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

Articles

Native Units in the Imperial Russian Army during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905

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Abstract

The paper explores why and how native units were mustered in the Imperial Russian Army during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 – 1905. One of the key directions of combat activities, led by the Russian Empire and Japan, where the Chinese population was widely engaged, was reconnaissance operations. Throughout the Russo-Japanese War, the adversary's reconnaissance service demonstrated achievements in the area, which were much more impressive than performance of the Russian service for a number of reasons. The Japanese had a significant advantage – their ethnic appearance was similar to that of the Chinese, and the benefit greatly facilitated the task of planting their agents, disguised as the Chinese, into the rear of the Russian army to collect information, as well as impersonating Chinese officers and commanding Honghuzi units operating in the rear of the Imperial Russian Army. As a consequence, to enhance the efficiency of the efforts of gathering intelligence directly in the theater of war, the Russian army command started forming native *sotnias* and detachments, as well as preparing an agent network consisting of the local Chinese and Mongolian population. The detachments and units were planned to carry out deep and close reconnaissance, including operations around the areas where Russian troops were positioned, deep reconnaissance in the enemy territory, in the rear of the Russian army and in Mongolia.

Keywords: Russo-Japanese War, China, Imperial Russian Army, foreign formations, native detachments and sotnias.

1. Introduction

In the early 20th century, the Imperial Russian Army significantly expanded the formation and combat use of foreign units, and the geography, along with traditional units and detachments, comprised totally new regions in the Far East, where the Russian troops had not had military and combat experience so far. For the first time in the Russian military history, units and detachments were mustered of the Chinese and Mongols.

The end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries brought about a fierce competition between the leading world powers to capture new spheres of influence. Seeking to extend the

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boundaries of its vital interest, the Russian Empire further continued its expansion in the Far East with a focus on China and Korea. On 27.03.1898, the Russian Empire and China concluded the "Convention for the Lease of the Liaotung Peninsula" that granted a twenty-five-year lease of the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula with the city of Port Arthur (Koz'menko, 1952: 309).

Port Arthur is a non-freezing port, and the fact had particular importance for the economic and military development of the entire region. Port Arthur became the base for the Pacific Squadron of the Imperial Russian Navy in the same year. The steps certainly had a negative impact on relations between Russia and Japan that in turn also considered China an area of its national interests. The deteriorated contradictions between the two countries on 27.01.1904 resulted in the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.

The events that took place in China in 1900 showed that the decision not to create native volunteer units and not to enlist the local population in the Imperial Russian Army proved to be a serious mistake. If cleverly used in combat operations, they could handle a wide range of combat missions behind enemy lines, collect intelligence, arrange sabotage activities, carry out militia functions in the rear of the Russian troops and generally bring substantial benefits to the Imperial Russian Army in the theater of war (RGVIA. F. VUA. Op. 16. D. 29090. Ch. II. L. 120)

The situation that developed at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 was not advantageous to Russia. The Russian Empire had no political allies (Suvorin, 1910: T. I. 83), was not prepared for war and eventually, suffered a crushing defeat from Japan. The defeat in the war was contributed by many factors, including inadequate decision-making by the military and political leadership of the Russian Empire regarding reconnaissance. The Japanese army was misjudged – prevailing opinion in the Russian Empire had it that Japan was unable to conduct fully-fledged military operations. Prior to the war, the size, condition, armament and combat effectiveness of the Japanese land and navy forces were significantly underestimated.

The Russian General Staff planned future military operations failing to thoroughly review lessons drawn from previous experiences in the war in China. As it was the case before, the high command of the Imperial Russian Army once again made a number of fatal errors. The Chinese theater of military operations was absolutely unknown to the Russian troops. The Imperial Russian Army had no meaningful experience of conducting military operations in the country, and the traditional methods of organizing comprehensive logistic support for the troops adopted in the Imperial Russian Army were ineffective here.

One of the crucial areas of military activity, where the Russian Empire and Japan widely used the Chinese population, was reconnaissance. Throughout the Russo-Japanese War, the adversary's reconnaissance service demonstrated achievements in the area, which were much more impressive than performance of the Russian service for a number of reasons. The Japanese had a significant advantage – their ethnic appearance was similar to that of the Chinese, and the benefit greatly facilitated the task of planting their agents, disguised as the Chinese, into the rear of the Russian army to collect information, as well as impersonating Chinese officers and commanding Honghuzi units operating in the rear of the Imperial Russian Army.

The Russian military leadership completely ignored the need to proactively build a network of locally recruited agents in China before the Russo-Japanese War broke out. As a result, the command of the Russian armies at the front was faced with a huge array of insoluble problems from the first days of the war. The traditionally closed nature of Chinese society misunderstood by representatives of European countries was one of the major barriers that blocked the efficient organization of military operations in the local theater, even against the Japanese army. This situation was further worsened by the fact that the Chinese population itself, in consequence of the events that had taken place in the country, had a very hostile attitude to any foreigners. Regarding the position taken by the country's population towards the subjects of the Russian Empire, although it had no signs of open belligerence, it was not particularly friendly at the same time. This explains why it was essential to win the Chinese population over to the side of the Russian Empire before the outbreak of hostilities and muster units and detachments of members of the local ethnic groups for the Imperial Russian Army. This would have given the Russian troops the necessary support in the upcoming operations and eliminated a number of serious issues, for example, the problem of collecting intelligence behind enemy lines, carrying out forward and flank reconnaissance as well as disrupting enemy reconnaissance activities. However, the command of the Imperial Russian Army again completely overlooked these undeniable facts in preparation for the war. The outcome was that the Imperial Russian Army almost lacked the intelligence after the war began – the information was fragmented, unreliable and poorly substantiated (RGVIA. F. VUA. Op. 16. D. 29090. Ch. I. 3. L. 50ob.).

To enhance the efficiency of the efforts of gathering intelligence directly in the theater of war, the Russian army initiated the formation of native *sotnias* (literally means "hundred", in this context refers to a military unit of about 100-150 persons) and detachments, as well as the preparation of an agent network consisting of the local Chinese and Mongolian population. The detachments and units were planned to carry out deep and close reconnaissance, including operations around the areas where Russian troops were positioned, deep reconnaissance in the enemy territory, in the rear of the Russian army and in Mongolia.

As military operations began, the command of the Imperial Russian Army admitted that it was instrumental and imperative to recruit former Honghuzi and Chinese militia and create native units and detachments. However, the attempt was not a success at the time, and the command managed to form only two native units operating in Colonel Aleksandr S. Madritov's detachments and in the Liao River detachment. The headcount in the units could vary from 20 to 50 people or more (RGVIA. F. 846. Op.16. D. 10294. Ch. I. L. 1). Later, the situation changed dramatically, and the number of local inhabitants willing to join the Imperial Russian Army massively increased. Throughout the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, native units and detachments were formed of the Chinese and Mongols on the front line as part of the Imperial Russian Army.

The main reason, which drove the Imperial Russian Army to engage the indigenous population to serve in its ranks during the war, muster native reconnaissance detachments and develop an agent network was a critical shortage of trained specialists with relevant language proficiency. The latter factor in turn complicated various reconnaissance activities by the own units of the Russian army. There were only 11 Russian Japanese interpreters and translators for the entire Imperial Russian Army operating in the Chinese theater of war. Speaking of Russian Chinese interpreters and translators, things looked brighter in this respect as the number was a little bigger, but still not sufficient to carry out productive reconnaissance activities. Furthermore, the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief had only two people at their disposal who were familiar with Mongolian and could write in the language. These were a student at the St. Petersburg Imperial University – V. Shaigin and a graduate from the Oriental Institute – Khionin. It should be emphasized that the shortage of specialists who knew Japanese and Chinese was especially desperate. Arranging intelligence and reconnaissance operations using the Chinese population was also extremely difficult because the number of Chinese-speaking officers was relatively small. Only the availability of officers fluent in Chinese and familiar with local customs could ensure the success of such operations (RGVIA. F. VUA. Op. 16. D. 29090. Ch. I. L. 31–33).

Fig. 1. V.A. Kosagovsky (1857–1918)

In the summer of 1904, the responsibility for the distant reconnaissance organization on the entire front line of the Manchurian Army was assigned to a Major General of the General Staff, V.A. Kosagovsky (1857–1918). Despite the fact that General Kosagovsky had very limited financial and human resources, he, nevertheless, managed to set up the work of digging up valuable information for the Russian military command located on the front line.

As soon as combat operation began, the efforts by the Russian distant reconnaissance service were expanded with the close reconnaissance activities. Its key component was clandestine reconnaissance missions performed by Chinese scout agents. However, initially, until the defeat of the Russian troops near Mukden in February 1905, close reconnaissance with the use of the Chinese population was only carried out near military encampments by the reconnaissance divisions of large unit staves of the Imperial Russian Army. It was not until the Mukden defeat that the reconnaissance department of the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Russian Army set up close reconnaissance missions involving scouts.

2. Materials and methods

2.1. The materials include documents of the Russian State Military History Archive (RGVIA), as well as studies on the history of the native Chinese and Mongolian detachments and units in the Imperial Russian Army during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

2.2. The methodological framework of the paper is based on fundamental methods of reviewing objective nature, system organization and dialectical relations of phenomena and a historical method as well as comparative analysis and synthesis, which enable a critical and analytical understanding of events and facts in the distant past. The foundation was also provided by maintaining a critical view of sources, drawing conclusions based on the analysis of the entire body of facts, as well as showing phenomena as they progressively emerged in the context of historical settings.

The validity and reliability of the study was achieved through the analysis of a large number of archival materials and literary sources, is ensured by the scientific methodology used, comprehensive nature of the study and a systematic approach and is confirmed by conclusions logically arranged in line with the goals and objectives set by the study.

The results of the study can be put into practice as part of academic programs at higher educational (military) institutions as well as used as reference and analytical materials by researchers.

3. Results

In the early 1905, there were up to 1,000 Chinese militiamen in the area where the 3rd army was concentrated, who wanted to join the Russian army. Previously mustered units additionally received up to 200 people.

Fig. 2. Ye.I. Martynov (1864–1937)

The commander of the 140th Zaraysky Regiment, General Yevgeny I. Martynov (1864–1937), was requested by a Chinese Colonel Wang Ham Hing (hereinafter all Chinese proper names, which have no established translations, are translated using the Palladius System and Hanyu Pinyin standards) to recruit 300 Chinese soldiers. General Nikolai Al. Ukhach-Ogorovich (1856–?) received several proposals from the Zhao Chong Ting brothers who offered to bring a 2,000-strong detachment of Chinese soldiers positioned in the Japanese area to be used by the Russian command. The Russian Consul in Tianjin was approached by a Chinese officer, Lia Kan Zhang, who proposed to recruit to the Imperial Russian Army 7,000 Chinese Honghuzi dissatisfied with their service in the Japanese army (RGVIA. F. VUA. Op.16. D. 29090. Ch. II. L. 118). Back in February 1905, before the Battle of Mukden, Major General Ukhach-Ogorovich manned native *sotnias* with the Chinese and Mongols for army logistics headquarters, Separate Border Guard Corps of Zaamursky District and the Staff of the 3rd Army. In the spring of 1905, native units of up to five hundred people were activated in the Russian front line armies (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. I. L. 1).

Fig. 3. N.M. Chichagov (1852–1910)

However, senior officers in the command of the Imperial Russian Army did not have a consistent approach or opinion on how Chinese volunteer units should be formed or used in combat operations together with the troops of the Russian armies. Many generals believed that the units would bring significant benefits in the fight against Japanese troops. The most prominent proponents of the view who took part in the Russo-Japanese War included General Nikolai A. Ukhach-Ogorovich, Lieutenant General Nikolai M. Chichagov (1852–1910), Head of the Zaamursky District and Separate Border Guard Corps, Mikhail A. Sokovnin (1863–1943), Chief Enlistment Officer of the Girin Province, Colonel of the General Staff, Colonel Mikhail F. Kvetsinsky (1866–1923), Mukden Chief Enlistment Officer, Colonel Aleksandr S. Madritov (1868–1916). There were, however, those who were very skeptical about the idea and objected to it.

Fig. 4. A.N. Kuropatkin (1848–1925)

In his telegram dated 09.06.1905 to the 3rd Army Staff, General Nikolai A. Stepanov reported that a 60-strong native detachment under command of Cornet Merklin had arrived at the location of his units to reinforce them, and the rest of the detachment had fled. Stepanov wrote that the presence of a militia detachment was undesirable in the location of his troops. He argued that the Chinese were very poor fighters, he assumed that the Chinese militia would take up robberies, because the detachment had not any equipment. To his mind, it was impossible to send them to the enemy's rear to carry out combat missions, because according to the report by the detachment commander, the militiamen could refuse to perform a mission or simply run away (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. I. L. 127).

Nevertheless, Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Russian Army, Adjutant General Aleksei N. Kuropatkin (1848–1925) defined uniform rules for the formation of volunteer units. The rules for native Chinese units, above all, specified the allowance of the same size for all Chinese troops (it was bigger than the one received by the Honghuzi in the Japanese army); volunteers were to form foot and horse *sotnias*; a single personnel organization was established for all units (Tables 1, 2).

