5 km (helicopter complexes). Broadcasting on an even greater territory is carried out with the help of special sound broadcasting stations, which, due to their size, cannot be placed on military equipment or transported by personnel.

**Keywords:** typology, portable, vehicle and helicopter sound stations.

#### 1. Introduction

Sound broadcasting equipment is regarded as one of the most effective weapons at the disposal of military propagandists.

There is a large number of sound broadcasting equipment that is at the disposal of the armed forces of different countries of the world.

The sound broadcasting equipment can be classified by the following principle:

1. Portable sound broadcasting stations;
2. Vehicle sound broadcasting stations;
3. Helicopter sound broadcasting stations.

These stations differ in their power capacity ([Table 1](#))

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**Table 1.** Maximum power capacity of sound broadcasting stations

Equipment	Maximum power capacity	Radius of action
Portable sound broadcasting stations	Up to 350 Watt	700–1000 m
Vehicle sound broadcasting stations	Up to 1000 Watt	1200–1800 m
Helicopter sound broadcasting stations	Up to 2700 Watt	3200–4800 m

**2. Materials and methods**

Open Internet sources as well as specialized literature were used as materials.

In terms of methodology, comparative and typological methods were used in the article, which made it possible to compare such weapons of propaganda as sound stations from the standpoint of typology.

**3. Results**

Let us consider the various modifications of sound broadcasting stations.

1. Portable sound broadcasting stations

1.1. Lightweight sound broadcasting station.

It is designed to enhance speech and music broadcasts (Fig. 1). There are portable (more commonly used) and mobile versions of it. The station is transported by “UAZ-469”. It is important to note that the analogues of this station were used during World War II (Zharkov, 2009; Zharkov, 2010).

Power capacity – 100 Watt, broadcast range is up to 2 km, 1 person in the crew.



**Fig. 1.** Lightweight sound broadcasting station – OZS-78

1.2. Portable sound broadcasting station.

It is designed to enhance speech and music broadcasts (Fig. 2). The station has two fixed power capacities of 75 and 30 Watts. It is equipped with a device for mounting loudspeakers on military equipment. Its’ broadcast range is 100 meters. Radio remote control is possible at a distance of up to 225 meters. It is possible to combine several such stations into a single system to cover large areas. Battery powered (up to 2 hours of continuous work). Broadcast is conducted from a microphone or audio cassette. 1 person in the operating crew.



**Fig. 2.** Russian-Soviet portable PZS-86

1.3. Portable sound broadcasting station (power capacity 250 Watt).

It is installed on automobile and armored vehicles, as well as on boats and ships. The broadcasting range is 400–600 meters (depending on the terrain and climatic conditions). The station is powered by battery. Broadcast is conducted from a microphone or audio cassette. Operating crew consists of 2-3 people.

1.4. Portable sound broadcasting station with increased power capacity (power capacity 350 Watts).

It is installed on automobile and armored vehicles, as well as on boats and ships. Broadcasting range is 700–1000 meters (depending on the terrain and climatic conditions). The station is powered by battery (up to 3 hours of continuous operation). Broadcast from a microphone or audio cassette. Operating crew consists of 2-3 people.

2. Vehicle sound broadcasting stations

2.1. Vehicle sound broadcasting station. Vehicle sound broadcasting station is based on “Hummer” off-road vehicle (**Fig. 3**) (can also be installed on helicopters, boats and ships). Power capacity – 450 Watts. Broadcasting range of 1000–1500 meters (depending on the terrain and climatic conditions). Broadcast from a microphone or audio cassette. Operating crew consists of 3 people.



**Fig. 3.** Vehicle sound broadcasting station based on “Hummer” off-road vehicle.

2.2. Vehicle sound broadcasting station of increased power capacity.

The station is installed on the base of the American "Hummer" off-road vehicle, as well as Russian BRDM-2 and BTR (Fig. 4; 5) (can also be installed on helicopters, light aircraft, boats and ships). Power capacity of the station is 700–1000 Watts.

The broadcasting range is 1200–1800 meters (depending on the terrain and climatic conditions). It is powered by car battery or autonomous battery (up to 6 hours of continuous operation). Broadcast is conducted from a microphone or audio cassette. Operating crew consists of 3 people.



**Fig. 4.** Russian-Soviet sound broadcasting station ZS-82 based on BRDM-2 (Romanchuk, Mitiukov, 2016: 39)



**Fig. 5.** Russian-Soviet sound broadcasting station ZS-88 based on the armored personnel carrier

3. Helicopter sound broadcasting stations

3.1. Helicopter sound broadcasting station.

It is installed on multi-purpose helicopters (Fig. 6; 7) (on a special panel that is bolted to the floor of the cargo compartment). With the transitional equipment it can also be installed on the

vehicles and other equipment. Power capacity 2100–2700 Watts. The range of broadcasting, depending on the terrain and weather and climatic conditions is 3.2–4.8 km. The station is powered by helicopter onboard power supply. Broadcast from a microphone or audio cassette.



**Fig. 6.** Soviet sound broadcasting station placing in a helicopter



**Fig. 7.** American sound broadcasting station placing in a helicopter

It is important to note that the broadcasting on larger territory was carried out due to the portable sound broadcasting complexes, which, due to their size, could not be installed on military equipment or transferred with station personnel. Such complexes were used, for example, by South Korea for broadcasting on the territory of North Korea. (Shiukashvili, 2015: 113).

At a fundamentally new technical level is the following source of long distance sound broadcast equipment. This is a plane EC-130E Commando Solo (Fig. 8). In fact, it is a flying television tower; the aircraft is intended for conducting television and radio broadcasting in a combat zone. During the flight, which can last up to 12 hours, the aircraft tunes in to local frequencies, releases a towed antenna, and begins broadcasting propaganda materials to military units of the enemy, as well as to civilians. Moreover, the aircraft can also act as a receiver, receiving information via satellite communications. In addition, according to some data, the EC-130E Commando Solo can also work as a flying Wi-Fi router. These machines were actively used during all major military operations of the American army, since the 1980s.



**Fig. 8.** EC-130E Commando Solo plane

#### **4. Conclusion**

Summing up, it is important to note that there is an almost full range of sound equipment in the arsenal of the Armed Forces today, and it allows broadcasting at various distances from several hundred meters (portable complexes) up to 5 km (helicopter complexes). Broadcasting on an even greater territory is carried out with the help of special sound broadcasting stations, which, due to their size, cannot be placed on military equipment or transported by personnel.

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