Table 1. Organization of native horse sotnias

No.	Position	Quantity	Total
1	Russian officers	02 people	
2	Clerk	02 people	
3	Russian lower ranks	15 people	
4	Chinese volunteers	150 people	169 people

Table 2. Organization of native foot sotnias

No.	Position	Quantity	Total
1	Russian officers	02 people	
2	Clerk	02 people	
3	Russian lower ranks	25 people	
4	Chinese volunteers	250 people	279 people

Consistent and clearly visible insignia, distinguishing them from the Honghuzi, were introduced; these detachments were termed in the Imperial Russian Army as "native foot and horse sotnias". It was strictly forbidden to call the staff of the sotnias as Honghuzi, and every Chinese who joined the Russian army proudly called himself a Russian soldier, the name "Honghuzi" insulted them, all the more so, because many volunteers were soldiers of the Chinese army or militiamen and did not belong to the Honghuzi. After the native sotnias were established and staffed, they were assigned with strict numbers. The right to form native sotnias, determine their quantity and identify as part of a particular armed forces branch, as well as decide on their combat engagement, was granted to the commanders of the Russian armies on the front line (RGVIA. F. VUA. Op. 16. D. 29090. L. 119–119ob.); By order No. 760 dated 14.05.1905, issued by Viceroy in the Far East, Admiral Yevgeny I. Alekseiev (1843-1917), Commander-in-Chief of All Land and Naval Armed Forces, fighting against Japan, based on the memorandum No. 7252 dated 07.04.1905 by the Chief of Logistics of the Manchurian Army and pursuant to Article 34 of the Provisions on the Field Wartime Command of Troops, the command of the native five-hundred-strong detachment and native sotnias were formed (Tables 3, 4). The formation was carried out under the leadership of General Ivan P. Nadarov (1851–1922), Chief of Logistics of the Manchurian Army.

Table 3. Temporary organization of the command

No.	Position	Quantity	Pay
1	Sotnias officer in charge	1 person	Monthly pay as per rank/ Table allowance 100 rubles
2	Chief aide officer	1 person	Monthly pay as per rank/ Table allowance 25 rubles
3	Native aide officer	1 person	75 rubles/-
4	Translator	1 person	75 rubles/ -
5	Russian clerk	1 person	Pay as per position
6	Native clerk	1 person	75 rubles/ -

The state treasury also gave additional monthly allocations – 200 rubles to the sotnias officer in charge for hospitality expenses, 240 rubles for office supplies and one-time allocation of 200 rubles to purchase equipment for the Office of the Sotnias Officer in Charge. (RGVIA. F. VUA. Op. 16. D. 29090. Ch. II. L. 120–120ob.).

Table 4. Temporary organization of the mixed Russian and native sotnia

Combatant organization			
No.	Position	Quantity	Pay
1	Sotnia commander	1 person	Monthly pay as per rank/ horse provided by the state treasury
2	His assistant, native officer	1 person	monthly pay 100 rubles
3	Half-sotnia commanders, native officers	2 people	monthly pay 60 rubles
4	Total chief officers	4 people	
5	Platoon commanders, native non-commissioned officers	4 people	monthly pay 35 rubles
6	Section commanders	8 people	monthly pay 30 rubles
7	Russian sergeant (Rus. uriadnik)	1 person	Monthly pay as per position
8	Russian horse hunters	9 people	Monthly pay as per position
9	Native soldiers	96 people	monthly pay 25 rubles
10	Total	118 people	
11	Translator	1 person	monthly pay 75 rubles
12	Total ranks	119 people	

Fig. 5. I. P. Nadarov (1851–1922)

Order No. 940 by the Commander-in-Chief of All Land and Naval Armed Forces Operating Against Japan, dated 05.06.1905, acknowledged that it was expedient to form native and horse sotnias as part of the Imperial Russian Army. As a consequence, the commanders of the armies and the chief of logistics of the army were granted the right to muster sotnias. The same order also instructed to begin the formation immediately, and report on any new Chinese native foot and horse sotnias, formed in the Russian forces, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Russian Army, Adjutant General Kuropatkin, personally (RGVIA. F. VUA. Op. 16. D. 29090. Ch. II. L. 122). The Russian command formulated a special regulation on the formation of native foot and horse sotnias in the Russian armies, which determined the procedure for their organization, munitions, supplies, pays, allowances and uniforms.

Table 5. Temporary organization of the mixed Russian and native foot sotnia

Combatant organization			
No.	Position	Quantity	Pay
1	Sotnia commander	1 person	monthly pay 100 rubles/ horse provided by the state treasury
2	His assistant, native officer	1 person	monthly pay 100 Rubles / horse provided by the state treasury
3	Half-sotnia commanders, native officers	2 people	monthly pay 60 rubles
4	Total chief officers 04 people		
5	Platoon commanders, native non-commissioned officers	4 people	monthly pay 25 rubles
6	Section commanders	8 people	monthly pay 20 rubles
7	Russian sergeant (Rus. uriadnik)	1 person	Monthly pay as per position
8	Russian horse hunters	9 people	Monthly pay as per position
9	Native soldiers	159 people	monthly pay 75 rubles
10	Total	172 people	
Non-combatant organization			
1	Translator	1 person	monthly pay 75 rubles
2	Total ranks	173 people	

Regulation on the Formation, Upkeep and Operations of Native Troops:

"1. Foot and horse sotnias shall be formed by order of the commanders of the armies; the number of sotnias, as well as the decision on whether to form foot or horse sotnias, shall be left to the discretion of the commanders of the armies and the chief of logistics;

2. Chinese militiamen shall have the uniform of typical Chinese design. The militiamen shall use their own garments. For formal identification, each militiaman shall have an identity sign in the form of a Russian three-color flag with an inscription printed in Russian and Chinese on a white background;

3. Native horse lower ranks shall have their own horses;

4. The militiamen shall bring their own bladed weapons when they join the army; three-line rifles or Japanese rifles and cartridges shall be provided to them from the state treasury;

5. Each army shall keep its own numbering of sotnias. When forming sotnias, they shall refer to the tables of organization for foot and horse sotnias;

6. In case more than five sotnias are formed in the army, the commander of the army shall be entitled to unite the sotnias into a five-hundred-strong detachment, and in doing so they shall refer to the tables of organization in accordance with order No. 760" (RGVIA. F. VUA. Op. 16. D. 29090. Ch. II. L. 122v).

On 20.04.1905, as ordered by the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Russian Army, it was decided to create a Chinese guerrilla detachment under the general command of a Russian officer. To lead the detachment, the Ensign (Rus. praporshchik) of the 52nd Nezhinsky Dragoon Regiment of Separate Cavalry Brigade, Putyata, was appointed. Parallel to this, there was a process under way to form a special Department of the Quartermaster General of the 3rd Army, Adjutant General Mikhail V. Alekseiev (1857–1918) (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. I. L.21, 32, 37). By 01.05.1905, the first native Chinese detachment was formed of 50 people under the leadership of a Chinese commander, Jan Chung Chang.

The detachment was armed with Russian three-line rifles, and each militiaman was given 120 cartridges. This detachment was incorporated in the 2nd Army and was utilized by the army headquarters. In early May 1905, the detachment carried out reconnaissance of the area west of the Gangan and Zhenjaitun towns (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. I. L. 8). On 08.05.1915, following negotiations, a 50-strong Chinese Honghuzi detachment, headed by Chief Yi Ren, defected to the side of the Imperial Russian Army, and on 10.05.1905, a 100-strong detachment of another chief – Yi Gin – defected to the Russian side. As a result, the Department of the Quartermaster General had a militia detachment of 350 Chinese horsemen available for its missions. The detachment was divided into two units, and Cornet (Rus. khorunzhy) of the 1st Argunsky Cossack Regiment Merklin was appointed commander of one of them – a militia detachment of 150 horsemen. The second detachment, consisting of 200 Chinese horsemen, was commanded by Ensign of the 52nd Nezhinsky Dragoon Regiment Putyata. Both were appointed commanders of the native Chinese units by Order No. 1435 of the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Manchurian Army, dated 13.05.1905. Ensign Putyata's detachment also included 10 Cossacks of the Argunsky Regiment, who knew Mongolian and Chinese, and two volunteers (volnoopredelyayushchiysya – a conscript who voluntarily joined the army in return for enjoying a number of benefits during the service). Cornet Merklin's detachment was additionally manned with 05 Cossacks (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. I. L. 41, 52, 53–54).

Fig. 6. Ye.I. Alekseiev (1857–1918)

Militia chiefs were supposed to receive 60 rubles as a payment. The detachment commanders were granted the right to exclude, as appropriate, from the detachments those militiamen who for some reason were unfit for military service, as well as disarm them. Russian small firearms were considered a reward for Chinese militiamen, which they were to earn on the battlefield. Weapons and ammunition for the newly forming detachments were delivered from various units of the Imperial Russian Army on the front line. Later, to set up ties and communication with the local population and send scouts, Cornet Merklin's detachment recruited 80 Mongols, who were more reliable fighters than the Chinese.

On 12.05.1905, a militia chief, living in the Liaoyangwo area, suggested mustering and bringing a Chinese detachment of 500 horse fighters and 500 infantrymen to the army headquarters to mount joint military operations against the Japanese. Of the 1,000 people, only 100 were armed with German guns, while the rest had outdated Chinese guns. They offered their services on the condition that each militiaman would be paid 30 rubles. (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. I. L.40–40ob.) The urge of the Chinese to conduct joint operations against the Japanese army was propelled by the fact that the entire population in the region was exasperated over the Japanese repressions against local inhabitants. On 01.06.1905, Rao Lang Ting, who served in the Russian army, was approached by Chenshua, the commander of a Honghuzi detachment, consisting of 250 Chinese who served in the Japanese army, with a proposal to join his detachment to the Russian army. Rao Lang Ting offered him terms for the defection – to prove his loyalty and commitment to the Russian command, the Honghuzi commander had to leave 50 people hostage from his detachment, take the rest and penetrate the rear of the Japanese army to capture 5 or 6 Japanese. Commander Chenshua agreed to the terms (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. I. L. 289).

After the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces issued the order on 04.06.1905 to start forming native foot and horse sotnias, Ukhach-Ogorovich formed 06.06.1905 a detachment of Chinese militiamen, consisting of 500 people. The detachment was led by Cornet of the 2nd Argunsky Cossack Regiment Guda A. Gudiev. The detachment was formed and was stationed in the Kuanchendzakh town. By order of the General Quartermaster of the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, the detachment was handed over to the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Manchurian Army. The army logistics headquarters also controlled a detachment of volunteers including: – 28 Russians; – 17 Chinese and sotnia of the 3rd Verkhneudinsky Regiment. The detachment's objectives were reconnaissance missions in its area of responsibility (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. I. L. 100, 201). On 23.06.1905, the Sub-lieutenant (Rus. podporuchik) of the 160th Abkhazsky Infantry Regiment, Prince Elizbark A. Eristov, was appointed commander of another native sotnia formed in the 3rd Army. Later, Prince Eristov was ordered to hand over command of the sotnia to Ensign Putyata. On 25.06.1905, Cornet Aleksey P. Baksheev of the Argunsky

Regiment was assigned to take command of the next formed Chinese sotnia (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. I. L. 313, 325, 394).

Native sotnias were formed based on the model of Chinese troops. As of 13.06.1905, the first native horse sotnia of the 3rd Army was consisted of four isos: first iso – 24 people; second iso – 24 people; third iso – 24 people; fourth iso – 24 people. One iso included three Chinese non-commissioned officers (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. II. L. 595-598). Chinese half-sotnias (50 people) were also formed in the Russian army. The structure of an individual half-sotnia of the mounted militia detachment of the 3rd Army had two isos: the first one – 26 people; the second one – 27 people. The half-sotnia also included one translator and two Chinese non-commissioned officers in each iso (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. II. L. 598-599).

In April 1905, the 3d Army had six sotnias of native militia at its disposal. Of these, as of 26.04.1905, the 1st and 3rd sotnias were included in the horse detachment under General Stepanov, who carried out reconnaissance in Mongolia, the 2nd sotnia was used at the headquarters of the 3rd Army, and the 6th one was seconded to the headquarters of the 5th Siberian Corps. The 4th and 5th sotnias of Chinese militia were stationed in the Yushintai town (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. I. L. 5, 20). To mount operations in Mongolia, the headquarters of the logistics and border guard recruited the native sotnias that consisted entirely of Mongols living in the region (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. I. L. 29ob.)

Native foot and horse Chinese sotnias of the 3rd Army were distributed among the regiments of the Russian armies. The Mongol sotnias were assigned among dragoon cavalry regiments. On 28.08.1905, due to the end of the Russo-Japanese War, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army signed an order to disband all native foot and horse sotnias and detachments. According to the order, native sotnias should be disbanded no later than 01.09.1905, government-furnished weapons collected, and weapon loss certificates drawn up (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. II. L. 622-625).

Along with the Chinese units, the command of the Imperial Russian Army assigned high priority to detachments formed of Mongols, since the Russian Empire urgently needed to enlist sympathies of the Mongolian elite. The primary reason was the desire to protect the Russian troops from the Japanese and Honghuzi attacking from areas in Mongolia, which had borders with the Chinese theater of war. In particular, near the Dzian Jia settlement, the protection was provided by a well-armed 900-strong detachment of the Mongolian militia, equipped with German guns. According to the army leadership, winning the detachment to the Russian side would enable the Russian troops in the area to arrange army logistics bases, and this would significantly assist to materiel supplies for all the troops of the Imperial Russian Army (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. I. L. 9–11). To conduct reconnaissance in the Mongolian territory, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army authorized to form patrols and squads from the Chinese Honghuzi, which should include the lower ranks of the Russian army and be under the general command of Russian officers. One of such detachments was staffed with servicemen of the 1st Argunsky Cossack Regiment on 24.04.1905. The unit included personnel of the regiment who could speak Chinese or Mongolian (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. I. L. 3).

4. Conclusion

It is impossible to provide an unambiguous review of the combat use of native units and detachments in the Imperial Russian Army during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, but, in my opinion, the experience can be considered successful. Within a short timeframe, each Russian army managed to form the required number of detachments and units to carry out various combat missions assigned to them. On the other hand, quantity did not necessarily imply quality. The rush, in which the Chinese native units were mustered, resulted in recruiting former bandits, who, despite being in the Russian service, continued to plunder the local population. As can be seen from the telegram of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Russian Army to the Commander of the 3rd Army, the short-term practice of forming militia from local inhabitants under random commanders failed to yield any beneficial results, and only provoked complaints about the militia from the local population. In light of this, the Commander-in-Chief thought that further activities to form militia were highly undesirable, but at the same time, the commanders of the armies on the Russian-Japanese front line were given the right to decide independently on the usefulness of militia units for a certain army. All consequences and responsibility for the actions of the militia in the army were further placed on its commander (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. II. L. 486). As a result, the sotnias were dissolved, and perpetrators brought to justice.

Scant supplies for native units also pushed them to committing robberies. However, for the most part, the presence of native detachments on the front line helped the Imperial Russian Army tackle many problems that it faced throughout the Russo-Japanese War. They, above of all, were key to organizing reconnaissance in the line of operations of the Russian forces and in the enemy's rear as well as in providing logistical support and protection to the rear of the Imperial Russian Army, which was equally important. The native units, among other things, prevented activities of guerilla detachments, mounted sabotage missions on the Chinese railway and ensured the security of the army logistical facilities, warehouses and rear bases.

More order was maintained in the native detachment of the rear logistics headquarters, and especially in the Pintui guerilla detachment to which an officer of the field troops, familiar with the life and language of the Chinese, was seconded. Thanks to the vigor and personal influence of its commander, Colonel of the Chinese army Zhen Zhang Yuan, strict order and iron discipline were imposed in the detachment; the unit in a short period succeeded in bringing a clear positive benefits to the Russian troops by smashing the Honghuzi gangs in the area and establishing the communication of one of the vanguards of General Rennenkampf (1854–1918) with the Hailongcheng village (RGVIA. F. VUA. D. 29090. Op.16. Ch. I. L 29).

The command of the Imperial Russian Army did it best to stop illegal activities of the Chinese militia against the local population. For example, first news that the Chinese militia detachment of Ensign Putyata robbed the local population were received on 31.05.1905. On 01.06.1905, Chief Quartermaster, Major General M.V. Alekseiev sent a military investigator to the detachment to clarify all the circumstances of the case and conduct an inquiry; a preliminary investigation was initiated on 02.06.1905.

The investigation carried out by Sub-lieutenant Novikov, a representative of the war commissary, confirmed the available information. It was found out that when the 1st native detachment of the 3rd Army of Ensign Putyata was formed, Honghuzi from the Sihai, Chan, Taijuer and Chongzier gangs were recruited and continued their criminal pursuits during their service in the detachment (RGVIA. F. VUA. D. 29090. Op. 16. Ch. I. L. 24–238). Militiamen of Cornet Merklin's detachment, who robbed the Chandiopa village, were arrested and escorted to the army headquarters (RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. II. L. 321).

On 19.06.1905, a strict procedure was defined for the combat use of Chinese militiamen as it was done for the border guard troops to prevent robberies of local inhabitants. With the introduced measures, no complaints were received by the border guard command from the local population about the personnel of the native militia units. To achieve this, the Imperial Russian Army took the following steps: native troops were assigned to the Russian cavalry to mount joint reconnaissance operations, serve as guides, etc.; native units were seconded to the vanguards of the Russian troops; the presence of the native sotnias in the rear of the Russian armies was unacceptable and was not allowed (RGVIA. F.846. Op. 16. D. 10294. Ch. II. L. 327–327ob.)

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

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Soviet Anti-US Visual Propaganda during the Khrushchev Thaw (1953–1964) (Based on Materials from Krokodil Magazine)

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Abstract

This paper explores some of the key themes of Soviet anti-US visual propaganda in Krokodil, a satirical literary-artistic magazine. The author examines some of the key ways of disseminating this type of Soviet propaganda. The paper explores its manifestations across the physical, information, and virtual domains. The work reveals that Soviet propaganda used to be a tool for building the “right” model of the world by way of contrasting heroics with anti-heroics in Soviet-American relations. These relations were interpreted in Soviet visual propaganda both as an international conflict and as an antagonism between the socio-political conditions that the USSR and the US were in during the Cold War.

It is suggested that this visual propaganda, which concurrently influenced the cognitive, emotional-volitional, and communicative subsystems of the human mind, was aimed at building the picture of a world in which a happy citizen lives in a just state. An attempt is made to prove that at the time this type of propaganda performed an ideological function and was a key means of conducting ideological work in the USSR as part of its clash with world imperialism and capitalism.

Keywords: propaganda, visual propaganda, ideology, mass consciousness, political caricature.

1. Introduction

At different times, the USSR was home to a number of satirical magazines whose title included the term ‘krokodil’ [‘crocodile’] – over 10 different items. In addition to Krokodil proper, there were regional periodical publications such as Krokodil na Zapadnoi Ukraine [Crocodile in Western Ukraine], Bashkirskii Krokodil [Bashkir Crocodile], Rizhskii Krokodil [Riga Crocodile], Krokodil Luganskii [Lugansk Crocodile], as well as Bezbozhnyi Krokodil [Godless Crocodile], Krasnoarmeiskii Krokodil [Red Army Crocodile], Voennyi Krokodil [Military Crocodile], Gazeta Krokodila [Crocodile’s Gazette], Komsomol'skii Krokodil [Komsomol Crocodile], and a few others.

Krokodil magazine was founded in 1922. It was published three times a month. Over time, it became the USSR’s largest satirical periodical publication. During the period under review, the magazine had an impressive circulation. If in 1953 it was 350,000–400,000, in 1964 it was now 2,000,000. Consider here the fact that each year 36 issues of the magazine were published. By the end of the Khrushchev era, the magazine had a monthly circulation of 6,000,000 copies, and its yearly circulation was 72,000,000 copies. The magazine was to “be a weapon of satire, expose the flaws of the Soviet everyday, react to hot-button international issues, and criticize the

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West's bourgeois culture, with a focus on deriding its ideological worthlessness and degeneracy" (Stykalin, Kremenskaya, 1963: 176-212).

Krokodil remained the Soviet Union's most long-lived and influential periodical publication used for state-sanctioned satire for over 70 years. It outlived the USSR. Due to financial difficulties, the magazine ceased publication in 2000. Between 2001 and 2004, thanks to the effort of a group of activists, Novyi Krokodil [New Crocodile] was published. However, unable to reach a mass readership, the magazine failed to cash in on its former fame and stopped its presses for good in 2008.

2. Materials and methods

In exploring the characteristics of Soviet visual propaganda, the author analyzed the content of 432 issues of Krokodil magazine, published from 1953 to 1964, a combined 6,912 pages, as well as a few hundred caricatures devoted to issues of international politics and the international status of the USSR during the Khrushchev Thaw.

The study was conducted based on principles of systemicity and historicism. The author employed the following methods: analysis of visual sources, interpretation, generalization, intent analysis, and content analysis. The use of these methods helped examine Soviet visual propaganda in its dynamic development and analyze the picture of a world for Soviet citizens that it was building.

3. Discussion

The study of propaganda is essential in understanding history and mentality. This research seems increasingly relevant today amid changes in the forms and mechanisms of propaganda due to the development of the Internet, social networks, and new types of media. Yet, many of the visual forms and ways of manipulating mass consciousness that used to be employed in the past appear to be no less efficient today.

Issues of propaganda have found reflection in the pages of numerous scholarly works focused on the study of general principles and mechanisms of propaganda (Bernays, 2004; Pochepczov, 2018; Pochepczov, 2019; White, 1980 i dr.) and its particular applied aspects alike (Podmariczy`n, 2013; Luchshev, 2016; Mamedova, 2013; Klinova, Trofimov, 2017; Soldak, 2017 i dr.). Worthy of separate mention is the pool of research devoted to Soviet visual propaganda specifically (Fedosov, 2018) – particularly, the use of political caricatures (Chervyakov, 2019; Etty, 2016; Etty, 2019).

It is worth noting that Soviet anti-US visual propaganda and political caricatures in Soviet satirical magazines, namely Krokodil, remains a little-researched subject. For the most part, you will come across several isolated works that are devoted to visual propaganda. There remains a paucity of research devoted to the analysis of propaganda materials in Krokodil magazine.

E. Bernays was one of the first to propound a method for shaping and manipulating public opinion and mass consciousness – the so-called "engineering of consent". The scholar defines propaganda as multidirectional management of collective consciousness and organized manipulation of public opinion (Bernays, 2004).

According to S. White, the history of the USSR cannot be explored without conceptualizing ideology and propaganda as two of the key pillars of the Soviet political regime. The scholar notes the determining role of propaganda in shaping the political mass consciousness of the Soviet people, which acquired particular new characteristics at different stages in the development of the Soviet state (White, 1980).

A broad spectrum of issues on the history and theory of propaganda have been reflected in Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present. The authors suggest that propaganda is characterized by a continually expanding nature – as the product of an agitator whose target audience is a certain mass of people, as manipulative actions by a shadow government, as a means of influencing people's consciousness, etc. (Cull et al., 2003).

A joint work under the editorship of G. Rawnsley, Cold-War Propaganda in the 1950s, examines issues of the origins, organization, and methods of British, American, and Soviet propaganda in the 1950s. The book analyzes some of the major international and domestic aspects of propaganda that determined the general contours of the development of the Cold War and some of the key propaganda practices employed in that period (Rawnsley, 1999).

Worthy of separate mention is the pool of research that reflects some of the key applied aspects of propaganda. To be specific, the mechanisms underpinning the special way the October Revolution was presented in the pages of Krokodil magazine during the period 1920–1930s have been explored by scholars M. Klinova and A. Trofimov. The authors have analyzed the event in the following three conceptual planes: solemn, comparative, and pragmatic. The event appears to have been exploited to construct a set of new symbols and to build into mass consciousness the "right" interpretations of what happened during that period (Klinova, Trofimov, 2017).

Scholar E. Luchshev has explored the emergence and development of the system of atheist education, analyzed some of the key forms, methods, and characteristics of the ideological struggle against religion in the period 1917–1941, and investigated the ideology of mass atheism in the USSR (Luchshev, 2016).

The development of new forms of Soviet scientific-atheist propaganda using administrative-forcible methods has been explored by scholar A. Podmaritsyn (Podmariczy`n, 2013).

The characteristics of Soviet propaganda in relation to children, including the issue of cultivating in them a relevant attitude toward Soviet power, have been examined by K. Soldak (Soldak, 2017).

J. Etty, who has investigated Soviet political satire in Krokodil in the period 1954–1964, notes that subsequent to Joseph Stalin's death the magazine received a new lease of life thanks to reduced censorship and improved economic well-being in the USSR (Etty, 2019). The scholar has also attempted to gain an insight into the nature of political satire in the magazine. He has investigated processes related to the production and consumption of the magazine's content. By way of transmedia theory, the scholar has discussed the influence of the reader on the development of the magazine's topics. He has also investigated the performative power of political satire in the magazine's pages (Etty, 2016).

A. Mamedova has explored the language of Soviet visual propaganda, particularly the use of various signs and symbols in covering hot-button international and domestic topics (Mamedova, 2013).

E. Fedosov suggests that "with the commencement of the Cold War Soviet propaganda had a continual orientation toward the foreign world", and by the end of the 1950s it reached a global scale, when international events came to be viewed through the prism of propaganda activity, with a focus on the creation of caricature images of the USSR's ideological allies and opponents (Fedosov, 2013). The scholar views Soviet propaganda as a sociocultural phenomenon that served as one of the ways to shape Soviet identity (Fedosov, 2018).

4. Results

Before moving on to examine the actual object of this study, it will be worth analyzing the characteristics of Soviet propaganda proper, which could well be viewed as a "weapon of mass destruction" open to a diversity of uses. A medium with a long history, Soviet propaganda was designed to shape the state's past, present, and future across the physical, information, and virtual domains. It was capable of bringing some individuals to the level of sacred figures – whilst, at the same time, it could altogether erase others from historical memory or easily ascribe to them the qualities of an enemy, or "them".

Soviet propaganda manipulated concepts and images in the virtual domain to create a more "correct" and "just" model of "our" world. Furthermore, it extended its reach and influence into the physical and information domains, with a focus on thwarting the spread of narratives with a different interpretation of Soviet reality.

The determining role of propaganda within the physical domain was manifested in the renaming of streets and setting up of monuments that carried certain symbolic significations. This is known as static symbolization. Parades, demonstrations, flower-laying ceremonies, and other rituals were employed as dynamic symbolization.

The information domain was controlled via the institution of censorship, and the actual system of propaganda was implemented through print publications with multi-million circulations.

In organizing the virtual domain, there was a focus on building a system of knowledge with the "right" interpretation of Soviet reality – creating a virtual product based on what the state's ideological system required.

This way to control propaganda, which held for all the three domains, characterized it as total and indispensable to the existence of the Soviet state. Soviet propaganda permeated all spheres of life in Soviet society, with a focus on creating a universal narrative and discourses clearly defined by the state. The key forms and ways of spreading Soviet propaganda included the following:

1) Schools and youth organizations, which were to construct a relevant picture of the world and shape behavioral patterns for the nation's future generations (e.g., Yunye Oktyabryata (Little Octobrists), Yunye Pionery (Young Pioneers), and Komsomol).

2) Radio, with a focus on reaching the illiterate portion of the population.

3) Posters, with a focus on the use of simple drawings designed to trigger relevant emotional reactions.

4) Cinema. The Soviet government employed propaganda films to influence and inspire the population. For citizens who for some reason were unable to enjoy the opportunity to watch films at a movie theater, news-films were shown on the walls of subway stations, agit-trains, etc. Propaganda trains were outfitted with a printing press, a mobile movie theater, and a radio receiving set and had an agitational speaker onboard employed to inform, entertain, and influence the masses.

5) Public lectures, as a way to inform Soviet citizens on major news, talk to them about the importance of the right habits of living, etc.

6) Art. During the Soviet period, popular propaganda images relied upon heroic socialist realism and were focused on the Soviet ideals of vitality, health, happiness, industrialization, work success, etc.

7) Print publications, like newspapers, magazines, and books. Subsequent to the Revolution of 1917, all libraries in the country were "cleaned up", all deviant writers and scholars were deported, and all nationalized printeries and publishing houses were placed under censorship. Censorship of books was not as strict as that of newspapers or magazines, which did not, however, prevent a significant portion of the material from being either edited or destroyed altogether.

8) Agitprop theatre, which involved the use of simple onstage plays with characters who personified good and evil, designed to awaken in one emotions and feelings of support for the Soviet government or/and those of animosity toward the enemy.

9) Mass demonstrations, designed to reinforce, directly or indirectly, popular support for the government.

Thus, Soviet propaganda was quite a powerful tool for constructing the "right" model of the world that relied upon tried-and-true mechanisms for the control of mass consciousness. It was characterized by the same narratives being repeated as often as possible and circulated as wide as possible, with a focus on translating them into a soft form, like art, literature, movies, and leisure, with a view to evoking in one the right emotions.

Soviet propaganda was monological and did not tolerate dissent. Of no less importance in this context was the role of censorship and security agencies, which sought to combat discourses that were alternative to the official one and clamp down on carriers thereof, believed to produce "wrong" information flows. It follows from the above that Soviet propaganda, just like propaganda in any other country, was creating a sort of memes and information viruses of its own that were to be spread by their carriers as fast as possible across the information and virtual domains, shaping, thereby, the structure of the physical domain.

In the context of Soviet propaganda, worthy of special mention is the fact that the victory of the visual over the verbal occurred long before the advent of the Internet, social networks, and new media. Back in the Middle Ages, use was made of the idea of Pictura Quasi Scriptura, which suggested that images can be read as text and the actual perception of images was often determined by the verb 'read'. The visual is more ancient than the verbal. It is graphic and does not require expression through words. The visual is positioned with the recipient of information, and the dialogical verbal – with its source. Soviet propaganda made effective use of both visual and verbal communication.

An analysis of materials from Krokodil magazine indicates quite a simple logic behind the construction of its narratives. Indeed, the more mass a product, the simpler it must be. One of the most powerful means of influence at the time was satire, specifically the genre of caricatures. Without question, Krokodil magazine, which simultaneously was a satirical and ideological periodical publication, sought to reflect the general line of policy pursued by the Soviet government. It served as a propaganda mouthpiece for the entire Union.

As a means of visual propaganda, caricatures were employed to simultaneously influence the cognitive (perception, thinking, and memory), emotional-volitional, and communicative subsystems of the human mind. For their influence to be effective, caricatures were to be in line with the following standards on delivery and evoking:

1) being a mass form of visual art intended to perform a set of clearly predefined utilitarian social functions;

2) being a carrier of fast-track information, with a focus on having the main idea expressed in a simple, clear, and unequivocal manner to avoid a plurality of interpretations;

Fig. 1. Seeing eye-to-eye. The heyday of McCarthyism

3) the effect on the recipient lasting for a limited amount of time, which implies limits on imagery, style of execution, and emotionality;

Fig. 2. This caricature depicts the realities of American-Korean relations in the 1950–60s, when subsequent to the Korean War the US focused on containing the "Chinese threat", which involved creating in the region joint security systems with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. The Taiwan issue was a particular bugbear in American-Taiwanese relations and was a factor in them worsening

4) facilitating a more efficient perception of the gist of a caricature through reducing the depth of space, minimizing the number of planes (limiting it to no more than two), using local colors, keeping the contours plain and sharp, and employing color contrast with a sharp transition boundary;

Fig. 3. The American plan for unifying Germany… It is sewn with white threads

5) employing conceptual contrast through the use of opposites (e.g., giants versus dwarfs, grotesque, and allegories).



Fig. 4. "This is the only place where I can still appear". The members of the U.S. HUAC have subjected Paul Robeson to a humiliating interrogation. They have forbidden the famous singer to make appearances outside U.S. borders

Caricatures in Soviet visual propaganda were, thus, performing the following two key functions: (1) communicating something to the audience and (2) influencing it through mechanisms of clarity and expressiveness. A characteristic of Soviet anti-US visual propaganda was the use of the "us", "others" (the USSR's allies and confederates), and "them" (in the more complex cultural-semiotic domain) narrative. It is the image of the opposing "them" that was most effective in uniting the people in their sacred opposition to Evil.

Of interest is the fact that, while the USSR's confrontation with the West, represented by the US, was covered by Soviet propaganda within the framework of the military-political rivalry between the two countries, in the broader context it was interpreted as a rivalry between socialism and capitalism. To this end, the following two methods were employed: (1) the use of symbolically generalized caricatures to portray the US stereotypically (e.g., Uncle Sam, the dollar, the Congress, etc.); (2) a focus on differences in social class relations (e.g., depicting the enemy ("them") as a bourgeois wearing a top hat and a tuxedo or a cocky heavily armed military person).

In this context, the following models of the enemy ("them") and formats of their perception in mass consciousness were employed:

1) the mythological model: in terms of the "us" and "them" narrative, there is the Hero and there is the Anti-Hero; anything that is characteristic of "us" is not characteristic of "them" and vice versa;

2) the totalitarian-religious model: in terms of the “us” and “them” narrative, “them” must strictly be regarded as the enemy and will always possess the qualities of an enemy;

3) the philosophical model: in terms of the “us” and “them” narrative, there is “me” and there is “others”.

It follows from the above that in the period under review Soviet visual propaganda in Krokodil magazine portrayed the US and its allies as the enemy mainly using the terms and images of the totalitarian-religious model. In doing so, it demonstrably demonized them, imputing to them, and absolutizing, qualities such as aggression, anti-humanism, greed, money-grubbing, manipulation, etc., i.e. the qualities that were not typical of “us”. There was the Hero (the USSR) and the Anti-Hero (the US), i.e. the ontological nature of good was contrasted with that of evil (global imperialism, capitalism, chauvinism, and bourgeois dictatorship).



Fig. 5-8. Soviet propaganda portrayed the US and its allies as an aggressive adverse bloc. Moreover, the latter were portrayed as an incarnation of metaphysical evil, whilst the USSR was depicted as an incarnation of metaphysical good. Evil, naturally, must be punished and destroyed, so that was the message communicated to the regular Soviet citizen through propaganda. Despite the détente in foreign relations, messages of this kind continued to be disseminated (even though their volume decreased and they were a lot less radical in conception), with the US remaining to be the USSR’s enemy number one

Legal proceedings in the US:
- Are all these guys witnesses? Which case is it?
- It's up to you, sir.



The police are cracking down on African Americans who boycott the public transportation system of the city of Montgomery (Alabama, USA) as a token of protest against racial discrimination.



Forbid it? Are you a Communist?
Don't you know that America is a country of freedom?

Fig. 9-12. Generally, Soviet propaganda in the pages of Krokodil magazine reacted with political satire to any major international event. It sought to vilify the realities of American society, often focusing on specific aspects thereof, like increased red tape, the social status of workers, racism and racial segregation, the civil rights movement, McCarthyism, colonialism, etc.

Another important aspect of the activity of Krokodil magazine was to provide ideological satirical interpretations of the international political situation, with a focus on denouncing the "predatory plans" of the US and its allies. Of particular interest is the fact that Soviet propaganda tended to portray the US's allies as mere puppets subordinate to the will of the US, with which they were bound by onerous agreements and contracts. Krokodil characterized this policy as "predatory" in relation to both America's allies and other nations potentially within its ambit of influence (e.g., the member states of NATO, those of SEATO, etc.).

Fig. 13. The true face of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

Fig. 14. Under pressure from the US, NATO countries are upping their military spending by $1.5 billion. These funds will be used to purchase weapons from the US

No less trenchant was the way Soviet propaganda reacted to a series of headline-making international events in the Khrushchev Thaw period. Specifically, the magazine shared a vision of the causes behind the Suez crisis and the participation in it of the "imperialist war dogs". Krokodil's reaction to this conflict was quite trenchant, with the magazine obviously siding with Egypt and directing satire at the plans of France and Great Britain, the US's allies, to "tame" Egypt.



Fig. 15. A change of flag over the Suez Canal

Fig. 16. Egypt's sovereignty. Can't contain it

Built in 1869, the Suez Canal provides a crucial shortcut from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean. Its construction was funded by the governments of France and Egypt. As early as 1875, a financial crisis forced the Egyptians sell a large portion of their share in the canal. Consequently, the Suez Canal was controlled by France and Great Britain over the following 87 years. In 1956, Egyptian President G. Nasser initiated the collection of funds for constructing the Aswan Dam. He resolved to nationalize the canal, which would lead to an armed conflict.

The British and French governments were bound by appropriate agreements with Egypt. A key aspect of the reform agenda was modernizing and rearming the Egyptian army. The Egyptian president requested that Great Britain and the US sell Egypt some weapons. However, back in 1950, the US, Great Britain, and France had signed a tripartite agreement (the Tripartite Declaration of 1950) that restricted the sale of weapons to the countries of the Middle East. Egypt was allowed to purchase weapons only if it joined the Baghdad Pact, designed to create a strategic security belt along the USSR's borders to contain its expansion to the Middle East. These conditions did not suit G. Nasser, so all his attempts to acquire weapons from the US or Great Britain failed. Then, the Egyptian president turned to the USSR for weapons.

No less categorical was Krokodil's treatment of the events related to the West Berlin issue (the Berlin Crisis of 1961).

Fig. 17. The caricature

Subsequent to the end of World War II, Germany was split by the allies into two states – the Federal Republic of Germany, which was to be controlled by the USSR's anti-Hitler coalition allies, and the German Democratic Republic, which was to be run by the USSR. The same was done to the city of Berlin – West Berlin came under the jurisdiction of the US, Great Britain, and France (the Trizone), and East Berlin was placed under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union. Despite withdrawing its troops from the city in 1958, the USSR de facto continued to control the area. The USSR demanded that the allies do the same. The two camps never reached an agreement on this, with West Berlin remaining occupied by US, British, and French troops.

In response to that, the USSR intended to provide the East German government with control over access to the city and enter with it into a separate peace treaty. The US and France were against this. The USSR urged the East German government to boost control over the border between East Berlin and West Berlin, which eventually led to the building of the Berlin Wall. The US government responded by deploying troops along the wall, and the USSR suspended the demobilization of its troops in the region. The status of West Berlin continued to be a stumbling block in relations between the USSR and the countries of the West. Eventually, N. Khrushchev suggested calling a conference of the Four Great Powers with a view to reconsidering the status of West Berlin and turning it into a demilitarized free city.

The failed US-directed Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis, which followed it, were covered in the magazine's pages as well.



Fig. 18. In the fashionable resort city of Miami, 80,000 US-backed Cuban counterrevolutionaries and professional thugs are getting ready to invade Cuba

Fig. 19. Fidel Castro's visit to Moscow (1963)

The continual expansion of NATO and the US's deployment in Turkey in 1961 of medium range missiles, a direct threat to the military-industrial hubs of the USSR, which at the time did not have the technical capability to defend itself against this type of weapons, led the Soviet government to undertake the deployment of ground-launched ballistic and tactical missiles in Cuba, where there had just failed a US-initiated military operation against Fidel Castro's government. This would lead to a major crisis in US-USSR relations, with the world finding itself on the brink of World War III. The two powerhouses would eventually manage to avoid war thanks to the prudence and the political will and resolve of their leaders.

That is just a portion of the huge pool of anti-US propaganda in the USSR. Obviously, the spectrum of events in the US and across the West was quite broad, with most of those drawing a trenchant satirical reaction in the pages of Krokodil magazine.

It is worth noting that the US was not the only object of derision in the magazine's pages – propaganda was aimed at its allies, a second-order enemy, too. Labels with negative connotations were put on capitalists, colonialists, reactionaries, members of the church, etc. Now and then, Soviet propaganda resorted to the images of fascization – mainly, in relation to the powers-that-be in West Germany. The use of fascist symbols in Soviet visual propaganda served to amplify the negative characteristics of the West German political elite.

Fig. 20. Under the pretext of aid, American monopolists are foisting weapons on Western European nations on onerous terms

5. Conclusion

Propaganda was an indispensable part of the Soviet agenda – it helped respond to any hot-button issues, providing simple, easy-to-perceive, and easy-to-digest answers. Propaganda was a mandatory part of the life of a Soviet citizen but by no means complemented it. It built the picture of a world in which a happy citizen lived in a just state, contrasting it with the decaying West, with all its both real and made-up flaws. Propaganda was used to build a universal truth and adopt it in lieu of a pluralism of truths. In this role, propaganda performed an ideological function, serving as a key means of conducting ideological work in the USSR. Ideology and propaganda, as a practical form of spreading ideology, found specific expression in the worldviews, ideals, public images, stereotypes, and identity of Soviet people.

What is undoubted is the fact that Soviet propaganda was powerful, which is attested by the various propaganda mechanisms, methods, and narratives employed at the time. In essence, Soviet propaganda was monological and did not tolerate dissent. It was backed by all social and government institutions, including in the areas of literature, education, the arts, etc. Key characteristics of propaganda at the time were frequent repetition and increased replicability.

In large part, Soviet propaganda was based on the hero-antihero model. This model was employed in both peace and war contexts and was used to heroize workers and soldiers alike. According to Krokodil, man's core values were peace, work, and internationalism, which it contrasted with guile, greed, hypocrisy, etc. – that is, the qualities typical of the capitalist, colonialist, and reactionary.

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

Russian Propaganda during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905

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Abstract

This paper addresses issues related to Russian government propaganda during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. The work analyzes the key reasons behind and the essence of the related ideological "warfare" and explores the effect the propaganda had on domestic political affairs in the Russian Empire during the First Russian Revolution (1905–1907). The paper describes some of the key forms and methods of ideological warfare used during the period, the "target audience", and some of the more prominent and effective propaganda "artifacts". The author provides insight into the efficiency of the propaganda campaign as a whole, the key effects it produced, its influence on the progress of the war, and some of the subsequent use of propaganda by the Russian government.

Keywords: propaganda, Russian propaganda, Russo-Japanese War, First Russian Revolution, Russian Navy, Russo-Japanese War battles.

1. Introduction

From the earliest times, humans have been aware of the incontestable fact that the morale of both a state's army and workforce is highly dependent on the ability to organize the government's ideological work in a proper way. Military history offers numerous examples of effective propaganda helping win a war, most importantly one of "attrition". Ancient Egyptians wholeheartedly believed in the impeccability and divine power of their pharaohs, someone who would lead their soldiers to victory at the expense of their lives, given for the benefit of the ruler and the state (in his position at the center of the Egyptian state the reigning pharaoh embodied a divine power). It is obvious that this faith was being cultivated and fueled quite masterfully by the nomarchs and priests. Furthermore, ancient Romans believed in the flawlessness of their own laws and state system – they were convinced that the Roman Empire represented the pinnacle of civilization and civility. Accordingly, they "felt free" to use the gladius and pilum[1] to provide some "culture" to all those "barbarians" – in doing so, they did, however, not scruple to engage in depredation of the latter's lands. In a similar fashion, the medieval spiritual orders of knighthood

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[1] The gladius was a short Roman sword. It may have been adopted from the ancient Spaniards. The gladius became part of the Romans' military arsenal in the third century BC. It was a symbol of quality, efficiency, and lethality, and was matchless in tight close combat (which Roman legionaries mainly relied upon). The pilum was a short Roman javelin. It was a common arm of the Roman infantryman since the second century BC. Just like the gladius, the pilum was a symbol of the unshakeable might of the Roman army.

acted in the name of Christianity when they were advancing the kingdom of Christ among the "barbarians" by fire and sword.

In the course of time, the government's methods and forms of ideological work on boosting the morale were becoming, on one hand, increasingly more sophisticated (in terms of the tools employed) and, on the other hand, more primitive (in terms of conceptual content), as they were intended for a broad little-educated "target audience". The best example of this is ideological work carried out by several totalitarian-authoritarian states during the 1930–1940s (the USSR, the Third Reich, Italy, and Japan), with 'Goebbels's propaganda' even becoming a household term, coming to symbolize barefaced lying and a focus on appealing to base instincts.

A sort of "practice" before the world wars of the first half of the 20th century was the Russo-Japanese War, and that is not only in terms of organizational, technical, and technological means of waging warfare but in terms of ideology as well. This paper attempts to explore some of the key technologies, methods, forms, and outcomes of Russian military propaganda during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905.

2. Materials and methods

The work relies upon a set of relevant sources, a body of relevant statistics, and some relevant scholarly literature. One of the key sources employed in writing this paper is 'Illustrated Chronicle of the Russo-Japanese War', published in Saint Petersburg between 1904 and 1905. The document was produced practically in real time – information was entered into the chronicle within months or even weeks of an event occurring, which suggests that it contains only fact-based material. This appears to be one of the chronicle's incontestable benefits, as it can hardly be regarded as overly pretentious from an ideological standpoint. However, there is a lot of information, like that related to Russian soldiers, sailors, and officers who returned from captivity, that did not make it into the chronicle, which may somewhat distort the truth of the events described in the document. Another plus of the source is that it provides meticulous coverage of the statutory framework and offers numerous illustrations (Letopis', 1904; Letopis', 1905).

The chronicle was apparently intended for the educated portion of the population, and, save for a few propaganda phrases like "attacked the ships at Chemulpo in a rapacious manner" (Letopis', 1904a: 85), was quite refined. Compared with the period's newspapers, many of which abounded in all sorts of caricatures on the military subject, the chronicle had very few illustrations of this kind in it. Therefore, it will not be an exaggeration to state that this particular source, which has been considered a definitive authority on the subject by many a serious researcher of the Russo-Japanese War, does not actually reflect the real scale of the period's ideological warfare. It should also be noted that the chronicle contains a few minor factual errors. For example, there is an illustration that actually depicts the armored cruiser Rurik, not Rossia (Letopis', 1904b: 19). That being said, inaccuracies like these are hardly something major. In fact, the above inaccuracy could well have been just a typo.

The first "ideological" tool employed in the Russo-Japanese War must have been Nicholas II's "address to the nation" – the Highest Manifesto, in which the emperor announced the start of military action, did not forget to mention the treacherous Japanese attack on the Russian Navy in Port Arthur, carried out without a formal declaration of war, and asserted a firm commitment on the part of all loyal subjects to "rising as one in defense of the Motherland" (Letopis', 1904: 6). Given the document's level, it contains no offensive, pejorative undertones. Yet, its ideological underpinning is quite obvious – judging by its content, the manifesto appears to be oriented toward, above all, the officers, i.e. Russia's military elite.

The more objective picture may be provided by the period's newspapers and magazines, i.e. its most mass-produced information products. This specific type of periodical publications would serve as a primary vehicle for the period's fierce military-political propaganda. In 1904, the newspapers Russkoe Slovo, Novoe Vremya, Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik, Russkii Listok, Niva, Moskovskii Listok, and a few others would virtually compete in propaganda, with each oriented toward an audience of its own, whose intellectual-cultural level is what the "quality" of the ideological instrumentarium depended on. Another major propaganda vehicle at the time was luboks, inexpensive popular prints sold in the form of postcards or posters, which would become a sort of symbol of Russo-Japanese War propaganda.

3. Discussion

There has been quite a paucity of research into military propaganda during the Russo-Japanese War. A noteworthy work on the subject is D.V. Liventsev's 'Military Propaganda during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905'. The book covers the period's military propaganda in a somewhat diffuse, if not mediated, fashion. The author tends to "digress" onto other loosely related topics, like the overall sentiment within the Russian army and navy, the use of disinformation, the hardships of war and the ordeal of prisoners of war, the Russian Empire's unpreparedness for the war, the rivalry between opposing groups of high-ranking officers in the army and navy, etc. (Liventsev, 2012). Among other things, the work cites the extended abstract of a dissertation by A.O. Buranok (Buranok, 2009), devoted to information support for the Russo-Japanese War in a province (through the example of Samara Governorate). A.O. Buranok, in turn, likewise devotes a large portion of his dissertation to discussing various "contiguous" issues related to the Russo-Japanese War.

It may be stated in defense of D.V. Liventsev that the scholar (and the author of the present work too for that matter) is faced with a known problem – the obviousness and primitive content of the ideological instrumentarium employed, which can be summed up in just a few points, while to just cite and analyze a set of known (and reliably confirmed) propaganda posters and illustrations is a task that most historians may find to be quite thankless and uninteresting. This specific fact may explain the lack of fundamental works on the issue of military propaganda in the Russo-Japanese War. Indeed, during that war, which was quite short, the ideological instrumentarium did practically not change – compared with, say, World War II, when, as mainly applied to the USSR, the tools varied quite significantly in conceptual and objective content across all of the key periods: the pre-war, start of the war, middle of the war, and end of the war timeframes.

Therefore, one can hardly regard as a fundamental study of propaganda in the Russo-Japanese War the work of A.E. Kulanov and V.E. Molodyakov 'Russia and Japan: Image Wars', in which the subject is analyzed in quite a mediated fashion (Kulanov, Molodyakov, 2007). The same is the case with E.S. Senyavskaya's 'Russia's Opponents in the 20th century: The Evolution of the Image of the Enemy in the Consciousness of the Army and Society', quite an interesting integrated fundamental work (Senyavskaya, 2006), which, however, covers the subject only contextually.

It is also worth noting that most related materials available on various history-related forums on the Internet are mainly about just sharing all kinds of propaganda popular prints and talking points that were common back in the pre-revolutionary era.

Elsewhere, the subject has been investigated by a number of pre-revolutionary (Semenov, 1906; Semenov, 1907; Semenov, 1910; Semenov, 1911; Khudyakov, 1908; Klado, 1905), Soviet (Sorokin, 1956; Novikov-Priboi, 1977; Stepanov, 1983), and contemporary (Koktsinskii, 2002) researchers.

4. Results

The first ideological tool employed at the war's outset must have been the above manifesto of Nicholas II, which announced the start of the war with Japan. It is no wonder that the manifesto is written in quite a tactful form, as befits a "highest" statutory document. Yet, the emperor does not fail to mention the opponent's treacherous attack, carried out with no official declaration of war: "without providing advance notice of its intention to sever our [diplomatic] relations by way of commencing military action against us, Japan ordered its destroyers to launch a surprise attack on our fleet in the outer harbor of Port Arthur" (Letopis', 1904a: 6). Subsequently, the emperor communicates to his subjects a call to military action and seeks to inspire them: "In announcing our decision to do so, we reaffirm our unwavering faith in the assistance of Almighty God and our firm commitment to rising as one in defense of the Motherland and ask for God's blessing on the valiant personnel of our army and navy" (Letopis', 1904a: 6). Note that even the emperor's manifesto contains undertones of "shapkozakidatel'stvo"[1], which appears to have been typical of

[1] Derived from the phrase 'zakidat' shapkami' ('to beat someone by throwing a hat at them'), this facetious term was used as early as the first half of the 19th century by I.S. Turgenev (specifically, in his 'Three Portraits' (1846)). It means acting with a conceited and flippant attitude. There is little doubt that the phrase 'zakidat' shapkami' became idiomatic following the Russo-Japanese War specifically, coming to symbolize an attitude of acting as if victory were already in the bag. Another term that is apt in this context is

most of the Russian Empire's military top brass at the time. Worthy of note in this context is the role of the Far East governor himself, Admiral E.I. Alekseev, who had the reputation of Russia's top expert on the Japanese army and navy. Even Russia's top naval commanders, like S.O. Makarov, underestimated Japan's military might, which had increased sharply by the start of the war.

It is, perhaps, for this reason that from the very outset of hostilities propaganda luboks intended for a little-educated audience were imbued with a pronounced "victory-already-in-the-bag" attitude. Illustrations of this kind were printed in newspapers and magazines alike in the form of postcards and posters. In both scholarly (e.g., Leventsev, 2012) and popular literature this kind of popular prints are referred to as 'luboks' (derived from 'lub' – a special type of board on which pictures were printed), which is in alignment with pre-revolutionary tradition, although luboks would ultimately tend to be printed on paper.

A few words will now be said about some of the most famous of these luboks. One of the first and most famous popular prints was the poster 'Vasya Flotskii' ('Vasily the Navy Man') (Figure 1). It depicts a Russian sailor, wearing a pair of trendy shoes and smoking a pipe, who is sitting on a fortress and is shooting back at the Japanese Navy. Calm and with an ironic smile on his face, the sailor is throwing shells over his shoulder at the enemy, similar to someone playing with small rocks on the beach, while watching the "horseplay" of his opponents: a Japanese "puppeteer" admiral who is trying to manage some ships, a fat British military industrialist who is watching the battle with greed in his eyes, and a lanky American politician who is looking to "step" on yet another Pacific island. Behind the sailor, a little way away, there is sitting a Russian infantryman who is smoking a pipe in the same, calm, manner.

Fig. 1. Propaganda poster entitled 'Vasya Flotskii' ('Vasily the Navy Man')

'golovotyapstvo', employed by M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin in his works 'The History of a Town' (1869) and 'Letters to My Aunt' (1882), which means 'being incompetent, irrational, and negligent in performing one's duties'. The term is formed from 'golova' ('head') and 'tyapat'' ('to hit') – i.e. it implies a person who tends to hit their head against various objects due to carelessness.

The poster employs a special propaganda method for covering reality – the "exactly the other way round" technique, whereby facts are presented in upside-down form. The real story is that it is the calmness of Admiral O.V. Stark, who failed to take appropriate measures to protect the ships, that led to an attack on the First Pacific Squadron resulting in two of the Russian fleet's more powerful ships, Tsesarevich and Retvizan, being taken out of action (the sinking of the third ship, the protected cruiser Pallada, seems like "peanuts" compared to this). Only thanks to the crew's ability to provide a competent and efficient response, as well as by a stroke of luck, two of the Russians' top battleships did not sink. What is more, they would later display their true worth in the Battle of the Yellow Sea.

Fig. 2. Propaganda poster entitled 'The Sailors' Battle Song'

Another famous propaganda item is the poster 'The Sailors' Battle Song' (Figure 2). It depicts a Russian sailor (who seems to represent the battleship Retvizan) with a Cross of Saint George on his chest who is protruding from a ship's front section and, with a smile on his face, dealing a Japanese "ship sailor" a blow, knocking some of his teeth out.

The posters' content clearly suggests what the target audience is – peasants and workers, as in both illustrations the protagonists are not officers, i.e. someone from the noble estate, but "regular" soldiers and sailors.

Fig. 3. Propaganda poster entitled 'The Don Cossacks' Battle Song'

Propaganda did not, of course, pass the land forces by. The poster 'The Don Cossacks' Battle Song' depicts a Don Cossack who is punishing a Japanese infantryman with a whip as if he were a lazy student. This is happening against the backdrop of the Port Arthur fortress, with an American and a Chinese watching the scene.

Fig. 4. Propaganda poster entitled 'Japanese Victory'

What appears to be the most eloquent poster reflecting the "victory-already-in-the-bag" sentiment in Russian society is 'Japanese Victory' (Figure 4). It depicts a fluttering Russian flag, with the word 'Tokyo' written on it, on an island surrounded by a slew of sunken Japanese ships. Sitting on the island are two beaten members of the Japanese leadership – Prime Minister H. Ito and Admiral H. Togo, the man in charge of the fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy (what is depicted in the caricature is actually quite far from reality). They are being consoled by an "American" and a "Brit", respectively. The main character here is a Russian officer who is using some finger-flicking and blowing to send a flying Japanese soldier onto the island. At a distance, a "Korean" and a "Chinese" are watching the scene in a terrified manner. Evidently, it was not until the Russian army and navy sustained heavy defeats that the government would stop assuring society of Russia being "destined" for victory!

In addition to the pictures, each of the posters comes with prankish jaunty verse songs of a patriotic and derogatory-ironic nature, which were to help "reinforce" the material's propaganda effect on those who could read.

To conclude the examination of the period's lubok caricatures, it is also worth touching upon posters with a direct focus on inspiring a sense of national self-esteem, which openly promoted chauvinism, propagandizing the national-cultural superiority of the Russian people over the Japanese. Take for example the poster 'Our Women and Their Women' (Figure 5).

Fig. 5. Propaganda poster entitled 'Our Women and Their Women'

The illustration is split diagonally into two halves. The upper right half depicts a "woman" (as it says underneath) – a Russian nurse who is pouring some medicine into a glass. The bottom left half depicts a "broad" – a lady who is coquetting with a Japanese sailor. She is pouring him some liquor. It, however, is quite superfluous to state here that what is portrayed in the drawing was totally misaligned with Japanese mentality and cultural traditions. Promoting chauvinism and cultivating disrespect for the opponent at a national level must have been the only objectives pursued through the poster. Considering that back then Russian peasants and workers did not really know much about Japanese culture, posters of this kind were doing their ideological job pretty well.

Below is an analysis of the instrumentarium that was more "ideological".

The illustrated chronicle of the Russo-Japanese War, unlike the period's "mass-production" newspapers and popular prints, was written in a highly restrained and tactful form, with a pronounced reliance on verifiable facts. However, even the chronicle was not "free from ideology". For example, in the work's very first page there is an illustration depicting Saint George piercing an Oriental dragon serpent with pronounced Asian facial features! (Letopis', 1904a: 3)

What is definitely worthy of note is the large number of inaccuracies in the period's propaganda materials, which, however, seemed to always be there for the benefit of the Russian army – and may, therefore, be regarded as a sort of ideological tool too. In particular, the chronicle tells us about the "sinking" of the Japanese second-class protected cruiser Takachiho in the Battle of Chemulpo Bay (Letopis', 1904a: 91), having eagerly bought into a report by a "tale-teller" named V.F. Rudnev. One by no means must downgrade the heroism displayed by First-Rank Captain

Rudnev in particular and the crews of the cruiser Varyag and gunboat Korietz as a whole, who had entered an inherently hopeless battle facing an opponent with an overwhelmingly larger crew – these men chose to die in battle with honor rather than submit to the enemy in shame. What excuses the "chroniclers" is that the above report was the only information that was available to them at the time of writing the document. The Japanese were doing their best to conceal their losses. Even the sinking of the battleship Yashima, which struck a mine off Port Arthur on May 15, 1904 and later sank on its way to Japan, became known to the wider public only subsequent to the Battle of Tsushima.

The chronicle did, however, distort some obvious facts too – and it, obviously, did so for propaganda purposes. For example, speaking of the same battle at Chemulpo, it asserts that Rudnev deliberately refused to exploit the dark and his ship's superiority in speed, which he could have done to leave the harbor at night, and instead heroically confronted the enemy at daytime in company with the slow Korietz (Letopis', 1904a: 90). However, in reality, it was hardly possible to do something like that at night, for, based on pre-war reports from none other than Rudnev himself, due to mechanical problems Varyag was not capable of developing a speed of more than 14 knots. It was either a deliberate distortion of facts or just mere incompetence on the part of the authors, who may have relied on "factory" figures for the cruiser's speed that were based on 12-hour tests conducted back in 1900 (23.2 knots) and have not been familiar with relevant reports. Couple this with the chroniclers' implausible lack of knowledge of the tactical situation, although there is a layout of Chemulpo Bay in the chronicle – its long and narrow channel was controlled by the Japanese destroyers, which even at nighttime could easily spot and torpedo any relatively large cruiser. This was perfectly understood by Rudnev, who deliberately led the ships into battle 15 minutes before the expiry of the surrender ultimatum issued by the Japanese, as hypothetically one had much better chances of inflicting more damage on the opponent at daytime. There seems to have been a deliberate distortion of facts for the sake of a "cute" propaganda maneuver.

The ideological instrumentarium was obviously a lot larger than what is discussed in this work. Nevertheless, an attempt is made to distinguish between "mass consumption" propaganda materials, intended for the illiterate portion of the population, and "intellectual" ones, intended for members of the intelligentsia. However, even the relatively small pool of materials that this work examines appears to be well capable of providing a general picture of military propaganda in the Russian Empire during the Russo-Japanese War.

5. Conclusion

In outline, the paper's key points are as follows:

1. In addition to the various scientific-technical achievements, the period of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 witnessed significant advances in ideological tools for waging warfare, with the target audience being, above all, the state's own subjects. Just as the case would be in the two subsequent world wars, these tools were being reproduced by mass media, which were emerging in a new industrial society.

2. The propaganda instrumentarium employed in the Russo-Japanese War was aimed at a clear-cut target audience. The period's official government documents (e.g., manifestos, chronicles, etc.) were written in quite a restrained and tactful form, as they were oriented toward an "intellectual" audience – members of the intelligentsia and the military leadership.

The period's military propaganda posters (referred to as 'luboks' due to similarities with primitive pictures with a simple plot printed on a special type of board), postcards, and illustrations in the nation's mass newspapers were, above all, oriented toward members of the lower estates – workers, peasants, and non-manual personnel (some would call this group 'raznochintsy'). This ideological instrumentarium was distinguished by primitivism, the presence of offensive undertones, a tendency to openly distort reality, and a tendency to arouse feelings of national superiority, cruelty, hatred, and chauvinism. Posters and postcards of this kind contained little text and were limited to short catchy phrases or had no text in them altogether.

3. The ideological work conducted by the government in the first months of the war was highly fruitful – it helped foster a patriotic sentiment among the public, with numerous volunteers rushing to join the army and navy. However, as the number of Russia's military failures rose, the scale of disappointment grew with the same vigor, with even the illiterate portion of the population, mainly workers and peasants, becoming convinced of the deceitfulness of most of the

propaganda materials. This would spark a revolutionary sentiment among the public, galvanizing the revolutionary element in Russian society. It is hard not to agree with the suggestion that, among other reasons, a decisive role in the outbreak of the Revolution of 1905–1907 was played by the nation's defeat in a "small victorious war". A major role in bringing about the drastic change in societal sentiment – from "hurrah-patriotism" to animosity toward the government – was also played by "unbridled" propaganda, which in the end would expose to society the lies of the nation's leadership in an equally illustrative way.

The defeat in the war had a particularly dispiriting effect on the Russian army's mid- and lower-ranking officers, whom it is in no way possible to reprove for being incompetent or cowardly. Eventually, Russian culture began to be dominated by melancholic trends, with sorrowful romance songs becoming increasingly popular among the masses, with even the emperor evincing a liking for the genre. Worthy of note is the fact that performer of "gloomy" Gypsy romance songs Varvara Panina, who was a favorite songstress with many Russian officers and Nicholas II himself, earned her popularity subsequent to the Russo-Japanese War specifically, which she did thanks to her talent and, most importantly, her repertoire. Furthermore, they would choose as the nation's defeatist "hymn" I.A. Shatrov's haunting waltz 'On the Hills of Manchuria'. With that said, a number of mid-ranking Russian officers who had gone through the "crucible" of the Russo-Japanese War would turn out to be psychologically tough enough to subsequently become prominent personalities radiating the glory of the Russian army (e.g., N.O. Essen and A.V. Kolchak).

4. Unfortunately, subsequently (i.e., during World War I) the government would fail to take account of the flaws of its ideological work during the Russo-Japanese War. Its propaganda would again be rampantly blatant and offensive toward the opponent, and, on top of that, its content would not be altered in alignment with the situation at the front. While poor propaganda may not have been the cause of the 1917 revolutions, it certainly did not help boost patriotic sentiment – that is for sure.

In this regard, worthy of note is the fact that subsequently the Soviet government would show quite a subtle understanding of both the positive and negative elements of its pre-revolutionary ideological work. During World War II, the toughest known trial for the Soviet state, USSR officials concerned with propaganda, including Joseph Stalin himself, would for the most part keep their "nose in the wind" – with a focus on modifying the ideological instrumentarium as required by the situation. While using the same pre-revolutionary methods of rough, primitive propaganda, intended primarily for the illiterate portion of the population, the Soviet government did not scruple to alter the style in which it addressed the nation – from offensive-ironic posters released at the very outset of the war (e.g., those portraying A. Hitler) to patriotic ones produced subsequent to the heavy defeats sustained between July and August of 1941 (e.g., 'The Motherland Calls!'), followed by those carrying a rough, offensive message again. Even Joseph Stalin began his speech of July 3, 1941 (his first speech following the outbreak of the war, i.e. an address delivered 11 days later!) with the words "brothers and sisters", something absolutely unimaginable in the second half of the 1930s.

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

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Weapons of Propagandists

Messenger Pigeons as a Propagandist's Weapon (the Case of World War I)

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Abstract

This paper addresses the use of messenger pigeons for intelligence and propaganda purposes during World War I. The author describes the mechanism underlying the use of messenger pigeons by France and England on the Western Front against Germany.

In putting this work together, the author drew upon various sources of private origin, including the reminiscences of Chief of the Intelligence Service of the German High Command Colonel Walter Nicolai. The author also made use of some narrowly specialized literature on the subject, including regulations dealing with the use of messenger pigeons in the army. The following methods were employed: (1) the chronological method (to examine the issue in the chronological order it developed in); (2) the comparative method (to compare the efforts of the participating nations in terms of the use of pigeon stations and pigeon post services); (3) the generalization method (to identify the common and distinctive features of the use of messenger pigeons during World War I for intelligence and propaganda purposes).

The author's conclusion is that by the start of World War I the opposing sides had amassed extensive experience in the use of pigeons for war purposes. During the military confrontation, the participating nations continued to explore pigeons' potential as messengers with a view to employing them further not only for prompt delivery of information but for intelligence and propaganda purposes as well. With that said, these practices were reported to be quite efficient at certain stages of the war.

Keywords: messenger pigeons, World War I, propaganda, intelligence, England, France, Russian Empire.

1. Introduction

By the start of World War I, pigeon post was already a tried-and-true source of communication for the army's needs. It is known to have been employed as far back as the fourth century BC by the army of Alexander the Great. Messenger pigeons were used by Roman Decimus Brutus during Mark Antony's siege of Mutina in 43 BC. Roman general Julius Caesar, too, employed messenger pigeons for the delivery of messages to Rome (Tseitlin, 1932).

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2. Materials and methods

In putting this work together, the author drew upon various sources of private origin, including the reminiscences of Chief of the Intelligence Service of the German High Command Colonel Walter Nicolai (Nicolai, 1923; Nicolai, 2005). The author also made use of some narrowly specialized literature on the subject, including regulations dealing with the use of messenger pigeons in the army (Pochtovoe golubevodstvo, 1901).

The following methods were employed: (1) the chronological method (to examine the issue in the chronological order it developed in); (2) the comparative method (to compare the efforts of the participating nations in terms of the use of pigeon stations and pigeon post services); (3) the generalization method (to identify the common and distinctive features of the use of messenger pigeons during World War I for intelligence and propaganda purposes).

3. Results

A key role in relation to the use of messenger pigeons (Figure 1) for military purposes was played by the events of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. During the war, the French army lacked an organized use of the field telegraph, whilst the Prussian army already had in place mobile field telegraph units. With that in mind, the use at the time by the French of a completely new means of communication to connect besieged Paris with the province and the rest of the world would generate great interest across Western Europe (Rekhnevskii, 1872: 258).

Subsequent to the Franco-Prussian War, the Russian General Staff initiated the setting up in the Russian Empire, in 1874, of a special organization that would be concerned with the raising and keeping of messenger pigeons (later on, a network of pigeon post stations would be organized across the country). However, the Russian pioneers of the use of messenger pigeons for military purposes were faced with substantial difficulties in their activity, as there was a shortage of special academic and instructional literature on pigeon breeding. That being said, there was a shortage of this kind of literature outside of Russia as well.



Fig. 1. Messenger pigeons

Russia's Military Department paid keen attention to the development of the nation's military pigeon post service. Note that up until World War I pigeons were viewed as a strategic means of communication over long distance. From stationary stations messenger pigeons covered an average distance of 300–500 km, and from mobile ones – 50–150 km. The other impressive tactical-technical capabilities of messenger pigeons included their ability to fly at an average height of 300 m and an average speed of 60–70 km/hr. It normally took two to three years to train a pigeon, subsequent to which it could be of reliable service to the owner for at least five years (Tovpeka, 2010: 79).

The subsequent development of the nation's military pigeon post service found reflection in 'Instructions for Military Pigeon Stations', ratified by Minister of War A.N. Kuropatkin on March 14, 1901.

Pigeonries were divided into permanent pigeon stations (base stations) and field (demountable) ones, i.e. stationary and mobile stations, respectively (Figure 2). A base military pigeonry was sited in a spot where it could be visible to the bird from its eye view, one where the pigeonry ideally would be safe from being hit by enemy artillery fire. Permanent pigeon stations would normally be built for 125 couples of pigeons, while, for ease of catching, a pigeonry's internal height would reach six to seven feet (1.8–2.1 m) (Pochtovoe golubevodstvo, 1901: 48-54).

Fig. 2. Mobile pigeon station

During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, they successfully ran at Port Arthur a military pigeon station that numbered 45 pigeons trained to travel to Liaoyang and 31 pigeons trained to travel over a bay to Zhifu. On February 22, 1904, the pigeons were taken from Port Arthur to the destination points for training, while those that arrived in Liaoyang were taken to the pigeonry of the Trans-Amur Frontier Guard (Tseitlin, 1926: 124).

During World War I, the opposing sides made active use of messenger pigeons for prompt delivery of information. However, during the war's final period, they were also employed by the English and the French for intelligence and propaganda purposes. Of interest in this context are the reminiscences of Chief of the Intelligence Service of the German High Command Colonel Walter Nicolai (Figure 3).

Fig. 3. Colonel W. Nicolai (1873–1947)

In 1917, the English and the French launched large numbers of messenger pigeons and hot-air balloons for intelligence purposes in the rear of the German front. Messenger pigeons were placed in couples in little baskets and were released from airplanes in small silk parachutes. The baskets contained some food, a set of detailed instructions on how to handle the pigeons, a questionnaire, a model message, some French money, and an appeal of the following kind:

"The Germans' resistance is weakening under pressure from the Allies, who have already liberated a part of French territory. To be able to continue their advancement, the Allies need to be informed as fully as possible about the enemy's whereabouts and its intentions. It is incumbent on you, good patriots who are currently amidst the enemy army, to help in this. Here are some means for this.

And if you feel you will have to risk your life in doing so, think of all those soldiers of the Allies who so chivalrously sacrificed their lives for the sake of liberating you. By delivering the information, you will do your country an invaluable favor, helping expedite the end of the war.

Upon reaching peace, we will be able to reward you for your actions, and you will always be proud of having acted as a good patriot" (Nicolai, 2005: 156-157).

In certain uninhabited areas in the rear of the German front, numerous baskets with dead messenger pigeons in them were found (63 baskets in December of 1917, 41 – in January of the war's last year, and 45 – in late May of the same year, with just one army in operation at the time) (Nicolai, 2005: 157). These figures represent just a small portion of all messenger pigeon baskets dropped during the war. Without question, most of them were not detected, and were used by the people. Flying messenger pigeons were spotted on a regular basis. As much as it is hard to hit a flying pigeon, eleven of them ended up being shot down. All of them had been carrying a military message under their wings. This useful system was enhanced by the opponent in 1918. The dropping was done not only from airplanes, as this was too noticeable, but also from a nifty dropping contraption on small hot-air balloons (five meters in diameter). These balloons had a wooden cross on them, with baskets with messenger pigeons attached on all four of its sides. In the middle of the cross, there was an alarm clock that was to automatically disconnect, after the passage of a certain amount of time, a set of small parachutes with messenger pigeon baskets attached, causing the emptying of the balloon. To avoid potential treachery problems associated with the balloon's envelope, each had the following inscription on it: "This is a German balloon, so it can be destroyed". Afterwards, the alarm clock was replaced with a burning fuse that was to cause the timely falling of the messenger pigeon baskets and then set the actual balloon on fire.

Each time they dropped a messenger pigeon basket, it was done for propaganda purposes as well. An appeal of this kind released in June of 1918 concluded with the following words: "The Germans are unable to overcome the might of the Allies. They cannot prevent us from beating them and destroying their vile nation, this enemy of humanity, once and for all" (Nicolai, 2005: 158).

This is how the German command learnt about the multiple outbursts of animosity toward the Germans and the resolve to fight all the way up to complete destruction of Germany.

It is clear that it had, therefore, to take a different approach from the one taken by German politicians back in their protected homeland, who believed in the possibility of reaching an agreement and treated this kind of proofs of the enemy's real disposition as exaggerations on the part of the military authorities.

Messenger pigeons were quite sensitive creatures, with most facing the threat of death should they not be found straightaway. With this in mind, one would additionally drop special hot-air balloons with messages in them. A balloon of this kind was 60 cm in diameter, and was made of special silk pale blue paper suitable for aerial use. It could be filled using any gas pipe. Most of the packages contained one to three folded balloons of the same kind and a detailed description of how to use them. Sometimes, one also enclosed special chemicals that could be used to prepare right on the spot some gas to fill a balloon. Compared with the messenger pigeon, the balloon had the downside that it could be used only when the wind was fair.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that one also supplied the population with wireless telegraph units, by dropping them in the rear of the German front. These were the latest transmitters manufactured by Marconi. Each had four accumulators, a four-volt dry battery, and a 30 m-long antenna, which could be used to send messages over a distance of 50 km. In addition to the regular contents, the packages also contained ciphering instructions. German field radio stations reported more than once that there had possibly been in operation some small stations sending messages through the air. That being said, while dropped units had been found more than once, a working one had never been detected.

Despite the great danger facing the civilian residents of France's occupied areas, their own command urged them to engage in espionage activity by way of appeals of the following kind:

"Your attention, please!

Are you a real patriot of your land? You are willing to help the Allies drive the enemy out, aren't you?

If you are, then take this package, sneak it to your place, open it at night when you're alone, and just follow the instructions provided therein.

If you are being watched, do not pick it up. Memorize the spot, and pick it up at night. Destroy the parachute as soon as possible, as it will be of no use to you anymore.

If you do everything as directed, you will be acting as a good patriot, doing the Allies an invaluable favor, and helping bring victory closer.

Patience and courage!

All hail France! All hail Belgium! All hail the Allies!

Pro patria! To help expedite the absolute liberation of the fatherland, please take the time to fill out the questionnaire provided. Ask your faithful companions for help if something on the questionnaire is unclear to you. To establish your identity, please provide the name and address of two persons in unoccupied France. This will help find you after it is all over and reward you.

The heart of each and every French and Belgian soldier is with you. Provide them with your support in their efforts and show them once more that the oppressed are no less courageous than they are. All hail the Allies!" (Nicolai, 2005: 159).

Starting in late December of 1917, the opponent dared to drop messenger pigeon baskets and hot-air balloons both in Alsace and in German Lorraine, with the following appeals in French provided:

"To all Lotharingian patriots!

Through communicating the information provided below, you will be doing everyone an invaluable favor by expediting the end of the war. France will reward you after the war is over, and you will be proud of having acted as a good patriot" (Nicolai, 2005: 160).

The enemy organized not only air espionage but air propaganda as well. Up to 1916, the spreading of newspapers and leaflets in French and German, designed to stir the pulses and quicken the blood of the people in occupied areas and depress the morale of the enemy, was done by aviators exclusively. Since the high command viewed these actions as something that was not part of military operations and dealt accordingly with captured aviators who were guilty of dropping propaganda literature, special hot-air balloons were put in place in lieu of aviators. They were built similar to balloons designed for dropping intelligence-related packages. Balloons could cover greater distances, the figure reaching 600 km by the end of the war. Consequently, a balloon of this kind could reach as far as Germany, and normally ended up in its northeastern industrial part. Each balloon carried up to 400 newspapers. The dropping process involved releasing small packages via a burning fuse that was to burn out the supporting thread. For the populations of Belgium and France they mainly dropped new French newspapers, falsified issues of The Gazette of the Ardennes, as well as special aerial newspapers, like La Voix du Pays and Courrier de l'Air. The aerial newspapers intended for the German troops contained calls for defection, strikes, and a revolution. The falsified issues of German newspapers portrayed the situation back home in an exciting light. The use of falsified letters by German prisoners of war in both France and England, as well as the portraying of the treatment of German prisoners of war in both countries as good, was all done to induce German soldiers to desert, with illustrations of the good treatment of German prisoners intended to corrupt the German troops (Nicolai, 2005: 161).

4. Conclusion

By the start of World War I, the opposing sides had amassed extensive experience in the use of pigeons for war purposes. During the military confrontation, the participating nations continued to explore pigeons' potential as messengers with a view to employing them further not only for prompt delivery of information but for intelligence and propaganda purposes as well. With that said, these practices were reported to be quite efficient at certain stages of the war.

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

Propaganda Ammunition (Based on the Experience of World War I and World War II)

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Abstract

The article is dedicated to the use of propaganda ammunition by the warring parties during World War I and World War II. Attention is paid to the means of ammunition delivery to the enemy's positions, as well as performance characteristics of the ammunition used.

We used specialized scientific and technical literature on the issue of military propaganda and methods of the propaganda sources delivery as materials. Methodology of the study is based on the main principles of historicism, objectivity and chronological sequence. The principle of objectivity allowed us to disengage ourselves from stereotype opinions, assessments and thinking, and thanks to the chronological principle we were able to build up the study in its chronological sequence.

In the conclusion, the author notes that the experience of using propaganda materials during World War I has shown that efficient delivery of propaganda sources to the enemy's deployment sites can play a significant role in orchestrating the desired psychological effect on the enemy. Keeping this in mind, in the period prior to the World War II, different countries were developing propaganda ammunitions delivered by air and ground transport. During World War II, further development of propaganda ammunitions was taking into account the military hardware technical development. As a result of this confrontation, a range of means for the delivery of propaganda materials was determined, and firing leaflets charged into the missile of a caliber of more than 122 mm was considered inefficient.

Keywords: agitation, propaganda, weapons, World War I, World War II, propaganda ammunition.

1. Introduction

During World War I, the main trendsetter of the new methods of waging propaganda war was Great Britain. It was this country that developed the first propaganda missile in 1918. Agitation grenades, mortar ammunitions, air bombs and other means of the propaganda materials delivery were subsequently designed and tested. This is what our article speaks about.

2. Materials and methods

We used specialized scientific and technical literature on the issue of military propaganda and methods of the propaganda sources delivery as materials. We also used reference literature (e.g. Tekhnicheskaya Entsiklopediya, 1927).

Methodology of the study is based on the main principles of historicism, objectivity and chronological sequence. The principle of objectivity allowed us to disengage ourselves from stereotype opinions, assessments and thinking, and thanks to the chronological principle we were able to build up the study in its chronological sequence.

3. Results

It is important to understand at once that propaganda ammunition is a special purpose ammunition. It is designed to scatter (cover the ground with) propaganda materials (usually leaflets) across the territory controlled by the enemy. These ammunitions have no specific destructive power, but large fragments of such ammunitions can pose a danger to buildings, equipment and people.

Yet in 1927, Volume 1 of Tekhnicheskaya Entsiklopediya was noting that the propaganda missile was intended to disseminate propaganda leaflets among enemy troops by means of gunshots. The missile was not intended to damage the enemy with shrapnel, so it was designed to produce the smallest number of fragments and parts that could injure people. Leaflets were inserted through the bottom part of the missile that could fit 1.0 to 1.4 kg. After the shot, during the flight of the missile, at a certain height the distant tube fire was spreading to the powder chamber where the bursting charge was exploding; the resulting gases were pressing the diaphragm thus knocking out the missile's load along with its bottom. The leaflets were thrown back, unfolding in the air in the shape of a cloud of 25 to 60 meters in cross-section, spinning by inertia, scattering in separate sheets, depending on the wind direction. Having fallen down, the leaflets formed a narrow strip on the ground in the wind direction, 300 to 600 meters long (Tekhnicheskaya Entsiklopediya, 1927: 285-286).



Fig. 1. Propaganda missile and the mechanism of its use

Propaganda ammunition was divided into certain groups depending on the delivery method: by air (aircrafts, balloons) and by ground transport (artillery, mortars). Let's look at each delivery method separately.

Air Delivery

Towards theend of World War I, covering the ground with leaflets in the enemy's territory was used on a large scale with the help of balloons. In his military report called "Air Propaganda Propagation Methods", dated March 12, 1918, Captain Mitchell (France) emphasized that although the balloons could only deliver 1 kg of propaganda material each, it was a very efficient means of demoralizing the enemy (Stepanov, 2010: 52).

It should be understood that Germany also used agitation balloons with a shell volume of 12.5 m^3. The weight of printed materials for such balloons was up to 5 kg (2.5 thousand leaflets of the A5 format), the height of the balloon flight was 5 thousand meters, the distance it could cover was 300 km. In 1918, the United States were regularly launching balloons charged with propaganda materials into the enemy's territory. The scale of U.S. propaganda is evidenced by the fact that in three months of air battles they disseminated more than 3 million leaflets (Stepanov, 2010: 53).

After the end of World War I, the Soviet Union developed a propaganda aircraft called "Maxim Gorky" that had its own printing facilities onboard. So, it was possible to produce propaganda products during the flight. However, the aircraft crashed during the official test and the project was closed down (Katorin, 2017: 117-123).

By the beginning of World War II, there were two main means of airdropping propaganda materials: from balloons and from aircrafts. Let's look at these dissemination means.

Balloons As a Means of Disseminating Printed Information

During World War II, the British Defense Department organized an active subversive propaganda work against Germany. With the war outbreak, the British launched 60 balloons with leaflets, proclamations, newspaper circulations where the policy of the Third Reich was exposed. One of the leaflets dropped on the Germans said: "In this war, we are not fighting against you, the Germans; we are fighting against tyranny and a regime that betrays not only its own people, but also the entire Western culture and all that is dear to you and us... God is with the right cause!" (Stepanov, 2010: 54).

Propaganda materials were delivered to the enemy's territory with the help of a regular balloon that was able to make unmanned flights with a disposable load to the distances of more than 1,000 km. However, these agitation balloons, due to the lack of accurate information about high-altitude air flows, were often delivering leaflets to the wrong destination. Designed to bring moral and psychological pressure to bear upon the German troops, British balloons were sometimes found in neutral Switzerland or were dropping proclamations in German on Italy or Spain. Only 60 % of the balloons launched in the direction of Germany actually reached their destination (Stepanov, 2010: 54).

In order to improve the leaflets' airdropping quality, a J-100 leaflet container was developed. It was designed for use in the unmanned balloons flying up to 500 km away. Its operational principle was simple. Consistently moving along the air zones with different pressures, the gas in the balloon shell was expanding and eventually tearing the band linked to it, releasing a disposable load from the container. The maximum load for the J-100 container was about 3 kg. Other J-9-10-300-type balloon-container systems were able to fly with a load of leaflets (about 5 kg) at a distance of 500 to 1.2 thousand km (Stepanov, 2010: 54).

Later, the British created balloon-container systems of series 170 and 180 to flood the enemy's territory with leaflets at a distance of 3,000 km from the launching point. The disposable load of such a device was 40 kg (Stepanov, 2010: 55).

In 1933, Japan also began creating unmanned balloons for military purposes. Thus, in 1937 to 1941, the Japanese launched several test balloons in the direction of the USSR. In 1942, the concept of using agitation balloons as well as bomber balloons over long distances entered the stage of practical implementation, taking into account natural meteorological factors.

In order to carry out high-altitude long-range raids, gas balloons with a shell volume of 120 m^3 were mass-produced in Japan. Balloons were launched in groups. Most of these balloons were carrying shrapnel bombs, sometimes the group included several leaflet balloons. In just five months, the number of leaflets sent across the ocean exceeded 10 thousand copies. However, from November 1944 to March 1945, the Japanese were launching mainly bombs in the direction of the U.S., using almost no leaflets (Stepanov, 2010: 55).

Aircrafts As a Means of Disseminating Printed Information

Prior to the outbreak of World War II, the tactic of airdropping leaflets from a low height directly above the enemy's deployment sites was used in the air delivery of propaganda materials in different countries of the world. During World War II, airdropping of leaflets from a low height proved inefficient due to the ground-based counter-effort. For example, this is what Soviet propagandists had to face near Stalingrad in 1942. Near Stalingrad, any attempts at airdropping leaflets from the Soviet planes at low height often ended with the loss of both the machine and the crew, as the Germans were attacking the "agitators" using all kinds of weapons. And the leaflets dropped from a high altitude were carried far away along the Volga steppes. As a result, the solution to this problem required an intervention of the designers and armorers. On the instructions of the Head of the Special Propaganda Department of the General Political Administration of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, they were required to construct a propaganda air bomb. And taking into account all of the shortcomings of the propaganda ammunitions, when metal shrapnel was falling on soldiers' heads in addition to leaflets, the air bomb was made mainly of wood (Pyr'ev, Reznichenko, 2001: 244).

Weight of the agitation bomb, made in the dimensions of a 100-kg high-explosive bomb, did not exceed 20 kg, but it received the name AGB-100-30. The plywood front and the rear conical parts were fastened to the central cylindrical part with nails and twine. A metal sleeve was installed in the head part to fasten the tail of the distance tube. From that metal sleeve to the tail inside the air bomb, a tube with the additional powder pellet was installed, ensuring the bomb body's opening at a given height. The AGB was loaded with rolled leaflets, each roll was weighing 2.7 to 3.2 kg. Basically, these were the leaflets of format (Pyr'ev, Reznichenko, 2001: 244).

The AGB-100-30 was used both in external and internal bomb-release units. When the air bomb was dropped, the distance tube was activated, the front and rear cones were knocked out by the pellet, tearing the twine, and the plywood cylindrical part made of flat sheet was unfolding, releasing the ammunition contents.

Summer and full calm were considered to be the most favorable conditions for the use of AGB. Then the height of bombs' unpacking could be 500 meters, and the area covered with leaflets was the most wide-reaching. In windy weather or with rising air flows, the unpacking of propaganda ammunitions had been organized at altitudes of 50 meters and up (Pyr'ev, Reznichenko, 2001: 244).

The use of aviation for propaganda activities was carried out almost throughout the war by all the warring parties. Even in the autumn of 1944, Germany allocated aviation for these activities, for example during the East Scorpio Operation (Nesterenko, 2015: 117-118).

Ground-Based Delivery of Propaganda Ammunitions

By the beginning of World War II, almost all the main parties to the confrontation had developed propaganda missiles of different calibers, 75 to 155 mm. However, the Soviet Union took this matter a step further when agitation missiles for 305-mm guns were developed. There is information that such missiles were used near Sevastopol, but not for the intended purpose. Soviet artillerymen were stuffing them with sand instead of leaflets and firing at the German infantry.

The propaganda missile principle was very close to one of the propaganda bomb. Propaganda ammunition for guns and mortars had thin glass-like walls with a base plug. Bursting charge and the leaflet rolls were placed inside it. The distance tube was installed in such a way as to make the charge explode at an altitude of 100 to 150 meters. The thread was overturned, the rolls were thrown out, disseminating thanks to the centrifugal force.

Most often the propaganda artillery was used by Soviet troops. But there were certain downsides in that. Thus, when the gun was fired, it was getting exposed, so it was important to keep in mind that there is the counter-battery artillery fire. A single gun was not enough for the mass dissemination of leaflets, so as a rule, a battery or an artillery division was used at once. The result was of dubious efficiency, and the artillery position was exposed. There were also other drawbacks. Propaganda ammunitions were delivered by the BM-13 volley fire rocket systems. However, after the propaganda missile explosion, the 17-kilogram engine body with fin assembly was also falling on the trenches (Pyr'ev, Reznichenko, 2001: 244).

In the case of Germany, they used artillery more often compared to aircrafts to disseminate propaganda materials.

Since the end of World War II, the experience of using agitation ammunition has been thoroughly analyzed and the agitation materials delivery means have been improved.

So, the means of delivery that are in service with the Western countries became as follows:

Air bomb for leaflets delivery. Its empty weight is 52 kg, equipped weight is 100 kg. Its capacity is up to 30 thousand A4 leaflets. And the delivery distance is up to 500 km.

Balloons. Manufactured from paper, rubber or polyethylene and filled with light gas (usually helium, less often hydrogen). Carry a disposable load of up to 9 kg of printed products. And the delivery distance is up to 2.4 thousand km.

Unmanned aircrafts. They are able to deliver with high accuracy 50 to 100 kg of leaflets in a special head part or in outer suspension containers for a range of up to 150-200 km.

Special aviation container for leaflets delivery. Manufactured in the field from standard cardboard boxes for the leaflets airdropping from aircrafts and helicopters of military transport aviation. Capacity of up to 50 kg of propaganda materials (20 to 40 thousand leaflets).

Artillery 122-mm propaganda missile for self-propelled and towed artillery mounts. The missile's total weight is 21.5 kg. It can hold 0.8 kg of agitation materials (up to 400 leaflets). Coverage at a height of 100 to 150 meters and wind speeds of up to 3 m/s reaches 2.4 to 4.9 sq.km. (Krys'ko, 1999: 75-76).

The delivery means in service with the countries of the East included:

Agitation air bomb. It uses the body of a 500-kilogram high-explosive bomb and is designed for precision airdropping of printed materials when bombed from a height of 150 to 500 meters at a speed of up to 1,500 km/h and from a height of 700 to 2,500 meters at a flight speed of up to 3,000 km/h.

It is dropped from aircrafts of various types, capable of carrying up to 12 agitation bombs or more. The loaded bomb is 298 to 306 kg. The printed materials weight is 68 to 75 kg, i.e. up to 35 thousands of leaflets. It allows covering the front area from 450 to 1,850 meters long from the bomb opening height of 300 to 400 meters and at wind speed from 0 to 8 m/s, to the distance of 1,000 to 6,000 meters.

Agitation balloon. The shell volume is 12.5 cubic meters, weight of printed materials is up to 5 kg (2.5 thousand A4 leaflets). The balloon can fly at the height of up to 5 thousand meters. The flight range is up to 300 km.

122-mm rocket with agitation head part. The number of guides on the combat unit is 36 to 40. The missile's total weight is 56 plus 1 kg. Weight of the head part is 17 kg. The rocket can hold 1.5 kg of agitation materials (up to 750 leaflets). The maximum range is 15.58 km. The coverage area is 1 to 2.35 sq. km.

82-mm mortar rounds with six-vaned mortar bomb. The maximum range is 3 km. The capacity is 350 grams (175 leaflets).

Agitation parachute container. It is designed for single or serial precision airdropping of printed materials from a height of 400 to 1,000 meters at flight speeds of up to 700 km/h. It is a disassembled metal container with a parachute and an automatic remote device for its opening at a given height. The weight of containers in the loaded mode is 100+10 kg, the weight of printed materials is 70+10 kg (30 to 35 thousand leaflets). The optimum opening height is 300 to 600 meters. When a container bearing leaflets of any format is dropped from the aircraft, the coverage area is 100 to 180 meters wide and 1,000-1,500 meters long (Krys'ko, 1999: 76-77).

4. Conclusion

The experience of using propaganda materials during World War I has shown that the efficient delivery of propaganda sources to the enemy's deployment sites can play a significant role in orchestrating the desired psychological effect on the enemy. Keeping this in mind, in the period prior to the World War II, different countries were developing propaganda ammunitions delivered by air and ground transport. During World War II, further development of propaganda ammunitions was taking into account the military hardware technical development. As a result of this confrontation, a range of means for the delivery of propaganda materials was determined, and firing leaflets charged into the missile of a caliber of more than 122 mm was considered inefficient.

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